Collective Efforts Essential for Justice in Syria

[Alice Autin is international justice researcher at Human Rights Watch. 

Jörn Oliver Eiermann served as senior international justice counsel at Human Rights Watch from September to November 2025.]

The December 2024 fall of the Bashar al-Assad government marks a historic turning point for Syria, and after decades of atrocities, potentially for justice. Despite extensive information and evidence of serious crimes, the Assad government denied its responsibility, and with the support of its international allies, largely evaded accountability.

In the face of numerous obstacles to advancing justice for crimes committed, in particular during the years 2011-2024, Syrian civil society and the international community turned to innovative solutions—whether before the United Nations or in the courts of other countries—to yield at least a measure of accountability. Now is the moment to capitalize on these steps to fully pursue justice. But the path is by no means straightforward. 

Impunity in Syria was first and foremost an affront to victims and survivors. The change of government provides a previously unthinkable chance to tackle the pervasive impunity gap. What is at stake here matters not only for Syria, but more broadly, given the impact of the Syrian conflict on the international rule of law.

In a recent briefing paper “Next Steps on Comprehensive Justice for Syria,” Human Rights Watch set out how Syrian transitional authorities and the international community can build on past efforts to secure meaningful and impartial justice for the crimes committed in Syria. 

13 Years of Impunity Under Assad

The Assad government was responsible for a litany of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed since 2011, including chemical attacks, widespread torture, sexual violence, and deliberate targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure. Human Rights Watch and others have extensively documented these systematic abuses, which were often carried out with support from allies like Russia and Iran. Non-state armed groups, sometimes supported by foreign governments, also committed serious violations including indiscriminate attacks and torture.

The UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (COI) and national courts in third countries have found that the extremist armed group Islamic State (known as ISIS) committed a broad range of international crimes in Syria, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. 

Repression and political violence in Syria long predated 2011, spanning decades under the rule of Hafez al-Assad and later his son Bashar al-Assad, both of whom consistently suppressed political dissent through arbitrary arrests, torture, and enforced disappearances. During the infamous 1982 Hama massacre, Syrian army commandos killed thousands of civilians: a key example of the brutality of state repression, and of the absence of justice well before 2011.

For years, Syrians have borne the cost as efforts to achieve justice for atrocities were blocked for political reasons. At the UN Security Council, Russia and China vetoed resolutions to refer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and to renew the mandate of the Joint UN-Organization for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) mechanism to investigate chemical weapons use. 

The COI, the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for Syria (IIIM), and other relevant international entities, such as the OPCW and its Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), worked diligently to record and investigate crimes, and keep them on the world’s agenda, but did not have the authority to conduct prosecutions. Syrian civil society organizations, including victims’ groups, also played a critical role in gathering and analyzing information to support accountability and advance justice. 

With their help, European courts prosecuted some of these crimes under the principle of universal jurisdiction or other forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction. This has led to multiple trials that have so far been the only, though limited, justice avenues available to victims and survivors.

The broader impact of impunity for crimes in Syria is evident. For example, the playbook for atrocities in Ukraine was at least partly written in Syria. Russia’s widespread violations of international law, both since 2014 and the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, including attacks on civilians and hospitals, have mirrored the brutal tactics Russia and the Assad government applied in Syria. 

More generally, the absence of legal consequences paired with attempts by some countries to normalize political relations with the Assad government between 2018 and 2024 also eroded respect for international law. The current Syrian authorities are seeking to reclaim their seat at the international community’s table. Now is the time for other countries to work with Syria’s new authorities to ensure that Syria’s reintegration goes hand in hand with, advancing expeditiously, the needed progress on justice and accountability. 

Challenges Ahead

Since December 2024, the Syrian authorities have signaled their intention to advance accountability and broader transitional justice objectives. They have publicly committed to addressing crimes and set up domestic commissions to address transitional justice and to find out what happened to the tens of thousands of Syrians who remain missing. The commission is reportedly working with Damascus University to develop Syria’s new transitional justice law.

However, according to its establishing texts, including the Constitutional Declaration and Presidential Decree No. 20, the mandate of the National Transitional Justice Commission is limited to crimes committed by the Assad government, undermining the prospect for comprehensive justice processes regardless of the affiliation of the person alleged to be responsible for the crime. 

Following initial civil society criticism over selective consultations and limited transparency, the transitional justice commission recently held a series of “dialogue sessions” across Syria’s governorates. The government should provide clarity on these efforts and ensure that they consistently include and reach diverse segments of Syrian civil society and communities. Many of them have spearhead documentation and advocacy efforts for justice over the past decades. Any accountability initiative in Syria will succeed only if it fully engages these groups.

In addition, the transition in Syria remains fragile. Incomplete security sector reforms and intercommunal and identity-based violence and killings by government forces, government-aligned armed groups, and armed volunteers in Syria’s coastal region and Sweida in 2025, show the risk of cycles of impunity followed by more violence.

Drawing on Other Experiences of Accountability

Examples from the broader Middle East and North Africa region provide important lessons for pursuing accountability after conflict and during transitions in government, including the experiences of Tunisia, Lebanon, Iraq, and Libya. These experiences show that delivering justice depends on a number of factors, including comprehensive domestic judicial and institutional reforms: that guarantee the independence of accountability processes, ensure compliance with human rights, fair trial standards and due process rights, and integrate relevant expertise in key areas, such as evidence preservation, analysis, and international judicial cooperation. 

As it stands, the Syrian domestic judicial system will face significant challenges when it comes to prosecuting serious international crimes. The Syrian penal code––long part of the legal arsenal used to repress the rights of Syrians under the rule of the Ba’ath party––does not specifically criminalize grave international crimes, nor does it provide for key modes of liability essential for these prosecutions, such as command responsibility. Similar gaps in Libya’s penal code and related legislation, compounded with the fragmentation and deep political polarization of Libya’s justice sector, have hindered progress toward accountability in that country. 

The experience of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/ISIL (UNITAD) in Iraq, has shown the limitations of justice efforts that are not embedded in broader institutional reforms. The Iraqi government could have used the information collected by the UN team to prosecute those responsible for the worst crimes domestically. However, Iraqi authorities’ failure to overhaul a judicial system that does not operate in accordance with international criminal law and human rights standards, and continues to include the death penalty, meant that Iraq was not prepared to prosecute these crimes domestically.

While UNITAD successfully provided equipment and training to local experts and assisted many investigations and prosecutions in third states, the Iraqi government never demonstrated the necessary political will and the initial practical steps to put in place a criminal code; as a result, the frameworks necessary for judicial cooperation were ultimately not successful. These should include laws criminalizing core international crimes as well as procedures and processes to ensure that judicial authorities in Iraq would be able to receive evidence from UNITAD, and could ultimately use it for rights-respecting domestic investigations and prosecutions.

Post-ISIS Iraq also underscores the pitfalls of one-sided justice efforts. UNITAD was mandated to only address crimes committed by ISIS, falling short of the comprehensive approach needed to end selective justice that has plagued Iraq, and ultimately undermined accountability, for decades. The Syrian government should commit to an inclusive transitional justice process that reflects the needs and rights of all victims and survivors. The very first practical step is to formally extend the mandate of the National Commission for Transitional Justice to cover crimes committed by any actor, regardless of their affiliation.

In addition to ensuring impartial justice, upholding victims’ rights requires strong consultations to design and carry out the justice process. In Tunisia, after the 2011 revolution, broad consultations informed the Truth and Dignity Commission’s work to address abuses committed from 1955 to 2013. The Commission received over 62,000 complaints, held televised public hearings, and referred more than 205 serious human rights cases to special courts.

Regrettably Tunisia’s authorities failed to sustain their support for impartial and independent justice and ignored the Commission’s recommendations for institutional reforms and reparations. No judgment has yet been issued more than seven years after the beginning of the first related trial, in May 2018. 

These are just a few examples. Looking ahead, examining efforts in other countries where grave crimes have been committed can offer numerous lessons to inform and help tailor Syria’s efforts toward credible investigations and prosecutions of past crimes, in accordance with international standards.

The Need for National-International Cooperation

The Syrian government has the primary duty to hold those responsible for international crimes to account. Yet, given the enormity of the task, comprehensive justice will require fully leveraging the support of international justice actors and the international community. The international justice ecosystem is comprised of many actors who can, at their best, closely work with one another to help reinforce adherence to international human rights, humanitarian, and criminal law.

For Syria, this national-international cooperation has several components. 

When it comes to how justice takes place, comprehensive efforts should build on those already underway including prosecutions elsewhere under the principle of universal jurisdiction, and the involvement of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Syrian authorities should cooperate with third-state jurisdictions and enable them to investigate crimes in Syria and participate in the ICJ proceedings brought by the governments of the Netherlands and Canada under the Convention against Torture.

Looking ahead, Syria and supportive states should also jointly explore additional pathways to enable the investigation and prosecution of the full range of crimes committed, in accordance with international criminal law and human rights standards. In the future, this could include prosecutions by domestic courts in Syria, other future international or hybrid courts, and the ICC.

Indeed, the Syrian authorities should join the Rome Statute of the ICC and lodge a declaration to give the ICC jurisdiction over past crimes. This would enable investigations and prosecutions internationally and illustrate the Syrian authorities’ unequivocal commitment to a future Syria built on the rule of law. Doing so could deter future atrocities.

When it comes to partnerships, the Syrian authorities should provide full access and cooperation to existing entities, such as the COI, the OPCW and its IIT, the IIIM, the Independent Institution on Missing Persons as well as to international and Syrian civil society organizations. These entities have already delivered tangible contributions in ways that can support justice and accountability in Syria.

They have issued reports shedding light on specific violations and found entities responsible for the use of chemical weapons; assisted other jurisdictions with their court cases; and maintained close ties with survivors seeking clarity and closure. Partnering with these existing entities can form the foundation for comprehensive accountability, grounded in extensive expertise, while also already bearing credibility both internationally and among Syrian victims and survivors. 

States should ensure that investigations and prosecutions are conducted in full compliance with international law, whether these take place in domestic, hybrid or international courts and tribunals. Achieving this will require, but will not be limited to, supporting efforts aimed at reforms in Syria and building capacity to this end. 

A multilayered approach can also help move justice forward in a timely and effective matter. Syria should not be left to undertake these efforts alone. Other countries should actively offer partnership to the Syrian authorities to mobilize international political and financial support for concrete and comprehensive justice processes.

Syria’s international partners on justice, together with the Syrian authorities, should look to convene a dedicated forum to develop and coordinate justice options, including identifying avenues for effective investigations and prosecutions. Reforms in Syria will take time, but in the meantime, the accountability gap remains, rooted in the absence of competent courts with jurisdiction over the full scope of criminality. 

Now is the time for Syria, and other concerned states, to work together to develop and implement justice options to ensure that those responsible will be held accountable in a court of law. The UN General Assembly may have a critical role to play to advance these discussions, given its ongoing engagement with justice in Syria. 

Decades of impunity under Assad have contributed to the erosion of international law more globally. At this critical juncture, the new authorities in Syria, together with the international community, should take decisive steps to restore the rule of law and rebuild their legitimacy by delivering justice for all Syrians. A robust, comprehensive accountability process for Syria could set a powerful precedent, offering hope to victims of grave crimes around the world. 

Photo attribution: “More Cheeky Kids” by Sean Long is lincesed under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0