Archive for
February, 2014

Don’t Panic! The Budapest Memorandum Does Not Require US and UK to Defend Ukraine

by Julian Ku

Lots of reports, including those from the new Ukrainian government at a meeting of the UN Security Council, suggest that Russian military forces have crossed into Ukraine. This has caused a mild panic on Wall Street and some typically overwrought press reporting from, just to give an example, Britain’s Daily Mail.

A treaty signed in 1994 by the US and Britain could pull both countries into a war to protect Ukraine if Putin’s troops intervene.

Bill Clinton, John Major, Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kuchma – the then-rulers of the USA, UK, Russia and Ukraine – agreed to the The Budapest Memorandum as part of the denuclearization of former Soviet republics after the dissolution of the Soviet Union

Technically it means that if Russia has invaded Ukraine then it would be difficult for the US and Britain to avoid going to war.

Uh…no it doesn’t. At least not from my reading of it.  It might be a good idea for the US to stand up for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and it is true that the Budapest Memorandum commits Russia to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (I thought Russia’s president wanted to respect international law?).  The UN Charter does that anyway. The Memorandum does not in anyway obligate any country to intervene in order to guarantee Ukraine’s territorial integrity.

In other words, it is not a security guarantee, like the kind that the US has with Japan. It is also not a formal treaty which, at least under US law, would have more binding impact.  So relax, American doves, it’s 2014, not 1914.  International agreements will not lead us blindly to war (sorry, Ukraine!).

 

Survey Says: If You Want Solitary Confinement Reform, Talk Up Treaty Obligations

by Peter Spiro

Here is a timely piece from Adam Chilton on how treaty obligations may be experienced by the American public. He devised an experiment (using Amazon’s mTurk) to test the effect of a putative treaty violation on public support for reform of solitary confinement practices. The piece comes to us just as congressional hearings have focused policymakers on the issue as a matter (mostly) of domestic law.

The experiment framed comparative questions to control for the value of the treaty commitment itself, as opposed to that of unlegalized human rights norms. A statement that solitary confinement violates unspecified human rights didn’t move the needle at all, where an argument that it “violates human rights treaties that the United States has signed” did, in a statistically significant way. (Chilton carefully notes that “signed” was used to avoid confusion, consistent with the vernacular understanding of treaties.) Respondents were moved not by a sense that treaties should be honored or that violations are immoral but rather that U.S. practice should conform to international standards.

One unexpected finding:

Democrats in the control treatment group supported solitary confinement reform at a 4.45 rate. Information on international law increased support by 0.17 to 4.62, but this increase falls short of conventional levels of significance (p-value = 0.16). Republicans, on the other hand, were less supportive of solitary confinement reform overall—the control treatment group averaged 3.31. Information on international law, however, increased approval to 3.74. This was an increase of 0.43, which was both substantively and statistically significant (p-value = 0.05). This suggests that information on the status of international law on domestic human rights practices, at least with respect to solitary confinement, actually has a greater effect on Republicans than on Democrats.

Seems unlikely, but warrants further investigation. Maybe it plays into a “rule of law” mentality? In any case, the experiment seems well-constructed, so that there’s none of the garbage-in-garbage-out aura that one sometimes butts into as empirical legal studies begins to colonize international law, too.

As Chilton notes, “modest changes in public opinion do not automatically result in changes in public policy,” something of an understatement in the context of US treaty ratification and compliance (cue: the Disabilities Convention). But perhaps studies like this will help nudge policymakers in a more productive, international law-compliant direction.

Assessing the UN’s new “Rights Up Front” Action Plan

by Kristen Boon

In December 2013, the UN Secretary General launched a new Human Rights initiative called “Rights Up Front”.    Primarily a coordination tool for the UN Secretariat, the plan outlines six actions that can help the UN system meet its responsibilities regarding human rights:

Action 1: Integrating human rights into the lifeblood of staff, so that they understand what the UN’s mandates and commitments to human rights mean for their Department, Agency, Fund or Program and for them personally.

Action 2: Providing Member States with candid information with respect to peoples at risk of, or subject to, serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian law.

Action 3: Ensuring coherent strategies of action on the ground and leveraging the UN System’s capacities in a concerted manner.

Action 4: Adopting at Headquarters a “One-UN approach” to facilitate early coordinated action.

Action 5: Achieving, through better analysis, greater impact in the UN’s human rights protection work.

Action 6: Supporting all these activities through an improved system of information management on serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law.

The catalyst of Rights Up Front was the Petrie Report of 2012, an independent review panel report commissioned by the Secretary General and written by Charles Petrie, which assessed the UN’s response to the final months of the 2009 war in Sri Lanka.   The report was extraordinarily critical of the UN, characterizing its actions as a “systematic failure.”  It recommended “a comprehensive review of action by the United Nations system during the war in Sri Lanka and the aftermath, regarding the implementation of its humanitarian and protection mandates.”

To his credit, the Secretary General Ban Ki Moon took this charge seriously.    The Rights up Front plan represents the end product of internal assessment and reflection.   While it is too early to give a definitive assessment of the plan’s potential, some features are worthy of comment now.   The plan is noteworthy in identifying the protection of human rights as a core purpose of the United Nations, consistent with the UN Charter.  It also creates a human rights plan for the UN Secretariat in situations where there is no peacekeeping mission.   This is an important development: the plan recognizes the failure of early-warning systems that contributed to the Rwandan genocide and the Srebenica massacre. Moreover, Deputy Secretary General Jan Eliasson, in presenting the report, indicated that systematic human rights violations have often been a precursor to mass atrocities, and that the challenges facing the UN in Sri Lanka were not new.

Although the action plan refers to UN responsibilities (a term with legal connotations), the main responsibility it addresses lies with the Secretariat.    Clearly the plan would have been stronger had it staked out a legal responsibility for the UN.   When the Secretary General presented the plan he emphasized the UN’s political and moral obligations, but not its legal responsibilities.     Compare, for example, the UN’s position on humanitarian law, and its guidelines for UN troops, which state that they must respect and observe the rules of international humanitarian law or face prosecution.

In addition, while emphasizing the Secretariat’s coordinating role, conspicuously absent from the Plan are references to the responsibility of important organs like the Security Council and the General Assembly.    Because the plan is so heavily focused on the Secretariat, Rights Up Front appears to have little to no role in situations where the Security Council or the General Assembly are engaged.  Take the current humanitarian crisis in Syria.   Here, the Secretariat’s role is limited because the situation has been escalated to the Security Council, the organ with primary responsibility for threats to international peace and security.   Due to the Council’s involvement, the Secretariat’s role limited.  The potential impact of the Rights up Front plan does not, therefore, overcome cases of Council deadlock despite the evidence of massive human rights abuses.

Another interesting silence in the Rights Up Front plan is its relationship with the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).    There are clear parallels between the two doctrines with regards to the duty to prevent human rights abuses.   Pillar 2 of R2P, for example, states that the international community has a duty to assist states in meeting these obligations.   Rights up Front could be a way to implement Pillar 2.   Nonetheless, there is no explicit acknowledgement of this overlap, or explanation of how these doctrines work together.

In the final analysis this Plan represents an important step forward for human rights at the UN.  If Rights Up Front is systematically integrated into the Secretariat’s work, and becomes a basis for auditing and review, it may succeed in making human rights a much more central aspect of the UN’s work. Nonetheless, its limited scope, due to its focus on the Secretariat and its avoidance of legal obligations, mean that whether it is capable of delivering real world impact remains to be seen.

International Law: Not Helping to Resolve the Ukraine Crisis

by Julian Ku

I’m getting more and more nervous about events in Ukraine, and particularly in the Crimea.  Things are spinning (almost) out of control, and it is worth noting that international legal principles are not helping lead toward a resolution.

Instead of working out a negotiated transition, the new leaders of Ukraine have adopted a maximalist position by seizing power and then seeking to prosecute the former (?) president Viktor Yanukovych,  They’ve done this by (apparently) accepting the ad hoc jurisdiction of the ICC, and making noises about turning Yanukovych (and others) over to the ICC.

Kevin raises a very good legal point: ICC ratification appears to violate Ukraine’s own constitution as interpreted by its own constitutional court. But the new leaders of Ukraine don’t seem troubled by that ruling (or even aware of it).  So it is not surprising Yanukovych has retreated to Russia, where he can avoid both Ukrainian and ICC prosecutions.  In any event, an ICC referral will lock in Ukraine to its current path, making a negotiated transition even harder.

International legal principles are also not much help in restraining a Russian military intervention.  Russia appears to be mobilizing its military along the border, and the U.S. is warning against violations of Ukraine’s sovereignty.  It would be ironic if Russia starts to make noises about a need for “humanitarian intervention” to protect the Russian minority in Ukraine (especially in the Crimea).  It will also be ironic if the U.S. started demanding that Russia seek UN Security Council authorization for any use of force. The legal case for humanitarian intervention here is not very strong, but it is not implausible to think that retribution against ethnic Russians in Ukraine could happen.  I doubt the legality will bother Russia much (it didn’t much worry about it in Georgia), but now that Russia made such a big fuss about international law governing the use of force over Syria, will it do so here? And will anyone care?

Now That’s a Broad Reading of the Jus Ad Bellum!

by Kevin Jon Heller

The European Parliament has just overwhelmingly passed a resolution condemning the use of armed drones. I’ll leave it to others to do the hard work of analyzing the resolution, but I couldn’t let this paragraph pass without a mention (emphasis mine):

E. whereas drone strikes outside a declared war by a state on the territory of another state without the consent of the latter or of the UN Security Council constitute a violation of international law and of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of that country.

The last time a state formally declared war was 8 August 1945, when Russia declared war on Japan. So much for Art. 51 of the UN Charter…

Mueller on Kenya and the ICC

by Kevin Jon Heller

Susanne Mueller, who works at Boston University’s African Studies Center, has published a very interesting essay on the relationship between Kenya and the ICC. I want to bring it to our readers’ attention, because it’s published in the Journal of East African Studies, which many international-law folk may not normally read. Here is the abstract:

Kenya’s 2013 election was supremely important, but for a reason not normally highlighted or discussed. Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto’s run for president and deputy president as International Criminal Court (ICC) indictees was a key strategy to deflect the court and to insulate themselves from its power once they won the election. The paper maintains that the strategy entailed a set of delaying tactics and other pressures to ensure that the trials would not take place until after the election when their political power could be used to maximum effect to halt or delay them. However, unlike in 2007–08, the 2013 election did not result in mass violence. The Kenyatta–Ruto alliance united former ethnic antagonists in a defensive reaction to the ICC. The analysis has implications for theories seeking to explain why countries ratify and comply with treaties. It develops an alternative political economy argument to account for outliers like Kenya and has implications for international criminal justice and democracy in Kenya.

It’s an illuminating and persuasive argument, well worth the read if you are interested in Kenya and the ICC. A free copy can be downloaded here.

Chinese Victims of Forced Labor Sue Japanese Companies in Chinese Courts; They Might Even Win

by Julian Ku

In a legal wrinkle to the ever-worsening Sino-Japanese relationship, the Chinese government has now publicly backed a lawsuit filed in Beijing courts against Japanese companies that used Chinese citizens as forced laborers during World War II.

The lawsuit names Mitsubishi Materials Corporation and Mitsui Mining and Smelting as defendants and asks for compensation of 1 million yuan ($163,000) for each defendant as well as apologies in the Chinese and Japanese languages to be placed with the country’s major media outlets.

Japan’s government has already opposed these lawsuits, saying that any such war reparation claims were settled by postwar agreements between China and Japan. Its spokesman:

“…I can say that since such problems were included in the Japan-China communique, there is no case,” he said. “The individual rights for seeking (compensation) were included in the communique.”

In a prior post, I noted that Korean courts have allowed similar lawsuits against Japanese companies to proceed despite pretty clear language blocking such lawsuits in the Korea – Japan Agreement on the Settlement of Property.  Unless I am missing something, however, I don’t see any similarly clear language in either the China-Japan Peace Treaty or in the 1972 Communique re-establishing diplomatic relations.  The Communique does contain this clause:

5. The Government of the People’s Republic of China declares that in the interest of the friendship between the Chinese and the Japanese peoples, it renounces its demand for war reparation from Japan.

This language could be read to bar claims by wartime victims against Japanese companies for forced labor, but that reading is far from clear (at least to me).  If you compare this language to the Korea-Japan Agreement (“problems concerning property, rights, and interests of the two High Contracting Parties and their peoples (including juridical persons)” were settled) (emphasis added) and the US-Japan Peace Treaty (“the Allied Powers waive all reparations claims of the Allied Powers, other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war…”) (emphasis added), then the Japan-China Communique language looks far less protective..

In the China-Japan Communique, only the “Government of the People’s Republic of China” has “renounced its demand for war reparations.”  The people of China, or individual Chinese people, might still have claims, and there is also  no mention of waiving claims against Japanese persons or nationals.  Normally, governments only have claims for reparations from other governments.

Moreover, while the U.S. took lots of Japanese property in “compensation” during its occupation of Japan before waiving its further claims, and Korea got the Japanese to pay a cool $300 million in 1965 dollars before settling its claims, the Chinese government got nothing (at least financially) for its agreement to waive its claims.  This seems to further support the idea that some wartime claims still exist.

So read in context, the Chinese plaintiffs have a better case than their (already victorious) Korean brethren.  It is also possible that the Communique (unlike the Peace Treaty) is a non-binding international agreement, which would also not have any direct effect in Chinese courts.  So based on the relevant treaties and agreements, I think the plaintiffs have a decent case here. Inded, it is surprising that no similar lawsuit was filed before in Chinese courts.  The reason probably has more to do with the nature of Chinese courts than the international treaties and agreements relating to this lawsuit.

 

Should Taiwan and China Join Forces in Defending Territorial Claims?

by Julian Ku

As China continues to offend or at least alarm its neighbors in East and Southeast Asia with its expansive territorial and maritime claims, it is worth noting there is one important Asian player who wholeheartedly supports each and everyone one of China’s sovereignty claims:  Taiwan. (Taiwan’s government even supports China’s sovereignty claim over Taiwan, just disputing which government is “China”.)

In fact, the government on Taiwan, as the Republic of China, is actually the government that originated the now highly-controversial Nine Dash Line when it was still in power on the mainland (actually, Taiwan’s line has Eleven Dashes, so it is even more expansive).  And Taiwan has the exact same sovereignty claim over the Diaoyu Islands/Senkakus that China has.  Taiwan actually houses a lot of the academic firepower and expertise on the international legality of these various maritime claims.

So this editorial from a pro-China Taiwan newspaper, calling for a joint China-Taiwan policy in favor of the South China and East China Sea claims, kind of makes sense.  If you overlook the fact that the two sides are still technically at war and all that.

In my view, Taiwan should jettison at least the most expansive of China’s claims, especially the Nine-Dash-Line.  It is odd, even ridiculous, for the government in Taiwan to support this claim of sketchy legality when (unlike China), there is no prospect of Taiwan ever asserting actual control over the South China Sea. And because the U.S. is now officially opposed to the Nine-Dash-Line, Taiwan needs to re-evaluate its position. If Taiwan sticks to its positions, and even starts cooperating with China on exerting their claims, then it is another sign that Taiwan is slowly drifting into China’s orbit and away from the U.S.  It may be a sign that, as leading realist scholar John Mearsheimer wrote this week, Taiwan’s eventual domination by China is only a matter of time.

A Modest Suggestion for the Ukrainian Parliament (Updated)

by Kevin Jon Heller

According to VOA News, the Ukrainian Parliament would like the ICC to investigate recently-deposed President Yanukovych:

Ukraine’s parliament voted on Tuesday to send fugitive President Viktor Yanukovych to be tried for ‘serious crimes’ by the International Criminal Court once he has been captured.

A resolution, overwhelmingly supported by the assembly, linked Yanukovych, who was ousted on Saturday and is now on the run, to police violence against protesters which it said had led to the deaths of more than 100 citizens from Ukraine and other states.

The resolution said former interior minister Vitaly Zakharchenko and former prosecutor-general Viktor Pshonka, who are also being sought by the authorities, should also be sent for trial at the ICC, which is based in The Hague.

The court says it needs a request from Ukraine’s government giving it jurisdiction to investigate Yanukovych and others over deaths during the protests.

I’m pretty sure the Court did not actually say that. Why? Because Ukraine has signed but not ratified the Rome Statute. And it can’t without Parliament’s intervention, because Ukraine’s Constitutional Court has held that the Rome Statute is not in conformity with the Ukrainian Constitution. So here’s a suggestion: before Parliament tries to send its former President to the Hague — and it would, of course, have to refer the situation in the Ukraine, not just him — it should amend the Constitution and ratify the Rome Statute.

All that said, there would be worse things than a Ukraine self-referral. After all, the Ukraine is not in Africa, and it’s unlikely that Yanukovych won’t eventually be apprehended. Prosecuting a former non-African head of state would do wonders for the ICC’s reputation.

UPDATE: In the comments, Shehzad Charania mentions the possibility of the Ukraine accepting the ICC’s jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis and then waiting for the OTP to initiate a proprio motu investigation. As I read the Constitutional Court’s decision, linked to above, that route is also foreclosed by the Ukrainian Constitution. Here is the relevant paragraph from the ICRC’s summary of the decision:

Article 124 of the Ukrainian Constitution states that the administration of justice is the exclusive competence of the courts and that judicial functions cannot be delegated to other bodies or officials. The Constitutional Court noted that the jurisdiction of the ICC under the Rome Statute is complementary to national judicial systems. However, under Article 4(2) of the Rome Statute, the ICC may exercise its functions and powers on the territory of any State party, and under Article 17, the ICC may find a case to be admissible if the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution. The Court concluded that jurisdiction supplementary to the national system was not contemplated by the Ukrainian Constitution. Hence, the amendment of the Constitution is required before the Statute can be ratified.

If the problem with ratifying the Rome Statute is that Ukraine cannot delegate the administration of justice to an international court, that would seem to prohibit accepting the ICC’s jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis, as well.

Lecture Next Week at UCL

by Kevin Jon Heller

Opinio Juris readers who are based in London may be interested in coming to a lecture I’ll be giving for the ILA at University College London next week. Here is the relevant information:

International Law Association (British Branch) Lecture
What is an international crime?

Wednesday 5 March 2014, 6-7pm

  • Speaker: Professor Kevin Jon Heller (Prof. of Criminal Law, SOAS)
  • Chair: Dr Kimberley Trapp (UCL)
  • Venue: UCL Faculty of Laws
  • Admission: Free of charge
  • Accreditation: 1 CPD hour SRA (BSB pending)

Nearly all ICL scholars accept the idea that an international crime is an act that is directly criminalized by international law. Professor Heller will challenge that definition, what he calls the “direct-criminalization thesis,” in this lecture. More specifically, he argue that the thesis can only be defended on the basis of an unconvincing and illegitimate naturalist understanding of the creation of international law — and that any attempt to defend the direct-criminalization thesis on positivist grounds collapses it into what he calls the “national-criminalization thesis,” the idea that an international crime is an act that all states are obligated to domestically criminalize.

This is essentially the same presentation I gave at Oxford a few weeks ago, so if you were there or listened to the podcast, there is no reason to come to this event. But if you do go, please come up afterward and say hello!

The Reprieve Drone Strike Communication I — Jurisdiction

by Kevin Jon Heller

Reprieve, the excellent British human-rights organisation, has submitted a communication to the ICC asking it to investigate NATO personnel involved in CIA drone strikes in Pakistan. Here is Reprieve’s press release:

Drone victims are today lodging a complaint with the International Criminal Court (ICC) accusing NATO member states of war crimes over their role in facilitating the US’s covert drone programme in Pakistan.

It has been revealed in recent months that the UK, Germany, Australia, and other NATO partners support US drone strikes through intelligence-sharing. Because all these countries are signatories to the Rome Statute, they fall under The ICC’s jurisdiction and can therefore be investigated for war crimes. Kareem Khan – whose civilian brother and son were killed in a 2009 drone strike – is at The Hague with his lawyers from the human rights charity Reprieve and the Foundation for Fundamental Rights who have filed the complaint on his behalf.

The CIA has launched more than 300 missiles at North Waziristan since its covert drone programme began and it is estimated that between 2004 and 2013, thousands of people have been killed, many of them civilians including children.

The US has immunised itself from legal accountability over drone strikes and the UK has closed its domestic courts to foreign drone victims. In a recent decision, the Court of Appeal in London ruled that it would not opine on the legality of British agents’ involvement in the US drone war in Pakistan, for fear of causing embarrassment to its closest ally.

The communication is a fascinating document to read, and it is quite damning concerning the effects of the CIA’s drone strikes. My interest in the communication, however, focuses on two critical legal issues: (1) whether the ICC would have jurisdiction over NATO personnel involved in the CIA’s strikes; and (2) whether it can be persuasively argued that those personnel have been complicit in the strikes. I’ll discuss the jurisdictional issue in this post and the substantive complicity issue in my next post.

As the communication acknowledges, neither Pakistan (where the drone strikes took place) nor the US (which launched the drone strikes) has ratified the Rome Statute. Reprieve nevertheless asserts that the ICC would have jurisdiction over NATO personnel involved in the drone strikes — particularly individuals from the UK, Germany, and Australia — on two different grounds (para. 7):

The Court’s jurisdiction over the crimes committed as a result of drone strikes in Pakistan arises in two ways. The first is (subjective) territorial jurisdiction on grounds that the attacks were launched from a State Party (e.g. Afghanistan), while the second is nationality (on grounds that there is a reasonable basis for concluding that the nationals of States Parties to the Rome Statute may have participated in crimes under the Statute.

It may seem odd that the communication spends time trying to establish that Art. 12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute, the territorial jurisdiction provision, includes subjective territoriality. Why not just invoke nationality jurisdiction, given that Reprieve is only asking the ICC to investigate “nationals of States Parties”? In fact, the communication’s move is actually quite clever — and necessary.

To see why, consider what Art. 25(3) says, in relevant part (emphasis mine): “In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person…” The italicized language is critical, because the communication does not claim that the NATO personnel committed the war crimes themselves. On the contrary, Reprieve views those individuals as accessories to war crimes allegedly committed by CIA drone operators (para. 13; emphasis mine):…

Japan and Korea Take Their (History) Wars to U.S. State and Local Legislatures

by Julian Ku

A lawsuit filed yesterday in California federal court seeks the removal of a statue in a Glendale, California public park honoring women victimized by the Japanese military during World War II.  The placement of the statue was approved by the local city council with the strong support of Korean and Korean-Americans who want to recognize the suffering of the “comfort women”. The lawsuit appears to claim as one of its arguments that the local city council is interfering in national foreign affairs in violation of the US Constitution.

This lawsuit is only the latest front in a spreading battle between Korean and Korean-American groups and the Japanese government in various state and local legislatures.  In Virginia, the state legislature (again with strong Korean-American voters support) passed legislation requiring textbooks in public schools to note that the Sea of Japan is also called the “East Sea.”  New Jersey is considering similar legislation, and already has its own “comfort women” memorial.

As a legal matter, I can say with high confidence there is no serious argument that the placement of a statue in a public park, or the rewording of textbooks, violates the federal government’s foreign affairs authority under the Constitution.  No legal rights of foreign nationals are involved, nor is this a matter traditionally handled by the national government, nor does the US-Japan Treaty of Peace preempt this action.  So this aspect of the anti-memorial folks’ lawsuit seems pretty hopeless and borderline frivolous.

I am less sure about the policy benefits of this type of activity.  For US legislators this is just a cheap and easy way to get support from a growing voter population.  China’s government has tried a similar strategy to garner Korean friendship on a much grander scale when it put up a huge memorial to a early-twentieth-century Korean anti-Japanese revolutionary.  But those actions are purely out of self-interest.

On the other hand, all of this seems like a relatively gentle way to prod the Japanese on these issues.   In any event, expect to see more action at the state and local level in the U.S. One hopes (although this seems a vain hope) that this activity might even spark some useful Korean-Japanese debate on matters that they can’t seem to talk about much back in Asia.

Weekly News Wrap: Monday, February 24, 2014

by Jessica Dorsey

Your weekly selection of international law and international relations headlines from around the world:

Africa

Asia

Americas

Middle East

Europe

Events and Announcements: February 23, 2014

by An Hertogen

Calls for Papers

  • TDM is calling for papers for a special issue on “The Pacific Rim and International Economic Law: Opportunities and Risks of the Pacific Century“. The formidable scale and pace of economic and legal development in the Pacific Rim region offers considerable opportunities, but also carries certain risks. The forthcoming Pacific Rim TDM Special Issue will collect views of experienced practitioners, academics, and policymakers on key economic and legal opportunities and risks in the Pacific Rim region today. Topics to be addressed could include, but are not limited to, the following: 1. TPP and RCEP: Competition, Coordination, or 2. A U.S.-China BIT as a 21st Century Model BIT?, 3. Pacific Rim Investment Treaty Practice: Regional Considerations, 4. Pacific Rim Approaches to Key Legal Issues. The editors of the Pacific Rim TDM Special Issue are Wenhua Shan (Xi’an Jiaotong University School of Law) and Mark Feldman (Peking University School of Transnational Law). See here for more details and contact information.
  • The Australian and New Zealand Society of International Law (ANZSIL) is calling for papers for its 22nd annual conference in Canberra on July 3-5, 2014. This year’s theme is Towards International Peace through International Law. A postgraduate research students workshop will be held the day before the conference. Deadline for the submission of abstracts is March 7, 2014 for both the conference and the workshop.  More information is available here.
  • The Surrey International Law Centre of the School of Law of the University of Surrey with the support of the Institute of Advanced Studies, the McCoubrey Centre of the University of Hull and the British Institute of International and Comparative Law (‘BIICL’) will host a two-day workshop on the identification of core standards of Procedural Fairness before International Courts and Tribunals. The deadline for the submission of abstracts of max. 500 words is April 1, 2014. More information is here (pdf).

Events

  • The final program for the February 25-26, 2014 Doha conference on the Syrian Crisis and International Law, organised by the Qatar University, College of Law and the Qatari Branch of the International Law Association, is now available online.
  • Applications for the EIUC training seminar for International Electoral Observers close on March 14, 2014. More information about the seminar is available here. 

Last week’s events and announcements can be found here. If you would like to post an announcement on Opinio Juris, please contact us.

Weekend Roundup: February 15-21, 2014

by An Hertogen

Weekend again, time for a roundup of the blog! This week, Rogier Bartels provided a guest post in two parts on the temporal scope of application of IHL, asking when a non-international armed conflict ends.

Chris followed the situation in Ukraine closely with a post on the background of the conflict and the country’s long road to stability. He also wrote a legal primer on the Cossacks and their resurgence in Russia, after video emerged of the militia breaking up a Pussy Riot protest in Sochi.

Kevin is excited about Mark Lewis’ book The Birth of New Justice, and promised to let us know once he has read it whether it lived up to his expectations.

Finally, Jessica listed events and announcements and wrapped up the news.

Have a great weekend!

The Cossacks: A Legal Primer

by Chris Borgen

The recent altercation between members of Pussy Riot and Cossack militia that was caught on video is a red flag signalling a broader issue in the Russian Federation: the resurgent power of the Cossacks and their relation to the Russian state, especially to keep politically-disfavored groups in check.

But who are the Cossacks?  A paramilitary organization? A political party? An ethnic group? And what are they doing at the Sochi Olympics?  This post will try to explain a little about who the Cossacks are, their role in Russia today, and the legal implications for human rights, minority rights in particular, and the use of state power.

The word “Cossack” summons for many images of mustachioed horsemen with bearskin hats. But, as one CNN report put it, “the Cossacks have long symbolized rebellion and military might in Western and Southern Russia and Ukraine.” Today’s Cossack organizations provide contracted-for security services for Russian regional governments.  Aleksandr Tkachev, the governor of Russia’s Krasnodar region, in which Sochi is located, has been at the forefront of contracting with the Cossacks (although, as I’ll explain below, this has been supported from the Presidency on down). About 400 Cossacks are being used as security in Sochi. But this is just the tip of the iceberg.

As for the utility of  having Cossacks–a non-state (or perhaps quasi-governmental) entity–provide security services, the official line seems to be that Cossacks will have greater leeway for action. CNN again:

“What you cannot do, a Cossack can,” Krasnodar Gov. Aleksandr Tkachev explained to local police.

His comments sparked an outcry from Sochi natives, minorities and migrants. Analysts say it is not a coincidence that the Cossacks’ revival is taking place as nationalism and xenophobia are on the rise in Russia.

[Emphasis added.]

The Pussy Riot incident in Sochi is simply the most obvious example of a larger trend that could have important implications for the rule of law in Russia and in former Soviet republics. But before looking at the current situation in greater detail, some history and context is needed…

(Continue Reading)

Ukraine: Background, Sanctions, and the Sword of Damocles

by Chris Borgen

The BBC is reporting that dozens of people have died today in new fighting between police and protestors in Ukraine.  For a background to what is underlying the protests, see these posts concerning the struggle over the norms that will define Ukraine,  how Ukraine’s domestic disputes interact with Russian and European regional strategies, and the significance of the eastward spread of the protests and Russia’s technique of push-back against the norm-based arguments of the EU.

Some of these themes are echoed in the BBC report:

Ukraine seems be caught in a modern “Great Game”. Vladimir Putin wants to make Russia a global economic player, rivalling China, the US and EU. To that end he is creating a customs union with other countries and sees Ukraine as a vital and natural element in that – not least because of the countries’ deep cultural and historical ties.

The EU says assimilation and eventual membership could be worth billions of euros to Ukraine, modernising its economy and giving it access to the single market. It also wants to reverse what it sees as damaging infringements on democracy and human rights in Ukraine.

Many Ukrainians in the east, working in heavy industry that supplies Russian markets, are fearful of losing their jobs if Kiev throws in its lot with Brussels. But many in the west want the prosperity and the rule of law they believe the EU would bring. They point out that while Ukraine had a bigger GDP than Poland in 1990, Poland’s economy is now nearly three times larger.

While the immediate issue in the streets of Kiev is an end to the violence, the medium-term Western response may be sanctions against Ukraine, particularly targeting the assets of President Yanukovich and his allies.

But, hanging over all of this like the sword of Damocles is the concern over the stability of the Ukrainian state. The previous Opinio Juris posts, the BBC report linked-to above, and others have noted the sharp electoral and linguistic (Ukraine-speaking/ Russian speaking) divide between western Ukraine and eastern Ukraine. Some have voiced concern that Ukraine faces a possible civil war or a break-up of the country.  Edward Lucas of The Economist has written in an op-ed in today’s (February 20) Telegraph:

Perhaps the authorities will decide that they cannot crush the protesters and will draw back, meaning months of tension, jitters and uncertainty. Even then, Ukraine’s territorial integrity has been shattered, perhaps fatally. In the west, government buildings have been set ablaze. The region – the old Austro-Hungarian Galicia – was the site of a decade-long insurrection post-war against Soviet rule. If pro-Moscow authorities in Kiev try to crack down there, civil war looms…

Equally worrying is Crimea – site of the Charge of the Light Brigade 160 years ago – which could now be the flashpoint for another conflict with Russia, with far more devastating effects. The region is on the verge of declaring independence from Kiev (a move likely to prompt Russian intervention to protect the separatist statelet).

The BBC report sounds a more hopeful note:

Some commentators suggest this shows the country is liable to split violently across the middle. But others say this is unlikely – and that many in the east still identify as Ukrainians, even if they speak Russian.

As I mentioned in my previous post on Ukraine, the answer to the question of whether or not there is civil war or secession, depends in part on what the protestors in the eastern part of the country are protesting about.  If they are willing to continue on the path to closer integration with the EU and set aside closer integration with Russia, then the strand of hair keeps the sword suspended. If the Ukrainians in the east just want Yanukovich out, but still want to avert integration with the EU and increase integration with Russia, then the strand doesn’t necessarily break, but it does fray, as the normative conflict over the future of Ukraine will persist.

But while the question of civil war and secession depends in part on the severity of normative friction in Ukraine, that is not the only determinant. Also important is what role Russia will play in either further exacerbating the conflict or finding a peaceful solution. In September, Russia raised the specter of secessionism in Ukraine, specifically linking it to Ukraine’s signing the EU Association Agreement. Russia actively supports secessionist movements in Moldova and Georgia, two other countries seeking closer relations with the EU. Whether President Putin believes that preventing Ukraine from  signing an Association Agreement with the EU is important enough to push that country to war remains to be seen.

The issue for today is ending the violence in the streets of Kiev. But that is the first step in a long road to finding stability in Ukraine.

Guest Post: Bartels–Temporal Scope of Application of IHL: When do Non-International Armed Conflicts End? Part 2

by Rogier Bartels

[Rogier Bartels is a Legal Officer (Chambers) at the International Criminal Court and a research-fellow at the Netherlands Defence Academy. The views below are the author’s alone.]

The first part of this post discussed that a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) ends when the NIAC-criteria (a certain level of organisation of the parties groups, and a certain intensity of the armed violence) are no longer both present.

At the ICTY, the various trial chambers seized of cases concerning Kosovo and Macedonia had to consider the lower threshold for the start of (or continued existence of) a NIAC. The Boškoski and Tarculovski Trial Chamber, for example, gave a detailed overview of the indicators used so far and reviewed how the relevant elements of Common Article 3 recognised in Tadić (organisation and intensity; see Tadić TJ, para. 562) are to be understood. Its findings were confirmed by the Appeals Chamber (see Boškoski and Tarculovski AJ, paras 19-24). Certain “factors”, and a number of “indicators” thereof, were identified that need to be taken into account when assessing the organisation and intensity criteria. These factors have since been adopted by the Lubanga Trial Chamber in the first ICC judgment (paras 537-538).

If agreed that a NIAC ends when the criteria of “intensity” and “organisation” no longer exist, using these factors and indicators identified in the case law, could be helpful in determining such an ending. Naturally, not all indicators are of assistance. Most notably, the indicator of the existence of (attempts to broker) ceasefire agreements shows that parties considered that there was an armed conflict took place (at the time of the alleged crimes), but obviously does not answer the question whether the conflict continued or ended after such agreements.

Other indicators cannot easily be applied ‘in reverse’. A reversed examination of “the extent of destruction”, for example, would be difficult, as it is hard to assess whether damage diminishes if only few buildings are left standing or if few potential targets remain. The lack of (new or ongoing) damage may well be due to these circumstances, rather than result from the end of the conflict. Nevertheless, an indicator merely serves to ‘indicate’ the existence of an NIAC, and has to be seen in relation to the other indicators: if few military objects remain and a prolonged period occurs during which no targets are attacked, this may well be a sign that the conflict has ended.

In addition, some indicators could be adapted. Instead of looking at the (type of) weapons used, an indicator could be the effectiveness of a disarmament programme: the type and amount of weapons handed in vis-à-vis the initial number of fighters or the approximate type and number of weapons initially deployed. For the indicator of refugee flows from combat zones, one could look, rather than at the number of civilians fleeing an area, at the number of civilians returning home, i.e. considering their pre-conflict place of residence safe enough to return to. (That is not to say that a conflict could never be considered as ended when refugees and or IDPs do not return to their homes as this may be caused by other factors, such as, a changed ethnic composition of the area concerned, lack of cooperation by the government and/or measures implemented by the victorious party).

When peace agreements, as suggested by Tadić, are considered to be the end of NIACs, the focus appears to be laid on the intensity requirement. The discussion regarding the start of the Syrian NIAC (see here for an overview), however, has highlighted the (greater) importance of the organisational requirement. Between the two NIAC-criteria, organisation is the most relevant for the assessment of the end of such conflicts. The decline in organisation of one or more of the parties to the conflict can result in a security vacuum when the controlling regime (i.e. the state or the rebel force) gives way and the resulting (state) apparatus is not (yet) able to provide for effective security. Also, the opposing party will mainly target the organisational structure of an armed group. Whilst targeting the leadership was relatively uncommon in IACs, it has been the main goal in NIACs. It appears also the most effective way to bring about the end of such a conflict. See, for example, the killing of LTTE leader Prabhakaran in 2009, the effects of air strikes killing commanders of the FARC, and the (drone) attacks by United States on the Al-Qaeda leadership. Furthermore, intensity or ‘protractedness’ is hard to pinpoint on a specific moment, because some time element – despite claims to the contrary (see, e.g., the ICTY’s Delalić et al. TJ, para 184 and Kordić and Cerkez AJ, para. 341) – is still inherent in this requirement. Moreover, small break-away fractions of an armed group could continue to carry out attacks, or sectarian violence could go on after – or perhaps result from – the disappearance of the organisational structure of one or more of the fighting parties. Take, for example, the situation in Libya in the period after the defeat of the Gaddafi regime and the forming of the new government by the rebels.

My submission that NIACs end when the level of violence and/or organisation drops below a certain lower threshold, has consequences for the application of IHL and consequently for the protection afforded by IHL. It may be feared that it would lead to “legal uncertainty and confusion” (compare Gotovina et al TJ, para. 1694). In practice, however, having an end-threshold should not create a gap in protection, hence no uncertainty – or at least no more uncertainty than as to the start of the application of IHL at the beginning of a NIAC. Using the lower threshold for the application of IHL ‘in reverse’ in order to determine the end of a NIAC may actually allow for a smoother transition between the law governing the use of force during armed conflict (conduct of hostilities paradigm) and the law governing force outside situations of armed conflict (law enforcement paradigm). It makes sense to gradually move towards a law enforcement approach in the end stages of a NIAC. When the intensity of the fighting has decreased, and/or organisational structure of concerning groups has broken down, to such an extent that it no longer reaches the lower threshold, persons belonging to a (partly or fully broken down) group, would not be “directly participating in hostilities” in the traditional sense, but rather find themselves in a situation where the opposing party controls the territory they are in. As advocated elsewhere (albeit received with much criticism; see here for an overview), the opposing party should then apply the human rights/law enforcement approach when taking action against these persons. If it is unclear whether or not a situation of armed conflict continues to exist, the attacking party should err on the safe side and apply the least amount of force necessary (i.e. in line with law enforcement type of proportionality). This also follows from a moral as well as practical point of view: if the conflict is ending, what would be the benefit of and why would one want to continue to kill the opponents, rather than to start thinking about a process that would bring a lasting peace after the conflict?

The breakdown of the organisational structure of an armed group (which will, amongst other things, be indicated by the inability to carry out military operations) should result in the cessation of the “continuous combat function” of members of that group, thereby limiting the right to target the persons concerned. For those advocating for the so-called “membership approach”, no problem arises either: an even further breakdown of the group’s organisational structure would result in the concerning persons ceasing to be ‘members’; and thus targetable. After all, there needs to be a group or organisation in order for someone to be a member of it.

To sum up, it is my hypothesis that NIACs do not necessarily end only by virtue of a peace settlement being reached, but rather by the more factual circumstance of the level of “organisation” and “intensity” falling below the threshold set for the application of IHL. To assess when NIACs end, one could resort to using the factors and indicators for determining the lower threshold for the start of such conflicts, as identified by the ICTY in its voluminous case law. However, they are to be applied on a case-by-case basis, as not all of them are adaptable to the specific circumstances in which some conflicts take place.

New Book: Lewis, The Birth of the New Justice

by Kevin Jon Heller

I rarely get excited about a new book before I’ve read it — but I’m excited about this one, Mark Lewis’s The Birth of the New Justice: The Internationalization of Crime and Punishment, 1919-1950. Here is OUP’s description:

The Birth of the New Justice is a history of the attempts to instate ad hoc and permanent international criminal courts and new international criminal laws from the end of World War I to the beginning of the Cold War. The purpose of these courts was to repress aggressive war, war crimes, terrorism, and genocide.

Rather than arguing that these legal projects were attempts by state governments to project a “liberal legalism” and create an international state system that limited sovereignty, Mark Lewis shows that European jurists in a variety of transnational organizations derived their motives from a range of ideological motives – liberal, conservative, utopian, humanitarian, nationalist, and particularist. European jurists at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 created a controversial new philosophy of prosecution and punishment, and during the following decades, jurists in different organizations, including the International Law Association, International Association for Criminal Law, the World Jewish Congress, and the International Committee of the Red Cross, transformed the ideas of the legitimacy of post-war trials and the concept of international crime to deal with myriad social and political problems. The concept of an international criminal court was never static, and the idea that national tribunals would form an integral part of an international system to enforce new laws was frequently advanced as a pragmatic-and politically convenient-solution.

The Birth of the New Justice shows that legal organizations were not merely interested in ensuring that the guilty were punished or that international peace was assured. They hoped to instil particular moral values, represent the interests of certain social groups, and even pursue national agendas. At the same time, their projects to define new types of crimes and ensure that old ones were truly punished also sprang from hopes that a new international political and moral order would check the power of the sovereign nation-state. When jurists had to scale back their projects, it was not only because state governments opposed them; it was also because they lacked political connections, did not build public support for their ideas, or decided that compromises were better than nothing.

A book of this nature is much needed — the era between WW I and WW II has not received anywhere near enough attention from international criminal law scholars. I hope the book is good! (I will report back once I’ve read it.)

Guest Post: Bartels–Temporal Scope of Application of IHL: When do Non-International Armed Conflicts End? Part 1

by Rogier Bartels

[Rogier Bartels is a Legal Officer (Chambers) at the International Criminal Court and a research-fellow at the Netherlands Defence Academy. The below post discusses an argument made at a conference organised by the Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies in June 2012, that is expanded on in a chapter in the forthcoming book Jus Post Bellum (edited by Carsten Stahn et al.). The views below are the author’s alone.]

Over the past weeks, several ceasefire and peace agreements were concluded in a number of non-international armed conflict (NIAC) situations: in South-Sudan, the Philippines and Myanmar. The Syrian negotiations in Geneva have only yielded minor success, but those between the Colombian government and its longstanding enemy, the FARC, appear to have been more constructive. Nonetheless, all too often when there are peace talks or even peace agreements in a country, the fighting between the opposing sides does not (immediately) cease (see, e.g., here and here). In this post, I will address the end of temporal scope of the law applicable to the fighting in NIAC, i.e. international humanitarian law (IHL) and when such NIACs can be considered as ended.

Although certain provision of international humanitarian law (IHL), or laws of armed conflict, apply in peace time (e.g., Arts 47 and 53 of GC I) or continue to apply for a certain period after the end of the armed conflict (like Art. 5 of AP II), the application of the vast majority of IHL rules is dependent on the existence of an (international or non-international) armed conflict. Whilst the scope of application included in Common Articles 2 and 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 initially, of course, pertained only to these treaties, it has become accepted over time that said scope governs the application of the whole body of IHL; thus also for the rules contained in, e.g., the weapon treaties and customary IHL. Yet, one of the glaring gaps in IHL concerns its very foundation, namely the question of the definition of ‘armed conflict’. IHL does not provide a clear definition for either type of armed conflict: international armed conflict (IAC) or NIAC. A definition for NIACs was purposely left out of the 1949 Conventions and their Protocols, and it is true that a single definition may not be able to encompass all varieties of contemporary armed conflict. However, without a clear definition, determining when conflicts start is problematic; and it is similarly problematic to determine when they end.

Ever since IHL became applicable to conflicts that are “not of an international character” (i.e. with the inclusion of Common Article 3 in the 1949 Geneva Conventions), there has been much debate on what is to be considered a NIAC, and when the threshold of violence has surpassed a situation of mere internal disturbances, civil unrest or riots. The existence of an armed conflict allows States to take more forceful action, such as the use of lethal force against ‘fighters’ and/or against those directly participating in hostilities. In addition, when called upon to determine whether (war) crimes were committed, courts and tribunals must assess whether in the situations before them, an armed conflict existed – either to satisfy their jurisdictional requirements or to identify the applicable body of law. It is therefore of no surprise there has been extensive legal and academic debate, as well as voluminous case law on what qualifies as a NIAC, and on when the so-called lower threshold for NIAC has been crossed. The debate has almost solely focused on the start of these armed conflicts. In contrast, very little has been written on the temporal application of IHL, or indeed, on the end of these armed conflicts.

Common Article 3 does not refer to an end of its application. Similarly, Additional Protocol II refers to the “end of the armed conflict” (Articles 2(2) and 25 AP II), but does not clarify when this may be. The first, and almost only, authoritative statement hereon was made by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in its seminal decision on jurisdiction in Tadić:

that an armed conflict exists whenever there is […] protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State. International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities […], in the case of internal conflicts, [until] a peaceful settlement is achieved. (Tadić Jurisdiction Decision, para. 70)

So what is a peaceful settlement? The term is not very specific but suggests that IHL will cease to apply when the parties reach a peace agreement with each other. It is my view that the existence of a peace agreement is too rigid a standard to judge whether a NIAC can be considered to have ended. Moreover, it is submitted here that this approach and is not supported by the IHL.

For both IACs and NIACs, the test whether there is an armed conflict depends on the factual situation, and not on political statements. Political refusal to recognise the existence of a conflict is especially prevalent in cases of NIACs. It is argued therefore that political acts should be equally non-determinative in the test of whether peace has been achieved. As a result, the political act (statement) of agreeing to a peace deal should not be the determinative factor in whether a conflict has ceased. In Sierra Leone, for example, two “Lomé Peace Accords” were signed before the RUF was finally defeated and dissolved a few years later. Consider also the conflict between the Singhalese government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE: a peace agreement was signed between the warring parties in 2002, but the fighting did not cease. It was not until the full-scale military defeat in May 2009 of the LTTE by the government forces, that the armed conflict actually ended. Such a non-international version of debellatio is rare, however. On occasion, NIACs just taper out until they have withered away and no warring parties exist anymore. Often, however, as was the case with the Shining Path in Peru, armed groups continue to exist, but on a smaller scale with less fighting power, thereby forming less of a threat. On the other hand, it is also possible that only part of an armed group becomes a party to the agreement, as was the case with the Interahamwe in Rwanda.

Furthermore, the need for an “effective and final cessation of hostilities” for IACs comports with the fact that such a conflict starts with the first hostile act (involving two States), which initiates the protection given by IHL, namely – as Pictet put it – when the first (protected) person is affected by an attack. However, the threshold for the existence of a NIAC is significantly higher and not all violence reaches this threshold. Equally, at the end of a NIAC, certain violence should be considered to be below the armed conflict level. If a NIAC only starts when organised groups are engaged in fighting of certain intensity, then logically, the armed conflict ends when these two criteria are no longer both present. This would also make clear that the United States’ so-called NIAC against Al-Qaeda cannot be a “perpetual war”.

Weekly News Wrap: Monday, February 17, 2014

by Jessica Dorsey

Your weekly selection of international law and international relations headlines from around the world:

Africa

Asia

Americas

Middle East

Europe

Events and Announcements: February 16, 2104

by Jessica Dorsey

Calls for Papers

  • The University of Cagliari (Italy), Department of Public Law and Social Studies has issued a call for papers with the theme of Conceptualising Accountability in International Economic Law. The University welcomes ”submissions that describe new (previously unpublished) cutting-edge research in the following focus areas : Accountability and Law of International Development Banks; Accountability and WTO Law; Accountability and International Environmental and Energy Law; Accountability and Investment Law; Accountability and International Development Aid Law;Accountability and Multinational Enterprises; Accountability and Non-governmental Organisations; Accountability and UN Agencies; Accountability and Regional Intergovernmental Organisations; Accountability and Law-makers.” Interested candidates are invited to submit to federico [dot] esu [at] gmail [dot] com a 500-word abstract in English, with indication of the author(s), their affiliation and full contact information. Closing date for abstracts’ submission: 31/03/2014. Acceptance of abstracts: 15/04/2014 Deadline for draft papers’ submission: 15/07/2014. Deadline for selected final drafts’ submission: 31/07/2014 .More information can be found here.
  • In anticipation of International Law Weekend 2014 – to be held on October 23-25, 2014, in New York City – the sponsors would like to invite submissions of proposals for panels, roundtables, and lectures at International Law Weekend (ILW) 2014. The overall theme of ILW 2014 is International Law in a Time of Chaos. The role of international law in conflict mitigation is  a focus  – whether by building commercial links between states, fighting corruption, improving democratic governance, providing methods for resolving international and ethnic disputes, or regulating the use of force.  International Law Weekend 2014 will seek to address the role of public and private international lawyers in each of these tasks. More information can be found here.

Events

  • The Federalist Society is hosting an event entitled: The NSA, Security, Privacy, and Intelligence on February 24th. From the description: “In the 12 years since 9/11, as the national security threat matrix has become increasingly complex, technological advances have expanded intelligence gathering capabilities significantly. Recently, public concern about government monitoring of individuals has come to the forefront of the discussion. To address the intersection of security, privacy, and intelligence, the President has proposed several reforms, and is studying others in consultation with Congress. This Symposium will analyze and offer observations on those proposals.” Speakers include: Steven G. Bradbury, Michael Chertoff, Harley Geiger, Jim Harper, Peter S. Margulies, Nathan A. Sales, Julian Sanchez, Vincent J. Vitkowsky, Kenneth L. Wainstein, Benjamin Wittes. More information can be found here.
  • NYU Law School will host a symposium from February 27-28, on the topic of New Approaches to International Regulatory Cooperation. The symposium kicks off with a keynote address by C. Boyden Gray on the topic of the Transatlantic Trade & Investment Partnership, and altogether gathers leading practitioners, government officials, and
    scholars from different fields and regions of the world, to address the timely and important questions implicated by the growing need for effective regulatory cooperation.
    The full schedule is available here and registration information is here.
  • The University of Virginia School of Law’s Human Rights Program and the American Red Cross are hosting our 5th Annual International Humanitarian Law Student Workshop on March 22-23 (Saturday & Sunday) at the Law School in Charlottesville. The two day workshop consists of presentations and small group exercises that will guide participants through an extensive examination of international humanitarian law, with a focus on its application to combatants and civilians. Faculty includes international legal scholars and experts from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), American Red Cross, military Judge Advocates, and UVA School of Law. We are delighted to have Professor John Cerone and Justice Richard Goldstone join us again this year. This workshop attendance is free for participants. Applications are available on the UVA Law Human Rights Program website. The application deadline is February 24, 2014. Selected participants will be notified by March 1, and we will endeavor to find student hosts for those who need housing (though can’t promise that all will be accommodated). Contact Sadie Gardner, slg2cw [at] virginia [dot] edu, with questions.

Last week’s events and announcements can be found here. If you would like to post an announcement on Opinio Juris, please contact us.

Weekend Roundup: February 9-14, 2014

by An Hertogen

The heavy dumping of snow on the US East Coast made for a light dusting of posts this week.

Kevin found the ICTR’s recent acquittal of Augustin Ndindiliyimana after 11 years of pre-trial detention a stain on the tribunal’s reputation. He also was not convinced by Eugene Kontorovich’s use of Belgium’s extension of the right to die to terminally ill minors as an argument to attack on Roper v Simmons, and later replied to Eugene’s response.

For those hungry for more reading: Kevin recommended a post by Sergey Vasiliev on the relationship between Perisic and Sainovic while Julian recommended Stephan Talmon’s book chapter on the question of UNCLOS jurisdiction in Philippines arbitration against China, and Duncan announced the winners of the 2013 ASIL Certificates of Merit.

Finally, Jessica wrapped up the news and I listed events and announcements.

Have a nice weekend!

A Few Thoughts on Eugene Kontorovich’s Response to My Post

by Kevin Jon Heller

Eugene has graciously responded to my earlier post; you can find his new post here. It’s well worth a read. I just want to offer a few  thoughts on Eugene’s response, because I think it fails to address the core of my critique: that it is incorrect to claim, as Eugene did in his first post, that Europe’s opposition to the juvenile death penalty is based on the idea that “minors are not really responsible for their actions.” I argued that, on the contrary, Europe’s opposition to the juvenile death penalty is part and parcel of its opposition to the death penalty itself.

Eugene’s new post provides no support for his original thesis. Here is what he argues, in order:

The EU’s position is that the death penalty is wrong under any circumstances; however, the juvenile death penalty is even wronger. And this distinction could presumably only be due to the reduced decision-making capacity of juveniles.

Thus in their amicus brief in Roper, the EU did not argue that the death penalty was unconstitutional – though they stated their opposition – rather, they argued the juvenile death penalty was unconstitutional even if the death penalty itself were constitutional. (As amici, they were in no way limited to the facts of the case, and could have submitted a much broader argument.) The EU’s opposition to the juvenile death penalty repeatedly points to an “international consensus” against it, reflected in various treaties and U.N. documents. These instruments specifically do not bar the death penalty, but do prohibit the juvenile death penalty. Thus the consensus which the EU pointed to is itself based on a belief in a fundamental distinction between juvenile and adult death penalties.

It is true that there is an international consensus against the juvenile death penalty. And it is highly likely that some of the states that are part of the international consensus oppose the juvenile death penalty because they believe juveniles have a “reduced decision-making capacity.” But nothing in the EU amicus brief suggests that European states oppose the juvenile death penalty because of the diminished moral capacity of juveniles. As I noted in my earlier post, Europe opposes the death penalty for everyone, adult and juvenile, because — in the words of the Council of Europe — “everyone’s right to life is a basic value and that the abolition of the death penalty is essential to the protection of this right and for the full recognition of the inherent dignity of all human beings.” Yes, Europe would be more than willing to argue that “the juvenile death penalty was unconstitutional even if the death penalty itself were constitutional.” But that is because the international consensus against the juvenile death penalty is much stronger, not because Europe believes juveniles “are not really responsible for their actions.” In other words, the EU’s amicus brief does not care why some states permit the adult penalty but permit the juvenile death penalty (which may well reflect a view of juvenile moral capacity); it simply cares that even those states still reject the juvenile death penalty.

To be sure, if the EU thinks the juvenile DP to be even worse, it will not be reflected in its internal policies – but it would be reflected in its external ones. An indeed, in dealing with third countries, the EU makes a fundamental distinction between the juvenile and adult death penalty. As spelled out in the EU Guidelines on the Death Penalty, Europe will provide aid and have good relations with countries that practice the death penalty, Europe’s position is that where the death penalty exists, it should always be subject to certain “minimum standards”:

Where states insist on maintaining the death penalty, the EU considers it important that the following minimum standards should be met: … iii) capital punishment may not be imposed on … Persons below 18 years of age at the time of the commission of their crime;

Eugene does not quote the EU’s minimum standards in full, and the text he does not quote complicates his argument that Europe views the juvenile death penalty as “worse” than the adult death penalty because of the “reduced decision-making capacity of juveniles.” Here is the paragraph in full, with the omitted text in bold:

Capital punishment may not be imposed on:
• Persons below 18 years of age at the time of the commission of their crime;
• Pregnant women or new mothers;
• Persons who have become insane.

The EU’s suggested ban on executing the insane clearly does reflect the idea that insane persons have a “reduced decision-making capacity.” But the ban on executing “pregnant women or new mothers” doesn’t. Their decision-making capacity is not reduced — yet the EU insists that death-penalty states not execute them, either. So which category are juveniles closest to — the insane (who should not be executed because they are not responsible for their actions) or pregnant women and new mothers (who shouldn’t be executed because it’s inherently wrong to execute them)? There is no way of knowing from the EU’s Guidelines on the Death Penalty — which means that the Guidelines don’t support Eugene’s argument that Europe views the juvenile death penalty as worse than the adult death penalty because “minors are not really responsible for their actions.”

Let me add another point of Belgian inconsistency. Allowing minors to take their lives, or have them been taken, necessarily makes assumptions about their capacity that is at odds with many liberal features of international law. International treaties, including the Rome Statute of the ICC, make the recruitment of child soldiers a crime, and European countries have been active in promoting the expansion of these norms.

Being a child soldier (under 15) is not a crime, only enlisting them. Crucially, the consent of the child, her parents or any psychologists is not a defense. Indeed, consent is presumed, as the crime covers accepting voluntary enlistees. As the Special Court for Sierra Leone put it:

The act of enlisting presupposes that the individual in question voluntarily consented to be part of the armed force or group. However, where a child under the age of 15 years is allowed to voluntarily join an armed force or group, his or her consent is not a valid defence.

But is this still a far cry from euthanasia? Not if the underlying issue is one of capacity to make life-imperiling decisions. And it is important to point out 15 year old may join armed conflict in when the defeat of their side would lead to the massacre or oppression of them and their families and the destruction of their way of life. Yet international law still prohibits their recruitment. This does not mean it can never be rational for a child to join armed forces, but rather that we make a categorical judgement that even if it is sometimes rational, they lack the judgement to make decisions that imperil their lives.

The emphasis is mine — because I think Eugene’s argument actually proves my point, not his. Eugene’s claim is that the prohibition on the recruitment of child soldiers, which European states have enthusiastically supported, reflects Europe’s view that juveniles have a “reduced decision-making capacity.” But the bolded text, which I completely agree with, indicates that, on the contrary, international law prohibits the recruitment of child soldiers because it is wrong to let juveniles engage in combat, even if they are capable of making a rational decision to do so. Differently put, international law presumes that child soldiers consent to recruitment because recruiting child soldiers is wrong even when consensual, not because juveniles can never rationally decide to become child soldiers.

The bottom line is this: there is nothing inconsistent about Belgium’s legalizing juvenile euthanasia while rejecting the juvenile death penalty and opposing the recruitment of child soldiers. Belgium simply believes that executing juveniles and recruiting child soldiers is inherently wrong, while permitting terminally ill children to make an informed decision to end their own lives is not. Those are normative positions, and Eugene is free to think they are unwise. But they are not based on an inconsistent view of whether juveniles are responsible for their actions.

Eugene Kontorovich’s Problematic Attack on Roper v. Simmons

by Kevin Jon Heller

I’m currently in Belgium, teaching an intensive course on international criminal law at Katholieke University Leuven. So I was struck by Eugene Kontorovich’s most recent post at the Volokh Conspiracy, in which he uses a new Belgian law permitting euthanasia for minors to criticize the Supreme Court’s abolition of the juvenile death penalty in Roper v. Simmons. Here is the crux of his argument (emphasis mine):

Aside from its inherent significance, Belgium’s move requires us to revisit Roper v. Simmons, the 2005 Supreme Court case that ruled it inherently unconstitutional to apply the death penalty to anyone under 18. European nations had long waged a moral campaign against America’s allowance of the death penalty for 16-18 year olds, which they called barbaric and savage. After all, minors are not really responsible for their actions. America was labelled a human rights violator, an international outlier.

Finally, in Roper, the Court caved in to this pressure. Indeed, it cited the European position as support for its conclusion – other countries do not allow for such a thing.

Why can a 17 year-old rapist-murderer not face capital punishment? Because, as Justice Kennedy wrote in a 5-4 decision, science has shown that minors, even 17-year-olds, are too immature to truly understand the consequences of their decisions, or the meaning of life and death. Juveniles are prone to “impetuous and ill-considered actions” that they should not be made to lose their life for, even if the action involved taking the life of another.” Moreover, juveniles are susceptible to peer pressure, Kennedy wrote. (Of course, one of the concerns in allowing euthanasia is external pressure from doctors, parents and others.)

Yet now we see Belgium thinks kids are responsible enough; the Netherlands similarly allows euthanasia as young as 12. These countries may be the way of the future, as they have been in other areas of progressive mores. Roper misread their belief system. It is not one of paternalistic concern for youth.

Eugene does not provide a link for his assertion that Europe opposes the juvenile death penalty because “minors are not really responsible for their actions.” But I don’t think that’s surprising, because Europe’s opposition to the juvenile death penalty is not based on that idea. Europe has abolished the juvenile death penalty because it rejects the very idea of the death penalty itself, not because it believe minors are not responsible for their actions. After all, no European state other than Belarus permits the death penalty for anyoneIt is thus irrelevant for Roper‘s purposes that Belgium and the Netherlands believe that minors are capable of making an informed decision to end their own lives; that in no way undermines their opposition to the juvenile death penalty. To sustain Eugene’s argument, he would have to identify a state that (1) permits the death penalty for adults while prohibiting it for juveniles on the ground that juveniles, unlike adults, are not responsible for their actions, but (2) allows juveniles to take their own lives on the ground that they are capable of making an informed decision to do so. Belgium and the Netherlands don’t qualify.

It’s also worth noting that, in his zeal to level a “gotcha” at Roper, Eugene misstates Belgian criminal law. Here is what he says about Belgium’s rejection of the juvenile death penalty (emphasis mine):

It is not one of paternalistic concern for youth. Rather, a system that permits the euthanasia of innocent 12 year-olds but not the punishment of guilty 17-year-olds is one that exalts autonomy without culpability.

Of course, with the juvenile death penalty, only a small fraction of minors who committed capital crimes would be sentenced to death. On a case by case basis, hosts of psychologists, jurors, and judges would have to be convinced that the particular defendant truly knew what they were doing.

So it comes out that the juveniles cannot really make accountable decisions when it comes to killing people, unless it is themselves. Or to put it differently, Belgium will not hold children responsible when they hurt others, but gives them free license to hurt themselves. Perversely, in Belgium, the youths who are considered grown up enough to be euthanized have not done anything wrong at all, unlike Simmons, who tied up his victim and thew him off a bridge.

This is simply false. Belgium most certainly holds juveniles criminally responsible for their actions — it simply doesn’t permit executing them. In Belgium, children between the ages of 12 and 15 can be prosecuted in juvenile court and imprisoned until they are 20. And children who are 16 and 17 — the latter being the age that Eugene singles out — can be prosecuted for murder in the Court of Assize and sentenced to a maximum of 30 years in adult prison. Eugene may think a 30-year sentence for a 17-year-old who commits murder is too lenient, but he cannot seriously contend that Belgian criminal law does not permit “the punishment of guilty 17-year-olds,” that it is based on the idea that “juveniles cannot really make accountable decisions when it comes to killing people,” or that it “will not hold children responsible when they hurt others.”

I often agree with Eugene on issues other than Israel (piracy and universal jurisdiction in particular). But his attempt to use Belgian criminal law to attack Roper is fatally flawed.

When Acquittal Is Small Consolation…

by Kevin Jon Heller

Although the ICTY’s recent high-profile acquittals have been getting all the attention, it’s worth noting that the ICTR Appeals Chamber has just acquitted two high-ranking defendants, Augustin Ndindiliyimana, the former chief of staff of the Rwandan paramilitary police, and François-Xavier Nzuwonemeye, the former commander of a military reconnaissance battalion, on the ground that the Trial Chamber erred in concluding that they had effective control over gendarmes suspected of participating in the 1994 genocide. The acquittals are obviously notable in themselves, but what’s particularly striking — and more than a little disturbing — is that Gen. Ndindiliyimana was originally sentenced to time served because he had spent 11 years in pre-trial detention:

Mr. Ndindiliyimana, who was arrested in Belgium in 2000, was convicted in 2011 of genocide, extermination as a crime against humanity and murder, and he was sentenced to 11 years. He was freed after time served.

Eleven years in pre-trial detention at an international tribunal is simply unacceptable. And Ndindiliyimana’s acquittal on all charges after 11 years in pre-trial detention simply adds insult to injury. All in all, a bad day for the ICTR’s reputation.

Someone (Prof. Stefan Talmon) Finally Makes An Argument In Favor of China in the Philippines UNCLOS Arbitration

by Julian Ku

One of the most frustrating things about China’s response to the Philippines arbitration has been the brevity of its legal discussion and analysis.  In particular, I’ve long thought that China had a pretty good argument that the Annex VII UNCLOS arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction over the dispute since, in many ways, territorial disputes are at the heart of the Philippines’ case.

But neither the government nor Chinese scholars have offered much flesh to this argument.  The closest statement I’ve seen was Judge Xue Hanqin’s impromptu remarks at the Asian Society of International Law conference last fall and a very brief Global Times essay.. But all that has now changed due to a book chapter  released by Professor Stefan Talmon of the University of Bonn.  From his abstract:

The chapter examines whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the case, whether the claims brought by the Philippines are admissible and whether there are any other objections which the tribunal will have to decide as a preliminary matter. It aims to offer a (not the) Chinese perspective on some of the issues to be decided by the Tribunal. The chapter is to serve as a kind of amicus curiae brief advancing possible legal arguments on behalf of the absent respondent. It shows that there are insurmountable preliminary objections to the Tribunal deciding the case on the merits and that the Tribunal would be well advised to refer the dispute back to the parties in order for them to reach a negotiated settlement.

I’ve only taken a quick look at Prof. Talmon’s pretty comprehensive discussion, and it really does read like an “amicus brief” for China on the question of jurisdiction.  I will have to consider more carefully Prof. Talmon’s claim that the 9-Dash Line claim can fit into the “historic waters” exception to jurisdiction, but overall it seems like a very careful and persuasive treatment.

Weekly News Wrap: Tuesday, February 11, 2014

by Jessica Dorsey

Your weekly selection of international law and international relations headlines from around the world:

Africa

Asia

Americas

Middle East

Europe

2014 ASIL Certificates of Merit Announced

by Duncan Hollis

I had the great pleasure the last several months to serve on ASIL’s Book Awards Committee (along with Jutta Brunnée, Jean d’Aspremont, Saira Mohamed, and a very well organized chair in Jacob Cogan).  I’m pleased to announce that the Society’s Executive Council has selected three winners for 2014 based on our nominations.  The winners (plus the Committee’s accompanying citation) are as follows:

Certificate of Merit for a Preeminent Contribution to Creative Scholarship:  Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights through International Law (Oxford University Press 2013).

In Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights Through International Law, Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks offer a groundbreaking theory of acculturation that illuminates how social processes can promote human rights and, more generally, can influence norms. “Acculturation” refers to “the general process by which actors adopt the beliefs and behavioral patterns of the surrounding culture.” The authors distinguish acculturation from two other mechanisms of social influence: “material inducement,” or the offering of rewards for conformity or punishments for nonconformity with a state’s or institution’s demands, and “persuasion,” whereby actors internalize new norms through a process of social learning and “redefine their interests and identities accordingly.” Goodman and Jinks offer a sophisticated account that both defends the relevance of acculturation and acknowledges its weaknesses in some areas. The theoretical complexity and methodological rigor of Socializing States make this a book that should be studied by any scholar interested in promotion of human rights, the spread of global norms, regime design, or compliance. It has already changed scholarship in these areas and will certainly continue to influence the field in the years to come.

Certificate of Merit for High Technical Craftsmanship and Utility to Practicing Lawyers and Scholars:  Robert Kolb, The International Court of Justice (Hart Publishing 2013)

Robert Kolb’s International Court of Justice provides a magisterial, lucid study of its subject. The breadth and depth of the treatment are impressive: Kolb takes the reader from the history of the Court, to its role in international society, to the more technical questions concerning its composition, powers and procedures, to the development of its jurisprudence, and to its future. The finely grained discussion provides much more than a mere survey of the Court’s constitutive instruments and decisions. It engages the Court as an institution and asks how it actually operates, and secures efficacy and authority in doing so. The book’s careful and detailed coverage of the Court’s legal framework and operation will benefit practitioners and scholars alike. There is no doubt that Kolb’s volume immediately takes a place among the authoritative references on the Court.

Certificate of Merit in a Specialized Area of International Law:  Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters eds., The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (Oxford University Press 2012).

The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law innovatively and comprehensively provides a timely and ambitious global history of international law from the sixteenth century to the mid-twentieth century. Under the skilled editorship of Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters, the contributors, experts who themselves come from all parts of the world, present a history that imagines international law as the product of different regions, cultures, actors, and eras. Setting a new agenda for the field, the Handboowill be the indispensable starting point for students and researchers exploring the history of international law.

The awards will get presented at this year’s ASIL Gala Dinner.  I’m looking forward to seeing the authors there and having a chance to congratulate them personally on their achievements.

Vasiliev on the Relationship Between Perisic and Sainovic

by Kevin Jon Heller

Sergey Vasiliev, an excellent young ICL scholar, has posted at the Center for International Criminal Justice a superb — and very long — analysis of the relationship between Perisic and Sainovic entitled “Consistency of Jurisprudence, Finality of Acquittals, and Ne Bis in Idem.” I agree with almost everything Sergey says, although I don’t think we should consider the Perisic AC’s adoption of the specific-direction requirement to be “clear error” (a basic requirement of any argument that the Appeals Chamber should reconsider the judgment) simply because the Sainovic AC says that it was. As Bill Schabas notes in his recent post, the legal issue can hardly be considered settled by Sainovic, given that the judgment was not unanimous, was decided by different appeals judges and the two dissenters (on the specific-direction point) in Perisic, and included a judge who was inexplicably in the majority in both Perisic and Sainovic. I also find it odd that Sergey doesn’t like my claim that the OTP’s motion for reconsideration belongs in the dustbin, given that he unequivocally rejects — on ne bis in idem and human-rights grounds — the idea that the OTP should be given what it wants: namely, Perisic’s acquittal overturned and a conviction entered.

But those are minor points. The post is must-read for anyone interested in the specific-direction requirement or the sudden implosion of the ICTY’s Appeals Chamber.

Events and Announcements: February 9, 2014

by An Hertogen

Calls for Papers

  • The ICTBEL Organising Committee has now issued a call for papers to be presented in June 2014 conference, which will be held in Edinburgh, United Kingdom. International Confer­ence on Trade, Business and Economic Law (ICTBEL) provides an opportunity for academics, practitioners, consultants, scholars, researchers and policy makers with different backgrounds and experience to present their papers in the conference. Papers may address, but are not restricted to, the main theme from any of the following sub-themes. Unlisted but related sub-topics are also acceptable: International Trade Law, International Economic Law,  International Business Law, Corpo­rate/Commercial Law, Climate Change, Sustainable development and International Trade, Im­pact of Liberalisation and globalisation on trade, business and investment, Globalisation and Free Trade,  Trade Policy,  Economic and Finance,  International Trade Frauds,  Money Laun­dering regulations, Bribery and Corruption, Foreign investments,  Mergers and Acquisition,  Ju­risdiction and Enforcement of Judgments, International commercial arbitration and litigation, Im­port and Export, Letters of Credit,  WTO and related agreements. An abstract between 300-500 words written on a topic within the broad conference theme of in­ternational trade, business and economic law should be submitted by e-mail before April 14, 2014.

Events

Announcements

  • OUP have just published a new debate map on the disputes in the South and East China Seas and has made some relevant OUP content freely available here.
  • The European Inter-University Centre for Human Rights and Democratisation (EIUC) is accepting applications for the 18th edition of the European Master’s Degree in Human Rights and Democratisation (E.MA).  E.MA provides students with the opportunity to share knowledge and skills with leading scholars from 41 prestigious European Universities and renowned Human Rights experts, in the classroom and during a week-long field trip. Applications for the academic year 2014/2015 are processed on an on-going basis. The Second Round Deadline is March 15, 2014Apply now.
  • The Antonio Cassese Initiative for Justice, Peace and Humanity and the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights open their application process for the Summer School 2014 on Transnational Justice: Conflict and Human Rights from July 7-11, 2014.
  • The Academy on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law is proud to announce the call for applications for the 15th annual Program of Advanced Studies on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law which runs from May 27th to June 13th 2014. The program offers 19 courses taught by more than 40 prominent scholars in the field of human rights, in both English and Spanish. The Academy on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law provides through this Program the unique opportunity to learn and interact with judges of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Special Rapporteurs of United Nations, members of the Inter-American Commission and Court on Human Rights, recognized members of NGOs and professors from all over the world. The program welcomed more than 165 participants from over 25 countries with differing backgrounds and levels of experience for an intensive three weeks in Washington, D.C. Additionally, the Academy hosts special events, such as panels, a film series, and site visits to international organizations. The Diploma is offered to a select group of 35 law professionals who fulfill the admission requirements. Access more information here.
  • The Summer Academy on the Continental Shelf (SACS) will be held from June 21-28, 2014 under the auspices of the University of the Faroe Islands. You can download the information folder here.

Last week’s events and announcements can be found here. If you would like to post an announcement on Opinio Juris, please contact us.

Weekend Roundup: February 2-8, 2014

by An Hertogen

The year is now officially in full swing on Opinio Juris with our first symposium of 2014. Up for discussion were both lead articles of the latest AJIL issue. The first article, on the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, was introduced here by Karen Alter, Larry Helfer and Jacky McAllister and was followed by comments by Solomon Ebobrah, Kofi Kufuor, and Horace Adjolohoun. Karen, Larry and Jacky’s response can be found here. The second article, by Julian Davis Mortenson and introduced here, discussed the role of travaux préparatoires in treaty interpretation. Ulf Linderfalk offered vigorous two part (1, 2) rebuttal. Other comments came from Richard Gardiner and Bart Szewczyk.  Julian’s reply is here.

Kevin mourned Maximilian Schellcriticized President Obama’s certification concerning US participation in the UN’s Mali stabilisation mission and the ICC; and was even more critical of the ICTY’s OTP request to the Appeals Chamber to reconsider Perisic. On the last issue, Kevin also recommended a post by Bill Schabas.

Julian, who was elected to the ALI, posted on the US’ first public statement China’s South China Sea Nine Dash Line is inconsistent with international law. Deborah tried to keep up up-to-date on the difference between ISIS and al-Qaeda and Peter engaged in a thought experiment on Olympic free agency.

Finally, Jessica listed events and announcements and wrapped up the news.

Many thanks to our guest contributors and have a nice weekend!

AJIL Symposium: Reply to Comments on “The Travaux of the Travaux”

by Julian Davis Mortenson

[Julian Davis Mortenson is Assistant Professor of Law at Michigan Law.]

I am most grateful for the thoughtful comments offered by Bart, Richard, and Ulf. Their observations are well-informed, generous, and extremely useful in advancing the conversation about treaty interpretation. So first and foremost, sincerest thanks to each of them.

In my response, I hope (1) to clarify the question that seems principally at issue in the discussion so far, and (2) to suggest how the historical evidence helps answer that question. As Ulf rightly points out, the article’s aim is not to march through a unified field theory of treaty interpretation in the exhaustive fashion of a single subject treatise. It is, rather, to debunk a theoretically central misunderstanding about the interpretive role of travaux under the VCLT as a historical document.

The article is thus fundamentally a historical inquiry. But it also has obvious doctrinal implications. While those implications are not the article’s central concern, I will briefly expand their logic as outlined on page 5 of the draft posted on SSRN. I take some time to spell this out because—with the exception of Richard’s kind and detailed approbation of the historical analysis—the commentaries in this symposium understandably engage less with the particulars of the history than with its doctrinal implications for contemporary interpretive practice.

So here is a sketch of the case for those implications:

  • First:  Every mainstream understanding of treaty interpretation contemplates the use of travaux to resolve ambiguity that remains after the methods described in Article 31 are applied. We argue about the use of travaux in other circumstances. But no one seriously contests that they are not just available but potentially decisive in the face of ambiguity. (This is why any perceived doctrinal circularity is illusory. Since all parties to the debate are in agreement on at least this point, for doctrinal and argumentative purposes we can treat the relevance of drafting history in cases of ambiguity as an axiom requiring no proof.)
  • Second:  The complex, multilayered, and rather-quirkily-drafted provisions of Article 31 and 32 are a textbook example of such ambiguity, both in their individual meanings at the subsection level and in their overall structural interrelationship. One might reasonably rely (for example) on the structural separation of Articles 31 and 32 to conclude that they instantiate an interpretive hierarchy that disfavors travaux. But one might also reasonably rely (for example) on the existence of the “special meaning” and “confirm[ation]” provisions to conclude that they do not. This ambiguity is stubborn, and no amount of deductive gymnastics can make it disappear.
  • Third:  Because the treatment of travaux under Articles 31 and 32 is ambiguous, every mainstream theory of treaty interpretation must concede a potentially decisive role for the VCLT’s drafting history in resolving that ambiguity. Putting it as one might in a legal brief:  assuming arguendo with the most conservative commentators that resort to travaux is available only in the case of ambiguity, that condition is easily satisfied here.
  • Fourth:  Careful review of the VCLT travaux—and it is on this point that the article focuses—demonstrates that Articles 31 and 32 were understood to reject a hierarchical or mechanistic view of interpretation. The holistic view of interpretation adopted by the drafters extended in particular to the use of travaux, which were viewed as automatically incorporated among and conceptually equivalent to the many other (potentially contradictory) indicators of legal meaning enumerated in the VCLT.

With the exception of the last bullet point, these statements are obviously asserted rather than demonstrated. But if each of them holds up, then as a matter of modern legal meaning the VCLT instantiates neither an interpretive hierarchy generally nor a hostility (suspicion, inhospitality, etc.) toward drafting history specifically. The Vienna settlement erected neither barriers, nor thresholds, nor negative presumptions regarding the use of travaux. Instead, it incorporated drafting history as a central and indeed crucial tool for identifying correct legal meaning.

Bart puts his finger right on the most important open question about this bottom line doctrinal conclusion. Given the conceded prevalence of learned professions that such a hierarchy does exist, it’s not out of bounds to argue that subsequent practice under the VCLT conflicts with its original meaning. (Note that, as explored in a shorter paper available here, the VCLT does not tell us how to resolve such a conflict. But bracket that for now.)

Partly because of the stark contradiction that Ulf observes between actual interpretive practice and professions of interpretive principle, however, it is my strong instinct that no such practice has in fact arisen among states parties to the VCLT. But the burden here will be on anyone seeking to dislodge the Vienna settlement. They will have to show, in the precise terms of Article 31, that contrary “subsequent practice in the application of the treaty . . . establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.” If you can’t make that showing, then it’s hard to avoid the following doctrinal conclusion:  Drafting history is generally and automatically available as a source of meaning in every single case.  And that’s true even if—as Richard so nicely shows with the meaning of “poison” under the Rome Statute—the particular travaux of a particular treaty might not in fact illuminate a particular question facing a particular interpreter at any particular moment.

Olympic Free Agency (An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, Apparently)

by Peter Spiro

I have a piece up on Slate arguing that the Olympics should no longer require competitors to have the nationality of the country for which they compete.

A journalist friend of mine once told me, “Don’t ever read the comments. Just don’t.” Misguidedly thinking that Slate readers were somehow exempt from the laws of the internet, I made that mistake. Maybe 10 to 1 against. A lot of ad hominem stuff. (To this one, really, I’m not such a bad guy.) Doesn’t everyone know that we academics are supposed to play the role of the court jester, saying things that other people can’t?

On the substantive side, two responses:

1) The seemingly reflexive opposition to eliminating nationality requirements (“I’m not even going to read this piece”) takes no account of athlete interests. If you’re the number three player in China, you’re probably also the number three player in the world, but because of the two-competitor per-country quota in singles table tennis, you don’t get to compete. That seems unfair.

Restrictions on transfer of nationality are in some ways worse. The Olympic Charter requires a three-year cooling-off period when an athlete wants to compete for another country (waivable at the discretion of the country of origin). Sporting federation rules add another layer, sometimes extreme. Soccer and basketball prohibit transfers altogether. Once you’ve played for one country at the international level you cannot play for any other. That looks to me like a human rights problem, a kind of modern-day feudalism.

2) A number of commenters suggest my proposal will lead to corporate teams rather than national ones. I’m not suggesting (for now) that the Olympics abandon the state-based orientation, for team sports at least, just that individual players not be required to have citizenship in the country whose team they’re playing for.

But the role of corporate sponsorship is implicated here. It might be part of the answer. To the extent that the Jamaican bobsled team attracts a lot of attention, corporations should be interested in footing training bills in a way that Jamaica the state may not be. A big part of the charm is that the team is labeled as Jamaican. Corporations will have an interest in backing teams not just from the United States and other big countries. (Here is an example from Sochi involving tiny Tonga, though perhaps not one to be emulated.)

Regardless of nationality rules, we seem to be moving towards corporate sponsorship in any case. Would that be the end of the world? In Korea, baseball teams sport the name of companies not cities (and the fans are astonishingly fanatic). To the extent companies had their name on Olympic scorecards, they might be even more generous with their teams, with athletes and fans as the ultimate beneficiary. But I mean this as a THOUGHT EXPERIMENT ONLY, so please, no need for negative responses below!

Schabas on the OTP’s Attempt to Reconsider Perisic

by Kevin Jon Heller

It’s an excellent post, well worth reading in its entirety. I just want to flag two particularly important points. The first concerns whether, in light of Šainović, Perišić can really be considered fundamentally flawed. Schabas compellingly argues no:

But the Prosecutor is not claiming that any ‘new fact’ has been discovered. Rather, the Prosecutor is arguing that the law has changed as a result of the legal basis of the acquittal of Perišić being ‘unequivocally overturned’. But was it?

First, there was a dissenting opinion in Šainović. Under the circumstances, the word ‘unequivocal’ is probably not appropriate. Second, Judge Ramaroson, who sat in both Perišić and Šainović agreed with the majority judgment in both cases. I would not use the word ‘unequivocal’ to describe such a strange situation. Judge Ramaroson might have enlightened us with a separate opinion to explain the change of heart. Third, the Appeals Chamber cannot ‘overturn’ the Appeals Chamber. It may seem paradoxical, but by refusing to follow the finding in Perišić the judges in Šainović may inadvertently have undermined the authority of their own judgment. Who is to say that yet another five-judge panel of the Appeals Chamber will not ‘overturn’ Šainović, perhaps restoring Perišić or possibily setting out a third vision of aiding and abetting? It seems more accurate to describe what has happened is that four judges of the Appeals Chamber disagree with four other judges of the Appeals Chamber (really, three judges, because one of them disagrees with herself).

The second point concerns the human-rights implications of “reconsidering” Perišić’s acquittal 11 months after it became final. I considered mentioning the issue in my previous post, but ultimately didn’t. Here is what Schabas says:

The real problem with the Prosecutor’s motion concerns the rights of the accused. According to article 14(7) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ‘No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country.’ The same rule is formulated slightly differently in article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention on Human Rights:

1. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which he has already been finally acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of the State.

2. The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not prevent the re-opening of the case in accordance with the law and penal procedure of the State concerned, if there is evidence of new or newly discovered facts, or if there has been a fundamental defect in the previous proceedings, which could affect the outcome of the case.

3. No derogation from this Article shall be made under Article 15 of the Convention.

Can the Prosecutor argue that when Perišić was acquitted by the Appeals Chamber there was ‘a fundamental defect in the proceedings’? There is not much in the way of judicial interpretation on this expression. Recently a Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights held that there was such a ‘fundamental defect’ where an acquittal was based upon an amnesty (Marguš v. Croatia, no. 4455/10, § 74, 13 November 2012). The case is currently pending before the Grand Chamber. But four judges disagreeing with four judges cannot be described as a ‘fundamental defect in the proceedings’.

The rule against double jeopardy (ne bis in idem) is part of a larger norm known by the term res judicata. It is almost certainly a general principle of law in the sense this expression is employed by article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. There is something profoundly troublesome about reconsideration of a final acquittal because a new judicial finding concerning legal interpretation is at variance with an earlier one.

I have nothing to add to Schabas’s points. I completely agree with them. We can only hope, for the sake of the ICTY’s legitimacy, that the Appeals Chamber does as well.

For the First Time, U.S. Says China’s South China Sea Nine Dash Line is Inconsistent with International Law

by Julian Ku

As Jeffrey Bader of Brookings notes, the U.S. government has, for the first time, publicly rejected the legality of China’s “Nine Dash Line” claim in the South China Sea (for a little background on the unusual Nine Dash Line, see an earlier post here). This is a semi-big deal as it shows how the US is going to use international law as a sword to challenge China’s actions in this region.

During testimony before Congress, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel stated:

Under international law, maritime claims in the South China Sea must be derived from land features. Any use of the ‘nine-dash line’ by China to claim maritime rights not based on claimed land features would be inconsistent with international law. The international community would welcome China to clarify or adjust its nine-dash line claim to bring it in accordance with the international law of the sea.

It is actually surprising that the U.S. government has never actually publicly stated this argument before, since the Russel statement fits comfortably within the U.S. government’s long-standing positions on the nature of maritime territorial claims.  And China could not have been unaware of US views on its 9-dash-line claim. But the U.S. also likes to repeat that it takes no position on any sovereignty disputes, and since the Nine Dash Line is sort of a sovereignty claim, it has always been a little unclear whether the US was neutral on the Nine-Dash Line as well.

Russel’s statement ends this ambiguity, and also offers more explanation on how the US “neutrality” in sovereignty disputes does not mean that it has no view on how those disputes would be resolved.

I think it is imperative that we be clear about what we mean when the United States says that we take no position on competing claims to sovereignty over disputed land features in the East China and South China Seas. First of all, we do take a strong position with regard to behavior in connection with any claims: we firmly oppose the use of intimidation, coercion or force to assert a territorial claim. Second, we do take a strong position that maritime claims must accord with customary international law.

Again, I can’t imagine this is a new US government position, but it is useful to make it clear publicly.

By tying itself to customary international law, the U.S. is challenging China to try to fit its Nine Dash Line into the legal framework created by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.  Even some clarification from China as to the legal basis for its Nine Dash Line would be helpful, since it would shift the burden on China to explain its legal position.

Moreover, the US government is also offering a legal roadmap for other countries that are not claimants in the region. It is hardly a controversial legal position, and should be fairly easy for the EU, Canada, or Australia to adopt (assuming they don’t mind tweaking China).

Having wedded itself to international law, the US will now have to see whether China will start making non-legal claims or even noises about withdrawing from UNCLOS.  The law definitely is not on China’s side here, but that doesn’t mean that China is going to back down in the SCS.

AJIL Symposium: Szewczyk Comment on “The Travaux of the Travaux”

by Bart Szewczyk

[Dr. Bart Szewczyk is an Associate in Law at Columbia Law]

This excellent article provides an invaluable contribution to our knowledge of the original understanding of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of the Treaties.  Its careful attention to the factual details, articulated in an elegant narrative, provides a vivid picture of the debates and decisions in Vienna.  And its comprehensive analysis of the historical record corrects any modern misperceptions as to what the drafters of the VCLT expected as the rules applicable to treaty interpretation.  The follow-on question, as the article notes, is “whether a regular and uncontested contrary practice has arisen—not just as a matter of what interpreters say, but of what they do—sufficient to undercut that original understanding.” (at 785).

Indeed, alongside the VCLT, there may exist several conventions (in the commonwealth, rather than international, sense of the term) governing interpretation for particular treaties, courts, or jurisdictions.  Such contemporary customs or practice may be as important in interpreting treaties as the rules of the VCLT.  For instance, judgments of the International Court of Justice are formally binding only between the parties to a particular case.  The ordinary meaning of the text of Article 59 of the Court’s Statute—the “decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case”—allows for no other interpretation.  Yet, any State would be highly remiss—and its advocates would border on malpractice—if it argued that an ICJ judgment on a specific legal question should be disregarded because it is not binding.  On the other hand, judicial decisions of other courts may be granted less weight in the ICJ, even though formally, they have equal status with ICJ judgments under Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute as “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”

Or take Article 27 of the U.N. Charter:

Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members.

In the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa), the ICJ held that “concurring,” notwithstanding its apparent textual clarity and travaux to the contrary, included voluntary abstentions from voting.  The Court’s interpretation was based on the “consistent[] and uniform[]” practice of the Security Council.” (para. 22).  As for the U.N. Charter so too for the VCLT, subsequent practice can inform or even transform the original interpretation of a treaty provision.

The article recognizes this tension between the original understanding of the VCLT and subsequent interpretive practice of international courts.  It notes that  Continue Reading…

AJIL Symposium: Comment on “The Travaux of Travaux: Is the Vienna Convention Hostile to Drafting History?”

by Richard Gardiner

[Richard Gardiner is a Visiting Professor at University College London, Faculty of Laws]

The article which this symposium addresses is important, timely, and elegant.

It is an important study because it examines one of the most common misunderstandings about the VCLT provisions on the role of preparatory work in treaty interpretation. It lays to rest the mistaken idea that an interpreter may only consider preparatory work if interpretation of a treaty provision by applying the general rule reveals ambiguity or obscurity, or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. As the study shows, these considerations are only prerequisites for use of preparatory work to determine meaning, not for its much wider role of confirming meaning.

This is particularly timely because the ILC may itself have given the misleading impression in its recent (and otherwise very useful) work on subsequent agreements and practice, suggesting that any recourse to preparatory work is limited by preconditions:

Article 32 includes a threshold between the primary means of interpretation according to article 31, all of which are to be taken into account in the process of interpretation, and “supplementary means of interpretation” to which recourse may be had when the interpretation according to article 31 leaves the meaning of the treaty or its terms ambiguous or obscure or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. (ILC 2013 Report, Chapter IV, A/68/10, p 14, Commentary on Draft Conclusion 1, para (3), footnote omitted.)

This seems to lose the careful distinction in the 1969 ILC/VCLT scheme between general use of preparatory work to confirm and its conditioned use to determine meaning.

The most elegant feature of the study is its use of the preparatory work of the VCLT to confirm the proper meaning of the Vienna provisions themselves. Continue Reading…

More on the Al Qaeda Name

by Deborah Pearlstein

For those who try to keep up with the shifting nature of radical Islamist groups – groups too many in the media sometimes wrongly link to Al Qaeda –the stories earlier this week on the group formerly known as Al Qaeda in Iraq, now calling itself ISIS, are significant:

Early Monday morning the leadership of al-Qaeda disowned Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS), the most effective of its two franchises fighting in Syria, in a maneuver that could alter the trajectory of the fight against President Bashar Assad. In a message posted on jihadi websites, the al-Qaeda general command stated that its former affiliate “is not a branch of the al-Qaeda group [and al-Qaeda] does not have an organizational relationship with it and is not the group responsible for their actions.”

Evidently not among those trying to keep up with the latest – the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee, which today held a hearing entitled: “Al-Qaeda’s Resurgence in Iraq: A Threat to U.S. Interests.”

AJIL Symposium: Is the Vienna Convention Hostile to Drafting History? A Response to Julian Davis Mortenson, Part 2

by Ulf Linderfalk

[Dr. Ulf Linderfalk is a Professor of International Law at the Faculty of Law at Lund University, Sweden. The first part of his comments can be found here.]

In what sense does the VCLT give a description of the way to understand a treaty?

The way Julian describes prevailing legal doctrine, the presumption against preparatory work is effectuated “by a set of threshold restrictions that relegate drafting history to ‘a carefully bounded and contingent role’, for use only … ‘when the text [of a treaty] cannot, in itself, guide the interpreter’” (pp. 782-783). Julian finds this position to be inconsistent with legal practice. As he says, (p. 783)

the ‘strange thing’ about Articles 31 and 32 ‘is that the one serious limit these rules set, is constantly ignored: I cannot think of a serious lawyer who would not at least have a look at some of the preparatory work to bolster her conclusion or, if necessary, reconsider her conclusion, regardless of whether the interpretation without the preparatory works would lead to ambiguous or absurd results.’

Such statements indicate a failure to distinguish between the scholarly investigation and description of an activity such as the interpretation of treaties in a context of discovery and in a context of justification, respectively.

Investigating the usage of Articles 31-32 of the VCLT in a context of discovery, scholars’ primary interest is with the mental processing of the kinds of material listed in those two provisions. Scholars are interested in knowing the way some given agent or agents, or class of agents (such as international lawyers or judiciaries, for instance) actually use particular means of interpretation in reaching an understanding of a treaty. Investigations ask questions such as the following:

(1)   When lawyers think they have an insufficient understanding of a treaty, do they generally consult preparatory work?

(2)   In any situation described in Question (1), do lawyers generally consult the relevant conventional language or languages, that is, the lexicon, grammar, and pragmatic rules of the language used for the authenticated version or versions of the treaty?

(3)   In any situation described in Question (1), to the extent that lawyers consult preparatory work and conventional language, do they generally consult conventional language before they consult preparatory work, or rather the opposite?

Investigating the usage of Articles 31-32 of the VCLT in a context of justification, scholars’ primary interest is with international law as a reason for action. Scholars are interested in knowing under what particular condition or conditions an understanding of a treaty will be considered legally correct. Investigations ask questions such as the following:

(4)   In a situation where a treaty is in need of clarification, when does an agent have a legally sufficient reason to understand the treaty in accordance with conventional language?

(5)   In any situation described in Question (4), when does an agent have a legally sufficient reason to understand the treaty in accordance with whatever can be inferred from its preparatory work?

(6)   In any situation where the usage of conventional language and preparatory work imply the adoption of different meanings, when does an agent have a legally sufficient reason to understand the treaty in accordance with conventional language rather than in accordance with whatever can be inferred from preparatory work?

(7)   In any situation described in Question (6), when does an agent have a legally sufficient reason to understand the treaty in accordance with whatever can be inferred from preparatory work rather than in accordance with conventional language?

Obviously, like most rules in the VCLT, Articles 31-32 give a description of the proper justification of legal propositions. They do not seek to teach us anything about the mental processing of interpreters of interpretation data such as preparatory work and conventional language. Rather, they seek to teach us something about the conditions under which the understanding of a treaty in accordance with each respective set of data will be considered legally correct. Any failure to see this will quite naturally cause questions like that posed by Julian on page 787:

[The Confirmation Route] allows the use of travaux to check and reassess the provisional hypothesis yielded under Article 31. Unsurprisingly, this inquiry usually validates the interpreter’s hypothesis. But not always. Sometimes, a fair and thorough analysis of the travaux will convince an interpreter that the drafters meant to convey something different from her original understanding. What happens then?

Obviously, if Articles 31-32 gives a description of the interpretation of treaties, not in a context of discovery, but in a context of justification, then nothing in the VCLT prevents an agent from consulting the preparatory work of a treaty before he/she/it engages in serious studies of conventional language, the context of the treaty, or its object and purpose. The order of consultation is immaterial. In a context of justification, the relevant questions are whether or not the meaning that the agent possibly discovers from studying preparatory work can be justifiably inferred; whether Article 31 provides sufficient reason to confer a different meaning on the treaty; and if so, whether there are sufficient reasons to refer to that meaning as manifestly absurd or unreasonable, in the sense of Article 32.

What is the appropriate method for a scholarly analysis of Articles 31-32 of the VCLT?

Julian’s conclusion about the role and significance of preparatory work for the interpretation of treaties builds on an analysis of the meaning of Article 31, paragraph 4, and Article 32 of the VCLT. The methodology used for this analysis implies very little usage of other interpretation data than the preparatory work of the VCLT, including Summary Records and Documents of the Vienna Conference; Reports of the 1966 meetings of the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly; the Final Draft Articles With Commentaries adopted by the International Law Commission in 1966; comments given by governments on the ILC Final Draft Articles; the Draft Articles With Commentaries preliminarily adopted by the International Law Commission in 1964; Summary Records of the ILC meetings held in 1964 and 1966; and the Third and Sixth Reports of the ILC Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties. Obviously, this choice of methodology assumes the conclusion. Julian relies primarily on preparatory work to show that preparatory work can be used as a “primary means of interpretation” – on an equal footing with conventional language, context, and the object and purpose of a treaty. To Julian’s defense, it could perhaps be contended that whatever other methodology he would have chosen, he would have appeared as internally inconsistent. This contention, however, builds on a misunderstanding of the role of the international legal scholar.

Treaty interpretation is an activity that engages many different kinds of agents, including, for example, international legal scholars, judiciaries, state organs and representatives, and state counsels. Not all agents are subject to the same societal constraints, of course. Depending on the capacity of a treaty interpreter, consequently, different lines of action are typically expected. So, for example, is a person acting as state counsel expected to choose the line of action that serves the particular interest of his or her employer or client as effectively as possible. One-sidedly advocating a particular meaning of a treaty, without caring too much about other possible meanings or counter-arguments, is standard procedure. If instead the person had acted in the capacity of an international legal scholar, like Julian Mortenson does, this same line of action would be considered improper. A scholar is expected to consider openly the possibility of conferring different meanings on a treaty. He or she is expected to conduct an open-minded assessment of those different possibilities, making allowance for arguments and counter-arguments alike.

Consequently, as I see it, the only appropriate method for Julian to conduct his analysis of the meaning of Articles 31-32 of the VCLT is to assess his preferred interpretation with an open mind to other possible alternatives. Thus, he should have inquired more carefully into (i) the wording of the VCLT, (ii) the organizational structure of Articles 31-32 of the VCLT, and (iii) the general significance and possible ways of reading ILC materials. In so doing, his entire argument would have come out rather differently. For those with a particular interest in issues of treaty interpretation, I have developed this argument in a working paper posted on the SSRN.

AJIL Symposium: Is the Vienna Convention Hostile to Drafting History? A Response to Julian Davis Mortenson, Part 1

by Ulf Linderfalk

[Dr. Ulf Linderfalk is a Professor of International Law at the Faculty of Law at Lund University, Sweden.]

Julian’s article focuses on a single proposition (p. 780)

“[W]hen an interpreter thinks a text [of a treaty] is fairly clear and produces results that are not manifestly unreasonable or absurd, she ought to give that prima facie reading preclusive effect over anything the travaux [préparatoires] might suggest to the contrary.”

Specifically, Julian argues (p. 781), that this proposition – while today shared by an overwhelming majority of international judiciaries and legal scholars – “cannot be reconciled with the agreement actually reached in 1969” and embodied by Articles 31 and 32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).

In critically assessing Mortenson’s article, I find that it builds on three assumptions:

  • In the final analysis, the legally correct meaning of a treaty is determined by the intention of its parties. Thus, when interpreting a treaty, the ultimate purpose is to find out how the original parties to the treaty actually intended it to be understood.
  • Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT guide interpreters to discovering the common intention of treaty parties. Thus, ordinary meaning, context, preparatory work, and other means of interpretation help interpreters understand the legally correct meaning of a treaty.
  • A detailed analysis of the preparatory work of the Vienna Convention is an appropriate method for a scholarly analysis of the legally correct meaning of Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT.

As I will explain in my two posts for this Symposium, I think all three of Julian’s assumptions are either fundamentally flawed or seriously debatable. Readers with a particular interest in issues of treaty
interpretation might want to consult the slightly more elaborate working paper that I have recently posted on the SSRN.

Continue Reading…

AJIL Symposium: The Travaux of Travaux

by Julian Davis Mortenson

[Julian Davis Mortenson is Assistant Professor of Law at Michigan Law]

It is often asserted that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties relegates drafting history to a rigidly subsidiary role in treaty interpretation. Many commentators go so far as to suggest that the VCLT entrenches a categorical prejudice against travaux préparatoires—the preparatory work of negotiation, discussions, and drafting that produces a final treaty text. Because of this alleged hostility to history as a source of meaning, the conventional wisdom is that when an interpreter thinks a text is fairly clear and produces results that are not manifestly unreasonable or absurd, she ought to give that prima facie reading preclusive effect over anything the travaux might suggest to the contrary.

As The Travaux of Travaux: Is the Vienna Convention Hostile to Drafting History? demonstrates, however, this conventional wisdom cannot be reconciled with the agreement that was actually concluded in 1969. Careful analysis of the multi-decade process that led to the VCLT shows that, far from adopting a doctrinally restrictive view of drafting history, the Vienna Conference sought to secure the place of travaux as a regular, central, and indeed crucial component of treaty interpretation. In reaching this conclusion, the article draws on a range of published and unpublished sources, including minutes from meetings of the Institut de droit international, the International Law Commission, the UN General Assembly in both its plenary and Sixth Committee sessions, and the Vienna Conference itself; internal memoranda and other documents circulated at each of those institutions; and proposed drafts and amendments that were submitted throughout the process.

It is true (and likely a source of modern confusion) that Vienna Conference delegates rejected a U.S. proposal to formulate the rules of treaty interpretation as a totality-of-the-circumstances balancing test. But that had nothing to do with hostility to travaux as such, much less with any desire to impose strict threshold requirements on their use. Rather, the delegates were rejecting Myres McDougal’s view of treaty interpretation as an ab initio reconstruction of whatever wise interpreters might view as good public policy. They objected to the purpose for which New Haven School interpreters wanted to use travaux—not to drafting history as a source of meaning per se.

To the contrary, the drafters repeatedly reiterated that any serious effort to understand a treaty should rely on the careful and textually grounded resort to travaux, without embarrassment or apology. They themselves leaned heavily on travaux when debating any legal question that turned on the meaning of an existing treaty. And each time a handful of genuinely anti-travaux delegates attempted to restrict the use of drafting history to cases where the text was ambiguous or absurd, those efforts were roundly rejected.

The understanding that emerged was of interpretation as a recursive and inelegant process that would spiral in toward the meaning of a treaty, rather than as a rigidly linear deductive algorithm tied to a particular hierarchical sequence. In any seriously contested case, interpreters were expected automatically to assess the historical evidence about the course of discussions, negotiations, and compromises that resulted in the treaty text—in short, the travaux. The modern view that Article 32 relegated travaux to an inferior position is simply wrong. The VCLT drafters were not hostile to travaux. They meant for treaty interpreters to assess drafting history for what it is worth in each case: no more, but certainly no less.

AJIL Symposium: Response to comments on “A New International Human Rights Court for West Africa”

by Karen Alter, Larry Helfer and Jacqueline McAllister

[Karen J. Alter is Professor of Political Science and Law at Northwestern University, Laurence R. Helfer is the Harry R. Chadwick, Sr. Professor of Law at Duke University, and Jacqueline McAllister is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Kenyon College (as of July 2014).]

Many thanks to Solomon Ebobrah, Kofi Kufuor, and Horace Adjolohoun for their challenging and insightful comments our AJIL article, A New International Human Rights Court for West Africa. We are pleased to have provoked a debate about the drivers of legal integration in Africa and to see this debate linked to a larger set of literatures.  We hope that this symposium will encourage others to investigate the forces that have shaped regional integration projects around the world and to use evidence from ECOWAS to inform regional integration theory in general.

Our article attempts to stay on firm empirical ground and to generate as complete and accurate an account of the ECOWAS Court’s transformation as one can have at this moment in time.  But here is the rub—what does it mean to say “at this moment of time?”

There were many questions that we could not answer in research conducted only a few years after the events in question. For example, we did not interview the member state officials who debated the expansion of the Court’s jurisdiction.  This was in part due to a lack of time and money, but also because doing so was unlikely to yield different or more complete information.  The decision to extend the Court’s jurisdiction is recent and still contested.  This makes it tricky to interview participants, whose answers may be colored by or speak to the sentiments of the day.

Someday, African scholars may write a version of the recent book The Classics of EU Law Revisited, which examines foundational ECJ rulings fifty years later. The passage of time allowed EU historians to access personal archives and analyze the views of key individuals, and thereby reconstruct what happened before, during, and after these rulings.  We look forward to the day that our account of the ECOWAS Court is similarly dissected.  For now, here are our tentative answers to some of the questions raised in this symposium.

Continue Reading…

AJIL Symposium: Can the ECOWAS Court Revive Regionalism Through Human Rights?

by Horace Adjolohoun

[Dr. Horace S. Adjolohoun is a Senior Legal Expert at the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. He recently completed his LLD thesis on Giving Effect to the Human Rights Jurisprudence of the ECOWAS Court of Justice: Compliance and Influence at the University of Pretoria.]

I agree with Alter, Helfer and McAllister that progressive judicial lawmaking may be risky, particularly in an environment where domestic politics are not in favor of a supranational court that limits the sovereignty margin of state organs. In the context of the ECOWAS Court of Justice (ECCJ), an interesting question could therefore be whether, by a purposive adjudication, the Court could read community law through its human rights mandate. The Court has repeatedly given a negative answer, and many have warned of the related risks, particular bearing in mind the fall of the SADC Tribunal. An association of factors makes me suggest that the chance could be worth taking.

The ECCJ is the official judicial body in which ECOWAS has vested the mandate to oversee the interpretation and application of norms adopted under the aegis of the Community (‘original’ Community law). I suggest that the African Charter has acquired the status of Community law because of its ‘constructive’ incorporation in ECOWAS instruments, particularly the 1993 Revised Treaty and the 2001 Governance Protocol. On the basis of the 2005 Court Protocol, the ECCJ has confirmed that status through its successive human rights judgments, starting from the first one in 2005. Article 31(1) VCLTTreaty law commands that interpretation of conventions should follow the ordinary meaning and not expand beyond the initial intention of the parties. Particularly, in the framework of regional integration arrangements, the ‘agency’ doctrine suggests that the Agent (here the ECCJ) may not usurp legislative functions by either interpreting the silence of the law in a particular direction (which I argue the ECCJ did in the Ugokwe case) or – and thereby – generating new norms that were not expressly formulated by law-makers (here, state parties)  (see Stone Sweet, 10-15). Some of the authors of the lead article support that approach in a previous work.

I agree that the silence of the 2005 Protocol regarding the well established international customary law rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies is as plain as was the lack of direct access for private litigants in the Afolabi era. Despite this, the ECCJ’s judges espoused purposive – and, in my view, ‘progressive’ – judicial lawmaking regarding exhaustion. The ECOWAS human rights ‘regime’ borrows from the African Charter-based system, which poses seven admissibility requirements for complaints to be accepted by the African Court and Commission. In the practice of the Commission, the rule of exhaustion is by far the one that attracts more contention. The 2005 ECCJ Protocol provides for ‘non-anonymity’ and ‘non-pendency’ as the two admissibility conditions.

From the foregoing, it is surprising that, in the course of lawmaking, ECOWAS states provided expressly for two ‘minor’ conditions, and remained silent for a ‘major’ condition, which has always attracted dispute. Continue Reading…

AJIL Symposium: Regional Courts, Regionalism, Critical Junctures and Economic Integration in Africa

by Kofi Kufuor

[Dr. Kofi Oteng Kufuor is a Professor at the University of East London, UK.]

In November 2013 the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice threw out a case brought before it by Nigerian traders seeking a judgment that Ghana’s investment legislation which discriminated against ECOWAS nationals was inconsistent with ECOWAS law. The decision by the Court was surprising not only on account of it being a setback to the ECOWAS goals of a single economic market but it was also a blow to the supranational regime that the members created with the adoption of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty. Moreover, this decision was even more astonishing as it went against ECOWAS law and related protocols on the free movement of persons, right of residence and establishment.

The decision was also surprising in the wake of the efforts by the Court, carefully outlined in the paper “A New International Human Rights Court for West Africa: The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice” by Alter, Helfer and McAllister (AHM), to extend its power. The research by AHM states that in the early stages of the Court’s power grab, economic union was sacrificed for the protection of human rights. At the core of the paper by AHM is that a constellation of actors, driven by a variety of interests, came together at a critical juncture in ECOWAS politics – there was widespread concern about the respect for human rights and humanitarian law – and this meeting of persons and policy space created an opportunity for the Court to expand its reach into the realm of human rights.

However, if we accept the core arguments of public choice theory then the Court could have exploited the petition before it to seize more power for itself. Thus public choice theorists studying international organizations will be surprised to see that this supranational moment has slipped especially with regard to an organization that still has compliance and legitimacy problems.

AHM assert that the decision to allow private interests to bring human rights suits before the ECOWAS Court was done at the expense of the Court serving as an engine for realizing the economic integration objective. The inference from this is that while a critical juncture appeared and thus an opportunity seized in the name of human rights, a similar opportunity is yet to come into existence for economic interests. However, looking at the rejection of the traders’ suit from a non-economic “irrational” point of view, the ECOWAS Court has struck a blow for re-connecting markets to society by abating neoliberal economic openness that subordinate Ghana’s investment law to ECOWAS law. Was the Court able to do so because the kind of interests that birthed the Court’s rights moment did not exist at the regional level? Inferred from AHM’s work the answer seems to be yes.

Continue Reading…

OTP Asks for Perisic Reconsideration — On the Basis of Nothing

by Kevin Jon Heller

Fresh from its victory in Sainovic, the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has now asked the Appeals Chamber to reconsider its final judgment in Perisic on the ground that it would be unjust to permit Perisic to remain acquitted. As the legal basis for such reconsideration 11 months after final judgment, the OTP cites…

Precisely nothing.

Which is not surprising, because nothing in the ICTY Statute actually permits such reconsideration. The only provision that deals with reconsideration of Appeals Chamber judgments is Art. 26, which is limited to the discovery of new facts:

Where a new fact has been discovered which was not known at the time of the proceedings before the Trial Chambers or the Appeals Chamber and which could have been a decisive factor in reaching the decision, the convicted person or the Prosecutor may submit to the International Tribunal an application for review of the judgement.

Even more problematic for the OTP, the Appeals Chamber specifically rejected reconsideration of final appeals judgments in Zigic, noting that the victims and the accused “are both entitled to certainty and finality of legal judgments.”

Lacking any legal basis for its request, the OTP does what it always does — invite the Appeals Chamber to engage in what Darryl Robinson has called “victim-centered reasoning” and reconsider Perisic anyway. In the OTP’s words, because Perisic was wrongly decided (according to one iteration of the Appeals Chamber), “the interests of justice for the tens of thousands of victims, substantially outweighs Perisic’s interest in finality of proceedings. Justice must be restored to the victims. Reconsideration is the only way to this end.” Put more simply: forget that inconvenient principle of legality. The demands of justice trump the text of the ICTY Statute.

It’s also worth noting a profound irony at the heart of the OTP’s request. It acknowledges Zigic is against it — so it argues that the Appeals Chamber should disregard Zigic in favour of its earlier decision in Celebici, which held, in another classic example of ignoring the text of the ICTY Statute in favor of its supposed “object and purpose” of combating impunity, that the Appeals Chamber’s “inherent jurisdiction” (of course) empowers it to reconsider any decision, no matter when decided, that “has led to an injustice.” In other words, the OTP is asking the Appeals Chamber to ignore a new decision (Zigic) that rejected an old decision (Celebici) in order to apply a new decision (Sainovic) that rejected an old decision (Perisic). Remarkable.

I would like to predict that the Appeals Chamber will consign this motion to the dustbin where it belongs. But who knows? As Marko Milanovic has pointed out, precedent no longer has much meaning for the Appeals Chamber. The outcome of an appeal now largely turns on which judges are randomly assigned to the panel.

I will be speaking soon on Perisic and Sainovic at a conference on the legacy of the ICTY. With each motion like this one, that legacy becomes a bit more tarnished.

UPDATE: Dov Jacobs adds some important points at Spreading the Jam.

AJIL Symposium: Comment on “A new International Human Rights Court for West Africa”

by Solomon Ebobrah

[Dr. Solomon T. Ebobrah is a Senior Lecturer at Niger Delta University.]

To date, ‘A new International Human Rights Court for West Africa: The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice’ authored by Karen Alter, Larry Helfer and Jacqueline McAllister is arguably the most eloquent scholarly exposition on the human rights jurisdiction of the ECOWAS Court of Justice (ECCJ) by observers from outside the African continent. This brilliant piece of work is to my knowledge, also the only one yet in existence to have taken a multi-disciplinary approach to the study of the ECCJ. Based on their very thorough and painstaking empirical investigation, the authors have successfully (in my view) supplied answers to some of the nagging questions that political scientists and lawyers would have regarding the budding human rights mandate of the ECCJ. As they point out in their opening remarks, intrigued (as the rest of us are) by the sharp but successful redeployment of the ECCJ from its original objectives of providing support economic integration to a seemingly more popular but secondary role as an international human rights court, the authors apply this article for the purpose trying understand and explain the rationale and manner of this transformation.

The authors have made very compelling arguments in support of their theoretical claim that international institutions, including international courts adapt to changing norms and societal pressures such that rational functionalist goals do not exclusively determine how a given international institution ultimately turns after its creation. While I find myself in agreement with much of the article, it is in relation to this claim and the evidence supplied by the authors in proof thereof that I find my first challenge. Continue Reading…

AJIL Symposium: Introduction to “A New International Human Rights Court for West Africa: The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice”

by Karen Alter, Larry Helfer and Jacqueline McAllister

[Karen J. Alter is Professor of Political Science and Law at Northwestern University, Laurence R. Helfer is the Harry R. Chadwick, Sr. Professor of Law at Duke University, and Jacqueline McAllister is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Kenyon College (as of July 2014).]

The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice is an increasingly active and surprisingly bold adjudicator of human rights cases.  Since acquiring a human rights jurisdiction in 2005, the ECOWAS Court has issued more than 50 decisions relating to alleged rights violations by 15 West African states. The Court’s path-breaking cases include judgments against Niger for condoning modern forms of slavery, against Nigeria for impeding the right to free basic education for children, and against the Gambia for the torture of dissident journalists.

A New International Human Rights Court for West Africa: The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, recently published in AJIL, explains how a sub-regional tribunal first established to help build a common market was later redeployed as a human rights court.  We investigate why West African governments—which set up the Court in a way that has allowed persistent flouting of ECOWAS economic rules—later delegated to ECOWAS judges a remarkably expansive human rights jurisdiction over suits filed by individuals and NGOs. Our theoretical contribution explains how international institutions, including courts, evolve over time in response to political contestation and societal pressures.  We show how humanitarian interventions in West Africa in the 1990s created a demand to expand ECOWAS’s security and human rights mandates.  These events, in turn, triggered a cascade of smaller reforms in the Community that, in the mid-2000s, created an opening for an alliance of civil society groups and supranational actors to mobilize in favor of court reform.

The creation of a human rights court in West Africa may surprise many readers of this blog. Readers mostly familiar with global bodies like the ICJ, the WTO and the ICC, or regional bodies in Europe and the Americas, may be unaware that Africa also has active international courts that litigate important cases.  Given that ECOWAS’ primary mandate is to promote economic integration, we wanted to understand why its court exercises such far-reaching human rights jurisdiction.  Given that several ECOWAS member states have yet to accept the jurisdiction of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, the ECOWAS Court’s ability to entertain private litigant complaints—without first requiring the exhaustion of domestic remedies—is especially surprising.  We also expected that even if ECOWAS member states decided to create such a tribunal, they would have included robust political checks to control the judges and their rulings.

What we found—based on a review of ECOWAS Court decisions and more than two dozen interviews with judges, Community officers, government officials, attorneys, and NGOs—was quite different.  The member states not only gave Court a capacious human rights jurisdiction, they also rejected opportunities to narrow the Court’s authority.

Our AJIL article emphasizes several interesting dimensions of the ECOWAS Court’s repurposing and subsequent survival as an international human rights tribunal.

Continue Reading…

Weekly News Wrap: Monday, February 3, 2014

by Jessica Dorsey

Your weekly selection of international law and international relations headlines from around the world:

Africa

Asia

Americas

  • In Olympics news, U.S. officials say the first of two American warships heading into the Black Sea in advance of the Olympic Games has sailed from Italy.
  • A 30-foot (9 meter) sailboat with about 30 Cuban refugees aboard docked in the Cayman Islands and passengers said they were hoping to reach Honduras.
  • US President Obama released a certification memorandum that any US armed forces personnel involved in the international stabilization mission in Mali would be immune from prosecution at the ICC.

Middle East

Europe

Oceania

AJIL Symposium this week

by An Hertogen

This week we’re hosting a symposium on both lead articles in the October 2013 edition of the American Journal of International Law.

Today and tomorrow, Kofi Kufuor, Solomon Ebobrah and Horace Adjolohoun discuss “A New International Human Rights Court for West Africa: The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice” by Karen Alter, Larry Helfer and Jacqueline McAllister:

The Court of Justice for the Economic Community of West African States has
been transformed from an interstate tribunal for resolving disputes over
ECOWAS economic rules into a court with far-reaching human rights jurisdiction.
This article identifies political mobilization, rather than judicial lawmaking,
as the catalyst of this transformation, and explains the surprising reality that,
whereas private actors in recent years have been able to pursue legal actions alleging human rights violations, they remain unable to challenge state noncompliance with ECOWAS economic rules.

On Wednesday and Thursday, Ulf Linderfalk, Bart Szewczyk and Richard Gardiner discuss “The Travaux of Travaux: Is the Vienna Convention Hostile to Drafting History?” by Julian Davis Mortenson:

It is often said that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties relegated drafting history to a subsidiary role in treaty interpretation. This article relies on a
close reading of the Convention’s own drafting history to challenge that view.
Under the settlement actually negotiated by the drafters, reference to travaux
préparatoires was meant to be a regular, central, and indeed indispensable component of the interpretive process.

As always, we welcome your comments too.

Talk About the Imperial Presidency!

by Kevin Jon Heller

President Obama has issued the following memorandum concerning US participation in the UN’s Mali stabilisation mission:

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, and consistent with section 2005 of the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7424), concerning the participation of members of the Armed Forces of the United States in certain United Nations peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, I hereby certify that members of the U.S. Armed Forces participating in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali are without risk of criminal prosecution or other assertion of jurisdiction by the International Criminal Court (ICC) because the Republic of Mali has entered into an agreement in accordance with Article 98 of the Rome Statute preventing the ICC from proceeding against members of the Armed Forces of the United States present in that country.

This is, of course, completely wrong. At most, the Article 98 agreement between the US and Mali would prohibit the ICC from asking Mali to surrender a US soldier wanted for war crimes. It would not in any way prohibit the Court from prosecuting a US soldier it managed to get its hands on without Mali’s help. (Or even if Mali decided its obligation under the Rome Statute took precedence over its Article 98 agreement with the US and handed a US soldier over despite the agreement.)

I realize Obama is a communist/marxist/fascist/socialist dictator, but he has not yet been crowned King of the ICC. Until he has, the Rome Statute remains more important than his presidential memoranda.

Congratulations to Julian

by Kenneth Anderson

Warmest congratulations to OJ’s very own Julian Ku, on his election to ALI – the American Law Institute.  (For those unfamiliar with ALI and its work, this is a great honor in the American legal profession.  Among other things, it produces the Restatements of Law, as well as model codes and annotated commentaries and “Principles” on various legal topics.)

Events and Announcements: February 2, 2014

by Jessica Dorsey

Calls for Papers

  • The Institute of Advanced Legal Studies at the University of London is organizing a workshop on National Security and Public Health as exceptions to Human Rights’ on 29th May 2014 and is now calling for papers. The Institute is honoured to announce that the keynote speaker will be Professor Malcolm Dando who will speak on “Threats of dual use biomedical research – when nation security and public health collide”. Please note the deadline for submissions is 14th February 2014. All the information and the call for papers can be found here.

Events

  • On Monday, February 10, 2014 at the American University Washington College of Law, the ICRC presents: “Targeting The Sleeping Fighter and Other Hard Legal Issues: A Discussion on the Use of Force in Non-International Armed Conflict.” Should government forces be obligated to capture a rebel fighter located away from zones of active hostilities, or may they use lethal force as a first resort?  Can a soldier automatically fire on a car barrelling through the check-point in a conflict zone, or on fighters who mingle with civilians during a riot? How should government forces respond to criminal gangs that support rebel fighters, or to fighters who are escaping from detention centers? In response to these types of questions that frequently arise in modern warfare, the ICRC convened an expert meeting on the use of force in non-international armed conflict, and published a report summarizing the findings of this meeting in late 2013 .  The report highlights challenges militaries face when both human rights law and international humanitarian law may apply, thereby creating situations in which the relevant actors face difficulties identifying and applying the adequate legal framework. Speakers include: Brigadier General Richard Gross, US Army, Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Gabor Rona, International Legal Director, Human Rights First; Daniel Cahen, Legal Advisor, ICRC Regional Delegation to the United States; Moderated by Professor Robert Goldman, Washington College of Law. For further information, please contact: Office of Special Events & Continuing Legal Education. To register (no charge), please click here.

Announcements

  • The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Freie Universität Berlin announce two new Post-Doctoral Fellowships (one at each location) for the 2014-2015 Academic Year in the framework of the Joint Interdisciplinary Program “Human Rights under Pressure” (HR-UP). The Fellow will participate in the full HR-UP program curriculum, including interdisciplinary colloquia and annual summer schools. The Fellowship is open to researchers who received their doctorate no earlier than September 2010 – or who will submit their dissertation no later than March 2014 – in any discipline related to human rights. The research plan must deal with the current challenges confronting human rights, relevant to the HR-UP research program. The application deadline is 20th February 2014. For further information please click here 
  • The Centre of Excellence for International Courts (iCourts) and PluriCourts – Centre for the Study of the Legitimate Roles of the Judiciary in the Global Order is hosting a high-level summer school for PhD students and junior scholars working on international law and with a special interest in interdisciplinary studies of international law and its social and political context. We particularly welcome students and scholars who are writing up a PhD thesis or a post-doc project that involves an interdisciplinary study of one or more international courts. The summer school will take place on June 23-27 2014 in the center of Copenhagen and is offered free of charge (excluding expenses relating to travel and accommodation). Applicants will be considered on a rolling basis until 1 May 2014. To learn more please visit the website.

Last week’s events and announcements can be found here. If you would like to post an announcement on Opinio Juris, please contact us.

RIP, Maximilian Schell

by Kevin Jon Heller

downloadI was very sad to learn that Maximilian Schell died today at age 83. Schell was sensational as the defence attorney, Hans Rolfe, in Judgment at Nuremberg — it was only his second role in a Hollywood movie, and he won an Academy Award for it. An original poster of the film hangs above the desk in my office; I used it as inspiration when I wrote my book on the Nuremberg Military Tribunals. Schell’s career, however, went far beyond Judgment at Nuremberg. I had no idea, for example, that he was an accomplished pianist and conductor! Here’s a snippet from one of his obituaries:

Despite being type-cast for numerous Nazi-era films, Schell’s acting performances in the mid-1970s also won him renewed popular acclaim, earning him a best actor Oscar nomination for “The Man in the Glass Booth” and a supporting actor nomination for his performance alongside Jane Fonda, Vanessa Redgrave and Jason Robards in “Julia.”

The son of Swiss playwright Hermann Ferdinand Schell and Austrian stage actress Noe von Nordberg, Schell was born in Vienna on Dec. 8, 1930 and raised in Switzerland after his family fled Germany’s annexation of his homeland.

Schell followed in the footsteps of his older sister Maria and brother Carl, making his stage debut in 1952. He then appeared in a number of German films before relocating to Hollywood in 1958.

By then, Maria Schell was already an international film star, winning the best actress award at the 1954 Cannes Film Festival for her performance in “The Last Bridge.”

Maximilian made his Hollywood debut in Edward Dmytryk’s “The Young Lions,” a World War II drama starring Marlon Brando, Montgomery Clift and Dean Martin.

Schell later worked as a producer, starting with an adaptation of Franz Kafka’s “The Castle,” and as a director.

Rest in peace, Maximilian Schell. Yours was truly a life well lived.

Weekend Roundup: January 26-February 1, 2014

by Jessica Dorsey

It is hard for many of us to believe it is already February, but as things go, the world keeps turning we keep blogging! Here’s a look at what happened this week on Opinio Juris:

We had posts from Julian on the media’s coverage of the Amanda Knox trial (and his prolific media presence!) and a reminder for the extended deadline to register for the ASIL/ILA Conference in April.

Chris shared some thoughts about the ongoing protests in Ukraine where two crises are at play: the future of the country and President Yanukovich’s crackdown on protesters; a recent TED Talk by Benjamin Bratton that got him thinking that we international lawyers can learn a lot from technologists (and vice versa); and China’s crackdown of Uighurs, by highlighting the case of Ilham Tohti. Duncan brought our attention to the unveiling of AJIL’s new blog: AJIL Unbound (a heartfelt welcome to the blogosphere!).

We had four guest posts this week, two covering some of Roger’s posted thoughts on extraterritoriality in Kiobel  and two on the effectivity of international criminal courts. In the former category, Anthony Colangelo talked about Kiobel and conflicts of law and William Dodge posited that the presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply to jurisdictional statutes. In the latter category, Stuart Ford showcased the topic of his recent article on complexity and effectivity of international criminal trials and Jonathan Hafetz offered some commentary on Stuart’s post and article.

I recapped the news here and offered events and announcements here. Thanks, as usual, to our guest contributors and have a great weekend!