Has the Obama Justice Department Adopted the Bybee/Yoo Interpretation of the Torture Statute?

Has the Obama Justice Department Adopted the Bybee/Yoo Interpretation of the Torture Statute?

Yes it has! At least according to Andrew McCarthy, who argues in this National Review article that the Obama administration’s brief in a case seeking to uphold its decision to deport Demjanjuk adopted the same narrow interpretation of the U.S. torture statute’s requirement of specific intent as the much-vilified Bybee/Yoo memos.

….[E]ven after Obama declared himself open to the possibility of criminal prosecution against the Bush officials, and even after Holder promised to conduct an investigation that would “follow the evidence wherever it takes us, follow the law wherever that takes us” (emphasis added), the Obama Justice Department is relying on the very same legal analysis in order to urge a federal appeals court to reject torture claims. In fact, as the Obama Justice Department argued to that appeals court a little over a week ago, the torture law analysis in question has already been adopted by another federal appeals court.

I am sympathetic to Deborah’s criticsm of McCarthy’s recent somewhat over-the-top letter rejecting an offer to participate in deliberations on detention policy with the Justice Department. But his legal analysis seems sound here. McCarthy is right to point out that the Yoo/Bybee memos adopted a really narrow view of specific intent under the torture statute.  This narrow view, which the Obama Justice Department appears to have adopted, was also adopted by the Third Circuit in Pierre v. Mukasey.

Specific intent requires not simply the general intent to accomplish an act with no particular end in mind, but the additional deliberate and conscious purpose of accomplishing a specific and prohibited result. Mere knowledge that a result is substantially certain to follow from one’s actions is not sufficient to form the specific intent to torture. Knowledge that pain and suffering will be the certain outcome of conduct may be sufficient for a finding of general intent but it is not enough for a finding of specific intent.

I’m not sure this analysis would necessarily get the CIA interrogators off the hook, because one might argue that they intended to cause severe pain and suffering, and not just knew it would happen. The other controversial part of the analysis is, of course, what exactly constitutes “severe pain.”

Still, McCarthy is right that it is very odd, if not outright hypocritical, for Obama and Holder to suggest criminal prosecutions are appropriate or even ethical charges for, at least in part, adopting interpretations of the torture statute endorsed by ten judges on the Third Circuit as well as their own Justice Department.  (By the way, John Yoo, at least, will definitely avoid any ethics reprimands).

All of this makes me think that, at least in the U.S, the criminal case against the Bybee/Yoo memos is very, very weak and even the ethics complaints are probably going nowhere (as Geoffrey Hazard seems to agree). Everyone should simply admit this is simply a disagreement (a very serious disagreement) about the legal interpretation of a statute.  In the old days (pre-2001), we used to have disagreements about questions of statutory interpretation. Today, though, we prefer to accuse people of war crimes.  I like the good old days, but then again people often call me a conservative….

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Steve Vladeck

Julian — Your post is proof positive of why this debate is so frustrating, perhaps to both of us equally. First, unless you disagree with the ICRC report (perhaps you do), I think it’s hard to believe that the personnel on the ground did not commit torture, even under the Third Circuit’s narrow definition of specific intent. Second, if the OPR Report says what media reports make it sound like, it is entirely possible that senior-level DOJ officials knew exactly what they were signing off on, which might demonstrate their specific intent, as well. And so, this is not “simply a disagreement . . . about the legal interpretation of a statute.”  This is an attempt to ensure that senior officials were not involved in a deliberate effort to commit acts of torture against terrorism suspects–and if they were, to ensure that they are held accountable for their conduct. I am on record as being somewhat equivocal on the question of whether any of the lawyers should be prosecuted.  To me, it really depends on what’s in the OPR Report.  But for now, I think it could just as easily have been said of the Supreme Court’s decision in Korematsu… Read more »

anon
anon

“McCarthy is right to point out that the Yoo/Bybee memos adopted a really narrow view of specific intent under the torture statute.  This narrow view, which the Obama Justice Department appears to have adopted, was also adopted by the Third Circuit in Pierre v. Mukasey.

In his previous post about the Ministries Case, Prof. Heller wrote that “[t]he authors of the OLC memos did not have to intend to cause pain and suffering.  They could be convicted of aiding and abetting torture as long as they knew that their legal advice would facilitate the criminal acts authorized by the memos.”  Does that mean that the Obama Justice Department and the Third Circuit are probably aiding and abetting torture by adopting Yoo and Bybee’s narrow view of specific intent under the torture statute?

Patrick
Patrick

I am glad to see this here. I have consistently thought that a prosecution was very unlikely and in part because it would be very unlikely to succeed.

Professor’s Heller’s view as quoted is in fact begging the question (‘criminal acts’?).

Thomas
Thomas

Steve, wait, are you saying that members of the Supreme Court should have been prosecuted for getting Korematsu wrong?

Benjamin Davis
Benjamin Davis

One more in the line of seeking to get acquiescence on torture.

Yoo is not out of the clear.  First, the statute of limitations pitch for acquiescence is not that clear a solution.  Second, if that line on the statute of limitations for state bar complaints is in fact true, well just prosecute him. Once he is convicted, he can be disciplined/disbarred then (see Clinton) for that.  Nough said.

As to a policy differences, sorry, a crime was committed by these high-level civilians and military generals.  People can squirm and rationalize as they wish about this, but that is what happened.  Low level grunts were court-martialed, are serving or have served time, and been dishonorably discharged for the doing the bidding.  Deal with it.

Best,
Ben

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