Symposium on PMSCs: Deadly Agents Functioning as ‘Humanitarian Actors’

[Dr Jelena Aparac is a senior academic and consultant, and former chair and member of the UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries]

Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) have significantly expanded their operations, sectors of activity, and client base over the past decades. They operate not only in armed conflict zones but also in areas of peace, across diverse industries such as extractive sectors, cyber security or maritime security. Their clientele includes States, multinational corporations (including in the oil and gas industries), civil society organizations, and even armed groups. Despite their widespread presence, PMSCs’ activities have frequently been accompanied by grave and systematic human rights violations, often carried out with near-total impunity. Perhaps most concerning is their growing involvement in the humanitarian sector, where their expansion raises profound legal, ethical and operational challenges.

In September 2021, in my capacity as Chair-Rapporteur, I led the drafting of the United Nations Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries’ (WGM) report titled “Impact of the Use of Private Military and Security Services in Humanitarian Action”, which I subsequently presented to the Human Rights Council. In this report, the WGM underscored the growing commercialization of humanitarian action and its far-reaching implications for the integrity and neutrality of humanitarian responses. Despite the experts’ recommendations, the report has failed to generate meaningful action on the part of States. Moreover, the report prompted debate primarily around the responsibility of humanitarian actors as clients of private security services, rather than adequately addressing the more troubling issue of PMSCs acting as “humanitarian actors”.

Over recent decades, the global humanitarian aid system has expanded significantly in an effort to address the rising number of both man-made and natural disasters. Today, the system faces unprecedented strain, with more than 110 active armed conflicts worldwide, a surge in climate-related disasters, and the increasing frequency of epidemics. This growing demand is met with dwindling financial resources, placing immense pressure on humanitarian actors and prompting shifts in operational models. Indeed, the current landscape marks a clear departure from the so-called “golden age” of humanitarian action, when humanitarian actors operated within a relatively protected and privileged space. This situation pawed the way for PMSCs to place their services not only as combatants for parties to the conflicts but also as “humanitarian actors”. This convergence of militarized actors with traditionally civilian and neutral functions exacerbates the erosion of the legal distinction between combatants and civilians, a cornerstone of IHL enshrined in Article 48 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.

The phenomenon is not new; the WGM raised concerns as early as 2014 in a report that addressed the troubling practice of the United Nations contracting private security providers. Recent reports have documented operations labelled as “humanitarian,” such as evacuations conducted by private security providers, which have violated established standards under international human rights law and international humanitarian law (IHL)These operations often lack transparency, independent oversight, and adherence to the core humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence.

In a more concerning development, some PMSCs have not only attempted to position themselves as humanitarian actors but have also sought to operate under the guise of providing medical humanitarian assistance, a role they significantly expanded during the COVID-19 pandemic.

IHL recognizes and protects two distinct categories of humanitarian operations: humanitarian relief missions and medical missions. While both are afforded protection, important legal distinctions exist. Humanitarian relief operations are protected under the general rules governing civilians and civilian objects (see here and here) whereas medical missions are granted special protection, which applies in all circumstances and is more difficult to forfeit (see among others articles 19-24)

Under IHL, attacks on humanitarian relief activities are not listed as war crimes. In contrast, intentional attacks against medical units, personnel, or transports are explicitly prohibited and may constitute warcrimes under the Article 8(2)(b)(ix) and 8(2)(e)(ii) of Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

This legal distinction has significant consequences. If the current trend continues, and PMSCs not only expand into the humanitarian space but also begin providing, or claiming to provide, medical assistance, this could severely undermine the integrity of medical missions. It also raises profound accountability and ethical challenges, especially when such actors operate in complex emergencies where the presence of impartial medical providers is essential to civilian protection (see here and here). It would risk eroding the legal clarity necessary for the effective protection of medical services in armed conflict and increase the vulnerability of affected populations to violence, reprisals, or denial of access to care.

Furthermore, additional serious concerns emerge. PMSCs have historically operated with near-total impunity for human rights violations committed across various conflict and post-conflict settings. Despite well-documented abuses, there has been a persistent failure to hold such actors accountable through international legal mechanisms. Simultaneously, there have been no international prosecutions to date specifically for attacks on medical missions, despite their recognition as serious violations of international humanitarian law and potentially constituting war crimes.

This dual accountability gap, concerning both PMSC misconduct and violations against medical personnel and infrastructure, creates a dangerous permissive environment. It enables PMSCs to engage in or support operations with potential for serious violations of international law without facing meaningful legal consequences, thereby undermining the protective frameworks designed to safeguard humanitarian and medical missions in armed conflict.

As for relief operations, the recent case of the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) offers a chilling preview of the direction humanitarian action may be heading, raising profound concerns about its politicization, militarization, and erosion of core principles.

The GHF was established by former members of the United States military and paramilitary services. While the organization presents itself as independent, it reportedly operates with support from both the Israeli and U.S. governments. Its emergence must be assessed in the context of the severe humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip, which multiple United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations have described as catastrophic and on the brink of famine. Despite the urgency, Israeli authorities have systematically blocked or severely restricted the entry of humanitarian relief into Gaza, drawing international condemnation.

In response to this criticism, Israel introduced a militarized “aid mechanism,” under which GHF began operations in May 2025. Preliminary reports on GHF’s operations reveal disorganized, opaque aid distributions, potentially even defined as war crimes, confirming long-standing concerns about the privatization and politicization of humanitarian assistance as it was highlighted in the WGM’s 2021 report. These developments are yet another striking example of blurring the lines between military and humanitarian actors, eroding trust, safety, and access for affected civilian populations, and basically undermining humanitarian relief. It is therefore not a surprise then many human rights and humanitarian actors called for ending the GHF operations and to all stakeholders to stop any cooperation with GHF (see here and here). Currently, the Swiss branch of GHF faces risks of potential liquidation.

What comes next? The current international legal framework is wholly inadequate to address the expanding scope and impact of PMSCs, particularly given their potential to cause devastating harm to human life and dignity. At present, PMSCs are regulated only by two primary international instruments: the Montreux Document (2008) and the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC) (2010). While both instruments represent important normative steps, they are non-legally binding, possess significant limitations, and are not fully equipped to regulate the evolving and increasingly complex operations of PMSCs.

Although these frameworks have undergone some updates, they remain insufficient in addressing the scale and nature of contemporary private military and security operations. An Intergovernmental Working Group, mandated by the Human Rights Council, is currently engaged in discussions around the Fourth Draft of a proposed international instrument on PMSCs. However, if international law is to remain relevant and effective, this new instrument must be legally binding and directly responsive to the challenges posed by modern privatized military and security actors.

That said, legal reform alone is not enough. The international community must also confront the underlying drivers of humanitarian crises, including protracted armed conflicts, structural inequalities, and climate-related displacement, in order to safeguard both humanitarian principles and human dignity.