Uncertain Commitments: The US-Ukraine Rare Minerals Agreement and the Limits of Treaty Law

[Theodore Hanna is an LL.M. candidate in International and European Law at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens]

In The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoyevsky cautions that, “[t]he man who lies to himself and listens to his own lie comes to a point that he cannot distinguish the truth within him, or around him.” This warning resonates powerfully in the context of contemporary treaty-making, where states often pursue mutually incompatible obligations under the veneer of strategic alignment. The United States–Ukraine Framework Agreement on Rare Minerals (the Agreement), announced in February 2025, exemplifies this pattern. Ostensibly aimed at securing long-term cooperation in the extraction, processing, and trade of critical minerals essential to the green energy transition and defense technologies, the agreement is part of a broader geopolitical gambit in which Ukraine positions itself as a reliable resource partner to Western powers. 

Yet Dostoyevsky’s observation on self-deception casts a shadow over this arrangement. The Ukrainian government, while locked in an ongoing war and dependent on external financing, has also entered a century-long resource deal with the United Kingdom and is reportedly engaged in parallel negotiations with France. These overlapping commitments raise pressing legal and strategic questions: can Kyiv credibly guarantee access to resources it does not yet control? Are these agreements a form of economic statecraft or merely diplomatic signaling papering over irreconcilable obligations? As investors push forward with projects premised on postwar extraction, the legal uncertainty surrounding ownership, governance, and enforceability of these mineral rights calls into question the coherence and enforceability of Ukraine’s international commitments. This post examines these tensions under the law of treaties, focusing in particular on issues of consent, validity, and state responsibility. At stake is not simply whether the treaty meets formal requirements under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, but whether international law should recognize as legitimate a resource agreement signed during a constitutional crisis and under military occupation, especially when the state in question may not survive the war in its current form.

In October 2024, President Volodymyr Zelensky introduced a strategic ‘Victory Plan’ to the Verkhovna Rada, prioritizing the development of Ukraine’s mineral resources (uranium, titanium, and lithium) through partnerships with the European Union and the United States. This initiative sought to attract foreign investment and strengthen Ukraine’s geopolitical alliances. The proposal laid the foundation for what would later become the US-Ukraine Framework Agreement on Rare Minerals, announced in February 2025.

However, Ukraine’s borders, sovereignty, and even the future of its political regime remain uncertain due to the ongoing war with Russia. Facing prolonged military and economic destabilization, the government in Kyiv lacks a clear constitutional mandate to enter into long-term agreements, agreements that may ultimately prove unenforceable under any future settlement shaped by facts on the ground. If the current Ukrainian state collapses, or if it undergoes territorial fragmentation, any commitments made under this Agreement may be rendered null or unenforceable under international law.

Legal precedents suggest treaties signed by wartime or transitional governments may face post-war challenges to their enforceability. Iraq’s post-2003 oil contracts, Kosovo’s early agreements post-independence, and Crimea’s investment disputes following Russia’s 2014 annexation illustrate how regime change or territorial loss complicates treaty obligations. ICSID tribunals have ruled on state succession in treaty obligations, with investment tribunals considering whether wartime agreements are binding post-conflict.

Further complicating matters, Ukraine’s access to the Black Sea remains under threat. While the country currently relies on the Black Sea to facilitate exports, a Russian takeover of Odessa would render Ukraine landlocked, cutting off a major route for mineral and agricultural exports. Western investors, including those from the UK and US, have conflicting interests in securing access to Black Sea trade routes, while also dealing with logistical uncertainties. This isn’t merely a matter of infrastructure: it underscores how any resource agreement is premised on speculative assumptions about future Ukrainian sovereignty and control, assumptions that investors, and their partner governments, are choosing to ignore. If Ukraine loses access to its Black Sea ports, any mineral trade agreement becomes reliant on overland routes through Western Ukraine, an area where Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland have historical claims that could resurface in a post-war settlement. The combined risks of territorial fragmentation, contested sovereignty, and limited export infrastructure seriously undermine the viability of Ukraine’s mineral agreements.

The Agreement raises additional legal uncertainties under international treaty law, particularly in light of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT, 1969) and established international adjudicative principles. Key concerns include jurisdiction, dispute resolution mechanisms, third-party intervention, territorial applicability, and the potential invalidity of the agreement due to Ukraine’s constitutional crisis. By prioritizing geopolitical strategy over legal certainty, the United States and its allies risk financial and strategic instability. As Ukraine’s mineral wealth becomes entangled in military conflict and overlapping contractual obligations, this Agreement illustrates how treaties concluded amid instability may rest on precarious legal foundations, raising logical questions about their enforceability in a postwar legal order.

Under the VCLT, a treaty is a binding international instrument between states governed by international law (Article 2). A key legal issue is whether the Agreement constitutes a binding treaty or a memorandum of understanding (MoU), a distinction that determines the extent of legal obligations. If it is legally binding, both parties would be obligated under pacta sunt servanda (Article 26 VCLT), meaning the treaty must be performed in good faith. If the Agreement is classified as a non-binding MoU, its obligations would be based on political commitments rather than enforceable treaty law.

The enforceability of the Agreement is further complicated by Ukraine’s constitutional crisis. The legitimacy of the Zelensky government to enter into long-term agreements is increasingly contested, as martial law remains in effect, and Ukraine’s ability to uphold its obligations beyond the war is uncertain. Zelensky has outlasted his constitutional mandate, refusing to conduct elections, effectively extending his rule with questioned democratic legitimacy. Under Article 46 VCLT, a treaty may be invalidated if the state entering it lacked the constitutional authority to do so. If Ukraine’s government collapses or is replaced through regime change, this Agreement may be unenforceable or revoked by a successor government, particularly if new leadership views it as a product of wartime coercion.

Investment tribunals have adjudicated similar cases of state succession in treaty obligations, particularly in contexts of regime change, armed conflict, or territorial disputes. Kosovo v. Serbia (ICSID arbitration) and Yukos v. Russia (PCA arbitration) serve as examples where post-war governments contested agreements made by previous regimes. If a post-Zelensky government seeks to challenge the mineral agreements, tribunals may have to determine whether wartime treaties are binding on successor governments.

The Agreement’s viability under international treaty law will likely depend on how Ukraine navigates its prior mineral agreements with the UK and France, whether a dispute resolution mechanism is clearly established, and how international law adjudicates resource claims in occupied territories. If Ukraine has pre-existing obligations to the UK and France, this Agreement may violate pacta sunt servanda (Article 26 VCLT). If Ukraine lacks full territorial control over mineral-rich areas, questions arise about whether the Agreement could be unenforceable under international law.

If Ukraine joins the European Union, the EU’s exclusive competence over trade and investment policy (Article 207 TFEU) could supersede or require renegotiation of the Agreement to align with EU law. This raises additional uncertainty about the Agreement’s long-term enforceability and Ukraine’s ability to unilaterally manage its mineral resources under EU trade regulations.

Rather than securing Ukraine’s long-term development, the US–Ukraine Framework Agreement on Rare Minerals reflects the extractive opportunism of purported allies who have undeniably contributed to Ukraine’s current condition. By locking Kyiv into long-term resource concessions amid territorial uncertainty, legal fragmentation, and active military occupation, Western powers are not offering solidarity, they are securing first rights to pillage what remains. Russia is advancing through force of arms, redrawing facts on the ground. Rather than a durable framework for cooperation, the Agreement exemplifies the use of treaty instruments as tools of anticipatory appropriation. This Agreement is not a partnership, but a preemptive carve-up, one that raises urgent questions about what law really legitimates in wartime.