04 Oct And Then the Future of the IMF
Here’s a follow-up to Julian’s question about the World Bank – what’s the future role of the IMF? Interesting news story in the WSJ over the weekend on whether the IMF might become, as its chief would like, a quasi-central bank to the world – or instead, as the article suggests is the tenor of the G 20 meetings, a sort of administrative staff of the G 20. I live on a cul de sac in DC where the neighbors have, during a period of years, nearly all been either IMF or Bank senior staff, so I’ve had these discussions a lot and close to home over the years. I don’t actually think things will work out along either of those paths with respect to the IMF; successful central banking requires a central government. And although the IMF might be very interested in becoming the administrative arm of the G 20, the problem lies with the undefined nature of the G 20, irrespective of the IMF. The G 20 couldn’t function as a policy body when it was the G3, G7, G8, G x. Apart from multiplying parties with, if anything, a greater disparity of economic conditions and fundamental economic interests, what has changed? My guess is that the IMF will elaborate a role in fact, as opposed to its annual confabs, in which it does what it has done reasonably well in the current crisis – facilitate the liquidity bailout of smaller, but not truly basket-case, economies, such as Eastern Europe, Iceland, the Baltics, places like that. That seems like a lot on its plate, frankly, just with that task.
Unusually, I agree with this entire post, except one thing: I think it is very well possible to have a central bank without a central government, though it does depend on what kind of central bank we’re talking about. As long as the central bank has a clear objective – ideally the objective to fight nflation without any other concerns – it doesn’t need very much else. Both the Bundesbank in the past and the ECB at present are doing exactly that: projecting the DMark-Zone and the Euro well beyond Germany and the Eurozone, respectively.
Of course, if we’re talking about a central bank as a regulator of banks, it’s a different story. Similarly, to the extent that the bank is expected to balance inflation and economic growth, it will need a better source of legitimacy, one that only a legitimate central government can provide. But an inflation-only central bank only needs a currency, which the IMF won’t have for at least another 100 years.