Smith-Mundt and the Battle for Hearts and Minds

Matt Armstrong, who blogs at MountainRunner, has a thought-provoking guest-post over at Small Wars Journal on the Smith-Mundt Act, which is commonly understood as having intended to prevent blowback of propaganda intended for foreign audiences back into the U.S. Here’s an example from the act concerning the Voice of America (VOA). Section 501(a) of the Act provides that

information produced by VOA for audiences outside the United States shall not be disseminated within the United States … but, on request, shall be available in the English language at VOA, at all reasonable times following its release as information abroad, for examination only by representatives of United States press associations, newspapers, magazines, radio systems, and stations, and by research students and scholars, and, on request, shall be made available for examination only to Members of Congress.

Matt argues that

Despite popular belief, the restrictions the Act is known for today were not designed or intended to be a prophylactic for sensitive American eyes and ears.

Understandably, [SecDef] Gates did not suggest revising the “anti-Goebbels” act, even if it is misunderstood (while his Department firmly believes themselves to be covered by the Act, a source tells me outgoing Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy Karen Hughes was not aware of this until a few short months ago). Smith-Mundt has shaped the content and methods of communications from State and Defense through institutionalized firewalls created along artificial lines, fostering a bureaucratic culture of discrimination that hampers America’s ability to participate in the modern struggle over ideas and managing perceptions.

The rest of the post provides a history of Smith-Mundt and how it affects what we now call “public diplomacy,” or strategically controlling the narrative of international relations. I agree with Matt that:

Simple communications models of the 1940’s have been replaced by global networks of formal and informal media. Perception overcomes fact as deliberation by both the consumers and producers of news shrinks to almost nothing. Too often, by the time the truth comes out, the audience and media have moved on.

I also see that the resultant question is how shall America act in this new world?

What I am less clear about is which “handcuffs” need to be removed from Smith-Mundt. The implication of Matt’s criticisms is that Smith-Mundt (among other things) allows the U.S. to engage foreign publics but not its own citizens with truthful propaganda. (I know truthful propaganda sounds like an oxymoron, but Matt explains.) This leads to the result where foreign organizations (such as al Qaeda) and states can propagandize the U.S. public with lies but certain of our information organz (USIA, for instance) is unable to directly access the U.S. market with responses.

Although I take Matt’s point that there is a lack of direct symmetry, I am not yet convinced that Smith-Mundt needs to be rewritten because, while I can see how reworking Smith-Mundt may make it easier for policymakers to target the U.S. public with propaganda, I do not see why such a rewriting is needed to affect foreign-targeted propaganda. The one issue, possibly, is that with the globalization of communications, news that appears on foreign news stateions can easily enter the U.S. via cable or satellite TV or the Internet. If that is the case, then I think a very narrow reworking of Smith-Mundt may be able to address the problem of such unintended seepage back to the U.S.

It would be more of a concern if the goal would be to allow greater leeway in targeting the U.S. with propaganda (truthful or not).For one thing, as Matt correctly points out, there are many ways that the government can respond to foreign propaganda (be it truthful or not) via the use of Press Secretaries, Spokespersons, etc.

Second, even if Smith-Mundt has been incorrectly interpreted through the years as being about avoiding the propagandization of the America public, perhaps this incorrect interpretation has had a salutary effect. As Matt correctly shows, there is a wide range of information outlets available today. I would argue that they cover just about every ideological niche, responding to (or supporting) just about any policy claim that is made. Some of them I find neither fair, nor balanced, nor credible (paging Fox News…) And, as it now stands, I listen to what my own government says and take it with a grain (or a mountain…) of salt. And, even though Matt explicitly states that the goal of his proposal is not the propagandization of the American people, if that is a byproduct of taking off the handcuffs, is that what we really need for better counterterrorism? Haven’t we seen in recent years almost every little loosening of constraints on Executive power getting expanded completely out-of-proportion with the original purpose of the looseing? Similarly, while I accept that there can be such a thing as truthful propaganda, I am not sure that is what the American people will get receive when it is the government itself determining whether or not propaganda is “true.” And a sound democracy needs accurate information.

Or, am I being too doctrinaire? In this era of information operations is it unwise to constrain your government when the prize may be not only be the hearts and minds of some other country, but of your own citizenry?

I look forward to any thoughts or comments.

[And if you are interested in learning more about public diplomacy, I also recommend checking out Matt’s post on readings on public diplomacy.]