Scholasticide in Gaza: A Need for Recognition of Systematic Educational Destruction as Genocidal

[Kate May is an LLM international human rights law and practice student at the University of York]

As Palestinian scholar Nabulsi warned over ten years ago, “Israel is seeking to annihilate an educated Palestine.” The devastating impact of educational destruction in Palestine has reached unprecedented levels, and this extended crisis has left children without formal education for over a year and a half, all while continuing attacks on schools worsen the humanitarian situation. This systematic destruction, known as scholasticide (or educide), appears to represent a deliberate strategy that threatens the very foundation of Palestinian education and cultural identity. 

The Anatomy of Scholasticide

Scholasticide manifests through three components: targeted killing or detention of educational staff and students; physical destruction of educational facilities; and systematic disruption of educational processes. Indeed, the scale of destruction in Gaza is staggering. As of December 2024, 95.2% of schools have been destroyed or rendered inoperable, all 12 universities are damaged or destroyed, over 12,000 students have been killed along with 492 educators–all while approximately 658,00 students have been unable to access education. The intensity of destruction is unprecedented, and analysis from Amnesty International has revealed that current damage levels are 90 times higher than during any previous offensive.

The Current Legal Framework

While education is enshrined as a fundamental right in multiple international treaties, including the ICESCR and the CRC, the current legal framework proves inadequate in light of the devastation in Gaza. The ICESCR outlines four essential features of education, including availability of functioning infrastructure, accessibility to all, appropriate quality standards, and flexibility to adapt to societal needs. The law is clear: education remains a fundamental right, even during armed conflict. However, Gaza’s educational system has effectively collapsed, and the scale of this collapse threatens long-term educational access and quality–two main tenets of the right.

Indeed, the widespread ratification of the right to education stands in stark contrast to the systematic destruction in Gaza. A significant challenge emerges from Israel’s position on IHRL applicability within the OPT. Through consistently maintaining that only IHL applies in these territories, Israel effectively sidesteps IHRL obligations, despite clear precedent establishing dual IHL and IHRL applicability during conflicts. This stance exposes a fundamental weakness of the current IHRL framework: its effectiveness diminishes when states are able to avoid accountability through legal interpretation without concrete repercussions. 

Israel’s position might reflect what Cohen terms ‘interpretive denial’–where through euphemisms and technical language and interpretation, an action’s meaning can be reframed and reclassified. In light of this, and given Israel’s apparent determination to avoid its human rights obligations regarding education, through interpretive denial, it might be left to third states to hold Israel accountable.

Indeed, powerful states can shape international law by influencing other nations’ behaviour, with their efforts to promote compliance having a significant impact on IHRL accountability. That being said, a further complication lies in the fact that third-party state responsibility mechanisms under both the ICESCR and CRC demonstrate notable limitations (see De Schutter et al and Lundy et al). Given such limitations, establishing third-party responsibility through customary international law (CIL) emerges as a possible alternative. The right to education might qualify as CIL due to its widespread ratification and the fact that states often fulfil their reporting obligations as required. However, such responsibility is governed by the, albeit, non-binding ARISWA, and is applicable only to serious breaches of jus cogens or obligations owed to the international community. There exists no consensus that the right to education qualifies as such.

So then, the limitations under the current IHRL framework protecting educational rights arguably demand a fresh approach. For that reason, I will now present an argument in favour of the recognition of scholasticide as evidence of genocidal intent within the Genocide Convention’s framework. This approach would not only give deserved credence to a too little-acknowledged concept but would also strengthen the protection of educational rights within armed conflicts, and create stronger obligations for third-party states, particularly when confronting violations by states such as Israel that resist accountability.

Education as a Fundamental Right

Nabulsi first conceptualised the term scholasticide through direct observation of educational suppression in Palestine. While such suppression has persisted for decades, one cannot stress enough that the scale of destruction following 7th October 2023 represents an escalation. Many experts and observers have concluded that these actions constitute a coordinated and systematic campaign specifically targeting the foundation of Palestinian educational rights. 

While the destruction of educational infrastructure itself is not explicitly prohibited under IHRL and is rather guided by IHL, it is essential to recognise that the realisation of many human rights requires physical spaces such as schools, libraries and archives. Moreover, education itself serves as what former UN Special Rapporteur Tomaševski terms a gateway right; it bridges civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights. For example, let us briefly consider expression rights. Under the CRC this encompasses the right to ‘seek, receive and impart information of all kinds, regardless of frontiers,’ but, without educational materials or educators this right has the potential to become meaningless. Where would children seek information from? Who can they receive information from? Through what channels might they have the opportunity to impart this information? Education provides children with the critical tools and knowledge to understand, assert and defend their rights effectively, and becomes particularly crucial in conflict zones like Gaza where it can provide safe spaces, disseminate essential survival information, and protect vulnerable youth from exploitation. 

Moreover, the value of education in Palestinian society transcends mere academic learning. As Nabulsi explains: “education is the most important thing–it is part of the family life, part of your identity and part of the rebellion … in a refugee camp like Gaza, every child knows that in those same schooldesks sat your parents and your grandparents, whose tradition they carry on.” Similarly, Eghbariah notes that ‘legal theory still lacks an adequate framework to describe the reality of domination and violence in Palestine.’ Thus, giving formal recognition to the concept of scholasticide might help to address this gap.

Reconceptualising Scholasticide as Genocidal

While the Genocide Convention does not explicitly (or implicitly for that matter) address educational destruction, jurisprudence has recognised that systematic cultural destruction can serve as compelling evidence of genocidal intent. As UN Special Rapporteur Albanese noted in her report on the OPT, the destruction in Gaza is ‘significant and indicative evidence of genocidal intent inspiring genocidal acts.’ The systematic annihilation of the Gazan educational system certainly appears intentional. Interpretation surely acknowledges that education in modern society extends beyond a basic right–it is fundamental to a group’s survival, reminiscent of art II(c) of the Convention. Certainly, as discussed above, scholasticide poses a direct threat to a group’s intergenerational sustainability and their potential to advocate for their wider rights.

Nevertheless, many advocate for maintaining a clear distinction between cultural and physical genocide, citing that an inclusion of non-lethal harms might diminish the concept’s gravity. However, I concur with those who believe that such an argument overlooks the Convention’s thoughtful structure. While the definition’s first three provisions address immediate physical existence, the final two speak to long-term group viability. This distinction is crucial because genocide can be established through any element of the Convention–challenging the common misconception that genocide necessarily involves mass killings or specific victim thresholds. 

This understanding is particularly important when considering that the distinction between cultural and physical genocide originated during the Convention’s drafting, where cultural genocide was deliberately set aside to be addressed through separate treaty mechanisms. However, while this decision has created significant gaps in rights protection, it should also provide an opportunity to interpret the Convention more broadly, allowing for the inclusion of scholasticide as evidence of genocidal intent.

The current IHRL framework has proven insufficient in addressing systematic educational destruction, particularly in cases that exceed basic treaty violations yet don’t reach the level of jus cogens norms. Recognising scholasticide as a genocidal strategy—one that targets the very foundation of children’s futures—would help bridge this gap in IHRL and strengthen the protection of education rights in conflicts like Gaza. This is especially relevant when considering third-party obligations under the Convention (discussed below). Crucially, treaty interpretations, including the Convention itself, should not have a single fixed meaning. Instead, they require persuasive arguments for interpretations that best align with the agreement’s context and purpose. Indeed, the systematic destruction of education (encompassing schools, libraries, universities, archives, students and educators) in Gaza can surely be interpreted as a ‘deliberate inflicti[on] on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.’

So, with this understanding of treaty interpretation, the unique Palestinian context, and the crucial importance of educational rights in mind, surely there is compelling logic for consideration of the act of scholasticide as genocidal. 

The Imperative of Third-Party Responsibility

Having in mind the aforementioned issue of Israel’s unwillingness to acknowledge any violation of educational rights, and the need for third-party responsibility to counter this, an understanding of scholasticide as genocidal would create strong obligations for third-party states. 

Indeed, the legal foundation for third-party state obligations under ARISWA stems from violations of jus cogens norms. Genocide, representing one of the most serious violations of IHRL, undoubtedly meets this threshold. Article 41 of ARISWA establishes two key obligations: (1) states must actively cooperate to end genocide, and (2) must refrain from providing aid that sustains genocidal conditions. While 41(1) is widely accepted as CIL and is thus binding, 41(2) is not generally considered as part of CIL. With this in mind, many commentators argue that powerful states, including the United States (US) and other European nations, are currently violating 41(2) through their continued provision of arms to Israel. Indeed, these arms are foreseeably being used in the bombardment of educational infrastructure, and, in doing so, directly contributing to the Gazan scholasticide. Yet, as major global powers remain unwilling to restrict arms provision, it becomes evident that CIL alone cannot adequately enforce IHRL obligations concerning genocide or scholasticide.

This is where the Convention becomes crucial. It establishes explicit, binding obligations on state parties regarding prevention and punishment. The Bosnia v Serbia judgment set a clear standard: states must ‘employ all means reasonably available to them … to prevent genocide as far as possible.’ This erga omnes obligation, notably reinforced recently in South Africa v Israel, suggests that under this conception of scholasticide, states providing support for actions contributing to scholasticide could face complicity charges. Notably, the threshold concerning complicity, after plausibility of genocide has been established, is considerably low. Once a state becomes aware of a serious risk of genocide, it must implement any reasonable and available deterrent measures. This naturally raises the suggestion of an arms embargo.

Finally, while de facto limitations of the Convention exist, they extend beyond what this post can reasonably discuss. However, the Convention represents the most potent existing legal mechanism for the protection of education rights in conflict zones. Its potential for recognition of scholasticide as evidence of genocidal intent would provide a strong legal foundation for third-party state responsibility, which appears the most viable way to ensure accountability for and to put an end to Israel’s systematic destruction of the right to education in Gaza, and the denial of educational opportunities for an entire generation of Palestinian children.