The Resurgence of Large-scale Deprivation of Nationality: The Case of Kuwait

[Eric Fripp is a Barrister at 36 Public & Human Rights, part of the 36 Group, Gray’s Inn, London and Senior Visiting Fellow for the Refugee Law Initiative, School of Advanced Study, University of London]

Deprivation of Nationality

Deprivation of nationality, which breaks an important tie between state and individual and potentially increases the number of persons unable to obtain protection by a state, has historically had significant implications for international law and society. Loss or exclusion from citizenship of ethnic, religious, or national minorities, or others displaced  in the collapse of multinational empires and formation of new states during and after the First World War, made the problem of statelessness a pervasive one in the interwar period. The interwar and post-Second World War developments in international refugee law, international human rights law, and international laws relating to statelessness, substantially responded to this and related problems. Deprivation of nationality, at least at scale, became far rarer in the postwar world. However the direction of movement may now have reversed, with Kuwait potentially a harbinger of diminished respect for norms against large scale deprivation of citizenship.

The Recent Resurgence of Deprivation of Nationality

Large scale deprivation of nationality has since the Second World War been a relatively rare phenomenon- for example occurring in the context of the Rohingya in Myanmar, and during the 1998-2000 conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia.

However a resurgence of collective deprivation of nationality now seems to be taking place, driven by a strong focus on citizenship amidst rising currents of nationalism and exclusion of minorities. Both as a growing phenomenon and in individual instances, this has important implications for what have been at least relatively respected global norms against large scale deprivation of nationality.

A key instance is Kuwait. It has long excluded from citizenship the so-called bidoon (short for ‘bidoon jinsiya’, or ‘without nationality’ in Arabic, defined by Minority Rights Group as ‘a stateless Arab minority in Kuwait who were not included as citizens at the time of the country’s independence or shortly thereafter’) who are characterised by the state as ‘illegal residents’ and excluded from many rights and services. But on 10 May 2024, Kuwait’s new Emir, Sheikh Mishal al-Ahmed al-Sabah, suspended the Kuwaiti Parliament and parts of the Constitution by decree. Through 2024 and 2025 a large-scale campaign of nationality deprivation has followed. A reputable local news source stated in August 2025 that Kuwait, which has a citizen body of just over 1.5 million ‘has revoked the citizenship of almost 50,000 over the past year in a sweeping review of nationality files that officials say leaves “no one exempt”.

A large proportion of those affected are women. The basic form of Kuwait’s citizenship law is that citizenship is by descent, through the male line only, from an ‘original Kuwaiti national’ defined at the time of the law’s institution (Kuwait Nationality Law 1959, articles 1-2). This is consistent with a general pattern of gender discrimination in nationality in Gulf Cooperation Council states. In practice however Kuwait had in many cases used discretionary provisions under article 8 of the 1959 law to extend nationality to non-national women married to Kuwaiti citizens, including in some cases following death of the husband or divorce. It appears that that extension of nationality to women has now, in many thousands of cases, been followed by deprivation of nationality. But while ‘the policy claims to target foreigners who illegally obtained Kuwaiti citizenship’ its scope and objectives remain opaque, notwithstanding enactment since initial cases of a legislative amendment authorising forfeiture of citizenship for ‘moral turpitude or dishonesty, or for actions aimed at threatening state security, including criticism of the emir or religious figures’. This has apparently broadened the scope for a large scale continuing campaign of revocation of citizenship within which, the Financial Times reported: 

A Supreme Committee chaired by the minister of the interior examines cases to establish who has a legal claim to Kuwaiti citizenship. And every week, the names of those stripped of nationality are made public – with anxious Kuwaitis poring over the lists looking for their names or the names of relatives.

In many such cases deprivation of Kuwaiti nationality seems likely to bring about statelessness, perhaps because the woman affected had no nationality- this would include Kuwaiti bidoon– or because another nationality has been lost either automatically or by renunciation. Renunciation is more likely than it would be otherwise given Kuwaiti does not accept its citizens holding another nationality in parallel. 

Consistency with International Law 

Deprivation of nationality which is ‘arbitrary’ has been repeatedly stated to be incompatible with international law- in 2009 the Secretary-General reported to the Human Rights Council that in light of canvassed human rights provisions ‘arbitrary deprivation of nationality, especially on discriminatory grounds such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, constitutes a violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms.’ In a further report of the Secretary General in 2013 it was stated that: 

loss or deprivation of nationality must meet certain conditions in order to comply with international law, in particular the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality. These conditions include serving a legitimate purpose, being the least intrusive instrument to achieve the desired result and being proportional to the interest to be protected. Where loss or deprivation of nationality leads to statelessness, the impact on the individual is particularly severe. International law therefore strictly limits the circumstances in which loss or deprivation of nationality leading to statelessness can be recognized as serving a legitimate purpose.

The full scope of the prohibition of arbitrary nationality in broader international law has been relatively lightly considered, though see for instance Tamás Molnár and ISI’s proposed Principles on Deprivation of Nationality as a National Security Measure from 2020. In Anudo v Tanzania (Judgment) (African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, App No 012/2015, 22 March 2018) the potential relevance of statelessness in the assessment of  arbitrariness was emphasised. The European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (‘ECHR’) also lacks a general prohibition on arbitrary deprivation of nationality and the European Court of Human Rights has over time examined this by reference to article 8 ECHR, holding:

In determining arbitrariness, the Court should examine whether the impugned measure was in accordance with the law; whether it was accompanied by the necessary procedural safeguards, including whether the person deprived of citizenship was allowed the opportunity to challenge the decision before courts affording the relevant guarantees; and whether the authorities acted diligently and swiftly…

Usmanov v Russia (para. 63)

In the article 8 ECHR context proportionality falls for consideration because the right is a  qualified one. Arbitrary deprivation has also been considered in the context of EU law. In the Rottmann case (para. 53), the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the EU cited the ‘general principle of international law that no one is arbitrarily to be deprived of his nationality’ referring to article 15 UDHR and article 4(c) of the European Convention on Nationality 1997, adding the statement that deprivation by reason of material deception in obtaining nationality ‘cannot be considered to be an arbitrary act.’  The Court further indicated at para. 55 that in light of European Union law, deprivation of a nationality of a member state had to ‘[observe] the principle of proportionality so far as concerns the consequences it entails for the situation of the person concerned in the light of European Union law, in addition, where appropriate, to examination of the proportionality of the decision in the light of national law.’

The requirement for proportionality likely has unique aspects in in context of article 8 ECHR and/or European Union law, as opposed to public international law. But there seems no reason why an extreme disproportion in a state act of deprivation of citizenship could not come within the characterisation of arbitrariness by the International Court of Justice:

Arbitrariness is not so much something opposed to a rule of law, as something opposed to the rule of law. This idea was expressed by the Court in the Asylum case, when it spoke of “arbitrary action” being “substituted for the rule of law” (Asylum, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 284). It is a wilful disregard of due process of law, an act which shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of juridical propriety.

Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (ELSI) (USA v Italy) case (para. 128) 

In Kuwait, the withdrawal of citizenship from women who had obtained it under article 8 of the Nationality Law appears to originate in the desire to recast national inclusion, in line with a resurgent nationalism common to many other states today:

The rhetoric surrounding these revocations serves to reinforce and legitimize exclusion. Government officials and public commentators justify the policy as a means to “purify national identity.” This language not only echoes exclusionary nationalism but also cultivates a public narrative in which women are vilified — accused of fraud, deception or manipulation simply for asserting their legal status. Last month, a woman’s objection to her denaturalization through a post on X resulted in deportation and public shaming by the Kuwaiti Ministry of Interior. In this environment, statelessness functions not merely as a legal condition but as a powerful social stigma, one that is weaponized to further marginalize women and racialized minority groups.

This is consistent with further description of events connected to the deprivation campaign, garnered from reports by affected persons.

Applied to the process of large-scale deprivation of nationality in Kuwait, there appear to be multiple grounds upon which deprivation might be found arbitrary and inconsistent with international law. Even assuming for present purposes that relevant acts of deprivation are valid under the laws of Kuwait,  on the current evidence it appears that that the standards applied in such decisions are opaque, those affected are not notified of the possibility of action against them, they do not have a meaningful opportunity to address the authorities before any decision is taken, and they may lack even the ability to do so effectively ex post facto (it has been said that an online ‘electronic grievance portal’ was launched in 2025 to enable appeals, but evidence of effective operation of this is at best scant). Further, to quote only two standards capable of application, deprivation of nationality acquired by reference to article 8 of the Kuwait Nationality Law 1959 would seem potentially to constitute gender discrimination (Kuwait acceded to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in 1991), and where children are potentially affected,  failure to treat their best interests as a primary consideration would breach article 3(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (which Kuwait ratified in 1991). Furthermore other standards may apply to potential consequences of deprivation of nationality- perhaps most importantly, exclusion from the territory of Kuwait would potentially constitute arbitrary deprivation of the right to enter a person’s ‘own country’ under article 12(4) ICCPR 1966 (ratified by Kuwait in 1996, subject to reservations relating to non-discrimination and gender equality provisions).

In turn, breaches of applicable human rights provisions may create a basis for asylum outside Kuwait. The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (with its 1967 Protocol) provides a refugee definition at article 1A(2) turning on possession of a ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’ for ‘race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion’ and being unable or, owing to that fear, unwilling to depend on the protection of a country of nationality, or in the event of statelessness, a country of former habitual residence. Gender has frequently been accepted as a qualifying basis, as ‘membership of a particular social group’. And substantial decisions of different national courts have applied the definition to cases of arbitrary deprivation of nationality, in particular where linked to denial of the right to enter or return to the individual’s ‘own country’ under article 12(4) ICCPR 1966 (for instance see Fripp [ch 6] and Hathaway and Foster).

The international reaction to Kuwait’s campaign of nationality deprivation is another feature of note. Deprivation of nationality, as noted at the start of this post, played a central role in the international crisis of the interwar years. It could be said in this context that it should be part of the muscle memory of international law and the international community.

Reaction

Notwithstanding the importance- and historical resonance- of nationality deprivation as a phenomenon, the seriousness of its effects on individuals and families, and the potential effect on other states, the weakness of international standards currently is shown both by a strikingly weak international reaction  to Kuwait’s actions and by Kuwait’s strong defence of its actions as ‘acts of sovereignty.’  Boston University International Human Rights has commented that:

Despite the scale and severity of the crisis, international institutions have remained conspicuously quiet — no significant statement has been issued by the United Nations, the European Union, or any major international human rights body. Beyond civil society reports, the issue remains largely invisible.

This silence is not neutral; it functions as a form of tacit approval. Gulf states remain shielded from global scrutiny thanks to their economic power, control over energy resources, and diplomatic ties with the West, as the plight of stateless Gulf residents is rendered invisible by a mix of diplomatic deference and racialized apathy.

Kuwait’s Universal Periodic Review, concluded in 2025, which coincided in time with its nationality deprivation campaign, a number of relevant conclusions/recommendations were made, but these principally focus not on deprivation per se but on the desirability of adequate procedures or consideration of statelessness (see for instance paras 31.64, 31.67, 31.278, 31.281, 31. 285, 31.287). To the suggestion of the Netherlands, for instance, that Kuwait should ensure that decisions on the revocation of nationality are subject to transparent legal procedures and judicial oversight, especially for human rights defenders, Kuwait has replied that:

It should be noted that matters of nationality are acts of sovereignty exercised by the State as a governing authority rather than an administrative one. As a matter of doctrine, law and jurisprudence, such acts are beyond judicial review, as they relate directly to the exercise of State sovereignty and independence. It should also be noted that the Council of Ministers has established the “Grievances Committee on Withdrawal, Revocation and Loss of Nationality” pursuant to Decision No. 207 of 2025.

Conclusion

The current campaign of nationality deprivation in Kuwait instantiates  a wider resurgence of practices reminiscent of the interwar period, in the light of which post WWII international law- in particular developments in international human rights law and as regards statelessness- was shaped. The muted reaction to it – and to the strong response by Kuwait even to limited and oblique challenges – provides another worrying sign of declining confidence in the defence of important norms of international law.