Protest Repression in Indonesia as Torture under International Law

[Debora N. Gunawan is a Doctor of Juridical Science (S.J.D.) student at University of Michigan Law School]

The Indonesian government’s response to the August 2025 protests should not be dismissed as mere “excessive force” or even as cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, it amounts to torture under the Convention against Torture (CAT). This post argues that the crackdown satisfies CAT’s four defining elements of torture while also breaching Indonesia’s obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). It proceeds in three parts: first, this blog post outlines the background to the protests and the state’s response; second, it assesses Indonesia’s conduct against CAT ‘s threshold and ICCPR; and third, it explores the international mechanisms available to civil society for accountability. Crucially, this is not an issue that can be effectively handled through domestic mechanisms: Indonesia has shown a growing authoritarian tendency, and even its Constitutional Court, long regarded as a final check, has been increasingly subordinated to executive control since the era of the previous President Jokowi. Recognizing the crackdown as torture reframes the debate from domestic law and order into binding international responsibility.

Background

Mass protests erupted across Indonesia in late August 2025, which was sparked by public outrage over the House of Representatives’ (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or DPR) housing allowance of 50 million rupiahs per month (~US$3,000–3,075), which is roughly ten times Jakarta’s 2025 monthly minimum wage of Rp 5,396,760 (~US$337), and even more compared to poorer regions where monthly wages hover between Rp 2–3 million (~US$135–200). Protesters condemned the allowance as emblematic of political elitism during a time of economic hardship, marked by mass layoffs, rising taxes, stagnant wages, and a shrinking middle class.  

On 28 August 2025, 21-year-old Affan Kurniawan, an online motorcycle taxi driver reportedly delivering food, was run over by a police armored vehicle during a demonstration in the capital Jakarta. The incident, widely circulated online, ignited nationwide outrage and fueled protests that spread beyond Jakarta to more than 30 provinces. Indonesian police responded with tear gas, water cannons, rubber bullets, and mass arrests of 3,915 people across the country, including 1,240 people in Jakarta. However, the demonstrations appear to be infiltrated by provocateurs, as social media videos and eyewitnesses describe unidentified individuals who ignite fires in buildings and police stations before quickly disappearing. According local news per 2 September, the casualties resulted in at least 10 deaths and numerous injuries. KontraS (the Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence), a human rights NGO in Indonesia, reported on 10 September that three individuals remain missing.

The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has condemned these developments, urging restraint and dialogue. 

Meeting the CAT Threshold

Under the CAT, which Indonesia ratified in 1998, an act qualifies as torture if it involves (a) severe physical or mental suffering, (b) intentional infliction, (c) is carried out by or with the consent of state officials, and (d) is committed for a specific purpose such as punishment, intimidation, or coercion, as outlined in Article 1. If any of these elements are absent, the act may still fall under the broader prohibition of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment (CIDT) under Article 16, which requires states to prevent such acts when committed by or at the instigation of public officials. 

Under international law, the classification of protest repression as torture rather than as cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment carries significant legal and moral weight. Torture must be criminalized by states under Article 4, investigates impartially under Article 12, and can never be justified under any circumstances pursuant to Article 2. By contrast, CIDT, though still absolutely prohibited, only requires prevention under Article 16 without the same explicit duty to criminalize, making the framing of abuse as torture rather than CIDT especially significant for raising the legal and political stakes in advocacy, litigation, and engagement with UN mechanisms.

Indonesia’s Response as a form of Torture

When evaluated against the CAT’s four-prong criterion, Indonesia’s response to the August 2025 protests undeniably meets the threshold for it to be considered torture. 

First, the severity of suffering is unmistakable. The death of 21-year-old Affan Kurniawan, at least eight other confirmed fatalities, and hundreds of reported injuries, including beatings, tear-gassing of university campuses, and the hospitalization of students, demonstrate the grave physical and psychological harm inflicted. 

Second, the level of intentionality is clear. Under CAT, intentionality refers not to sadistic motives but to the deliberate and foreseeable use of methods that cause severe pain or suffering. The coordinated deployment of armored vehicles, systematic raids on campuses, and mass detentions of nearly 4,000 people were not accidental byproducts of crowd control, but deliberate tactics designed to intimidate, punish, and deter further protest.

Third, state involvement is beyond question. These acts were carried out by police and military forces under official orders, and the subsequent promotions and benefits offered to injured officers evidence that the violence was not condemned but effectively sanctioned at the highest levels of government.

Fourth, the purpose of punishment and intimidation is made explicit; protesters were publicly labeled as leaning toward “violent” and “anarchy.” President Prabowo’s dismissive remark that “police are sometimes careless” (polisi kadang khilaf) is deeply concerning. His subsequent incentives, promotions and educational benefits for wounded officers, signal state endorsement of harsh repression and reward loyalists rather than accountability. Meanwhile, media freedom was curtailed: reports of a letter from the Regional Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (KPID Jakarta) were circulated, urging broadcasters to limit coverage of the protests, which later they claimed to be hoax. At the same time, digital platforms introduced restrictions, with TikTok temporarily suspending live-streaming in Indonesia. Reports of deliberate provocation, such as conspiracy claims of infiltrators posing as intelligence agents who then instigated violence, emergent CCTV footage showing non-protestors setting fire to buses, and suspicious looting of guarded official residences, all point to orchestrated operations rather than spontaneous breakdowns in order. These elements collectively indicate a state-directed intent to punish dissent, squarely fulfilling the torture criteria under Article 1 of CAT, not merely “excessive force” or degrading treatment. 

In this context, comparative practice shows how protest repression can amount to torture under international law. In Belarus (2020), after the contested presidential elections, thousands of demonstrators were arbitrarily detained and subjected to systematic beatings, sexual and gender-based violence, denial of medical care, and incommunicado detention. UN experts documented more than 450 cases of torture and ill-treatment, concluding that the deliberate use of violence to silence dissent likely constituted crimes against humanity, while the Committee Against Torture itself described torture in Belarus as “widespread.” Similarly, in Venezuela (2017–2024), Human Rights Watch documented detainees being subjected to electric shocks, asphyxiation, sexual violence, and severe beatings as part of a systematic strategy to stifle dissent; a UN Fact-Finding Mission has since reported grave crimes including acts of torture and sexual violence and identified patterns consistent with crimes against humanity. These examples show that where state violence is weaponized to suppress civilian mobilization it may amount to torture. Understanding this, what is happening in Indonesia should not just be seen as CIDT but should amount to torture.

Indonesia is also bound by the ICCPR, which it ratified in 2006. The current situation breaches multiple provisions. Article 19 protects the right to freedom of expression, which has been curtailed through censorship of media and digital platforms. Article 21 guarantees the right of peaceful assembly, violated by the blanket bans, violent dispersals, and arbitrary arrests of nearly 4,000 people. Article 9 further prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, a safeguard ignored in the mass detentions. Therefore, this case represents serious violations not only of CAT but also of the ICCPR’s core protections for civil and political rights. 

When the State Fails Itself: Turning to International Law

Situating Indonesia’s response within both CAT and ICCPR makes clear that this is not merely a domestic matter of “law and order” but a breach of binding international human rights law. Under international law, the principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies usually applies, but Indonesia’s current context shows why international engagement is warranted. Its judiciary has become increasingly subordinated to executive power since the Jokowi era, and under President Prabowo there is little indication of impartial or independent review. Where the state itself is both the perpetrator and unwilling to provide remedies, international law provides the several framework for accountability. This framework rests on Indonesia’s binding treaty commitments and the monitoring bodies empowered to review state compliance, investigate violations, and issue authoritative findings.

Civil society therefore has several mechanisms available at the international level. Immediate action can include submissions to UN Special Procedures, including to the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. Similar communications can also be sent to the Special Rapporteur on Torture and the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Assembly and Association. The use of these mechanisms is intended to generate protective measures, create an official UN record of violations that may otherwise be suppressed domestically and increase international political pressure by making government abuses visible in global fora. Even though these procedures are not legally binding in the same way as court judgments, they can raise the diplomatic cost of abuses, mobilize transnational advocacy networks, and strengthen subsequent calls for accountability before treaty bodies or the United Nations Human Rights Universal Periodic Review (UPR).

Furthermore, civil society has at its disposal several mechanisms to pursue accountability under international law: (i) submitting information to the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council; (ii) submitting shadow reports to the UN Human Rights Council’s UPR, next scheduled for 2026; and (iii) sending parallel reports to the Human Rights Committee under ICCPR to flag violations of Articles 7, 9, 19, and 21. Crucially, framing abuse as torturous amplifies the “naming and shaming” effect, intensifying pressure on the Indonesian government by exposing reputational harm, potential diplomatic fallout, and investor concern. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Right (OHCHR) own call for thorough and transparent investigations provides fertile ground for these advocacy efforts.

Conclusion

In sum, Indonesia’s August 2025 crackdown transcends the realm of excessive force or CIDT and meets the legal definition of torture under the CAT. The government’s attempts to reframe the protests as mere “chaos” rather than legitimate public frustration, and its dismissive rhetoric that mocks the suffering of its people, only deepen the gravity of these violations. Recognizing the crackdown as torture elevates the discourse from calls for reform to demands for justice, from empty apologies to genuine accountability. Faced with a government unwilling to reckon with its own abuses, many in Indonesia now look to the international community for solidarity, pressure, and meaningful intervention to ensure that their voices are not silenced.