Armed Conflict With Al Qaida?

Armed Conflict With Al Qaida?

My next three posts will cover issues relating to the law of war. I know that many people have objected passionately to some of the Administration’s policies and legal positions relating to detainees. I have heard many assertions that U.S. detainee policies violate international law, and I must say that I think many of the criticisms are based on an inaccurate understanding of applicable international law or on aspirational statements of international law as critics wish it were, rather than as it now exists. I am not going to try in this limited space to rebut or discuss every one of these criticisms. I want instead to describe in detail our legal thinking on three specific matters. My purpose is not to persuade readers to agree with Administration policies. But I would ask readers to engage in serious legal analysis. If you question our approach, I would ask you to consider whether a different approach is actually legally required or simply preferable as a matter of policy. Did a realistic alternative approach exist, and how would that approach have worked better in practice?



I want to begin by addressing two related issues that have come up frequently in my discussions with my European colleagues. The first issue is whether the law of war is an appropriate legal framework in which to respond to terrorist attacks. The second issue is whether a state can be in an armed conflict with a non-state actor outside that state’s territory.



The phrase “the global war on terror”—to which some have objected– is not intended to be a legal statement. The United States does not believe that it is engaged in a legal state of armed conflict at all times with every terrorist group in the world, regardless of the group’s reach or its aims, or even with all of the groups on the State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Nor is military force the appropriate response in every situation across the globe. When we state that there is a “global war on terror,” we primarily mean that the scourge of terrorism is a global problem that the international community must recognize and work together to eliminate. Having said that, the United States does believe that it is in an armed conflict with al Qaida, the Taliban, and associated forces.



Let me start back in 2001. There was widespread recognition that the United States suffered an armed attack by al Qaida on September 11, and that, under the principle of self-defense, the United States was entitled to use force against al Qaida and Taliban forces in Afghanistan. No one in the international community suggested at that time that the United States was not entitled to use force to respond to those terrible attacks. (See here for a discussion about why law enforcement tools were not – and are not – sufficient on their own to stop future imminent attacks against the United States from al Qaida.)



Why did we have a right to use military force? We did so in self-defense against the Taliban because it had allowed al Qaida to use Afghanistan as an area from which to plot attacks and train in the use of weapons, and it was unwilling to prevent al Qaida from continuing to do so. After giving the Taliban an opportunity to surrender those it was harboring (an opportunity it refused), we took military action against its members.



We also were justified in using military force in self-defense against al Qaida, as an entity that planned and executed violent attacks with an international reach, magnitude, and sophistication that previously could be achieved only by nation states. Its leaders explicitly declared war against the United States, and al Qaida members attacked our embassies, our military vessels, our financial center, and our military headquarters, killing more than 3,000 people. Al Qaida also had a military command structure and world-wide affiliates. In our view, the United States was justified in responding in self-defense, just as we would have been if a nation had committed these acts against us. Indeed, the UN Security Council recognized our right of self-defense in resolution 1368 on September 12. And if the United States did not have the right to use force against al Qaida and the Taliban, we would have had no acceptable way to defend our citizens after the most devastating attack against the United States in history. Given the Taliban’s unwillingness to cooperate with the international community to bring the perpetrators of the September 11th attack to justice, one cannot reasonably argue that the only recourse the United States had against al Qaida was to file diplomatic protests or futile extradition requests to Mullah Omar.



So we found ourselves in an armed conflict in Afghanistan starting in October 2001. In the course of that conflict, we detained members of al Qaida and the Taliban, some of whom are now in Guantanamo. U.S. or allied forces captured the majority of these detainees in late 2001 or early 2002 in or near Afghanistan. One of the most basic precepts in the law of armed conflict is that states may detain enemy combatants until the cessation of hostilities. It cannot reasonably be argued that the United States and its allies had the right to use force in Afghanistan but did not have the right to detain individuals as an incident to the armed conflict that ensued, unless we planned to charge them with a crime. The Supreme Court explicitly has affirmed in Hamdi that the United States had the right to detain enemy combatants in the armed conflict that ensued after our decision to act in self-defense.



Some critics agree that we were in a war with the Taliban and al Qaida in Afghanistan in 2001-02, and that our detention of at least some of the detainees was justified under the law of war. But they argue that the conflict ended in June 2002 with the establishment of Afghanistan’s new government and that our legal basis for holding any detainees ended at that time. But this assertion is not consistent with the facts on the ground, because the Taliban continues to fight U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. We see the Afghanistan conflict as a continuing conflict that began in 2001, and believe that the United States is not obligated to release any Taliban detainees we currently hold in Afghanistan or Guantanamo, only to see them return to kill U.S. and coalition forces. Anybody who questions whether this conflict continues should consider that combat operations over the past few months have resulted in the deaths of several hundred Taliban fighters and a number of U.S., European, and Canadian forces.



Equally important, however, we believe that the United States was and continues to be in an armed conflict with al Qaida, one that is conceptually and legally distinct from the conflict with the Taliban in Afghanistan. It cannot reasonably be argued that the conflict with al Qaida ended with the closure of al Qaida training camps and the assumption of power by a new government in Afghanistan. Al Qaida’s operations against the United States and its allies continue not only in and around Afghanistan but also in other parts of the world. And because we remain in a continued state of armed conflict with al Qaida, we are legally justified in continuing to detain al Qaida members captured in this conflict.



Let me respond to two arguments I often hear as to why it is not correct to characterize this conflict as a war. First, some argue that a legal state of armed conflict can only occur between two nation states and that a state may not use force against a non-state entity. This contention is incorrect. The international rules regarding the right to use force, including those reflected in Article 51 of the UN Charter, do not differentiate between an armed attack by a state and an armed attack by another entity. This makes logical sense: The principle of self-defense permits a state to take armed action to protect its citizens against external uses of force, regardless of the source. It is true that most past wars were between states, or existed within the territorial limits of a single state, but this is an historical fact, not a legal limitation on the concept of armed conflict.



Over a century of state practice supports the conclusion that a state may respond with military force in self defense to attacks by a non-state actor from outside the state’s territory, at least where the harboring state is unwilling or unable to take action to quell the attacks. This includes the famous 1837 case of the Caroline, in which British forces in Canada entered the United States and set fire to a vessel that had been used by private American citizens to provide support to Canadian rebels, killing two Americans in the process. Even law of war treaties that govern the treatment of detainees in armed conflict contemplate conflicts between state and non-state actors across national borders. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions expressly contemplates armed conflicts between a state party and non-state actors. And any country that is party to Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, which contains additional rules applicable to international armed conflicts and also applies to certain conflicts with groups engaged in wars of national liberation, has acknowledged implicitly that a state may be in an international armed conflict with a non-state actor.



For an explanation of how U.N. Security Council resolutions and the U.N. Charter also contemplate States engaging in armed conflict with non-state actors, please see Thomas Franck’s article “Terrorism and the Right of Self Defense,” available here.



The second argument I hear is that the United States may have been justified in using force against, and detaining members of, al Qaida in Afghanistan, but it is not lawful for us to use military force against or detain members of al Qaida who were picked up outside Afghanistan. This argument seems more motivated by a fear of the implications about the possible scope of the conflict than by actual legal force or logic. We would all be better off if al Qaida limited itself to the territory of Afghanistan, but unfortunately, that is not the reality we face. No principle of international law limits to a single territory a state’s ability to act in self-defense, when the threat comes from areas outside that territory as well. This is not to suggest that, because the United States remains in a state of armed conflict with al Qaida, the United States will use military force against al Qaida in any state where an al Qaida terrorist may seek shelter. The U.S. military does not plan to shoot terrorists on the streets of London. As a practical matter, though, a state must prevent terrorists from using its territory as a base for launching attacks. As a legal matter, where a state is unwilling or unable to do so, it may be lawful for the targeted state to use military force in self-defense to address that threat.



One reason critics vigorously refuse to acknowledge that we have been and continue to be in a legal state of war with al Qaida is that they fear such an acknowledgement would give the United States a blank check to act as it pleases in combating al Qaida. However, recognizing a state’s right to take certain actions in self-defense is not to give a state carte blanche in responding to the terrorist threat. A state acting in self-defense must comply with the UN Charter and fundamental law of war principles. And whether a state legitimately may use force will necessarily require a careful review of the relevant law and specific facts, and will depend on a variety of factors, including the nature and capabilities of the non-state actor; the patterns of activity of that non-state actor; and the level of certainty a state has about the identity of those it plans to target. It also will depend on the state from which a non-state actor is launching attacks – specifically, whether that state consents to self-defense actions in its territory, or whether the state is willing and able to suppress future attacks. Rather than suggest that the use of force against al Qaida, including the detention of al Qaida operatives, is illegitimate, it makes more sense to examine the conditions under which force and detention may be used.



Let me close by emphasizing that I am not suggesting that military force and the laws of war are the ONLY appropriate or legal approach to dealing with international terrorism generally or al Qaida in particular. We recognize that other countries, like the UK, Germany, and Spain, may choose to use their criminal laws to prosecute members of al Qaida. Indeed, the United States itself continues to use its criminal laws to prosecute members of al Qaida, like Zacharias Moussaoui, who find their way inside our own territory in appropriate cases. But we do believe that it was – and continues to be – legally permissible to use military force and apply the laws of war, rather than rely on criminal laws, to deal with members of al Qaida in certain cases, such as those fighting or detained by U.S. military personnel outside the United States.


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Non liquet
Non liquet

Thank you, John for posting. I think it is helpful for administration officials to talk about their views in an open forum such as this one. I hope my question doesn’t jump the gun, but I’m sure one of the Professors here will let me know if it does. I’ll grant you that we’re in a state of war for the moment. But then, in your post you state: “One of the most basic precepts in the law of armed conflict is that states may detain enemy combatants until the cessation of hostilities. It cannot reasonably be argued that the United States and its allies had the right to use force in Afghanistan but did not have the right to detain individuals as an incident to the armed conflict that ensued, unless we planned to charge them with a crime.” Obviously, in traditional conflicts we had some formal terms at the cessation of hostilities which usually dealt with the repatriation of prisoners (and for those that committed crimes, trials). But how, if we are in a formal war against Al’Qaeda, will we know when the war is over? When will the President’s power to detain individuals as an incident to… Read more »

Marko Milanovic
Marko Milanovic

Dear Mr. Bellinger, May I first say what a pleasure it is to see a senior adiminstration figure such as yourself engage in this kind of a blogging experiment, a discussion I hope will prove to be most useful and productive. I have some comments on your most interesting post, as well some questions. So, to begin: (1) I am myself one of those who do not believe that the United States is engaged in an armed conflict with Al Qaeda, but that the “global war on terror”, a non-legal term though it might be, must be split into its constituent components. Therefore, the US is indeed engaged in an armed conflict in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and may lawfully detain combatants in these two conflicts until the cessation of hostilities. The US is not, however, engaged in an armed conflict with al Qaeda as such, all over the world, at it may not detain those individuals that it considers to be al Qaeda members wherever it finds them, pursuant to the law of war. Let me elaborate on this further. (2) Your post, insightful though it might be, shows somewhat of a conceptual confusion between the jus ad bellum… Read more »

Jmeniche
Jmeniche

Mr. Bellinger,

Thank you for your insight. A clear and incisive explanation of the Administration’s viewpoint has been notably absent from the sound bite dominated, mass media PR campaigns.

Do you have an office that is accepting resumes?

Marty Lederman
Marty Lederman

I concur in the kudos to Mr. Bellinger, not only for engaging this audience on a blog, but also for treating the questions so seriously — these posts are obviously not mere press releases. I have been very critical of the Administration, and Mr. Bellinger, on matters related to detention and interrogation, and therefore I’m looking forward to the discussion about standards for interrogation and rendition, and definitions of “enemy combatant” (which will determine who may be detained). But on this one, I must confess I’m still confused by the argument against what Mr. Bellinger has written. He will likely respond that, after Hamdan, the Administration accepts the view that the conflict against Al Qaeda is a non-international armed conflict, governed by Common Article 3 (at least outside Afghanistan — inside that nation, I’m sure others will argue that Article 2 applies). Why would we (i.e., pro-Geneva critics of the Administration) resist that conclusion? Let’s put it this way: Let’s say Marko Milanovic were correct that this is not an armed conflict recognized by Geneva at all. What would follow from that? The detainees would lose the protections of CA3, for one thing. And the military conflict would still be… Read more »

HowardGilbert
HowardGilbert

Although the Korean War began with an invasion of the South by the North (two entities that may or may not have been states depending on your point of view), the War was mostly between the UN and “Chinese Volunteers” who, although really units of the PLA, were superficially individual civilians. Even if you assert direct mainland involvement, the mainland was at the time occupied by an unrecognized rebel band of Communists unrelated to the official government of China on Taiwan. It wasn’t just the US that fought a several years war against a non-state actor supported by an unacknowleged government. The UN and most of the Western countries participated. Then there was something in Vietnam against another non-state bunch of rebels called Viet Cong, athough in reality it was a fight against unacknowleged units of the regular army of North Vietnam (even though we weren’t officially at war with the North). The 20th Century began with Congress (all but?) declaring war on the band of rebels associated with Poncho Villa. His raid on New Mexico was trivial compared to 9/11. The “Shores of Tripoli” refers to a time when governments routinely used formal military units against non-state actors. We… Read more »

Marko Milanovic
Marko Milanovic

Marty, I, as always, much appreciate anything you might say on the topic of the ‘war on terror.’ So, you have basically posed a policy question – if I were an attorney of one of the people detained in Guantanamo, or counsel to a suspected terrorist, what would my client lose by legally characterizing the conflict between the US and al Qaeda as a non-international armed conflict. My general answer is that these persons do indeed enjoy the protections of international human rights law and US constitutional law, and that these protections can actually be lessened by the application of the law of war, as states can do things in times of war that they cannot do in times of peace. That is precisely why the US government has argued for the application of the law of war in the first place. I can think of at least three more specific groups of consequences: First, as a preliminary question regarding the status of unlawful combatants – lawful and unlawful combatancy simply do not exist in non-international armed conflicts. Any combatant in a Common Article 3-type conflict is by definition the equivalent of an unlawful one, as he does not have… Read more »

Katherine
Katherine

Marty: 1) they do argue that the Convention Against Torture does not apply to an “armed conflict” correct? Granted that you could disagree with that argument without rejecting the idea that the armed conflict exists. 2) CA3 puts no limits on indefinite detention. It’s a bad idea to have the existence of “armed conflict”, and the ability to detain people for the rest of their natural lives, depend *only* on the executive’s assertion that this person is a member of the enemy–especially with an executive that has never made a good faith attempt to determine whether that is true. Read the CSRTs, and imagine being locked in prison for the rest of your life based on those procedures or anything like them. O’Connor’s opinion in Hamdi no longer seems so benign afterwards. I’ve never been sure where I come down on this debate, but if you actually look at the results of the administration policies…the more I look at the facts, the more I understand why people argue that no executive, and especially this one, can be trusted with a war that’s not limited in space or time. The claim that “The U.S. military does not plan to shoot terrorists… Read more »

Katherine
Katherine

Mr. Bellinger–maybe rather than assuming I should ask the question:

“The U.S. military does not plan to shoot terrorists on the streets of London.”

Is this a matter of law or solely a matter of policy? Are there legal limits that prevent the U.S. military or CIA from shooting terrorists on the streets of London, or from, hypothetically, taking prisoners into military or CIA custody and transferring them to a military brig, a CIA prison, or a foreign prison? If there are legal limits could you explain what they are?

HowardGilbert
HowardGilbert

One missing point of view in these discussions is anyone arguing for the acceptance of Al Qaeda as a real army whose members are combatants entitled to full POW status. Before 9/11 it was regarded as a civilain, criminal, terrorist organization whose members could be tried in the courts. Afterwards, the administration created the confusing status of “illegal enemy combatant” while administration critics seem to cry out for recriminalization. This will come to a head if and when Kahlid Sheikh Muhammed (KSM) is brought to some form of trial. If he was a combatant, then he was entitled to combatant immunity for the military planning and execution of 9/11. Nobody can doubt that the Pentagon was a legitimate military target. The World Trade Center was similarly a legitimate industrial target (at least in the context of US bombing history). So if the US accepts the consequences of its decisions, it will only be able to charge KSM with the death of the crew and passengers on the 4 jets (since Air Piracy is never a valid form of combat) but not for the deaths of the people (including police and firemen) on the ground. In a few cases (Padilla for… Read more »

kashi
kashi

re. Mr. Bellinger’s post and the case of the Caroline: “Over a century of state practice supports the conclusion that a state may respond with military force in self defense to attacks by a non-state actor from outside the state’s territory, at least where the harboring state is unwilling or unable to take action to quell the attacks. This includes the famous 1837 case of the Caroline, in which British forces in Canada entered the United States and set fire to a vessel that had been used by private American citizens to provide support to Canadian rebels, killing two Americans in the process.” As I understand it, the case of the Caroline does not support an argument that self-defense is permissible “where the harboring state is unwilling or unable to take action to quell the attacks.” In an exchange of letters between Lord Ashburton of the U.K. and U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster, “[t]he U.K. denied violating international law but apologized for the invasion of U.S. territory. Secretary Webster wrote in response: The President sees with pleasure that your Lordship fully admits these great principles of public international law … [and] respect for the inviolable character of the territory… Read more »

annej
annej

@Prof Lederman: Just because I enjoy the discussion too much, please do not get distracted from discussing mr. Bellinger’s point of view. I have been following your posts at Balkanisation and are more than interested to read your reply.

HowardGilbert
HowardGilbert

“these conflicts arose from internal divisions within states over domestic sovereignty, and by definition anyone who would contest such seated state sovereignty is a non-state actor” If the status (state, non-state) is determined only by its origins, then there has been a vast misclassification of a conflict between 1914 and 1918 that arose from a Bosnian movement for independence from Austria and a resulting assination. I would rather classify a War based on who is fighting. In Korea, for example, there were no meaningful North Korean forces throughout most of the conflict. To classify that war, you have to determine who the Chinese Volunteers really were. I do not see a meaningful objective distinction that can be made between the status of Al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan and Chinese Volunteers in Korea. They are both foreign soldiers injected into a conflict that was originally international (Russian/WWII) but later became a North/South civil war partition. It is also helpful to note that if you pressed the Chinese, they ultimately could fall back on China, while Al Qaeda ultimately fell back to its principal external source of support (Pakistan), and the US was reluctant to widen either war by bombing the enemy… Read more »

Benjamin Davis
Benjamin Davis

(I repost as I could not preview my comments above and have had to correct some of them). I would like to comment that this approach to interacting with a member of one’s government is very troubling to me. Essentially, I am receiving carefully developed position papers that seek to sound eminently reasonable from Mr. Bellinger to which a response is sought. Points that are immediately relevant are deferred to later in the week, yet I fully expect that they will not be addressed. I suspect that certain points have been included in this first post so that if a response is not made to them at this time, it will be considered that we are acquiescing in those points. So I am permitting myself to reserve my position on anything to which I do not directly respond here. Afghanistan. I believe we will have to await more analysis of the history to determine whether the coalition attack on Afghanistan was a legal response by the United States and its coalition partners in an act of self-defense after the 9/11 attack. I remember that the Administration was very dismissive of what the Taliban offered in response to the request to… Read more »

mzed
mzed

Mr. Lederman–remember that Congressional authorization has not been for a declared state of war, only for the use of appropriate military force. In the case of al Qaeda, it seems to me that the “appropriate force” was largely exercised in the battles of 2001. They attacked us, and we retaliated in kind, i.e. as appropriate for our defense. (I am largely basing this position on Yoo’s discussion of defensive warfare in The Powers of War and Peace.) The President still has authorization to continue using “necessary and appropriate force” to prevent future attacks…but that doesn’t mean *that* force is the *same* force we used in waging defensive war against al Qaeda. It is just whatever “necessary and appropriate” means in the post-Tora Bora context. I don’t know what that is, but I strongly suspect (speaking as a layman) it isn’t the same thing as the constitutional definition of “war”. And I really can’t believe that just because a group attacks our military we are at war with them. We are of course entirely justified in retaliating as appropriate and in kind, but surely that doesn’t place us in a state of war. Of course we could be said to be… Read more »

Dapo Akande
Dapo Akande

Both Marko Milanovic and Marty Lederman suggest that the Supreme Court in Hamdan held (i) that the US is involved in a conflict with Al Qaeda which is distinct from that with the Taliban in Afghanistan and (ii) this conflict with Al Qaeda is a non-international armed conflict. However, neither of these issues were actually decided by Hamdan. The US govt did make these arguements, the Court held “We need not decide the merits of this argument because there is at least one provision of the Geneva Conventions that applies here even if the relevant conflict is not one between signatories [to the Geneva Conventions].” Thus the Courts application of Common Art. 3 was only on the basis that this provision would at least apply and not on the basis that it was necessarily the applicable provision. Thus, whether or not there is a distinct conflict with Al-Qaeda and what the nature of that conflict might be are still open for decision, even with the US. Although Marko might be right that it is difficult to find historical examples of armed conflicts between a State and a non-State group which take place outside of the territory of that State, it… Read more »