Fifth Annual Symposium on Pop Culture and International Law: Ninjas Against Terror – The Akatsuki and the Challenges of Defining Terrorism in International Law

[Shpresa Salihu is a graduate assistant and PhD candidate at the Chair of Public International Law and European Law (University of Fribourg, Switzerland)]

‘We are both ordinary men, driven to seek vengeance in the name of justice. However, if there is justice in vengeance, then justice will breed only more vengeance. And trigger a cycle of hatred.’

Naruto, Chapter 436, volume 47, p. 10

Introduction

In the world of Naruto, the Akatsuki is a ninja organization that has become synonymous with fear and violence. Feared across all nations, it wields terror as a political instrument. Yet, its origins were profoundly pacifist: Yahiko, Nagato, and Konan founded the group to protect the innocent in a country ravaged by war. The death of Yahiko and the betrayal of the established powers drove Nagato into a tragic radicalization. Convinced that only fear could enforce peace, he redirected the Akatsuki toward a politics of terror: capturing the tailed beasts, first in peacetime, then during the Fourth Shinobi World War, turning them into weapons of deterrence, and compelling nations to abandon warfare.

This trajectory, from an ideal of justice, to the use of terror, echoes the real-world history of movements labelled as terrorist. Often born out of contexts of injustice or oppression, they shift toward a logic of violence that ultimately exceeds their original aims. In the real world, terrorism constitutes a transnational and persistent threat, yet it remains legally elusive: no universally accepted definition exists in international law. States continue to struggle to agree on a neutral formulation, largely because of the term’s inherent politicization.

This post proposes to use the metaphor of the Akatsuki as an analytical framework to shed light on the legal challenges of counterterrorism. After outlining the definitional enigma of terrorism, we will examine the consequences of this indeterminacy within international law, before addressing the challenges that the absence of a clear definition poses for international cooperation. 

From Justice to Terror: The Akatsuki and the Semantics of Violence

The term ‘terrorism’ first emerged during the French Revolution, where it denoted the ‘Reign of Terror’, a period characterized by the state’s own recourse to violence as a means of enforcing political order. Only in the twentieth century did the semantic orientation of the term shift, coming to describe acts perpetrated by non-state actors, frequently in opposition to colonial or imperial powers . This historical transformation inaugurated a lasting polarization: for some, such acts constitute legitimate struggles for national liberation; for others, they represent illegitimate, indiscriminate violence beyond moral justification.

Despite the absence of a universally accepted definition, most formulations identify two central elements: the use or threat of violence, and the intention to generate terror, intimidation, or political coercion. Terrorism is thus distinguished not by the nature of the act itself, by the nature of the act itself, but by its intended effect – to influence a population or compel a government, extending beyond the immediate victim of the violent act. In Naruto, the Akatsuki provides a compelling illustration of this dynamic: its assaults target not only their direct adversaries, but the very equilibrium of nations, through fear and coercion.

Defining terrorism without normative connotation is almost impossible, as the very terms ‘violence’ and ‘terror’ already imply moral condemnation. Thus, Nagato justifies terror as an instrument of peace: from the Akatsuki’s standpoint, it does not constitute barbarism but rather a rational strategy. This relativity of interpretation renders the task of legal definition particularly complex.

The United Nations debates on this matter illustrate the persistent difficulty of progress. The 2005 World Summit sought to adopt a common definition of terrorism but ultimately failed due to deep divisions among member states. Some argued that the definition should include acts of violence committed by regular armed forces, while others opposed this view. The risk is twofold: a definition too broad could enable states to arbitrarily designate their political opponents as ‘terrorists,’ whereas a definition too narrow could strip the concept of its legal and practical relevance.

The Law of the List: Between Justice and Fear

In the absence of a general definition, international law relies on a patchwork of instruments. Approximately twenty sectoral conventions prohibit specific acts, such as the financing of terrorism. In parallel, international humanitarian law prohibits certain acts analogous to terrorism when committed during armed conflicts. Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention forbids ‘measures of intimidation or of terrorism,’ while Additional Protocols I and II explicitly prohibit violence intended to spread terror among the civilian population.

Moreover, and this is particularly problematic in the context of the transitional fight against terrorism, given the broad discretion afforded to states, individual states frequently classify certain domestic offences as terrorist acts, and in particular, designate specific groups as terrorist organizations under their national legislation.

These provisions, however, reveal two major limitations. First, International humanitarian law applies only in situations of armed conflict; it does not govern acts committed in times of peace. Second, these norms address specific types of conduct without ever providing a comprehensive definition. This absence of a general framework poses a serious risk to fundamental rights, as the resulting ambiguity may be instrumentalized by states to suppress political opposition. Moreover, it excludes certain forms of terrorism, such as environmental destruction or cyberterrorism, from potential inclusion under existing treaty regimes. Consequently, the legal framework remains fragmented and incomplete, while the delegation to states of the power to define terrorism creates significant potential for abuse and arbitrariness.

Moreover, in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, lists of terrorist groups were established – often described as a new form of global security law – insofar as they enable pre-emptive action. These mechanisms make it possible to address uncertain future threats, thereby transforming the relationship between national and international law. It was also during this period that the expression ‘war on terror’ became entrenched in political discourse.  In our view, however, this formulation is conceptually contradictory: war presupposes a defined enemy, whereas terrorism refers to a method of action. This conflation blurs established legal categories and raises fundamental questions regarding the applicable legal framework and the most appropriate means of response.

The Allied Shinobi Forces: Building Alliances in a Fragmented Legal World 

A comprehensive definition thus remains necessary, precisely because terrorist groups operate across borders, deliberately disrupting established legal categories. In this regard, the United Nations General Assembly has emphasized the need to adopt a general definition of terrorism in order to enhance the effectiveness of counterterrorism efforts. A draft comprehensive convention has since been elaborated; however, negotiations have stalled for years and show little sign of progress.

Within the framework of international cooperation, and in an effort to address the definitional gaps, the United Nations Security Council has adopted a range of resolutions intended to fill these voids. These instruments explicitly reaffirm that all counterterrorism measures must comply with international law, in particular international human rights law and international humanitarian law. Yet this is precisely where the difficulty lies: the absence of a clear definition gives rise to all the challenges previously discussed, concerning the protection of human rights and the application of humanitarian law. It is, in effect, a vicious circle – the problem sustains itself. As in the Shinobi world, where mistrust among villages long impeded unity, international cooperation rests on unstable ground, a shared goal of peace pursued through fragmented means.

The Shinobi Alliance, formed against a common existential threat, symbolizes what effective multilateralism might look like: fragile, imperfect, but indispensable. 

Conclusion 

The absence of a universal definition of terrorism remains a major obstacle to the effective implementation of States’ cooperative obligations in this field. Given the inherently international and regional dimensions of counterterrorism and prevention policies, international and regional organizations, together with States, are called upon to cooperate on a fragile and uncertain basis.

The analogy between the Akatsuki and terrorist groups sheds light on the fundamental dilemmas facing international law in addressing terrorism. The first, upon which all others depend, is definitional: how can a multifaceted phenomenon be captured in legal terms without descending into politicization or arbitrariness? The second is juridical: the lack of a universal definition weakens the normative architecture and grants States a discretionary power that may ultimately undermine the principles of law itself. The third is practical: a shared definition is a prerequisite for coordinated action.

This challenge is vividly illustrated in Naruto through the initial divisions among the Shinobi villages, historical rivalries and mutual mistrust that long prevented any meaning cooperation. Yet, when faced with the common existential threat posed by the Akatsuki, these same villages chose to set aside their differences and form the Shinobi Alliance. Their unity was not born of identical interests but of a collective recognition that peace could not be achieved through the Akatsuki’s methods of fear and domination. 

In light of these challenges, one possible avenue would be to adopt a functional approach, defining terrorism by the methods employed, namely violence directed against civilians with the intent to terrorize, rather than by the identity of the actors. Such an approach could help depoliticize the concept and promote a more universal application. Yet, given the current geopolitical climate, marked by escalating international tensions, these fundamental divergences are unlikely to dissipate in the future.

Ultimately, the lesson from Naruto is clear: peace founded on fear is an illusion. Just as the Akatsuki failed to establish lasting peace through terror, the use of fear as a political instrument in the real world perpetuates only a cycle of violence. True stability can arise only from justice, respect for the rule of law, and the protection of the vulnerable. In essence, we all seek the same end, a world free from suffering – but it is the means employed to achieve it that must be questioned. The Akatsuki was ultimately dismantled not by force, but through a reconsideration of its methods in pursuit of its ideals.