Post-Acquittal Detention

by Deborah Pearlstein

[Cross-posted at Balkinization]

While Congress has held two lengthy hearings this week ostensibly on the use of military commissions to try detainees for war crimes, the only item that seems to be getting any significant play is this statement by Pentagon General Counsel Jeh Johnson regarding the administration’s view on its authority to hold detainees even if they are ultimately acquitted at a commission trial. The Senate witness statements are here. The House testimony is here. (Full disclosure, I was a witness at the House hearing.)

The Washington Post story quotes Johnson as saying:

“The question of what happens if there’s an acquittal is an interesting question — we talk about that often within the administration…. If, for some reason, he’s not convicted for a lengthy prison sentence, then, as a matter of legal authority, I think it’s our view that we would have the ability to detain that person.”

I think there’s actually less news here than perhaps meets the eye, but I fully understand the reaction that many, including a number in Congress, seem to be having. If you can hold them forever anyway, why even bother with a trial? And what could possibly be such a court’s claim to legitimacy if its rulings have such negligible significance?

So there’s a technical answer in international law, and a practical answer about where we find ourselves today. The technical answer is clear if one imagines for a moment we’re in the midst of a modern World War II – a classic international armed conflict, in which it is entirely possible that war crimes will be committed; in which the United States’ authority to hold, say, prisoners of war, is undisputed; and in which the United States has in all instances scrupulously carried out its obligations under the Geneva Conventions and other relevant law. The U.S. Army takes into its custody a Nazi soldier implicated in the murder and rape of civilians. Under current law, we could detain the soldier until the end of the armed conflict without trial (provided we continued to treat him in compliance with Geneva and any other relevant laws). But it’s looking increasingly like the armed conflict may end before next year. And if this guy is really guilty of war crimes, he deserves to be in custody (under a criminal sentence) for far longer than that. So we try prosecuting him. Unfortunately, some key witnesses end up refusing to testify at trial, and the soldier is acquitted. Also unfortunately, the war continues to drag on. Could we go back to holding him as a POW? I’d welcome correction, but I’m not aware of any international law bar to continued POW detention under those circumstances.

Does that technical answer apply in today’s rather different circumstances? The answer turns not on anything new Mr. Johnson just said, but on an argument the Administration has been asserting in Gitmo habeas litigation for months already. The Administration’s litigating position is that there is an ongoing, non-international armed conflict (i.e. a conflict not between two states, but between the United States and the organization Al Qaeda); and that the 2001 AUMF passed by Congress gives it ongoing authority to subject certain individuals (just who is the central subject of litigation) to military detention until the end of the U.S.-v.-A.Q. conflict. There is nothing in the Geneva Conventions that would affirmatively authorize such detention. But neither is there anything in the Geneva Conventions that would squarely prohibit it (provided, as always, it’s subject to adequate procedures, humane treatment, etc.). If the Administration is right about the scope of the AUMF – an interpretation that I believe is overbroad but that has so far been largely winning in the district courts – then presumably the same logic about post-acquittal detention applies as in the Nazi case.

So what’s the problem? I’d say several. First, the Administration’s litigating position on the scope of detention authority under the AUMF is hardly as clear cut as the detention authority the United States asserted over the hypothetical Nazi soldier. Its interpretation of the AUMF is, as I noted, pretty generous for a statute that doesn’t mention the word “detention” and that of itself sets forth no procedures under which such detention is to be carried out. Indeed, it’s still not clear to me the Administration has taken that position with respect to the scope of the AUMF anywhere beyond the so-called legacy cases (those detainee cases pending when Obama took office). Second, the military commission process to date has been anything but a paragon of legality or legitimacy. (Former commission prosecutor Lt. Col. Darrel Vandeveld’s testimony in the House yesterday on where the commissions have been was particularly powerful on this point.) It is possible in theory to conduct lawful trials for war crimes. But there is a great deal of appropriate skepticism (not least among House Democrats) about whether the third try at such a trial system will, particularly at this late date, fix the gross deficits of the past.

Here, the past eight years worth of behavior has left both the legitimacy of the detention authority, and the legitimacy of the trial authority, in substantial question. It is hard to imagine that combining the two will bolster the credibility of either. On the contrary, it seems very likely to make the strategic costs to U.S. counterterrorism policy – costs in weakened relations with our allies, and with the moderate Muslim world – substantially higher.

http://opiniojuris.org/2009/07/09/post-acquittal-detention/

3 Responses

  1. Detention of a prisoner of war is not supposed to be punishment. The enemy soldier does nothing wrong by fighting for his cause. Of course, this makes more sense when prisoners are detained in a proper POW camp with barracks where they are able to organize their own day to day activity under their local commanders.

    If then a POW is convicted of war crimes and is transferred to a criminal prison facility for punishment, his treatment becomes harsher.  If he finishes his sentence and the hostilities are still ongoing, he would be released back to the less harsh ordinary POW camp. If the hostilities end first, he finishes his sentence before being repatriated.

    However, if you make the decision to hold all your prisoners in what is essentially a SuperMax penitentiary, then there isn’t much room for a criminal sentence to result in harsher treatment as punishment. It is this policy that is really the source of the logical contradictions of executive policy. When it suits them, the administration uses the laws of war as a legal justification. From the beginning, however, this enemy has been treated as “the worst of the worst” criminals and terrorists, to be treated as harshly as sentenced felons. Trying to have it both ways, logical contradictions are inevitable.

    Since Hamdi, the detention of enemy combatants has been authorized under the laws of war. The AUMF may be a trigger, but it is not the source of the authority. The AUMF does not contain any language about dropping bombs or using Predator drones against targets in Pakistan. Once you start an armed conflict, then all the rest follows automatically. The state of armed conflict itself provides the authority to detain enemy combatants under international common law. The detention of prisoners in Guantanamo derives from the exact same authority  under which Gates took Burgoyne’s surrender at Saratoga.

    Once Congress authorizes armed conflict, the military does not need specific authorization to detain enemy combatants. It does, however, need an appropriation to provide facilities to house and care for enemy combatants. That is why the Continental Congress begins its consideration of POWs by appropriating $100 to house and care for them. When Congress appropriated the money to construct the facilities at Guantanamo, that was the only additional authorization required for simple military detention. However, if you want to go beyond that and add punishment for military crimes, then Hamdan tells us you must have Congressional authority to use any system other than Courts Martial.

    As Liza Goitein pointed out July 2 in Balkinzation, if you regard this as a non-international conflict against a non-state enemy, then domestic law can also provide a criminal basis for detention (although this is more common in cases of internal rebellion). Just because the AUMF is clearly not specific or sufficient to provide authority for this second kind of detention does not provide an objection against the first type of detention. Some might disagree with the Supreme Court and claim that this particular armed conflict does not trigger the application of the normal laws of war, but that is an entirely separate dispute.

  2.  if you regard this as a non-international conflict against a non-state enemy, then domestic law can also provide a criminal basis for detention

    I’ve always thought this is the correct answer.  Why did we invade Afghanistan?  Because the Taliban government would not extradite Osama to us or take steps against al-Qaeda.  Had Osama et al. been in France, the authorities there would’ve moved against them, and no U.S. invasion would’ve been necessary.

    Congress authorized the use of military force because there was no other way to apprehend Osama in what was a hostile or lawless territory.

    Once they’re apprehended, they’re criminals in custody, and should be tried as such.  Had we done this, KSM would’ve been executed by now.  (No reason CIA or whoever can’t interrogate them separately while in custody, provided none of that is admissible in court.)

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