Search: unwilling or unable

...can pass the “unwilling or unable” test. The last one seems almost impossible to me as the “unwilling or unable” test is tailored to indicate the inability of a state to act against some long-lasting threat not a single and reactive attack. If we take the 'terrorist' tag out we will have a murder case that could definitely not entail any self-defence (even if a state fails to capture perpetrators). So to sum it all up, I agree with all arguments you provide while they are used separately to answer...

...Ms. Alvarado was persecuted “on account” of belonging to a protected class of persons and how that protected class should be defined. The 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees contains the internationally accepted definition of a refugee. An almost identical definition of refugee is adopted by United States immigration law (as codified in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)) — a person outside his or her country of origin “who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail...

...Brennan stressed, norms of state sovereignty (including those in article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter), which generally prohibit the use of force in another sovereign state unless either that state consents, or the state’s government is “unwilling or unable to take the necessary actions” that are permitted to the U.S. under the doctrine of self-defense. [Even if Kevin is correct that the scope of the “unable and unwilling” doctrine remains subject to contestation, it is not news that the United States views it as applicable to self-defense against threats posed...

are being fired from its territory every two minutes. Jordan Response... Well, yes, he did not restrict the right of the United States under international law to use "our inherent right of national self-defense ... outside of an active battlefield, AT LEAST WHEN the country involved consents or is unable or unwilling to take action against the threat" posed by our enemies. And, yes, international law does not require consent or that the foreign state is unwilling or unable. 39 Denver J. Int'l L. 569, 580-81 (2011). I take issue,...

...to concede another of Bethlehem’s points, developed at length by Deeks – that a victim state may cross a border to respond to non-state actor violence emanating from the territory of a second state that is unwilling or unable to eject or neutralize the offending group. Bethlehem, echoing Deeks’s argument, agrees that the “territorial state” must be given an opportunity to live up to its sovereign obligations. However, if the state fails to avail itself of this opportunity, many (but not all) of those in attendance believed that the victim...

...Article 51 offered by the intervening States (see the position of the United States and the United Kingdom) has been accepted or acquiesced by the generality of States. The second category refers to military operations against entities such as terrorist groups located on the territory of a State believed to be “unable or unwilling” to prevent them from carrying out hostile activities. State practice is quite rich but far from uniform and therefore difficult to decipher. Likewise, doctrine is abundant yet divided. The two main conflicting arguments behind the “unwilling...

...and collective self-defence: the “unwilling or unable” doctrine. Readers know that I do not believe that “unwilling or unable” reflects customary international law. (For the most recent scholarly rejection of that idea, by Brunee & Toope, see here.) But the argument is not a frivolous one. An attack directed at Syria itself, however, would be patently unlawful. Syria has never attacked US forces or interests. By contrast, the US has attacked Syria: in 2017, when it fired 59 cruise missiles at a government airfield in Shayrat; and in 2018, when...

...acts by private actors (as opposed to acts by state militaries) could trigger a right of self-defense where the government of the host state was unable or unwilling to take action; and, second, whether the threat posed by those private actors satisfied the conditions of necessity, proportionality and immediacy so that the British action would be justified. But there was no question that the acts of private actors could trigger the right of self-defense where the host government was unable or unwilling to deal with the situation. Secretary Webster may...

...to the Report, if it lacks effective control of the territory where the armed group is operating. “Unwillingness might be demonstrated where, for example, a State is colluding with or harboring a terrorist organization operating from within its territory and refuses to address the threat posed by the group.” (p. 10) Does the current U.S. government believe “unwillingness” is limited to these circumstances? I doubt it, and the language is carefully crafted to avoid imposing any such limitation on the scope of the claimed ‘unwilling or unable’ permission. But it...

...“of the same mind as to the law” is crucial for the Caroline’s pedigree. This is, however, disingenuous. After all, two states can agree on a wrongful – or at least minoritarian – interpretation of international law. This is exactly the case with the so-called “unwilling or unable test” today. As Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope concluded in their excellent study on the matter: “State support for the unwilling or unable standard is much weaker than is often asserted by government officials and commentators. In fact, the purported new rule...

...Tzouvala, for instance, has traced their prevalence even to contemporary times. Take, for example, the debate about the unwilling or unable test in the context of the United States’ ongoing “War on Terror”. Under this doctrine, as Ashley Deeks defines it, “it is lawful for State X, which has suffered an armed attack by an insurgent or terrorist group, to use force in State Y against that group if State Y is unwilling or unable to suppress the threat”.   The problems with this test are manyfold, but it is beyond...

states to prosecute international crimes as ordinary crimes. Proponents of the hard mirror thesis argue that such prosecutions never satisfy the principle of complementarity, because the mere act of prosecuting an international crime as an ordinary crime indicates that the state is unwilling or unable to genuinely prosecute. Proponents of the soft mirror thesis, by contrast, accept that prosecuting an international crime as an ordinary crime does not necessarily mean that the state is unwilling or unable to prosecute, but nevertheless insist that states should prosecute international crimes as international...