Terraforming Warfare and International Law

[Dr Saeed Bagheri is Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in International Law at the University of Reading School of Law. His research focuses on the law on the use of force and international humanitarian law.

Gerhard Kemp is Professor of Criminal Law at UWE Bristol in the United Kingdom, with his research focusing on international criminal law, comparative criminal law, and transitional justice.]

The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has recognised in its Policy on Addressing Environmental Damage Through the Rome Statute (which was launched in December 2025) that ecological damage can be a significant factor in the various ICC crimes (war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and the crime of aggression). The challenge is to turn this acknowledgement into effective prosecutorial actions. As Maud Sarliève and Pauline Martini noted, the OTP Policy:

“represents a significant development in international criminal law (ICL), clarifying that environmental destruction may lead to criminal accountability for individuals, and not to merely regulatory sanctions or civil liability”.

International humanitarian law (IHL) and international criminal law (ICL) have long struggled to account for environmental destruction during armed conflict. Environmental harm has been doctrinally marginalised, treated as secondary to civilian casualties or property damage, and constrained by legal thresholds that are rarely operationalised in practice. At the same time, debates on “ecocide” and other ecocentric crimes remain largely prospective, with limited traction in existing accountability mechanisms. These limitations are starkly illustrated by the ongoing hostilities in Gaza, where environmental harm has reached levels that far exceed what international law typically treats as incidental collateral damage. Building on our recent article in the Journal of International Criminal Justice, this post presents a conceptually grounded assessment of the Gaza situation, relevant to similar cases of what we call “terraforming warfare” . We argue that the Gaza conflict exposes a critical accountability gap: international law lacks an adequate conceptual and legal framework for addressing systematic, landscape-altering environmental destruction as a method of warfare. To address this gap, we propose the concept of terraforming warfare, understood as forms of hostilities that intentionally transform the natural and built environment in ways that undermine long-term civilian life. While this anthropocentric (as opposed to ecocentric) framing can certainly be critiqued, we contend it is normatively defensible and realistic. Indeed, when properly interpreted, current IHL and ICL legal standards, especially those concerning war crimes related to environmental damage, are applicable to such conduct and ought to be enforced, even in the absence of a specific crime of ecocide. The OTP Policy on Environmental Crimes articulates this anthropocentric yet realistic view on how best to approach crimes that affect the environment and, by extension, human existence. The Policy recognises that environmental protection has inherent value. Regarding criminal liability for environmental harm, it states:

“There are significant synergies between the fight against impunity for international crimes and preventing environmental damage. Destroying, degrading, or polluting the natural environment will often directly impact humans, such as by causing people to be displaced, inflicting great suffering or injury on victims, or even causing death. If a causal link can be established between a perpetrator’s intentional actions and an objective element of a Rome Statute crime, those acts may constitute Rome Statute crimes both during armed conflict and in times of peace.”

We submit that “terraforming warfare” is a particularly egregious form of environmental destruction and firmly within the parameters of Rome Statute crimes, and war crimes in particular.

Terraforming Warfare: Concept and Legal Relevance

We use “terraforming” as a term borrowed from science fiction, typically used to describe the artificial transformation of an environment to make it accessible for settlement. The term ‘terraforming’ joins ‘terra’ (land) with ‘forming’, the ‘making’ or ‘moulding’ of land, land-making. In the settler-colonial projects described in Amitav Ghosh’s book on the subject, the phenomenon of terraforming was ‘fundamentally conflictual; it was a mode of warfare, of a distinctive kind’ (p. 55). In the context of armed conflict, however, terraforming takes on a darker meaning: the intentional transformation of an environment into one that is hostile to human life. Terraforming warfare refers not to isolated attacks causing environmental harm, but to patterns of destruction that reconfigure ecosystems, infrastructure, and landscapes in ways that have enduring ecological and humanitarian consequences.

Three interrelated features characterise terraforming warfare. First, it entails the systemic destruction of environmental infrastructure essential to civilian survival, including water networks, sewage systems, agricultural land, and energy facilities. Second, it produces long-term ecological effects, such as soil degradation, pollution, and biodiversity loss, that persist well beyond the cessation of hostilities. Third, it alters the physical geography of civilian life, rendering areas uninhabitable or incompatible with dignified existence.

The situation in Gaza exemplifies these dynamics. The scale of bombardment, the extensive use of heavy munitions in densely populated areas, and the destruction of agricultural and water infrastructure have generated an environmental crisis alongside the humanitarian one. Reports by UN bodies and environmental experts document widespread contamination, destruction of farmland, and the collapse of ecosystems critical to food security and public health. The cumulative effect is not merely damage, but transformation: Gaza’s environment is being reshaped in ways that threaten the possibility of civilian life itself.

Crucially, terraforming warfare is not defined by intent to destroy the environment per se. Rather, it captures situations where environmental destruction is either deliberately pursued or knowingly accepted as a means of achieving military objectives.

Environmental Protection under International Humanitarian Law

IHL does contain specific provisions aimed at protecting the natural environment during armed conflict. Articles 35(3) and 55(1) of Additional Protocol I (API) to the 1949 Geneva Conventions prohibit methods and means of warfare that cause “widespread, long-term and severe” damage to the natural environment. Similar protections are reflected in customary international law and in the ICRC’s Customary IHL Study (Rule 43 and Rule 45). However, these provisions have been criticised for their vagueness and high thresholds, which limit their practical utility. Notably, as pointed out by Johansen, the controversial nature of the provisions affords military commanders flexibility in deciding whether to target a specific object, thereby raising questions about the scope of environmental crimes under the Rome Statute (pp. 64-89). Yet, these criticisms, while not unfounded, should not obscure the normative significance of environmental protection in IHL. The prohibition on excessive environmental damage is grounded in the principle of humanity, which underpins the entire law of armed conflict (pp. 79-80). Environmental destruction matters not only because nature has intrinsic value, but because the environment sustains civilian life. Where environmental harm undermines access to water, food, shelter, and health, it directly implicates the core humanitarian objectives of IHL.

The interpretive challenge posed by terms such as “widespread,” “long-term,” and “severe” should not be resolved in a manner that renders environmental protections illusory. As the International Law Commission has emphasised in its Draft Principles on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, environmental considerations must be integrated into the application of existing IHL rules, including the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack. Applied to Gaza, this framework raises serious questions. Even when military objectives are present, the anticipated environmental impacts of extended bombardment – such as failures of water and sanitation infrastructure and land contamination – must be incorporated into proportionality evaluations. Environmental damage is intrinsically connected to civilian harm and cannot be considered independently. Consequently, assertions of military necessity should be thoroughly scrutinised when attacks could render civilian life impossible.

Accountability and the Limits of Anthropocentric Criminal Law

Despite the normative recognition of environmental protection in IHL, accountability mechanisms remain limited. The Rome Statute of the ICC does not include a standalone crime of ecocide, notwithstanding growing advocacy for its inclusion. Environmental harm is instead addressed indirectly, primarily through Article 8(2)(b)(iv), which criminalises attacks launched with knowledge that they will cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment that is clearly excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage. This provision mirrors the high thresholds of API and has never been applied in practice. Nevertheless, it provides an existing legal basis for addressing terraforming warfare. The key elements, including knowledge, foreseeability, and excessiveness, are particularly relevant where environmental destruction is not incidental but systemic. In Gaza, the cumulative environmental impact of military operations was not only foreseeable but widely documented. Continued operations in the face of such knowledge raise serious questions about compliance with the Rome Statute’s environmental war crime provision.

Moreover, environmental destruction rarely occurs in isolation. It frequently overlaps with other international crimes. The destruction of essential conditions necessary for civilian survival may constitute crimes against humanity when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. In extreme instances, environmental destruction may also intersect with genocidal conduct under Article 2(c) of the Genocide Convention (1948), which prohibits the deliberate infliction of conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of a protected group. Recognising these overlaps does not mean merging separate legal categories. Instead, it highlights the importance of addressing environmental harm within current frameworks rather than treating it as a marginal issue.

A Pragmatic (and Realistic) Path Forward

The progressive movement advocating for the recognition of ecocide as a discrete international crime reflects a legitimate dissatisfaction with the anthropocentric limitations inherent in current legal frameworks. Environmental damage is too frequently considered pertinent only insofar as it impacts human interests, thereby neglecting the intrinsic value of ecosystems and non-human life. Nonetheless, the political and legal obstacles to amending the Rome Statute remain substantial, rendering meaningful reform improbable in the near term. Meanwhile, concentrating solely on future reforms may overlook current harms. Terraforming warfare offers a practical alternative by viewing environmental degradation as a core element of modern warfare. This concept underscores the capacity of existing legal norms to address such issues. By emphasising conduct patterns, knowledge, foreseeability, and cumulative damage, terraforming warfare aligns with the frameworks of IHL and ICL, while challenging their most restrictive interpretations. This approach does not diminish the importance of ecocentric legal developments; rather, it aims to bridge the divide between aspiration and implementation. Holding perpetrators accountable for present environmental harm can fortify the normative underpinnings necessary for more ambitious future reforms.

The destruction of Gaza’s environment serves as a warning rather than an anomaly. Modern warfare increasingly damages the ecological and material foundations that support civilian life, rendering environmental harm a core aspect of conflict rather than merely collateral damage. This shift, described as terraforming warfare, highlights the inadequacy of current legal frameworks in addressing the intentional transformation of the environment as a weapon. International law cannot ignore such harm or consider it marginal. The challenge is not the lack of relevant laws, but the reluctance to interpret and enforce them properly, given the scale, intent, and civilian impact involved. If international criminal law aims to truly protect humanity, it must equally safeguard the environments vital to human existence.