Reviewing Afghan Evacuation and Resettlement

[Lt Col R. Scott Adams is a Judge Advocate for the United States Air Force. He was previously assigned to the Operations and International Law Directorate for US Air Force Headquarters, and as an Exchange Officer with the Australian Defence Force in Canberra. He was chief legal counsel for Task Force Liberty, as part of Operation Allies Welcome, the US mission to evacuate and resettle Afghan refugees. Lt Col Adams is also a PhD candidate at the University of Adelaide.]

This article was created in the author’s personal capacity. The views expressed in this article do not reflect the official position of the US Government or the Department of Defense

On November 26, 2025, two members of the West Virginia National Guard were shot near the White House in Washington D.C. One of the victims, Sarah Beckstrom, tragically passed away the next evening. The suspected shooter was Rahmanulla Lankanwal, an Afghan national who arrived in the United States in September 2021 as part of Operation Allies Welcome, the US mission to evacuate and resettle vulnerable Afghans. The event caused a sudden reconsideration of the US evacuation efforts in Afghanistan in 2021.

Lankanwal had previously worked with the Central Intelligence Agency in Afghanistan and was granted discretionary parole, on a temporary basis, under the Immigration and Nationality Act, at 8 USC § 1182(d)(5). He resettled in Washington, where he reportedly struggled to assimilate and suffered from mental health concerns. In December of last year, Lankanwal applied for asylum, which he was granted last April.  

On November 27, President Trump held up a photograph of the famous C-17 flight, call sign Reach 871, that evacuated over 800 Afghans from Kabul in August 2021. Previously considered an image of heroism (the aircrew received Distinguished Flying Crosses for the flight), Trump framed it representing strategic blunder. Further, the Trump Administration promised rapid and substantial reform to immigration policies, committing to a sort of “reverse migration.” This would include steps such as a permanent pause on migration “from all Third World Countries,” removals, and a “re-examination” of previous admission and asylum decisions. When the Wall Street Journal cautioned against blaming all Afghan refugees for the act of one man, the White House Deputy Chief of Staff openly disagreed. 

Much has been made of the vetting process applied to Afghan evacuees. That process is beyond the scope of this post. Vetting is, of course, an important component to evacuation and resettlement. However, in addressing the strategic decision to evacuate Afghans, it is perhaps worth reviewing what happened in the late summer of 2021, and more importantly, why the United States and its allies responded the way they did.

Evacuation from Kabul

Since 2021 nearly 200,000 Afghans have been admitted into the United States. These admissions primarily occurred through three different pathways: (1) Bespoke legislation, (2) refugee admissions, and (3) discretionary parole. 

Legislation

The Afghan Allies Protection Act (AAPA), Pub L 111-8, 123 Stat 807, created the special immigrant visa (SIV) for Afghan nationals who provided “faithful and valuable service” to the United States Government in Afghanistan. The AAPA has been amended many times, and for various reasons, the SIV process was notorious for its delays. It was, according to former Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, “designed to be a slow process.” Thus, when the Taliban took control of Kabul on August 15, 2021, there were still approximately 70,000 SIV applicants in Afghanistan. These Afghans had worked side-by-side with US Forces and were now at great risk of retaliatory attacks precisely because of that work. US Government officials at the time stated the United States held “a responsibility and an obligation to help the men and women who served by our sides.”  But given the AAPA’s statutory process, and the immediate threat to the Afghans, US officials looked to other options.

Refugee Admissions

 In August 2021 the Department of State created a Priority 2 Designation for Afghans who could demonstrate a history of serving the United States, but fell short of the SIV qualifications. The designation granted prioritized access and allowed admission outside the established refugee quota. However, Afghans could only apply from a third country. This and other requirements made it less useful as a response to the chaotic evacuation in August 2021. Thus, parole became the primary mechanism for Afghans to be admitted to the United States under emergency circumstances.

Discretionary Parole

Operation Allies Welcome brought 84,000 Afghans to the United States in 2021, most of whom were granted parole, including Lankanwal. This parole is granted for “urgent humanitarian reasons,” as it was similarly used to admit more than 100,000 Vietnamese refugees in 1975, and thousands of Iraqi Kurds in 1996, and Kosovar Albanians in 1999. As it reads today, the INA does not define “urgent humanitarian” but instead grants broad discretion to the Secretary of Homeland Security. In application, similar to the experience in Vietnam, the tactical decisions of who qualified for parole were left primarily to US Consular officers and US military members on the ground in Kabul. They were given some direction to identify those who “could be approvable” for the SIV, or who could otherwise “show some nexus” to “American programs and projects” in Afghanistan. Admittedly, grants of parole were rushed, but unlike in Vietnam, the SIV program provided some framework for parole decisions. Ultimately, all three avenues for admission were primarily granted through processes meant to identify Afghans with demonstrated loyalty and service to the United States. 

The United States was not alone in this effort. In total, 51 countries contributed to the war in Afghanistan and assisted US led efforts. Nearly all of them similarly accepted Afghan nationals in the days and weeks following the fall of Kabul. Some created bespoke legislation or visa programs, similar to the SIV program, including the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, South Korea and Denmark, among others. However, most US allies chose to admit Afghan nationals in 2021 under discretionary admission authorities, for humanitarian reasons, similar to US parole. It is primarily through these discretionary admissions that nations like Germany accepted over 13,000, as did the United Kingdom; Belgium received 6,500; Italy received over 8,000; France and Australia each received more than 5,000; and approximately 10,000 went to Canada. This was in 2021 alone; many more followed. For example, Canada received 40,000 Afghans by October 2024.  

The United States accepted more Afghan evacuees than any of its allies, just as it had the most servicemembers in Afghanistan. Indeed, the data shows a strong correlation between the number of forces nations deployed to Afghanistan and the number of Afghan refugees they accepted. This correlation exists because, as then Prime Minister Boris Johnson said, “we owe a debt of obligation” to those Afghans who served with them.  

Policy Justifications for Evacuation and Resettlement

In 2021 US officials similarly argued the United States held an obligation to ensure the safety of Afghans who had demonstrated faithful service to the United States. These arguments did not merely surface in the face of a humiliating retreat but frequently appeared long before full withdrawal was certain. For example, in 2014, then US Congresswoman Tulsi Gabbard stood in Congress and advocated for a bipartisan effort to expand the SIV program. After emphasizing the importance of teamwork she stated we cannot succeed without acting together with Afghan partners as “members of a team.”  She went on to argue that bringing these Afghans to the United States was required to “honor our commitment to our team members.” The sentiment was felt across the globe among US allies and partners, as demonstrated by the synchronized and rapid response in accepting Afghan evacuees for resettlement.  

When the dust settled from the chaos of late 2021, many allies conducted formal reviews of evacuation and resettlement efforts. Among many others, the Australian Senate initiated an independent review of its resettlement of more than 5,000 Afghan nationals. The review, completed in March 2023, included a series of lessons learned, and also provided a list of policy justifications for Australia’s actions. Those retrospective justifications are worth reviewing today.  

According to the independent review, Australia’s efforts to evacuate and resettle Afghans were justified for four primary reasons.

First, to fulfill a moral obligation. This first, and primary justification is more fully explained below. The Australian review concluded that the moral obligation was felt keenly and almost unanimously by governments that provided forces in Afghanistan. But it was not unlimited. The Australian review notes the obligation must be balanced with competing policy concerns. Security and impartial humanitarian concerns are among those competing policy objectives. These concerns do not displace the moral obligation owed to those who faithfully served and are now at risk of harm because of it. But they do temper the obligation in a way that justifies reasonable limitations and prioritizations. 

Second, to create an incentive for employment or partnership with Australia. Here the review makes the obvious point that loyalty is crucial to maintain alliances and attract new partners. The new US National Security Strategy is still committed to cultivating and attracting new alliances. Those efforts are assisted by strategic efforts to protect partners if they become vulnerable through associations to the US and its allies.   

Third, to facilitate the settlement of skilled employees in Australia. The review emphasized that Afghans who qualified for the program were generally fluent in English and “job ready” on arrival. In this regard, Afghan evacuees were unlike many others admitted through the traditional refugee admissions process and often made immediate contributions to Australian communities. 

Fourth, to provide an important measure of closure for Australians who served in Afghanistan. According to the report, Australian Defence Force personnel felt a “deep and personal” connection to Afghans partners. To abandon these Afghans would aggravate feelings that their efforts had been futile, or worse, had placed their partners at greater risk. The evacuation and resettlement of Afghan partners was, therefore, a form of relief to the memory of servicemembers who served their country in Afghanistan.  

Conclusion

Finally, the question of moral obligation deserves further consideration today. Holding a moral responsibility to Afghan partners was the primary, and often the only, policy justification offered by government officials to evacuate and resettle Afghans. There is general consensus that there was no binding obligation in international law to evacuate and resettle Afghan partners. This is true despite nuanced domestic court rulings in the Netherlands and Italy that ordered resettlement of Afghan plaintiffs after they served with those governments. New Zealand’s High Court ruled differently, and in a way that seems more generally accepted, holding that its Government should consider Afghan partners for resettlement under domestic processes, but is not required to admit them under international law.

Similarly, legal obligations do not arise from principles of jus post bellum, the emerging branch of international law that seeks to regulate post-conflict transitions to peace. In the absence of a robust legal framework, jus post bellum principles rely on responsible behavior. They do not create legal obligations to evacuate or resettle. Indeed, jus post bellum has, historically, often focused partially on reparations and accountability following armed conflict, in an embrace of the maxim fiat justitia ruat caelum (do justice even if the heavens fall), as applied by victors. Michael Walzer and others have instead argued for obligations under jus post bellum that focus on the preservation of life. The goal of jus post bellum, he argues, should be “to stop the heavens from falling.”  He went on to argue, long before the fall of Kabul, that the minimum expectation of a foreign occupier is that when they leave, they “must make sure that the men and women who cooperated with the occupation in any capacity will be safe in its aftermath—and if any of them are not safe, they must be given the opportunity to leave with the occupying force and be taken to the occupying state.” 

This is the lex ferenda obligation the United States holds for Afghans who gave faithful and loyal service to the US mission in Afghanistan. It is not an unlimited obligation. But the evidence suggests that responsible governments take reasonable steps to ensure their allies are not placed at greater risk of harm because of past assistance to that government.