Benedict XVI on Holy War

Non liquet

20 years ago

May not be the complete version, but the homily is available in English here.

“But he should not invoke past centuries to justify the incompatability of violence and religion, much less invoke ancient history to condemn Muslim violence.”

First, not invoking past centuries would be rather impossible for a Catholic theologian. History and the tradition of the Church is essential for their theology.

Nor do I think that’s what Pope Benedict did exactly, he was invoking a dialgoue of the Byzantine and the Persian as a conceit of whether God is inherently rational. Islam and jihad were challenged (and that will get most of the press), but the three modes of the “de-Hellenization” of Christianity were all specifically Western.

For example, Pope Benedict challenges reformed Christianity and sola scriptura. He states:

“De-Hellenization first emerges in connection with the fundamental postulates of the Reformation in the 16th century. Looking at the tradition of scholastic theology, the Reformers thought they were confronted with a faith system totally conditioned by philosophy, that is to say an articulation of the faith based on an alien system of thought. As a result, faith no longer appeared as a living historical Word but as one element of an overarching philosophical system.

The principle of ‘sola scriptura,’ on the other hand, sought faith in its pure, primordial form, as originally found in the biblical Word. Metaphysics appeared as a premise derived from another source, from which faith had to be liberated in order to become once more fully itself. When Kant stated that he needed to set thinking aside in order to make room for faith, he carried this program forward with a radicalism that the Reformers could never have foreseen. He thus anchored faith exclusively in practical reason, denying it access to reality as a whole.”

That’s why it’s a bit ironic that writers like Andrew Sullivan, who have read the homily, have suggested that Benedict is calling for a Muslim Reformation. Though I think a headline of “Pope Benedict challenges Protestants” wouldn’t have garnered much of a headline.

“It all but invites counterclaims by radical Islam against the history of Christian holy wars.”

Certainly, and if they really want to get cute about it, they could point out that the Fourth Crusade, led by Christains against Christians, crippled Constantinople and Byzantium far worse than any jihad.

But let’s hope for a reasoned, intellectual battle of priests and imams rather than one of suicide bombers. It would benefit both religions greatly.

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Patrick S. O'Donnell

20 years ago

Of course suicide, let alone suicide bombing, is not countenanced by Islam.

Be it the Sunni imams who serve as prayer leaders or the Imams of ‘Twelver’ Shi’ism (or other Shi’ite sects), neither is comparable to the priests of Catholicism. Better, although still significantly different in religious function, are the ulama (‘persons of knowledge,’ sg. alim)[diacritics unavailable]. There are also qadis, muftis, etc.

In any case, I suspect Muslims would win any ‘intellectual battle’ owing to the significance accorded the ‘intellect’ and reason (‘aql) in Islamic traditions and ‘sciences.’ The closest the Catholic tradition comes to an appreciation of the importance of reason is found in ‘natural theology,’ the irony of course being that such theology owes much, historically speaking, to Islamic philosophy and theology!

I would prefer Muslims and Christians competing to live up to the spiritual and ethical prescriptions, counsel and admonitions found in their respective traditions. The Muslims I have personally known have been exemplary individuals. Alas, not a few of the self-described Christians I’ve known and encountered appear to have forgotten what Jesus said about the Kingdom of God, indeed, they seem more drawn to the seven deadly sins than the various theological and moral virtues. Of course this is idiosyncratic and anecdotal evidence and I know there are still ‘good’ Christians ‘out there’….

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Roger Alford

20 years ago

Thanks for the link to the English translation of the lecture. Note that he starts and concludes with quoting the 15th century emperor Manuel II Paleologus. He concludes, “Not to act reasonably (with logos) is contrary to the nature of God,” said Manuel II, according to his Christian understanding of God, in response to his Persian interlocutor. It is to this great logos, to this breadth of reason, that we invite our partners in the dialogue of cultures. To rediscover it constantly is the great task of the university.”

I read this to be a dialogue based on a syllogism that transcends one particular faith. He suggests (1) God does not act contrary to reason; (2) violent conversion is unreasonable; (3) therefore holy war for the purpose of conversion is incompatible with the nature of God.

Of course the lecture is much more than that, but I think he is hinting at an approach of inter-faith dialogue that rejects jihad based on this logic.

Roger Alford

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Patrick S. O'Donnell

20 years ago

That ‘there is no compulsion in religion’ as stated in the Qur’an is understood to mean that one cannot coerce an individual into becoming a Muslim, let alone resort to the ‘lesser jihad’ for same. Of course the ‘lesser jihad’ is in any case about the defense of the religion from attack, and hence its apologetic invocation is more along the lines of the ‘just war’ tradition in Christianity and contemporary philosophy than that called to mind by reference to a ‘holy war.’ Muslims cannot reject jihad because it is central to their faith and practice, especially as the ‘greater jihad’ that finds them struggling against the passions, the ego, in short, anything that stands in the way between them and God (all such things being a species of idolatry).

An inter-faith dialogue has as its premise or presupposition a sincere desire to know about the religious beliefs, practices, and traditions of one’s interlocutors. Christians have some distance to go if such an inter-faith dialogue is going to rise above verbal pretense or impious gesture.

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Patrick S. O'Donnell

20 years ago

We need some clarification as to what constitutes ‘Muslim violence.’ I rarely, if ever, hear the expression ‘Christian violence,’ yet I know for a fact that many putative Christians commit acts of violence, indeed, on a daily basis (think of the recent conflict in Northern Ireland: did we refer to the violence there as ‘Christian violence?’ If not, why not?). What is it about those acts of violence commited by indivuduals who are Muslim, that warrants characterizing their acts of violence as indelibly ‘Muslim.’ The implication is that the motivating factors, the reasons for committing such violence, are principally or determinatively ‘Islamic.’ What if the reasons for such violence have to do with political, economic or cultural questions that render Muslim identity as such secondary, ancillary, or incidental in significance? Violence committed by ‘Muslims’ may not always be perspicuously described as ‘Muslim violence.’ For I think we have here a distinction with a difference. Don’t get me wrong, there’s much that falls under the ignoble heading of ‘religious violence.’ But we might consider the following from Sudhir Kakar:

‘[I]f we look closely at individual cases around the world, we will find that the much-touted revival is less of religiosity than of cultural identities based on religious affiliation. In other words, there may not be any great ferment taking place in the world of religious ideas, beliefs, rituals, or any marked increase in the sum of human spirituality. Where the resurgence is most visible is in the organization of collective identities around religion, in the formation and strengthening of communities of believers. What we are witnessing today is less the resurgence of religion than (in the felicitious Indian usage) of communalism where a community of believers not only has religious affiliation but also social, economic, and political interests in common which may conflict with the corresponding interests of another community of believers sharing the same geographical space. [….]

The danger to the material existence of an individual can indeed be experienced as an identity-threat which brings a latent group identity to the forefront. The heightened sense of identity with the group provides the basis for a social cohesiveness which is necessary to safeguard the individual’s economic interests. But there are other threats besides the economic one which too amplify the group aspect of personal identity. [For example], there is the identity threat that is being posed by the forces of modernization and globalization to peoples in many parts of the world. Feelings of loss and helplessness accompany dislocation and migration from rural areas to the shanty towns of urban megalopolises, the disappearance of craft skills which underlay traditional work identities, and the humiliation caused by the homogenizing and hegemonizing impact of the modern world which pronounces ancestral cultural ideals and values as outmoded and irrelevant. These, too, are conducive to heightening the group aspects of identity as the affected (and the afflicted) look to culural-religious groups to combat their feelings of helplessness and loss and to serve as vehicles for the redress on injuries to self-esteem.’

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Patrick S. O'Donnell

20 years ago

With regard to Christianity and the Greek logos, I find the Pope’s account refresing and inspiring. The problem is his characterization of the Islamic understanding of God:

‘But for Muslim teaching, God is absolutely transcendent. His will is not bound up with any of our categories, even that of rationality. Here Khoury quotes a work of the noted French Islamist R. Arnaldez, who points out that Ibn Hazn went so far as to state that God is not bound even by his own word, and that nothing would oblige him to reveal the truth to us. Were it God’s will, we would even have to practice idolatry.’

This is not at all an accurate characterization of the Muslim understanding of God, evidenced for example in the fact that Muslims often invoke the so-called ‘Ninenty-nine names of God,’ in effect, attributes that entail the realization that God is far from ‘absolutely transcendent.’ Muslims have an obligation to determine the ‘will of God,’ an obligation that relies on the intellect (‘aql) the, Muslim equivalent to logos. Cf. the following from my glossary guide for Islam:

‘aql: reason, intellect or intelligence; in Islamic theology (kalām) it refers to natural human knowledge, while in Islamic philosophy (falsafah) its meaning can vary according to Peripatetic (Aristotelian) or Neo-Platonic influences, although as Seyyed Hossein Nasr has noted, we are nonetheless left with a ‘distinctly Islamicized understanding of the intellect.’ ‘Aql is given comparatively wide berth in Islam, as revelatory texts themselves refer to its utility and often provide us with rational arguments. Instead of debates about the relation between faith and reason, Islam presents us with debates about the relation between ‘aql and naql (tradition). Oliver Leaman has well summarized the significance of reason in Islam: ‘there are many references to the importance of reason in the Qur’ān, and Islam seems to take pride, at least in its early years, in presenting itself as highly rational. What this implied is that people approaching Islam should use analytical reason in assessing the religion, in the sense that they should consider whether what the religion regarded as evidence for its truth is in fact evidence. We need to remember that Islam had to persuade members of other religions, and of none, to accept its validity, and what grounds could there be for such acceptance except reason? Force, after all, is ruled out, and Islam is not very enthusiastic about miracles, except for the miracle of its own form and matter. [….] The original Islamic sciences—the study of the Qur’ān, traditions [ahādīth], grammar, jurisprudence [fiqh], and theology [kalām]—are highly rational in structure—hence the early and bitter debate between the enthusiasts of the new thinking—philosophy—and the advocates of the Islamic sciences. This is not, it is important to grasp, a debate between philosophy and religion, but rather a debate between one way of reasoning and another way of reasoning.’

Now consider the entry on Islamic philosophy:

falsafah (falāsifah, philosophers): Perhaps the best characterization of Islamic philosophy is both generous and vague: it is the tradition of philosophy that arose out of classical Islamic culture. One virtue of such a circular definition is its capacity to accommodate contesting portraits of the philosophical tradition drawn with one eye toward illustrating or proving this or that theory in the field of Islamic Studies. What is more, most definitions of Islamic philosophy will exclude recognition of the rational approaches, methods and arguments—hence a philosophical temperament—found in varying degrees in the Islamic sciences: kalām, ma‘rifah (or ilm al-‘irfān), usūl al-fiqh, grammar, ‘ilm al-hadīth, and the sciences of awā’il. For example, formulations of rules for legal reasoning in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), as well as Qur’ānic exegesis (ma‘ānī, ta’wīl, and tafsīr), possess considerable rational resonance and philosophical pedigree. And whatever their polemical positions toward philosophy qua philosophy, Islamic theologians (mutakallimūn) were well-versed in the arts of dialectical reasoning. No less a theologian than al-Ghazālī (450/1058-505/1111), author of the Tahāfut al-falāsifah (‘The Incoherence of the Philosophers’), ardently defended the utility of Aristotelian logic for theology. Indeed, ‘his arguments against philosophy are themselves philosophical’ (Leaman 2002: 27). Islamic philosophy proper begins under the auspices of the ‘Abbāsid dynasty in the third/ninth century. Its origins are principally Greek, although it was transmitted largely by Christian scholars translating philosophical and other works into Arabic (with some of these from Syriac translations of Greek manuscripts). Of lesser but not insignificant impact was the rendering of Indian and Persian literature likewise into Arabic. Many Muslims did not welcome works of Peripatetic (Aristotelian and Pseudo-Aristotelian) and Neoplatonic provenance into the circle of Islamic sciences. The theologian Abū Sa‘īd al-Sirāfī (d. 368/979), for instance, argued the conventionality of language meant interpretative principles must be unique to each language, thus Greek logic may be applied to works in Greek, but it is wholly inappropriate for the analysis of texts, say, in Arabic. In general, Greek philosophy was perceived as a challenge if not threat to the integrity of the traditional Islamic sciences. Abū’l Walīd ibn Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Rush (Averroes) (520/1126-595/1198), a preeminent Islamic philosopher, viewed philosophy (falsafa) and religion (dīn) as distinct yet compatible and alternative routes to the same truth(s). Nevertheless, for Ibn Rushd, philosophy alone leads to that sort of certitude satisfying to the intellect owing to its reliance on the demonstrative syllogism (formal logic) of Aristotle. According to Ibn Rushd, philosophy does not deny the assent to Qur’ānic truth provided by the rhetorical and dialectical methods of the Islamic sciences, for such sciences are well-suited to the spiritual pedagogical needs of the masses. Philosophy, on the other hand, is not for the hoi polloi, but is rather the prerogative of an elite in possession of that rare combination of virtue and wisdom (hikma). Philosophy flourished in the Islamic world from the third/ninth to sixth/twelfth centuries. It met with considerable opposition from two formidable figures: al-Ghazālī and Ibn Taymiyyah (661/1263-728/1328), the former arguably Islam’s greatest theologian, the latter a notable Hanbalite jurist and theologian. Their main contention was that the absolute truth of divine revelation could in no way depend on the consent of the ‘aql (‘reason’) of the philosophers for its definitive confirmation. In other words, the revealed will and law of prophetic tradition is more than mere allegory or metaphor, and in the end, the demonstrative syllogism of philosophy cannot account for revealed truth. In brief, al-Ghazālī and Ibn Taymiyyah proffered arguments against those philosophers (falāsifa) who subscribed to the view that religion was intended for the salvation of unsophisticated believers, whose piety could not compensate for their lack of philosophical acumen. For their part, most Islamic philosophers, commencing with the Qur’ān, were intensely devoted to what we now term hermeneutic investigation. One presumption of such scrutiny being the sacred veracity of revealed texts. A distinction is frequently drawn between falsafa and hikma (‘wisdom’), and theology and mysticism (Sūfism) have often fallen under the rubric of hikma, hence the categorical boundaries between philosophy, theology, and mysticism are blurred when considering a philosopher like Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī (549/1158-587/1191) or a Sūfī like Ibn al-‘Arabi (560/1165-638/1240). In addition, and in spite of Ibn Sīnā’s (Avicenna) (370/980-429/1037) enshrinement of this distinction as one between al-hikmat al-mashriqiyyah (‘Oriental philosophy’) and mashshā’ī (Peripatetic) thought, most philosophers conceived of their enterprise as exemplifying hikma. Abū Yūsuf Ya‘qūb ibn Ishāq al-Kindī (d. after 252/866), Islam’s earliest philosopher of note, argued there was no inherent contradiction or even antagonism between the philosophical heritage of the Greeks and God’s revelations. Al-Kindi’s conclusion, however, found few adherents, as kalām and falsafah developed relatively independent of each other, marked by periods of fertile conflict and constructive engagement. Intriguingly, a philosophical disposition is at the core of Mu‘tazilite theology, as the Mu‘tazilah represent a species of theological rationalism in which reason (‘aql) is accorded pride of place in the determination of God’s will as revealed in the prophetic traditions, the Qur’ān, and ahādīth. Abū Nasr al-Fārābī (c. 257/870-339-950) is the tradition’s first truly systematic philosopher and logician, having penned a distinguished work of (Islamic) political philosophy inspired by several Platonic dialogues. Disagreeing with al-Sirāfī, al-Fārābī stressed the fundamental differences between the logic of philosophy and the rules of grammar, with grammar unable to provide the logical constraints for reasoning in language, nor was it sufficient for explaining the kinds of reasoning employed in the Islamic sciences. Ibn Sīnā was a first-rate logician and the tradition’s greatest Neoplatonic philosopher. His impact on medieval Christian theology and philosophy was profound, as was his influence on European science and literature. Indeed, he is responsible for articulating the metaphysical vocabulary appropriated by St. Thomas Aquinas. Like Ibn Sīnā before him, Ibn Rushd was a polymath, yet unlike his predecessor, he was deeply involved in public life, first as a qādī of Seville and later as chief qādī of Cordoba, while also serving as the sultan’s physician. For Ibn Rushd, philosophy and religion converge on the same truths, revelations speaking through narrative, allegory, symbol, analogy, and metaphor, while philosophy communicates with the logical consistency, coherence, and conceptual clarity evidenced in the certitude attained by syllogistic demonstration, a method befitting the exalted reasoning of the philosophers. There appears to be consensus among many contemporary Muslim intellectuals that Islamic philosophy reached its quintessential expression in the work of Muhammad ibn Ibrāhīm al-Qawāmī al-Shīrāzī, better known as Mullā Sadrā (c. 979/1572-1050/1640). This is in consonance with the historical observation that since the twelfth century, the cultivation of Islamic philosophy has taken place largely on Shī‘ite soil, especially its Persian precincts. In the modern world marked by the Nahda ( c. 1850-1914), something of Islamic philosophy persists in the writings of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1838/39-1897) and Muhammad ‘Abduh (1845-1905), although their output, together with that of Rashīd Ridā (1865-1935) and Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), is more aptly seen as the product of Muslim intellectuals rather than the musings of philosophers. Still, our time knows something of Islamic philosophy in the precious few works of the Indo-Pakistan poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938), while Seyyed Hossein Nasr (b. 1933) remains the best-known and most prolific contemporary Muslim philosopher.

And now the entry on Islamic theology:

kalām: lit. speech or conversation; theology; also ‘ilm al-kalām, or the science of theology (mutakallimūn, theologians); the Islamic philosopher al-Fārābī defined theology as ‘a science which enables a man to procure the victory of the dogmas and actions laid down by the Legislator of the religion, and to refute all opinions contradicting them.’ ‘Ilm al-kalām, in other words, employs meditation, reflection, and arguments—reason—in the service of religious beliefs and faith to further their elucidation and defense. Among important early theological schools we note the Mu‘tazilites and the Ash‘arites. In the beginning, theological controversies and conflicting doctrinal positions were often inextricably bound up with social and political struggles, although over time they could assume a life of their own. Antecedents of kalām, for example, are found in the Khawārij who seceded from the Shī’ī, rejecting both Sunnī and Shī’ī criteria for deciding the leader of the ummah. In opposition to the Khawārij, the Murji’ah held that a Muslim ruler deserved obedience even if one disagreed with his policies or found his character wanting from a Muslim standpoint. The Murji’ah also stood apart for their emphasis on God’s ‘promise’ and ‘hope’—the ‘carrot’—rather than ‘the stick,’ i.e., his threat and punishment. Indeed, they went so far as to oppose the notion of the eternal punishment of sinners. Finally, Murji’i doctrine accorded epistemic authority to the intention of faith (īmān). In effect, this meant that the very fact that one was a Muslim was prima facie or presumptive evidence that one possessed faith, the Muslim sinner accorded the benefit of doubt insofar as the determination of the gravity of one’s transgressions was, in the end, left to God (cf. Qur’ān 10: 106). In the late seventh century the Qadariyah articulated doctrines later incorporated into Mu‘tazilite theology, arguing, for instance, that the metaphysical and ethical fact of human freedom makes the human agent morally responsible or accountable for his/her acts, in turn, justifying God’s power to blame or punish man. The Qadari position on human responsibility was seen as politically provocative, for it was interpreted to imply that the ’Umayyad caliph was ethically accountable for his actions. Theological arguments centered largely upon analysis of the concept of God and his attributes; ontological and cosmological proofs of God’s existence; the nature of God’s relation to that which he created; theodicy and ethics with respect to free will, determinism (or fate), good and evil, punishment and reward; the semantics of religious language; the relationship between reason and revelation, and reason and tradition; and the politics of the interpretation and application (determination) of Sharī‘ah (Divine Law, God’s will) as fiqh (lit. ‘understanding,’ positive law, Islamic jurisprudence). Philosophical theology is exemplified in the work of Abū ‘Alī ibn Sīnā—Avicenna—(980-1035), Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (d. 1191), and Sadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī—Mullā Sadrā—(d. 1641). Exquisite formulations of mystical theology can be found in the writings of al-Husayn ibn al-Mansūr al-Hallāj (d. 922), Abū Hāmid al-Ghazzālī (d. 1111), and Muhyī al-Dīn ibn al-‘Arabī (1165-1240).

Finally, consider this entry on the foremost rational school of Islamic theology:

Mu‘tazilah: The first truly doctrinal school (madhhab) of theology (kalām) in Islam, the Mu‘tazilah flourished from the eighth to eleventh centuries. Its comparative rationalist orientation influenced discussions within classical Islamic philosophy, and made decisive contributions to the development and intellectual sophistication of ‘ilm al-kalām (science of theology). In fact, the rationalist approach and doctrines of Mu‘tazilī theology impacted a variety of Islamic sciences. In our own time, historical and theoretical treatments of Mu‘tazilī theology have affected the tenor and tone of modernist and post-modernist Muslim discourse in general and Islamic liberalism in particular: from the Indonesian scholar Harun Nasution to such diverse figures as the late Fazlur Rahman, Mohammed Arkoun, Fatima Mernissi, and Hassan Hanafi. The school’s name is derived from an Arabic verb meaning ‘to withdraw, stand aside’ (i‘tazāla), here in the sense of ‘those who separate themselves.’ The following traditional account elaborates: Al-Hasan al-Basrī (21/642-110/728), an ascetic Sūfī who belonged to the generation of pious Muslims (tābi‘ūn) after the Companions (sahābah) of the Prophet Muhammad, argued that humans have been accorded free will and thus possess moral and spiritual responsibility for their behavior. This viewpoint, propagated by the Qadariyyah, opponents of the ’Umayyad regime, allowed them to hold the caliph accountable for his acts. Technically, qadar meant divine decree or predestination, but for the Qadariyyah and the Mu‘tazilah after them, it referred to the fact that God has endowed man with a metaphysical and ethical power through his acts such that ‘determination’ (qadar) is in reference to the essence of human action. This is in stark contrast to the Jabriyyah (or Mujbira), who upheld the notion of divine ‘compulsion’—jabr—to account for the ultimate power or true attribution of what appears to be human agency. Tradition has it that when al-Hasan was asked whether a grave sinner (fāsiq) should be classified as a believer or unbeliever, his hesitant or unsatisfactory response was the occasion for one Wāsil ibn ‘Atā’ (d. 131/748) to dissent from the consensual view that such a sinner was either a mu’min (believer) or kāfir (unbeliever). Wāsil proclaimed the sinful Muslim was rather in an ‘intermediate state,’ thereby effectively ‘separating’ himself or ‘withdrawing’ from al-Hasan’s circle of scholars and students. ‘Amr ibn ‘Ubayd (d. 144/761), another of al-Hasan’s disciples, joined Wāsil after the death of their teacher. Mu‘tazilī theology was systematized in schools that developed in Basrah and Baghdād, although members of the respective madhāhib were not always confined to these geographic locales. From the earliest period in Basrah we note Abu ’l-Hudhayl (d. ca. 235/849-50), while the Baghdād branch was guided by Bishr ibn al-Mu‘tamir (d. 210/825). Under the ‘Abbāsid caliph al-Ma’mūn, a mihna (inquisition) was instituted in the early ninth century on behalf of a specific tenet of Mu‘tazilī doctrine, namely the notion a ‘created’ (rather than ‘eternal’) Qur’ān. While not instigated by the Mu‘tazilah themselves, the mihna required the regime’s qudāt (pl. of qādī, judge) to publicly assent to the notion that God’s speech—the Qur’ān—was created, a position conspicuously contrary to popular belief as vigorously espoused by Ahmad ibn Hanbal (164/780-214/855), a leader among the ‘people of hadīth’ (ahl al-hadīth). Ibn Hanbal refused assent and consent to this demand and suffered imprisonment as a result, not to be released until some years later when the caliph al-Mutawakkil renounced the mihna. Mu‘tazilī mutakallimūn (theologians) entertained questions later definitive of the agenda of ‘ilm al-kalām: whether the Qur’ān is created or eternal; the nature and scope of free will and moral responsibility; the problem of theodicy (i.e., how to reconcile God’s goodness with the evil that is part of the human condition or, put differently: did God create evil?); how to interpret and understand the attributes of God (as enshrined in al-’asmā’ al-husnā, the ninety-nine names of God); and the role of reason (‘aql) vis-à-vis God’s revelations or the understanding of God’s will. In the tenth century the ‘Basran’ school is defined largely by Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā’ī (d. 303/915) and his son, Abū Hāshim ibn al-Jubbā’ī (d. 321/933). Of the ‘Two Masters,’ it was the son who was to have the greater influence in this madhhab, clearly evidenced in the work of the ‘last great thinker of [this] school of thought’ (Martin and Woodward, p. 35), qādī ‘Abd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025). Among those worthy of mention in the Baghdād madhhab are Abu ’l-Husayn al-Khayyāt (d. ca. 300/913) and Abu ’l-Kāsim al-Balkhī (d. 319/929). Mu‘tazilī theology faced implacable opposition from Hanbalī and Zāhirī traditionalists (ahl al-sunna) on the one hand, and from the Ash‘arī kalām (founded by a former Mu‘tazilī, Abu ’l-Hasan al-Ash‘arī) and Māturīdī mutakallimūn on the other. The end of its golden age is coincident with the arrival of the Saljūqs, first in Persia and then Iraq by the middle of the eleventh century. Nevertheless, the Mu‘tazilah persevered for two more centuries, its madhāhib disappearing with the Mongol conquest. As far back as Abu ’l-Hudhayl, Mu‘tazilī theology was distinctive for its articulation and advocacy of five fundamental principles (al-usūl al-khamsa): (1) The absolute unity, uniqueness and oneness of God (al-tawhīd): While a basic tenet of Muslim belief, Mu‘tazilī theology is distinctive in the manner in which it spells out the nature of Divine transcendence in relation to God’s attributes so as to avoid the Scylla of anthropomorphism and the Charybdis of attributes denuded of concrete meaning. God’s attributes are one with his essence, and those attributes are rendered in metaphorical terms. (2) The justice (al-‘adl) of God. By way of illustration: for the punishment meted out by God to be just, man must possess free will or choice, that is, the capacity to choose between good and evil, with evil inhering in the errors ascribed to human acts. Suffering and evil which is not the consequence of human choice (e.g., the illness and subsequent death of a child) is said to warrant compensation from God. More intriguingly from an ethical vantage point, the independent (i.e., prior to or apart from revelation) use of reason suffices for becoming aware of at least some or minimal moral obligations, as well as knowing the difference between good and evil actions. In other words, for the Mu‘tazilah, there are basic and general rational rules of ethical conduct apart from Divine guidance although, to be sure, there are obligations that are known and motivated exclusively by revelation. Indeed, ‘God has graciously acceded to our frailty here and sent prophets to tell us what rewards and punishments await us in the next life and at the same time helps us to achieve the former and avoid the latter by detailing various laws and duties which strengthen our disposition to act rightly and so merit the ultimate reward’ (Leaman, pp. 164-165). God is just by definition, meaning he is constrained by the rules of justice. Thus we do what is right and good because, objectively speaking, it is right and good, not simply or only because God has commanded us to do it. (3) The ‘promise and the threat’ (al-wa‘d wa ’l-wa‘īd). In reference to the Day of Judgment, God promises recompense to those who obey him and threatens punishment for those who disobey him. Those guilty of grave sin (e.g. murder) who die without repentance will suffer the torments of hell. (4) The theory of an ‘intermediate state’ (al-manzila bayna ’l-manzilaytan). As discussed above, a grave sinner was classified as neither believer nor disbeliever but was said to be in an intermediate state between these categories, hence also betwixt and between the views of the Khawārij (or Khārijites) and the Murji’ah (Murji’ites). (5) The imperative addressed to all Muslims for ‘…commanding right and forbidding wrong’ (wa-ya’murūna bi’l-ma‘rūfi wa-yanhawna ‘ani ’l-munkar). This is an obligation both personal and public. The Mu‘tazilah provide an analytical treatment of this topic, as well as display an ‘underlying homogeneity of doctrine over space and time’ (Cook, p. 225). All the same, their approach to the subject has been characterized as ‘activist’ if not ‘heroic.’ As theologians, the Mu‘tazilah employed their considerable dialectical rationalist skills on behalf of Qur’ānic revelation and the interpretation of Sharī‘ah. They understood their employment of reason as furthering the endeavor to provide a correct interpretation of the Divine will. This assumes we have fulfilled our first and fundamental obligation to enlist the power of reason (al-nazar) so as to know God, so as to establish the truth of his existence. The Mu‘tazilah here rely on the cosmological argument, for that which has begun to exist and in fact does exist implies dependence on a God that transcends the contingency of that which he has created. Our capacity for reasoning should prompt us to ask questions on the order of why something, rather than nothing, exists. Persistence and trust in the power of reason should lead us to a belief in the absolute necessity of God’s existence and eventually to a nuanced appreciation of his attributes. With good reason, later Mu‘tazilīs called themselves the ‘People of Divine Unity and Justice’ (ahl al-‘adl wa ’l-tawhīd).

In short, the Pope gave a rather tendentious characterization of Islamic theology and its approach to God, one in which his story of the reconciliation of the Greek logos with Christian faith could not but appear to be the more reasonable and humane of these two Semitic religions of Abraham.

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kalki gaur

20 years ago

HEGELIAN POPE BENEDICT XVI STARTS DIALOGUE OF CULTURES FOR INCREASED ROLE OF REASON IN RELIGION AND SOCIETY- KALKI GAUR

NewsWireUSA, 9/19/2006. (1) DIALOGUE OF CULTURES: Good Pope Benedict XVI meant well and Muslims should look in the mirror. Good Pope urged in his German address a respect for reason and an appeal to all religions and secular communities to become partners in the Dialogue of Cultures, the very message Jesus gave and Hindus and Buddhists have been giving all these years. Pope set out to define his fundamental, deeply held Hegelian convictions about the rule of reason in religion and society. The Occidental religious cultures, in monotheist Islam, Judaism and Christianity, regard the “exclusion of the divine from the universality of reason as an attack on their most profound convictions.” Pope argued, reason and faith must “come together in a new way.” Jesus and Socrates were murdered because they taught because they brought together reason and faith. Gnostic Gospels, Hindu Upanisad, Buddhist logic, Jewish Kabbalah, Shiite Sufism and Taoism taught about the discovery of absolute Divine Brahman Atma through universality of reason, by bringing together yoga meditation and Upanisadic spiritual reasoning together. No wonder the Semite Muslims, Judeo Marxists, Jews and Judeo Christians are howling for the blood of Good Pope who is determined to bring Roman Catholic Church back to the principles of 1965 Synod of Bishops by dismantling the Marxian materialist Vatican-Mecca Axis of theocracy, monotheism, extremism, fundamentalism and intolerance developed during Judeo-Pontificate of John Paul II. Hegelian Protestants, Gnostic Christians, Kabbalah Jews, Hindus and Buddhists welcome this increased role of reason in religion advocated by German Hegelian idealist Pope Benedict XVI. Hindu India welcomes Pope Benedict with open arms. Acting against reason is “contrary to the nature of God.” Pope benedict XVI is bringing Christianity back to its original roots in Nicean theism of 325 AD, before Jews hijacked the leadership of Church and made Christianity anti-thesis of reason, which culminated in 1,000-year Dark Age in Christian world. Those who controlled Pope John Paul II from behind had conspired to descend on Christian Europe looming New Global Dark Age, which good Pope Benedict XVI has scuttled.

(2) Pope Benedict XVI is not a clone of Pope John Paul II. Benedict XVI is antithesis of John Paul II. Secretary Condoleezza Rice and President Bush put upside down the pro-Papacy patriarchal iconoclast monotheist Realism of former secretaries Kissinger, Brzezinski and Albright. Similarly Benedict XVI will reject and put upside down the Bolshevik Jew and Judeo-Christian conspiracy that cemented the Vatican-Mecca-Beijing Axis of Semite Extremism, Fundamentalism as part of grand alliance of Semite Judeo Christianity, Semite Wahhabi Islam, Semite Marxism and Semite OPEC, to wage a global war against Asian Buddhism, African Paganism and Asian Hinduism. Germany not Poland represents the soul of European Christianity. The pontificate of John Paul can be called with the benefit of hindsight the pro-Terrorism pontificate, Commie pontificate and anti-pagan pontificate. In contrast Benedict XVI represents anti-terrorism pontificate and anti-Communism pontificate. Pope Benedict XVI has silently ended the Vatican-Mecca-Beijing Axis of intolerance, extremism, totalitarianism and fundamentalism. The Semite Judeo Christianity of John Paul II, replaced by Aryan Christianity of Nicean Christianity that has been brought to the lime light by revelations of Da Vinci Code and Gospel of Judas. Pope Benedict XVI shall reform Catholic Church, Catholic Bible and undo all wrongs that Jew hijackers of Christianity, Orthodox and Catholic Church inflicted on the Christian Bible, theology and dogma during last 1700 years. The moral purpose of the Pope Benedict XVI is to reform Roman Catholic Christianity, in the light of the demands for Reformation by laity readers of Da Vinci Code and Gospel of Judas and other Gnostic Gospels.

(3) Hindu Indians would welcome new Catholic Pope with the same open arms as they welcomed president George Bush and secretary Condoleezza Rice in march 2006. The WASPs have a grudge against the Pope John Paul II for his alleged opposition to Protestantism and his alliance with Islamic terrorism and that is why Americans did not invite Pope John Paul II to visit USA after the 9/11/2001 attacks. Once German Pope Benedict XVI convinces Americans and WASPs that he is negation of John Paul II then Protestants could feel brotherly to Catholics once again.

(4) Pope Benedict XVI will help Baltic Orthodox Christians recover what they lost because of anti-Orthodox Catholic-Islamic Axis. Pope John Paul II was instrumental for secession of Catholic Slovenia and Croatia from Orthodox Yugoslavia. Orthodox Russia is again wealthy and powerful and Orthodox Church wants to bring back Kosovo and Bosnia and Albania under the control of Orthodoxy. Orthodoxy wants to create a Christian State of “Holy Christine” in Israel so that Holy Christian Religious properties in the Holy Land Israel are not desecrated, in the manner Muslims desecrated the Orthodox Monasteries in Holy Christian lands of Kosovo. Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania and Israeli Holy Christian properties should be brought back under Orthodox rule to promote better Catholic-Orthodoxy Christian brotherhood. Pope Benedict XVI would develop better ties with Orthodoxy and end the Papal alliance with Sunni terrorists and Sunni Heroin cartels.

(5) Hindus will welcome if Pope Benedict XVI ended the Vatican-Mecca-Marxism Axis, which had resulted in the genocides in Laos, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Congo. Pope John Paul II presided over the genocide of black African pagans in Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Congo, Chad and Nigeria that was implemented by Vatican-Mecca Axis of Iconoclast Monotheism. Papacy had earlier aligned with Marxists to end the Orthodox monarchy of Emperor Haile Selaisie. Papacy had aligned with Marxists to end the Hindu-Buddhist monarchies of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.

(6) IS ISLAMIC TERRORISM IS EVIL &INHUMAN? Alexander invaded Egypt and brought North Africa under Greek civilization and Greek religion. Julius Caesar invaded Egypt and brought North Africa under Roman civilization and Roman Religion. North Africa and Asia Minor were Christian lands when they were subdued militarily and Muslim victors slaughtered all Christian men and took over all Christian women and made these lands Muslim. The manifest destiny of the Western Civilization is to bring back Asia Minor and North Africa under Christian Civilization. Christian Crusades and Crusades of Democracy would make Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco Christian again in the 21st Century. Christian-Hindu Pact of Civilization would restore pre-Islamic religions of Asia Minor and North Africa in first half of the 21st Century.

(7) ISLAM IS A RELIGION OF SWORD: Pope quoted Byzantine Emperor “Show me just what Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached.” Pope Benedict XVI is right. It is Evil and Inhuman to propagate Islam by sword. John Paul II’s Pontificate was largely defined by his relationship with a global conflict between west and east. In 1391 in the winter barracks near Ankara – by the erudite Byzantine Emperor Manuel II Paleologus and an educated Persian on the subject of Christianity and Islam, and the truth of both. With a startling brusqueness on the central question about the relationship between religion and violence in general, saying: “Show me just what Muhammad brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached.” Pope Benedict XVI in a speech in Germany quotes the fourteenth-century Byzantine Emperor Manuel II Palaeologus, who challenged a Muslim correspondent to name anything not “evil and inhuman” spawned by the Prophet Mohammed. “Show me just what Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached,” was part of an historic dialogue between the emperor, whose throne in Constantinople was then under siege by a Muslim army. Yet some question the wisdom of his decision to use a besieged emperor’s depiction of Islam as a faith, which condones “acting unreasonably. Religions of Sword, which expanded by sword destine to decline or contract or die when the rival sword became more powerful than their sword. Islam is on the decline as it has abandoned Modern Islam and embraced barbarian Wahhabi Islam.

(8) CHRISTIAN-HINDU PACT OF CIVILIZATIONS: Hindu-Christian Pact of Civilizations to launch Christian Crusades on Islam and Crusades of Democracy in the Middle East. Hindus can provide 10 million soldiers to back it up. Pope John Paul II supported Wahhabi terrorists that bombed on 9/11. Pope Benedict XVI is wisely launching Crusades on Islam. The 900 million Hindus of India wholeheartedly support new Christian Crusades on Islam and new Crusades of Democracy on Islamic Middle East. Pope Benedict XVI is right that Mohammad taught nothing new except Evil and Inhuman. Hindus support all what Pope Benedict said. Hindu India wants to have a Hindu-Christianity Pact of civilizations to tame Islamic barbarism. Hindu India is willing to provide 10 million Hindu soldiers to new Christian Crusades in the Middle East and on Crusades of Democracy to the Middle East.

(9) RECLAIM MEDITERANEAN AFRICA FOR CHRISTIANITY: Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco were thriving Christian civilizations, before they fell for Arab Muslim Bedouin invaders after 630 AD, and Arab Muslim killed all Christian men and took over Christian women by sword. The Christian Manifest destiny in 21st Century is to regain Christian Lands of Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco for Christianity again before 2050 AD. Hindu India is willing to join Christian Crusades on Mediterranean Islam and provide 10 million Hindu volunteers soldiers for this noble cause in the name of Jesus to regain Mediterranean Africa and Asia Minor back to the folds of Christian Civilization, to help Pope Benedict XVI realize his Christian Dream in first quarter of 21st Century Age of Aquarius. If Jews can return to Israel after 2100 years, there is no reason that Christians cannot return to North Africa after 1300 years and Turkey after 700 years. Victory of Christian-Hindu Alliance is predestined. Jesus shall rule over Turkey, Asia Minor and North Africa again before 2050, with the blessing of Hindus. Hindu civilization is in clash with Islamic civilization. Doctrine of Chanakya Mandala Realism states that enemy of your enemy your friend. In the event of Christian-Islamic clash of religions, Hindu civilization shall enter into pact of civilizations with Christian civilization to tame the rising wave of Islamic terrorism, extremism and fundamentalism. Civilizations have neither permanent enemies nor permanent friends. German idealist Hegelian Pope Benedict XVI is the nemesis of or antithesis of materialist Marxian Bolshevik Polish Pope John Paul II, and provides a new historic opportunity for the Hindu-Catholic Pact of Civilization to meet the challenge of iconoclast monotheist patriarchal extremism and fundamentalism in the Aquarius Age. Hindus welcome Hegelian Pope Benedict XVI with open arms. The demise of Judeo monotheist intolerance in Christianity is the precisely the purpose of Catholic End of Time teleological Eschatology in New Millennium.

Philosopher Kalki Gaur, “GLOBAL CLASH OF RELIGIONS” (2006)

Kalki Gaur, “DIPLOMACY OF CIVILIZATIONS” (2006)

Kalki Gaur, “MANIFESTO OF NEOCONSERVATISM” (2006)

Kalki Gaur, “

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