Score One for the ICJ (with a little help from the Secretary General)

For those who have not done so already, it’s time to readjust the ICJ’s win/loss column when it comes to state compliance with the World Court’s decisions. In 1994, Cameroon sued Nigeria over the land and maritime boundary between the two nation states. In particular, Cameroon claimed sovereignty over the Bakassi peninsula, an area rich in fisheries and viewed as potentially having large oil reserves off its shores. Cameroon’s suit effectively stayed further violence between the two sides at a time when more than 30 lives had already been lost in clashes over the territory. In 2002, after years of complicated and extensive legal briefing (including some interesting treaty interpretation arguments), the ICJ ruled in Cameroon’s favor with respect to sovereignty over the peninsula. Nigeria, however, balked at complying with the decision – a reaction that gave support to those who argued that the ICJ had become a weak and ineffective institution.

Since then, however, the Nigeria-Cameroon case has actually been recast as a shining example of state compliance with the Court’s rulings. For the last four years, the UN Secretary General’s office has mediated talks between Cameroon and Nigeria to reach an agreement on implementing the 2002 ICJ decision. As Julian earlier reported, U.N. officials obtained such an agreement in June 2006. More importantly, the agreement’s terms have led to actual changes on the peninsula. Since early August, Nigerian troops have been withdrawing from the peninsula. And on Monday, the two sides held a formal ceremony to mark the transfer of sovereignty over the northern portion of the peninsula (the remainder of the Bakassi territory will stay under Nigerian civil control for two more years). Local accounts of how the shift in sovereignty was effectuated can be found here and here.

So, any discussion of state compliance with ICJ decisions now needs to account for the Nigerian-Cameroon case, where a recalcitrant Nigeria found itself relinquishing territory against its stated wishes, and in the face of strident opposition from the peninsula’s residents, who are mostly of Nigerian descent. Of course, recognizing this new reality does not tell us why Nigeria agreed to come around. Was it simply the threat that the UN Security Council might actually use its authority to adopt measures to force Nigerian compliance? Did the ICJ’s status as the UN’s principal judicial organ matter to Nigeria at all? Or, can readers identify other factors that explain Nigeria’s willingness to part with the land? And what do you make of reports that local residents are organizing to oppose Cameroon’s rule by force if necessary? Is there any chance that civil unrest might require further adjustments to the scorekeeping?

Still, given the current situation, you have to consider the Nigerian recognition of Cameroon’s sovereignty over the Bakassi peninsula on Monday as a big ICJ victory.