Symposium on PMSCs: Profit, Power, and the Privatised Battlefield

[Ara Marcén Naval is a Spanish human rights advocate and policy expert with over 20 years of experience working at the intersection of conflict, human rights, corruption, and accountability. She has advised governments, UN agencies, and civil society organisations, and recently contributed to international efforts to regulate private military and security companies.]

In today’s wars, power wears a suit and profit pulls the trigger. From the oilfields of Iraq to the forests of the Central African Republic, private military and security companies (PMSCs) have become indispensable actors in modern conflict. They guard convoys, train soldiers, surveil borders, and in some cases, fight battles. What was once the domain of state militaries is now a booming global market worth over $220 billion, expected to double by 2030.

But behind the rhetoric of “efficiency” and “support,” the privatisation of security reveals deeper and more troubling dynamics. In the shadows of conflict zones, PMSCs can operate with minimal oversight and maximum discretion. This opacity creates fertile ground for corruption: from bribery and inflated threat assessments to illicit arms brokering and political manipulation.

This piece explores the corruption risks embedded in the global PMSC industry, the regulatory gaps that enable them, and the urgent need for international standards that bring transparency, accountability, and integrity to the business of war.

The Rise of the Privatised Battlefield

The expansion of PMSCs over the past two decades is not without justification. Faced with complex crises, overstretched militaries, and rising security demands, governments have turned to the private sector to fill operational gaps. PMSCs can deploy rapidly, operate flexibly, and bring technical expertise in training, logistics, and cyber operations. For many conflict-affected states, they offer short-term capacity where national forces are underdeveloped or overstretched.

In some cases, their presence has arguably helped to protect critical infrastructure. The ability to draw on private actors can also allow international organisations and humanitarian actors to maintain operations in high-risk areas. When properly vetted, regulated, and embedded in lawful mandates, PMSCs can complement state efforts to uphold peace and security.

However, these benefits come with risks that grow in proportion to the opacity and lack of oversight surrounding their activities.

How Corruption Flows Through the System

Transparency International’s research, including the report Hidden Costs, has identified a range of corruption risks associated with PMSCs:

• Conflict of interest: PMSCs often advise security forces while also bidding for contracts, creating perverse incentives.
• Bribery and kickbacks: in fragile states, contracts are routinely awarded through opaque processes vulnerable to political manipulation or illicit payments.
• Threat inflation: by overstating risks, companies can justify prolonged deployments and larger budgets.
• Undue influence on security policy: shaping defence and security decisions to favour private interests.
• Strengthening repressive or corrupt security forces: enabling abusive practices by providing training, equipment, or operational support.
• Partnering with politically exposed persons: engaging with officials who hold ownership stakes in PMSCs.
• Resource capture: gaining control over valuable natural resources, fuelling conflict and competition.
• Enabling non-state violence: supporting militias or criminal groups that escalate conflict.
• Opacity and lack of accountability: using complex ownership structures and subcontracting chains to evade scrutiny.
• Untraceable funding streams: relying on hidden or unregulated financial flows, including cryptocurrency.
• Illicit economies: PMSCs have been linked to arms trafficking, smuggling, and resource exploitation in conflict zones.
• Subcontracting chains: layers of subcontractors obscure responsibility and create gaps in enforcement.

Moreover, PMSCs often operate in environments with weak institutions, limited media freedom, and high defence corruption risks, a combination that shields misconduct and hampers investigations. The result is not just financial waste, but serious harm to human rights, rule of law, and long-term stability.

Where the Law Falls Short

Current regulatory frameworks are insufficient. The Montreux Document and the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers offer guidance, but they are non-binding. National regulations vary widely, and many do not cover corruption risks.

The UN Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group (OEIGWG) is currently drafting an international instrument to regulate PMSCs. Thanks to civil society advocacy, including submissions by Transparency International Defence & Security (TI-DS), the latest draft now includes references to the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and the Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC). Yet critical gaps remain.

To prevent PMSCs from becoming vehicles for corruption, impunity, or elite enrichment, any international regulatory framework must include concrete anti-corruption measures. Based on lessons from past failures, said concrete anti-corruption measures, specifically, should entail full transparency of contracts and licensing procedures, public disclosure of ownership structures and beneficial owners, robust parliamentary oversight of procurement, effective protection for whistleblowers, and mandatory corruption risk assessments in licensing, procurement, and export controls. These are not abstract safeguards but essential, practical tools to bring accountability to a sector where opacity has too often shielded abuse.

A Balanced Path Forward

Acknowledging the utility of PMSCs should not mean accepting their unregulated expansion. The international community must move beyond voluntary codes and toward binding rules that reflect the real risks at play.

While PMSCs can play a legitimate role in peacekeeping, protection, and stabilisation, this cannot justify their unchecked expansion; the international community must replace voluntary codes with binding rules that ensure rigorous vetting, transparency, and oversight, and trigger real consequences for misconduct, including corruption-related offences.

The goal is not to eliminate PMSCs but to bring them under the same standards of integrity and accountability expected of public security forces. Security cannot be truly effective if it is bought at the cost of corruption and impunity.

Conclusion: Regulation as Prevention

The privatised battlefield is no longer an exception, it is fast becoming the norm. As PMSCs gain power, so must the systems that govern them. The risks are too serious to ignore: corruption erodes trust, weakens institutions, and fuels the very conflicts these companies claim to resolve.

The OEIGWG process presents a rare opportunity to create global rules fit for modern warfare. But for these rules to matter, they must include robust anti-corruption provisions. Profit and power may be inevitable in today’s security landscape. But impunity doesn’t have to be.