Moving Towards a Settlement of the Conflict in Ukraine

[Marc Weller is Professor of International Law and International Constitutional Studies in the University of Cambridge]

The Cambridge Initiative on Peace Settlements, in cooperation with Opinio Juris, offered a proposal for ending the war in Ukraine as soon as the conflict broke out, along with detailed contributions on individual aspects of a possible settlement from our international team of experts. This contribution introduces the text of a framework for a draft settlement in view of more recent developments.

Movement towards a Settlement

The original idea was to show that a settlement is possible and can be reached without further loss of life and suffering. In fact, a settlement sharing some of the elements that had been proposed in February 2022 was nearly achieved by the Russian Federation and Ukraine under Turkish facilitation some months later, in late March and early April of that year, at Istanbul.

With the withdrawal of Russian forces from Western Ukraine in April 2022, and the discovery of major alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Ukrainian territories that had been under Russian occupation, the hopes for a settlement receded. Instead, international efforts focused on providing security guarantees that might be offered to Ukraine once the conflict concludes. 

At the same time, the Russian strategy of attacking the civilian infrastructure of Ukraine, particularly the energy sector along with other civilian targets, has had its effect on the increasingly war-weary public. While the prospect of peace negotiations could not even be discussed in Ukraine a year or so ago, the mood is changing. Moreover, incoming US President Donald Trump has impelled his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelenskyi, to offer negotiations, although ‘from a position of strength.’

President Putin has maintained for some time that the Russian Federation is ready to negotiate. However, he has emphasized that such negotiations must aim towards international acceptance of the territorial gains made by Moscow over the past three years. This result would be inconsistent with the international legal order, and would evidently be resisted by Ukraine.

Whether a fully-fledged peace settlement is possible therefore remains doubtful. It is of course possible that the outcome will be a simple cease-fire following the precedent of the Korean Armistice of 1953. Fighting would stop along the present line of confrontation, perhaps with some adjustments, including in the Kursk area where Ukrainian forces have penetrated Russian Federation territory. Perhaps some steps would be added to try and stabilize the situation. This could include measures to defuse incidents, perhaps a withdrawal of heavier forces from the line of confrontation, and possibly even the deployment of an international buffer force. 

In such a situation, the Russian Federation might use the break in the conflict to rearm, while Ukraine too might seek to rebuild its arsenal with Western support. At best, a highly unstable situation would obtain, where a renewal of hostilities would be easily possible or even likely.

The alternative is a broader settlement that might meet the interests of both sides, at least for the mid-term. This would allow for a stabilization of the situation, the management of issues that arise in the immediate wake of the armed confrontation, and international steps supporting implementation of a settlement.  This might be followed by a broader, pan-European settlement some years down the line, addressing the broader dimensions of the conflict, conventional armament in Europe and other matters. Territorial issues affecting Ukraine might be addressed in a more definite way within that context, much as the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe endorsed the post-World War II order in Europe.

Options for a Draft Settlement

This draft settlement proposed here choses among the available options for settlement of a range of issues. This is not meant to suggest that the options chosen will necessarily be the ones accepted in the end by the sides, or that the sides should settle in line with this text. Rather, the idea is simply to show roughly what an agreement might in the end look like, and what elements it would need to contain. A larger study that will accompany this draft in due course will analyze each of the elements of a potential settlement, discusses alternative options on each major issue, and explains why this initial draft has adopted one particular option over another.

Key Elements

The draft agreement provides for a comprehensive and permanent cease-fire, followed by withdrawals of the sides from a zone of 7.5 kilometres from each side of the Provisional Line of Control. An International Disengagement Mission of a strength of up to 7.500 personnel drawn from states acceptable to both will be deployed in that 15 km-wide Disengagement Zone. The sides will withdraw heavy weapons to a minimum distance of 35 km from the Line of Control and will not fly manned or unmanned aerial vehicles in the area. 

The Provisional Line of Control, and hence the Disengagement Zone, will be adjusted to form the definite Line of Control after the comprehensive, permanent cease-fire has been established. This includes a withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from areas that were under the control of the Russian Federation as of 22 February 2022 (Kursk region), and a corresponding withdrawal of Russian Federation and associated forces from areas along the Provisional Line of Control. This may include areas that have been traditionally inhabited by a majority of individuals whose habitual first language is not Russian. These areas will be clearly designated in an annex to the agreement.

Previously, a significant range of alternative solutions relating to territories occupied in 2014 and since February 2022 were proposed. Early in the conflict, Russian-led autonomy for the Donbas region within the overall (nominal) sovereignty of Ukraine could have been possible. Subsequently, there was the idea of a lease-back of territory—Ukraine’s sovereignty would be confirmed while Kyiv would accept a Russian Federation presence on the territory for a long period. However, since September 2022, when the Russian Federation formally purported to incorporate the four additional Oblasts it has occupied, the Russian Federation insists that this incorporation into its sovereign state territory and constitutional system must be acknowledged in any outcome. 

Such acknowledgement remains impossible in view of the position of international law on annexations obtained through force. If the Russian Federation insists on this point, no deal could (or should) be possible, also for the Trump White House. Hence, the only possible solution is to defer the issue of status of territory, at least until a final settlement might be reached with the context of a larger, Pan-European Conference and Security and Cooperation in Europe a fair number of years down the line. 

Ukraine has seemingly confirmed its willingness to accept such a de-facto outcome. While this would not prejudice its de jure position, Ukraine would be ready to give a binding undertaking not the use of force to recapture the territory (one recalls Azerbaijan’s successful armed campaign of 2020/23 to recapture Ngorno Karabakh after decades of occupation by Ajerbaijan).

Accordingly, the draft agreement avoids any suggestion concerning the status of the territories that have fallen under the control of the Russian Federation since 2014. It simply provides for the administration of the territories under the control of each side under the agreement, including arrangements for the protection of non-dominant groups, the return of property or compensation for its loss, and cross-line cooperation.

Under the deal, Ukraine could progress on its path towards EU integration but pledges not to seek NATO membership, at least until the convening of a Pan-European Conference on Security and Cooperation to be held in between five to fifteen years. This conference would discuss a new system of cooperative security for Europe, limitations of conventional armaments in Europe, outstanding issues of the territorial order of Europe and other issues. Ukraine would however be entitled to engage in defence cooperation with any defensive alliance, including training and joint exercises. Training missions with such alliances on Ukrainian territory are however limited in terms of time and numbers involved and there would be no deployment of NATO forces on Ukrainian territory.

This option clearly excludes a peace-keeping force of over 100,000 troops drawn from NATO states willing to contribute. Despite the brave rhetoric of UK Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron, this idea would never be acceptable by the Russian Federation. After all, the entire invasion was aimed at removing Ukraine from the ever encroaching Western orbit, and expecially from providing a base for NATO troops.

Still, under this design, Ukraine could still cooperate bilaterally with any state it choses, including NATO members, in preparing for its defence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the already existing defence cooperation agreements. This would essentially reflect the design of the Yermak/Rasmussen plan for deep cooperation in terms of defence industries, supplies, training, etc. However, there would be no permanent deployment of foreign forces on the territory of Ukraine beyond a certain number of military/technical personnel from individual states, say around 1000.  Ukraine would not seek to acquire missiles or other unmanned aerial delivery vehicles beyond a range of 250 km.

The agreement would be supported by a Group of Supporting States composed of the US, UK, France, Germany and Italy, of Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, and Belarus, China, India, Brazil and South Africa. These would help ensure compliance, arrange an International Fund to finance the arrangements foreseen in the agreement, and consider issues relating to the gradual relaxation of economic measures imposed against the Russian Federation in the context of the present conflict.

The UN and possibly the OSCE would be associated with this Group. The International Disengagement Mission could be arranged as a UN-led peace-keeping force, it could be a UN-mandated force under OSCE guidance, or a force with a delegated UN mandate supervised by the Group of Supporting States.

Should any side resume the conflict, an arrangement for the automatic snap-back of sanctions could be constructed. While this might be difficult to accept for the Russian Federation, Ukraine and its allies could insist that the UN Security Council Resolution that would endorse the settlement under Chapter VII provides for sanctions that would be brought into force automatically, and universally, should a further armed attack occur.

As confirmed by President Trump (and already asserted by many other NATO members) there would be no Article 5-like NATO security guarantee. However, as noted, there would be EU membership for Ukraine, which also has certain security implications, along with bilateral security cooperation with individual states, including NATO members.

Issues not Fully Addressed

The proposal merely provides for a framework for a mid-term agreement. Necessarily, this framework cannot cover the highly detailed provisions, for instance relating to the technical aspects of the permanent cease-fire that would need to be provided. Such details on this and other elements of the agreement would need to be addressed in detailed annexes, which would be part of the agreement.

The text of the agreement proposed here leaves out, or only addresses in part, the one or other issue of significant interest to the sides and to some third states. It is unlikely that these could be addressed directly in such an initial agreement. 

As already noted, the draft avoids any pronouncement on the legal status of the contested territories between the sides. Ukraine will insist on huge compensation payments ranging in the trillions of dollars. The Russian Federation will reject any notion of compensation. 

The proposal includes some softer ways of circumnavigating this issue which are discussed in greater detail in the longer study. For instance, the Russian Federation would bear all costs concerning property lost in areas that have fallen under its control and will make additional significant contributions to the International Fund established for rehabilitation, reconstruction, damages and other purposes over a period of ten years.

Similarly, much international attention is being paid to the issue of personal accountability for launching the war, and for the way it has been conducted. War crimes prosecutions at the national and international level are advancing, with the prospect of the creation of a special criminal tribunal on the crime of aggression by the Council of Europe or some of its members looming for April. It is difficult to see President Putting signing a peace agreement at the moment when key supporting states are establishing an international tribunal specifically aiming to try him for launching an aggressive war.

Rather, the Russian Federation will demand that it, and its officials, including its President, must be released from any such liabilities in a settlement. However, it is clear that the sides, and even potential Supporting States, lack the legal authority to remove the threat of criminal or civil action in all national or international courts. While it is up to the sides to determine whether they will or will not pursue war crimes allegations in their domestic courts, it is no longer possible to offer international amnesties, even if that would appear to some morally acceptable or even desirable in order to achieve peace. At most, the UN Security Council can suspend proceedings in the International Criminal Court at The Hague for a year at a time. The Supporting States might also commit to abstain from creating additional accountability mechanisms concerning the crime of aggression, however painful this would be for those who have invested immense efforts in this project.

Generating a Settlement Process

The US and the Russian Federation are meeting for exploratory talks at the level of Foreign Ministers as this post is being prepared for publication. Ukraine and the EU have bemoaned their exclusion from the process thus far.

The real question is what role the US will play. If it wants to move from the position of staunch supporter of Ukrainian resistance to Russian aggression to that of a more or less neutral mediator, its present attitude can perhaps be explained. Making up for the previous stance under the Biden administration, the present manoeuvre of excluding Ukraine and putting distance between the US and EU positions makes sense.

On the other hand, one might have expected the US to play the role of committed mediator. That means that it would be clear that the US is committed to Ukraine and will try to defend its basic interests, much like it position in negotiations concerning Israel. Nevertheless, the other side, in this instance Russia, accepts this format, as it means that the committed mediator will be in a position to deliver the other side if a balanced bargain is struck in the end.

The final alternative is less appealing for Ukraine. Having made important concessions to Moscow even before talks about talks commenced might point to a broader attempt by the US to rebuild relations with the Russian Fedeation. This could be explained by the geopolitical aim to wean Moscow off its alliance with China. The Trump administration sees China as the real global threat, rather than the Russian Federation. In this scenario, Ukraine, the weaker side, would be faced with bluster from both Moscow and Washington, and pressure to accept a deal that might cross its red lines. Europe might not be an effective counter-weight, given the disdain of the Trump Administration for its former close allies across the Atlantic.

However the format of the talks develops, any mediation effort would in the end need to be backed up by a Contact Group of Supporting States. In addition to the US, UK, Germany, France and Italy, this might include traditional supporters of mediation like Norway, Sweden, Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Switzerland, and states closer to the Russian Federation, perhaps like Belarus, China, India, South Africa and Brazil. The effort would also need to involve the United Nations and potentially the OSCE.

This document represents the views of the author and is not attributable to any government or institution.