Somalia and Self-Defense — “The Lawyers Always Ask For Details”

Somalia and Self-Defense — “The Lawyers Always Ask For Details”

On Sunday, U.S. forces attacked what the Defense Department is characterizing as “’principal Al Qaeda leadership’ operating in the southern part of Somalia.” DOD’s information on the attack is pretty sketchy, but the official Defense Department news story indicates that the targets were “terrorists who may have struck the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.” [Update: The New York Times is reporting the attacks may have killed Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, who orchestrated the 1998 East Africa Embassy bombings.] The State Department’s press briefing yesterday added few details, but I loved the comment by Department Spokesman Sean McCormak (at approx. the 2:26 mark) that he couldn’t answer whether any of the targeted terrorists, if captured, would qualify as enemy combatants because “the lawyers always ask for details” so that categorizations could not be made on the basis of mere hypotheticals. Meanwhile, new U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon expressed concern over the humanitarian impact of the attacks “notwithstanding the motives.”

So, I’m a lawyer. And, Mr. McCormak is right – I want more details. What was the legal motivation for this use of force? As we all know, the U.N. Charter prohibits the use of force except where authorized under Chapter VII or where there is a case for exercising the inherent right of self-defense. As to Chapter VII, although the U.N. Security Council condemned the attacks on the embassies in Nariobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998, I don’t read it as an authorization for the use of force against those responsible. Operative paragraph 3 does call “upon all States and international institutions to cooperate with and provide support and assistance to the ongoing investigations in Kenya, Tanzania and the United States to apprehend the perpetrators of these cowardly criminal acts and to bring them swiftly to justice.” But I doubt that “justice” necessarily equates to gunship attacks. And, given that the U.S. explanation seems keyed to the 1998 attacks, I wonder whether that precludes the United States from relying on any later U.N. Security Council resolutions that might have broader language with respect to authorizing the use of force to combat terrorism.

And what of self-defense? Certainly, the United States can argue that it was the victim of an “armed attack” in 1998 and it has a legal right to respond against those who attacked it. After all, that’s the “classic” formulation of the doctrine. But, I wonder how well it holds up here, given that the U.S. response comes now more than eight years after the original attacks? Putting aside the issues of proportionality implicit in Secretary General Ban’s comments, the length of time between the attack and the response raises interesting questions about the notion of “immediacy” – i.e., how international law limits the time within which states may respond to armed attacks. Indeed, if eight years is O.K., as well it might be, where do we draw the line? Can a state wait 15 years to respond to an armed attack? What about 30 years? Don’t such delayed responses risk, as the New York Times today is indicating is the case in Somalia, the perception that the response was more about revenge than self-defense? And what of the idea that self-defensive actions must be necessary – doesn’t necessity get harder to claim the more time passes? More generally, might the doctrines of estoppel or laches kick in, given other states’ growing reliance interests that further uses of force are not forthcoming? Otherwise, doesn’t the international system risk great instability if a state knows it can bide its time and wait years, or even decades, for the right opportunity to respond to an armed attack against it?

Given such questions, I would not be surprised if the United States does not rely only on the classic formulation of the self-defense doctrine, but also justifies these attacks as an instance of preemptive self-defense. Indeed, my former boss Will Taft argued that, as much as one could see the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan as a reaction to an armed attack, it was also a case of preemptive self-defense given the imminent threat of harm from additional Al Qaeda attacks. Obviously, other states are much more skeptical about the availability of preemptive self-defense under the U.N. Charter. Still, you can see hints of such thinking in McCormack’s statements yesterday, when he talks about the fact that the terrorist targets had enjoyed something of a “safe haven” in Somalia and the U.S. attacks were designed to ensure that these people didn’t escape to set up a new base from which they could threaten U.S. interests again.

Now, let me be clear – I don’t mean to question the horror inflicted by Al Qaeda’s 1998 attacks or the United States’ right to bring those who perpetrated them to justice. Indeed, I was actually sent by the State Department to Kenya some weeks after the 1998 attacks. I’ll never forget standing among the ruins of what had been the U.S. embassy with bodies literally still sealed inside what remained of the structure. Nor, will I ever forget working with those who’d survived the attacks, still coming to work through Marine Corps pill boxes day after day, notwithstanding the tremendous losses they had suffered. So, I’m not questioning the United States’ moral or political reasons for responding. It’s just that as a lawyer, and as someone who saw what happened there, I want more details.

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Anthony Dworkin

I would like to raise a question about whether the UN Charter prohibition on the use of force is really relevant in this case. After all the Charter is mainly directed at the use of force “against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State” and the government of Somalia (at least the one we recognize) sanctioned the attack. Therefore the territorial integrity and political independence of Somalia were arguably not infringed. I guess it could be argued that the US use of force was inconsistent with the purposes of the UN but that is debatable — e.g. was it damaging to international peace, harmful to human rights etc? However the best way to assess the legitimacy of the attack may not be by reference to the Charter but other bodies of international law — i.e. was it consistent with US obligations under IHL and/or fundamental norms of human rights? These are familiar questions from previous targeted killings in the war on terror, like the CIA’s missile strike in Yemen in 2002: was the attack carried out in the context of an armed conflict? If so, did it comply with principles of distinction and proportionality? If not, did it… Read more »

Jmeniche
Jmeniche

…or an even easier assessment. US supports the transitional government there. They request our support in a written [non-public] document. Behind the scenes agreement concluded. We obtain their permission to act in their territory for the limited purpose of assisting them in defense of their territory (albeit for our own strategic interests). No need to get into Art.51 issues.

Marko Milanovic
Marko Milanovic

Anthony, The jus ad bellum issue could certainly be argued the way you do so, i.e. that the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) of the Charter is activated only when the purpose of a military action is to impinge on the territorial integrity and political independence of a state. According to that view, for instance, certain actions in the name of humanitarian intervention or protection of a state’s own nationals in the territory of another state cannot be a violation of Article 2(4), as their purpose is not to violate the political independence of a state. The majority view among international scholars is, I think, different – whenever one state sends a gunship or bombs the territory of another state, it has violated the latter’s territorial integrity and Article 2(4) is engaged (see generally Christine Gray’s International Law and the Use of Force). I therefore don’t think it’s relevant for the purposes of the jus ad bellum that the US has launched missiles against targets in Somalia, or that it has done so previously in Yemen, with the sole purpose of killing a terrorist. These actions are still per se a violation of the territorial integrity… Read more »

Christopher J. Le Mon

I believe that the shift in the comments to viewing this as a question of armed intervention by invitation of the government, rather than trying to shoehorn it between the lines of Article 2(4) of the Charter, provides the correct way to analyze the legality of this use of force by the United States. In short, the law of intervention by invitation permits a state to use force within the territory of another state so long as a valid invitation has issued forth from the latter (subject to the same human rights and IHL limits that would bind the inviting state). The validity of the invitation, of course, depends on whether the government (or government official) issuing the invitation has the legal right to do so — that is, whether it represents the state on the international plane. As Brownlie so succinctly put it, the “difficulty arises when the legal status of the government which is alleged to have given consent is a matter of doubt.” This issue of invitation validity has arisen repeatedly over the last half-century or so, as I analyzed in a law review article I published a few years back. (I actually flagged the Somali question… Read more »

Confused
Confused

“I think it’s perfectly appropriate to ask the question on what basis the use of force rests.”

Actually, it’s not. The Lotus principle puts the burden on you to name what law the US violated, not what law gives the US permission to act.

Anthony Dworkin

Just to clarify — I didn’t mean to suggest in my initial comment that armed intervention would only count as a use of force implicating Article 2(4) if its intention was to undermine territorial integrity or political independence. My point — as subsequent comments have also focused on — was purely about the question of consent, or invitation as Christopher LeMon says. If a state consents to the use of force by another state inside its territory, does that mean that territorial integrity and independence are not violated and jus ad bellum is not relevant? Duncan suggests that this might only be the case where force is used in support of the national government, but I’m not clear why that should be a decisive factor. What if (as in this case) force is used because of the inability of the national government to secure effective control of its own territory? In other circumstances, the US could presumably seek the extradition of Fazul and whichever other suspects it wanted to charge with involvement in the embassy bombings. Given that that’s not possible for the Somali government (I’m leaving aside all questions of the legitimacy of this particular govt., but Christopher LeMon’s… Read more »

Christopher J. Le Mon

Anthony puts the invitation point nicely — there is no jus ad bellum issue with a legitimate invitation, because there is no use of force against the inviting country, as there is no violation of the inviting state’s sovereignty. In fact, the inviting state exercises its sovereignty by inviting another state to use force on its territory — which is why the legitimacy of the inviting government, and its legal right to exercise sovereign functions of the state, is so important in determining whether the invitation provides a valid legal basis for armed intervention by another state. To respond to Anthony’s and Duncan’s questions, and leaving aside Anthony’s last points about IHL and human rights questions raised by the lapse of time (both good points), I don’t think that motive is particularly relevant. States facing armed challenges to their governments often would appreciate another state coming to the rescue, but it’s rare that a state with the power to do so will accept an invitation to put its forces in harm’s way, unless it has an independent interest in resolving the conflict to the benefit of the inviting government. This overlap in interests is sometimes phrased in terms of supporting… Read more »

Dapo Akande
Dapo Akande

Duncan asks how long States have to respond in self-defence to an armed attack. This issue is governed by the doctrine of necessity, the key question being whether it is necessary to use force self defence at that point in time. In the Caroline incident, Secretary of State Webster spoke of a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation. However, it is questionable whether there is a requirement that the defending State act “immediately”. When Argentina invaded the Falklands Island, the UK’s response was a few weeks later. Clearly, the UK required time in this case as it had to despatch a taskforce to the other side of the world. It is difficult to say whether the passage of time lessens the necessity of the use of force in self defence or alternatively strengthens it. A good question that can be posed to illustrate the problem and I ask my students is whether Syria has the right to use force today to retake the Golan Heights which were captured by Israel in 1967. Its now 40 years after the event. Some might argue that given the passage of time Syria is bound… Read more »

Dapo Akande
Dapo Akande

Marko said that “just lobbing a missile at a terrorist does not an armed conflict make, nor does it render IHL applicable.” I disagree. IHL can indeed apply to such an isolated incident where the use of force can be regarded as a use of force between States. In the Tadic case, the ICTY, stated that “an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a States.” Note here the distinction between the threshold required for a conflict between States (where all that is required is resort to force) and for a conflict between a State and an organised armed group (where protracted armed violence is required). It is well accepted that any use of force between States implicates IHL and that the threshold for an armed conflict between States is pretty low. My recollection is that the US has claimed POW status for a pilot captured after being shot down over Syria or Lebanon in a one-off incident in the 1980s. Likewise if a State fires a missile at another State which is directed at a civilian target… Read more »