Search: kony 2012

Following up on Julian’s post below, Uganda has announced that the ICC has agreed not to prosecute the five LRA leaders, including Joseph Kony, as long as the final agreement reached between the government and the LRA does not “condone impunity.” Interestingly, Uganda also claims that it only initiated peace talks with the LRA because it could not find a partner in the international community to help it arrest Kony and the other leaders: Kagoda said: “We approached an international peace keeping force to arrest Kony and his commanders but...

...our main arguments. Defence of D uress On duress, we agreed with the Trial Chamber’s (TC) finding in the conviction decision that this defence is unavailable to Ongwen, who argued he was under a continued threat of imminent death and serious bodily harm from LRA founder Joseph Kony and his controlling, military apparatus. The TC found that Ongwen was unable to rely on duress as a ground for excluding criminal responsibility under Article 31(1)(d) of the Rome Statute as he had failed to show he was under an imminent and...

should go ahead, as well as to decide if they can be prosecuted in Uganda’s proposed special court – which was reportedly established after LRA leader Joseph Kony refused to face trial in The Hague. However, analysts point out that Uganda’s lack of legislation to prosecute war crimes is a clear obstacle to putting Kony and his men on trial in the country. At the centre of the matter lies a bill that has been languishing in Uganda’s parliament since 2004. The legislation proposes to make the crimes of the...

...admissibility challenge was brought to the ICC in the case of Joseph Kony (who, of course has/had not been detained). My understanding is that ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II ruled on the basis of admissibility in the Kony case pursuant to Article 19. Mark Kersten Also, just to muddy the waters a bit more, at this point it's not clear that Saif al-Islam is in "custody" of Libya and it isn't even known whether Senussi was detained at all. Saif is in the custody of Zintan rebels, not the NTC and...

...in the High Court of Uganda while those accused of lesser crimes would face the northern Uganda traditional justice system know as Mato OPut. Uganda’s government seems to believe that it can get the ICC arrest warrants withdrawn against key LRA leaders. As its minister of state for defense says: “First of all it is Uganda which approached the ICC to help in getting Kony and his commanders because Uganda could not reach Kony because he was outside Uganda’s jurisdiction. We are hoping that if Kony and his commanders decided...

...May 2012, Dr. Gehani confirmed that the Zintan brigade remained unwilling to transfer Mr. Gaddafi to Tripoli, and on 2 July 2012, the Commander of the Zintan brigade confirmed this stance. 361. Article 17(3) of the Statute expressly lists the inability of the State to obtain custody of the defendant as grounds for declaring the case to be admissible before the ICC. In the Kony et al. case, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s confirmation of the admissibility of the case was predicated on a statement from Uganda that although the judiciary was...

...are they commitments that will last beyond 2012. The UN and other respected independent sources estimate that €55-80 billion in additional international financing is needed annually over the period 2012- 2020 to curb emissions in developing countries, and an additional €10-20 billion annually for adaptation, for a total of €65-100 billion annually. Much of the needed finance—perhaps €50-70 billion annually—will have to come from public sources, including bilateral ODA, domestic emissions allowance auctions, World Bank and other multilateral programs, and international levies on marine and aviation sectors and perhaps a...

...L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012). William Partlett’s response expands on these theoretical questions and places them within the concrete context of post-communist Europe and, most recently, Egypt. For example, Partlett notes the role that the Supreme Constitutional Court and the military have played in curbing the rise of political Islam in Egypt. I largely agree with Partlett’s observations, but I would argue that the military’s actions are best understood, not as an ideological reaction to political Islam, but through a self-interest paradigm. In fact, in the immediate aftermath of the 2011...

...opening of an investigation (A/HRC/27/56/Add.1, para. 76). Even more, it led to the prosecution of a judge who deemed the 1977 Amnesty Law not applicable to crimes against humanity (CAH) (see here). Back in 2012 the Spanish Supreme Court in the 101/2012 judgement found that crimes committed during the Dictatorship could not be prosecuted in light of the Amnesty Law, their prescription and the principle of legality. In October 2022 a new avenue for accountability seemed to open when the Ley de Memoria Democrática (Law 20/2022 of 19 October 2022)...

...atrocity investigations in Western Europe and North America, including the 1988 Lockerbie plane bombing, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, the 2005 London train bombings, the shooting down of MH17 in 2014 and the 2015 Paris attacks. The situation was much worse when Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda took office in 2012. A lack of resources at that time forced the OTP to take a ‘stop-go’ approach to preliminary examinations because there were not enough staff to work on them simultaneously. Resources for investigations were so low that a rotational model had to...

...between 2012 and 2014. While this decision is currently the subject of an appeal before France’s Supreme Court, the Appeals Court upheld the three other charges against the corporation for deliberately endangering the lives of its Syrian workers, financing a terrorist enterprise, and violating an embargo. A parent company is currently being criminally charged for illegal activities that took place abroad through its subsidiary and under the executive leadership of the company’s Parisian headquarters. Lafarge’s indictment is the first of its kind in France and represents an unprecedented step forward...

...in 2012, however, that the question of standing was addressed by the Court directly, affirming in Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite that all states – including Belgium, a non-injured state – had a legal interest in ensuring Senegal’s compliance with the Convention Against Torture 1984. This trend is reflected most clearly in Article 48 of the ILC’s Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001 (ARSIWA), a progressive development of the law in which, instead of diluting the definition of an injured state, the ILC ultimately chose...