Appeals Court Upholds State Secrets Doctrine Against El-Masri

Appeals Court Upholds State Secrets Doctrine Against El-Masri

A U.S. federal appeals court has upheld the use of the “state secrets privilege” to dismiss lawsuit brought by a German national. The underlying lawsuit, brought by Khaled El-Masri in U.S. federal court, alleged that he had been kidnapped by U.S. CIA agents and rendered to a third country for interrogation and torture.

The appeals court, like the lower court before it, relied on the “state secrets privilege”, may be invoked if there is a “reasonable danger” that litigation would require the disclosure “military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged.” If the court determines that the privilege does apply, the litigation must be dismissed if the circumstances make clear that privileged information will be so central to the litigation that any attempt to proceed will threaten that information’s disclosure.”

El-Masri argued that the privilege did not apply here, or if it did, it did not require the dismissal of his whole lawsuit. Indeed, he went so far as to argue that the whole privilege should be rejected in cases of extraordinary executive branch misconduct. The Court rejected all of these arguments, and in response to the last one, offered this rather sharp defense of their limited view of the judicial role here.

We also reject El-Masri’s view that we are obliged to jettison procedural restrictions — including the law of privilege — that might impede our ability to act as a check on the Executive. Indeed, El- Masri’s position in that regard fundamentally misunderstands the nature of our relationship to the executive branch. El-Masri envisions a judiciary that possesses a roving writ to ferret out and strike down executive excess. Article III, however, assigns the courts a more modest role: we simply decide cases and controversies. Thus, when an executive officer’s liability for official action can be established in a properly conducted judicial proceeding, we will not hesitate to enter judgment accordingly. But we would be guilty of excess in our own right if we were to disregard settled legal principles in order to reach the merits of an executive action that would not otherwise be before us — especially when the challenged action pertains to military or foreign policy. We decline to follow such a course, and thus reject El-Masri’s invitation to rule that the state secrets doctrine can be brushed aside on the ground that the President’s foreign policy has gotten out of line.

This seems about right. Just because courts have a limited role in overseeing executive conduct does not mean they have abdicated their authority. Courts have always had a limited role in reviewing executive action, especially administrative agency action. In some cases, they have no role at all. That doesn’t mean we don’t have the rule of law – it just means there are some areas that courts exercise no important role. Foreign intelligence seems like a proper place for a limited judicial role.

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Jan
Jan

Julian, thank you very much for the post. If this is a position of the US judiciary and in your view a right one a question arises what are then the checks on the executive not to commit these acts. What mechanisms are there to ensure that such grave violations of human rights do not happen? You can say that the main check on executive in a democracy is the vote of people. And indeed, in my view, this is a main reason why democracies have got generally a very good human rights record. If the governments misbehave they simply lose next elections. But (a big BUT) this mechanism (majoritarian voting) itself cannot prevent human right violations of those perceived as „others“ – minorities, socially excluded communities, foreigners etc. And it is exactly these, which are most vulnerable to human rights violations. This is where human rights come in and are the most important, in my view. Human rights are precisely a check on the executive not to do certain acts even though they would get away with it with their voters. So if the US courts have this hands off approach what mechanisms people like Khaled El-Masri have to… Read more »

D. A. Jeremy Telman
D. A. Jeremy Telman

Julian writes: Indeed, he went so far as to argue that the whole privilege should be rejected in cases of extraordinary executive branch misconduct. This misstates El-Masri’s position. Julian, following the court’s opinion on page 21, picks out a few phrases from El-Masri’s opening brief and places them into an argument that the brief does not in fact make. The brief can be found here: El-Masri Opening Brief The relevant language is as follows In ratifying the government’s contention that Mr. El-Masri’s suit must be dismissed on the basis of an evidentiary privilege before there was any evidence at issue, the district court embraced an expansive and overbroad construction of the state secrets privilege that would virtually immunize the most egregious executive misconduct from judicial review. As the 4th Circuit acknowledged on page 7 of the opinion, El-Masri never argued that the privilege should not apply, only that it should not be applied in support of a dismissal of the suit before any discovery had taken place: Importantly, El-Masri does not contend that the state secrets privilege has no role in these proceedings. To the contrary, he acknowledges that at least some information important to his claims is likely to… Read more »

Tobias Thienel

I would, certainly from my limited knowledge of US law, agree that the case was correctly decided as far as such law goes. The Court appears to be saying that cases which the courts cannot deal with on the grounds of non-justiciability fall outside the Article III concept of ‘cases and controversies’. I am aware of Supreme Court authority for this position as regards the political question doctrine (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-5 (1968); Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 215 (1974)), and it seems only logical to extend this to other justiciability doctrines. The fact that these doctrines are of long standing may explain the otherwise somewhat strange proposition that the meaning a term in the Constitution should be determined by law subordinate to it; also, the ‘cases and controversies’ clause may be taken as referring for much of its content to other law. But I would suggest that, as international lawyers, we may well have reason to disagree. As is well known, Article 14(1)(2) ICCPR provides for the right to a fair trial. Now, this is clearly only engaged when there is a trial, and therefore not by a refusal to entertain… Read more »

Tobias Thienel

Incidentally, I could not say anything more specific on the Circuit Court’s opinion because the link in the post seems to be wrong. Or is it just me?

And another incidental comment: the decision has received substantial, and not entirely flattering, media coverage in Germany. I should imagine that no ‘hearts and minds’ were won, and perhaps question the utility for the government of having the case dismissed. ‘Extraordinary rendition’ (a terrible euphemism) may be a state secret, but hardly effective as such. Basically, you should know you have lost when English judges, hardly known for their activism, pass comment on it: A and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (No. 2) [2005] UKHL 71, [2006] 2 AC 221, paras. 82, 107 (per Lord Hoffmann and Lord Hope of Craighead); Ahmad v. Government of the United States of America [2006] EWHC 2927 (Admin), paras. 81 et seq.; Abu Qatada v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKSIAC 15_2005, para. 324.

D. A. Jeremy Telman
D. A. Jeremy Telman

Tobias, you should be able to find the Circuit Court’s opinion here: http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/061667.P.pdf

Anon
Anon

I’m sorry, I just don’t see where in the Constitution it says the executive is entitled to torture people and classify the evidence. Which clause again?

Anon
Anon

By the way, at risk of being inflammatory, I take it from your post that you would endorse the use of state secrets privilege if the CIA were running a death camp, right? I mean, there’s no logical distinction. Clearly the “case or controversy” requirement of Article III requires it.

A law professor. Amazing.

Benjamin Davis
Benjamin Davis

Along the same lines, I wrote a Jurist oped today on this entitled “The Un-American Way: The Kafkaesque Case of Khalid El-Masri”

Best,

Ben

Tobias Thienel

On the ‘death camp’ proposition:

I’m not at all sure that the state secrets doctrine, properly applied, would really preclude judicial cognisance in such a case. It is difficult to see how a bona fide national security claim might be made for a death camp, and it is national security that the doctrine seeks to protect, not state secrets as such.

But there is another way of looking at this, which I find extremely troubling: according to District Judge Trager in Arar v. Ashcroft, cases must be dismissed if they tend to embarrass the executive. This would clearly apply to the hypothetical death camp case; indeed, it would apply with even greater force than in a case raising a more trivial violation of the law.

This terrible decision has been cogently criticised by David Luban at Balkinization, here and again here. I respectfully agree. I should hope that Arar will not be followed.