Search: unwilling or unable

region. See generally Ashley S. Deeks, “Unable or Unwilling”: Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 Va. J. Int’l Law 483 (2012) (discussing the development and limitations of the unable and unwilling test); Essentially, the US is claiming that the invasion of Venezuela was legitimate self-defence because at the time of the invasion the government of Venezuela was led by Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia, not Nicolas Maduro, and Gonzalez was unable to prevent Maduro from using Venezuelan territory to launch armed attacks against the US. A more bizarre invocation of...

unable standard for force against non-state actors in third-party territory. Although the status of the doctrine has in the past been in doubt, international law is very much an evolving creature, and years from now the present conflict will no doubt be an important exhibit in that debate. In other words, even if “unwilling or unable” is not the current state of the law, it may well be very soon on account of the present conflict, the U.S. legal justification for it, and the world’ community’s reaction to same.  ...

the extent that Yemen was “unwilling or unable” to suppress the threat he posed. This standard is not settled in international law, but it is sufficiently grounded in law and practice that no American president charged with keeping the country safe could refuse to exercise international self-defense rights when presented with a concrete security threat in this situation. The “unwilling or unable” standard was almost certainly the one the United States relied on in the Osama bin Laden raid inside Pakistan. This is a refreshing statement. As I have noted...

Ever since its very first articulations, the “unwilling or unable test” has relied heavily in the time-tested legitimacy of the 1837 Caroline Affair, where British forces sunk a vessel manned by Canadian rebels in American territory. Dressing such a visible and well-known case in the cloth of “unwilling or unable” allows its proponents to argue that its underlying principles have always been an accepted rule of international law, and we all just missed it. However, one specific incident is not enough to prove that a particular legal rule has been...

...in the title of this piece. Indeed, it concerns the ICC complementarity principle which entails that states have priority in proceeding with cases within their jurisdiction, and a case is only admissible if a state is unwilling or unable to investigate crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. By analogy, if the international community as a whole is unable (due to the US veto) or unwilling (considering the blatant double-standard positions of Western States) to hold Israel to account for its ongoing CAH, where can the Palestinians recourse to seek...

shocked international community.” If I was being picky, I would acknowledge that Zakharova did not specifically reject “unwilling or unable.” Her emphasis on the requirement of Syria’s consent nevertheless implicitly rejects “unwilling or unable” far more clearly than the statements by various governments that supposedly — according to Ashley Deeks — support the test. So it is more than fair to count Russia in the anti-“unwilling or unable” camp. If you’re keeping score at home, that makes it: at most four states that support “unwilling or unable”; at least one...

of IL. Outside of the scope of self-defence, and without consent of the territorial state, how is targeting ever lawful if that territorial state is unable or unwilling? Since when is inability or unwillingness the next exception to article 2(4) Charter? If there is no threat of an imminent attack, and without UNSC approval, allowing use of force against a sovereign state on the simple basis that this territorial state is unable or unwilling to prevent a (not-imminent) attack or quash a threat thereof, carries an immense danger of widening...

— there is no way to determine whether the it denounced Israel’s attack because it rejected the “unwilling or unable” test or — and this actually seems more likely — because it simply rejected Israel’s claim that it was acting in self-defence. (I disagree with Ori that the statement can be read as an indictment of Israel solely for using disproportionate force in self-defence.) And if we cannot determine the precise reason why LAS rejected Israel’s self-defence claim, that rejection obviously cannot provide opinio juris against the “unwilling or unable”...

“broad consensus”? A link to a blog post at Lawfare by Ashley Deeks, in which Deeks (1) correctly points out that the US and UK both support “unwilling or unable,” (2) claims that “France appears to be prepared to invoke the ‘unwilling or unable’ concept in the Syria context,” and (3) states that Australia is “apparently relying on a collective self-defense of Iraq/unwilling and unable theory.” So at most there is a “broad consensus” of four states in support of “unwilling or unable.” And perhaps there are only two. That’s...

...invoking the ‘unwilling or unable’ test despite its use by some other countries. This shows that India’s practice until now does not explicitly subscribe to the ‘unwilling or unable’ test in the context of non-state actors’ activities from the host State against another State. As pointed out by Alonso Gurmendi (here, here and here), several other countries’ state practice do not subscribe to this test either in the past or in contemporary conflict situations. Whether India would continue to refrain from accepting the ‘unwilling or unable’ test would depend on...

...ISIS whether or not the Assad regime is "unwilling" (surely not) or "unable" (apparently yes). I agree that "unwilling or unable" is not a limitation of the inherent right of self- or collective self-defense if an armed attack is underway, but armed attacks emanating from the territory of another state, for that period of time, do fit within a conclusion that that state is "unable." Jordan p.s. I note that you must, therefore, agree with the majority of textwriters on these points and disagree, for example, with Mary Ellen. John...

...actors in self-defense and/or in an armed conflict, Nation A cannot use such force against such targets in the sovereign territory of State B unless State B either consents to such use of force, or State B is unable or unwilling to interdict the threat itself. [UPDATE: In an important forthcoming article, Ashley Deeks explains that the United States and other nations have long viewed the “unable and unwilling” determination as a necessary precondition to the use of force in such circumstances where there is no consent of State B....