The Agreement Between the UK and France on the Prevention of Dangerous Journeys

[Eric Fripp is a Barrister at 36 Public & Human Rights, part of the 36 Group, Gray’s Inn, London and Senior Visiting Fellow for the Refugee Law Initiative, School of Advanced Study, University of London]

UK-France Agreement: Background

On 6 August 2025 the Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the French Republic on the Prevention of Dangerous Journeys entered into force.  A press release by the UK Home Office announced that ‘The treaty provides a legal basis for the groundbreaking UK-France “one-in, one-out” pilot scheme’ which represents ‘[t]he latest step towards dismantling the criminal trade in small boat crossings.’  The press release went on to state that:

‘The agreement means that anyone entering the UK on a small boat can be detained immediately on arrival and returned to France by the UK government– with detentions expected to begin within days. Under the ‘one-in, one-out’ scheme, an equal number of migrants will be eligible to come to the UK through a new route if they have not attempted an illegal crossing before – subject to full documentation and security and eligibility checks.’

As the Agreement entered into force, Channel crossings in small boats by persons seeking to claim international protection in the United Kingdom were continuing at a high level- official figures released on 11 August 2025 confirmed that more than 50,000 people had made the journey since July 2024, up from some 36,000 in the preceding twelve months.  It continues to be dangerous and in some cases lethal-at least 20 people are recorded as having died in connection to such crossings, and many have had to be rescued by authorities or volunteers on beaches or at sea.  

In a statement to the UK Parliament on 1 September 2025, the UK Home Secretary notified legislators that detention of persons arriving by small boat with a view to return to France had commenced on the day after the Agreement was signed, that returns were expected later in September, and that the first applications for permission to come from Farnce to the UK under the reciprocal part of the scheme had been opened.

The Agreement

In the Preamble to the Agreement, the parties affirm commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy, and the rule of law, and it is emphasised that the Agreement is intended to operate consistently with the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1951 Protocol (‘the Refugee Convention’) and the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘ECHR’) as well as other external legal standards.  The operative provisions of the Agreement provide for the return from the UK to France of ‘individuals who arrive in the United Kingdom via dangerous journeys on Small Boats, and who, upon arrival through that dangerous journey, do not or no longer, fulfil the conditions for entry to, presence in, or residence in the territory of the United Kingdom, to be returned and readmitted by France as efficiently as possible…’, and for the transfer from France to the United Kingdom of other individuals (arts 1(1)-(2), the aim of the parties being that numbers transferred each way will be ‘regularly balanced during the period of the Agreement’ (art 1(3)). The Agreement will remain in force only until 11 June 2026, unless extended by agreement or terminated before that date (art 22(1)).  

In form the Agreement is a ‘safe third country’ arrangement operating in one direction only, from the UK to France, coupled to a scheme for transfers from France to the UK, with numbers transferred from France to the UK corresponding to the numbers received by France from the UK authorities.  

A curious feature of the Agreement is that the central concept of ‘dangerous journeys by small boat’ is only partly defined: there is in it no indication what is defined as ‘dangerous’, whether in conjunction with ‘journey’ or otherwise.  The definition of ‘small boat’ is non-literal, including a ‘private vessel’, the size of which is not actually specified, where the vessel is used for a crossing of the English Channel without a lawful basis for entry (article 2(1)(f)).

Under the Agreement (article 4) an individual is liable to return to France if it is proven by the United Kingdom authorities that the individual is an adult or accompanied child, has come to the UK from France without permission by making a small boat journey or being intercepted or rescued in the course of such a journey no more than 14 days prior to the UK making a readmission request to France, and is not considered a risk to national security, public order, health or policy, or France’s relations with any other Schengen country.  In addition the individual must have no outstanding Refugee Convention or human rights claim at the time they are returned, there must not be any outstanding court process or order that bars the UK from returning the person to France at the time they are returned, and numbers exchanged by France and the UK must be balanced.  Following the UK request which must be made within 14 days of the person’s arrival in the UK, France must respond within 14 days or in exceptional cases, 28 days (art 8).  The stated aim of the Agreement (art 1(1) is transfer within 3 months.  The UK Home Secretary has said that the number of transfers under the scheme is not fixed.  Reports have described the Agreement as providing scope for a ‘pilot scheme’ and suggested an aim of returning ‘around 50 people a week’ initially then of building numbers up.  This suggests a desire not to set a target and then not to meet it.  In the last year, an average of 850 people per week arrived in the UK by small boat.  

Context to the Agreement

The political impetus for the UK-France Agreement comes from pressure felt by the UK Government to reduce the large numbers of persons arriving across the English Channel.  On the French side the effect of this transit on affected communities along the English Channel provides separate reason to seek a reduction in the phenomenon.

The UK by the Agreement seeks to regain an ability to remove arriving claimants to France in part to compensate for the fact that, since departure from the European Union, the UK has lost access to the European Union provision for internal transfers within the EU to countries of earlier connection within the bloc, treating members as safe third countries, a facility provided to the UK prior to British departure from the EU by successive Dublin Regulations (although the United Kingdom from 2016 had in fact been a net recipient of transfers: see Cuibus and Walsh, Oxford Migration Observatory, July 2025).  The Agreement however differs from the Dublin mechanisms, and in some important respects more resembles the EU-Turkey Action Plan announced on 18 March 2016 (European Parliament summary here).  This is evident most clearly in two core features, first motivation by desire to ‘break the business model of the smugglers’, and secondly, the reciprocal one-in, one-out approach to transfers.  

The EU-Turkey arrangement has from its initiation been highly controversial (see Migration Policy Institute, 2021).  It may have contributed to a substantially reduced number of asylum seekers arriving via the Aegean, but concerns regarding the risk of refoulement have prevented large transfers of persons to Turkey, and inadmissibility to procedures in Greece has created ongoing uncertainty and suffering among persons effectively stranded in Greece (see for instance International Rescue Committee, 2022).  

Relevant UK law

The United Kingdom Supreme Court in Rex (on the application of AAA (Syria) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] UKSC 42; [2024] 1 All ER 1 (‘the Rwanda case’), its decision finding the proposal of a previous UK Government for removals of asylum seekers to Rwanda unlawful, identified ‘the principle of non-refoulement’ as ‘guaranteed by’ the Refugee Convention and other instruments.  In the refugee context (para 5) it

‘requires that refugees are not returned to a country where their life or freedom would be threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. In order to qualify as a safe third country under paragraph 345B(ii), Rwanda must accordingly be a country in which the principle of non-refoulement will be respected, i.e. a country which will not return refugees to another country where their life or freedom would be threatened…’

The Court (para 25) left open the proposition, which it was not required to consider to determine the appeal before it, that the principle of non-refoulement also forms part of customary international law, noting that the UK and other states have endorsed this view in fourth recital to the Preamble of the 2001 Declaration of States Parties to the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.  As the decision in the Rwanda case re-emphasises, it is open to the UK to send an individual to a ‘safe third country’ so long as this did not create relevant risk of refoulement. 

Domestic legislation exists in the UK which would allow the Government to support returns to France as a ‘safe third country’ under the Agreement.  The previous UK Government by an amendment in June 2022 provided by sections 80B and 80C Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (‘NIAA 2002’) for asylum claims to be declared inadmissible where the applicant had a relevant connection to a safe third state, defined as including an unreasonable failure to seek protection there.  The present UK Government is likely to employ these provisions to enable return of persons to France under the Agreement.  By section 80B(4) NIAA 2002 a safe third state is one in which (i) the claimant’s life and/or liberty is not threatened by reason of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, (ii) the claimant will not be sent to another State in breach of the Refugee Convention or article 3 ECHR (inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), and (iii)  a person may in that state apply for and receive protection in accordance with the Refugee Convention.  

An inadmissibility decision under UK domestic law is not appealable but may be challenged by judicial review.  Claims other than asylum and article 3 ECHR claims relating to the destination country ‘must be considered before any removal.’   Such claims however may be certified under section 94 NIAA 2002, after examination as ‘clearly unfounded’.  Such a determination (which under the Agreement means a claim does not present an obstacle to removal to France) is not appealable, but may be challenged by judicial review.

Where age is contested and authoritative age assessment becomes necessary, a conclusion  reached as to age may be subjected to judicial review.

There is new provision at Appendix UK European Applicant Transfer Scheme (‘Appendix UKEATS’)’ in the UK Immigration Rules, put in place to allow regulation of transfers and proposed transfers of persons to the UK from France.

Practical implications/ Questions arising as regards the Agreement

At a general level the UK-France Agreement represents another example of the growing range of schemes focussed on externalisation of asylum seeking.  While it expressly avers respect for international law, it illustrates many of the strains affecting operation of such endeavours, including the potentially diverse political interests or perceived political interests of different states parties and the current political potency of migration and asylum in many countries.  The one-in, one-out aspect, paralleling that in the EU-Turkey scheme, is perhaps understandable as a measure of equality between states that seeks to displace the political difficulty of accepting a transfer scheme that might be seen in either country as operating disproportionately to the advantage of the other.

Turning to more narrowly focussed considerations, the most immediate question concerning the practicality of the Agreement’s provisions for transfer of claimants from the UK to France may be that of timescale.  Domestic law and practice will allow some or many claims to be resolved by inadmissibility under sections 80B-C NIAA 2002 and/or ‘clearly unfounded’ certification under section 94 NIAA 2002, but whether it is possible for this to occur, and any judicial review proceeding to be completed within the tight constraints of time envisioned in the Agreement, will have to be seen.  Separately age assessment may acquire importance in the operation of the Agreement because unaccompanied minors may not be returned under the scheme.  Age assessment if necessary would exacerbate delay, and it may be that enforcement will be focussed, at least initially, on cases in which age dispute is not a significant factor.  It is not clear that cases can be processed in any number within the 3 month parameter, given that relevant determinations may be subjected to judicial review.  Of course, if this proves to be the case, it will raise the question of whether the parties are prepared to extend timescales, and to what extent, and if so what effect this would have on affected persons.

There is also considerable room to question the practicality of UK domestic arrangements for transfers from France under the Agreement.  The UK may admit persons from France who are not UK or EEA nationals or family members exercising EU free movement rights in France, are not unaccompanied children, are not judged a threat to national security or public order in the UK, have not previously been removed from the UK, and are within the numbers agreed between the states.  

The Agreement itself does not provide details of the grounds on which the UK will admit persons within the ‘voluntary application route’.  Such as they are, these are set out instead in the UK’s Immigration Rules, a compendious statement of policy concerning the exercise of discretion which the Secretary of State is required by statute to maintain, but which is not itself statutory, at Appendix UKEATS.  This provides for individuals to advance to the UK, by enrolment in an online application process, an ‘expression of interest’ in transfer from France .  From the presumed pool of such applicants, the Home Office will select any who are to be allowed to travel to the UK and grant entry clearance in any such case.

A brief inspection of the policy highlights two issues.  First, beyond the basic validity requirements of an application from France by a relevant individual (App UEATS 2.1-2.5), no clue was offered immediately as to how the Home Office will select any applicant above others, assuming applicant numbers are substantial.  In the statement to Parliament on 1 September it was said that the UK ‘will seek to prioritise family groups among the applicants to come to Britain under our new deal with France’.  The absence of more developed criteria denies guidance to potential applicants as to what they should put forward, and the prospect of success any individual applicant (or family group) may have.  This seems almost certain to attract applications for judicial review.

Secondly, if it is hoped that this part of the scheme will provide a disincentive to attempting the Channel crossing in a small boat, its characteristics may not assist.  It appears that an application by someone who has previously applied unsuccessfully will be treated as void and not considered (App UEATS §1.1).  An individual must confirm his or her location in France, which is understandable but may be impractical or dissuade individuals from applying through fear of location (App UEATS §2.2).  An individual must inter alia ‘upload a copy of a passport or other document and a recent photograph which satisfactorily establishes their identity and nationality as part of their Expression of Interest application’ (App UEATS §2.3(c)).  – again understandable but perhaps difficult or impossible in many cases (likely including a disproportionate share of stateless persons, who may face particular obstacles to documentation because issuance of the latter is so often dependent on citizenship).  Cumulatively, and absent change to the scheme, there will be large classes excluded or with minimal prospect of entry clearance- for instance all unaccompanied minors, those who have failed once from whom any further application would be treated as void, those fearful of identifying their location in France with the required level of precision, and those unable or unwilling to provide satisfactory evidence of identity and nationality.  If determined to attempt travel to the UK those persons will provide a substantial continuing market for the organised criminals behind Channel crossings.

Conclusion

In light of the practical considerations above, it remains an open question whether the scheme put in place by the Agreement will in the short term allow the UK and French authorities to provide a significant deterrent to irregular journeys across the Channel.  If it does not, and these continue at a high level, the possibilities for further political action worth envisaging could include either extension of significant aspects of the current scheme, or resort to other measures, but in each event a concerning issue will be consistent protection of the principle of non-refoulement notwithstanding political pressure on states.