Search: kony 2012

...our main arguments. Defence of D uress On duress, we agreed with the Trial Chamber’s (TC) finding in the conviction decision that this defence is unavailable to Ongwen, who argued he was under a continued threat of imminent death and serious bodily harm from LRA founder Joseph Kony and his controlling, military apparatus. The TC found that Ongwen was unable to rely on duress as a ground for excluding criminal responsibility under Article 31(1)(d) of the Rome Statute as he had failed to show he was under an imminent and...

...in the High Court of Uganda while those accused of lesser crimes would face the northern Uganda traditional justice system know as Mato OPut. Uganda’s government seems to believe that it can get the ICC arrest warrants withdrawn against key LRA leaders. As its minister of state for defense says: “First of all it is Uganda which approached the ICC to help in getting Kony and his commanders because Uganda could not reach Kony because he was outside Uganda’s jurisdiction. We are hoping that if Kony and his commanders decided...

Following up on Julian’s post below, Uganda has announced that the ICC has agreed not to prosecute the five LRA leaders, including Joseph Kony, as long as the final agreement reached between the government and the LRA does not “condone impunity.” Interestingly, Uganda also claims that it only initiated peace talks with the LRA because it could not find a partner in the international community to help it arrest Kony and the other leaders: Kagoda said: “We approached an international peace keeping force to arrest Kony and his commanders but...

...May 2012, Dr. Gehani confirmed that the Zintan brigade remained unwilling to transfer Mr. Gaddafi to Tripoli, and on 2 July 2012, the Commander of the Zintan brigade confirmed this stance. 361. Article 17(3) of the Statute expressly lists the inability of the State to obtain custody of the defendant as grounds for declaring the case to be admissible before the ICC. In the Kony et al. case, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s confirmation of the admissibility of the case was predicated on a statement from Uganda that although the judiciary was...

[William S. Dodge is Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law. From August 2011 to July 2012, he served as Counselor on International Law to the Legal Adviser at the U.S. Department of State, where he worked on immunity matters. The views expressed here are his own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the State Department or of the United States.] The Fourth Circuit’s November 2, 2012 decision in Yousuf v. Samantar has generated discussion by Professor...

...L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012). William Partlett’s response expands on these theoretical questions and places them within the concrete context of post-communist Europe and, most recently, Egypt. For example, Partlett notes the role that the Supreme Constitutional Court and the military have played in curbing the rise of political Islam in Egypt. I largely agree with Partlett’s observations, but I would argue that the military’s actions are best understood, not as an ideological reaction to political Islam, but through a self-interest paradigm. In fact, in the immediate aftermath of the 2011...

[William S. Dodge is Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law. From August 2011 to July 2012, he served as Counselor on International Law to the Legal Adviser at the U.S. Department of State, where he worked on the amicus brief of the United States to the Fourth Circuit in Yousuf v. Samantar. The views expressed here are his own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the State Department or of the United States.] On November 2,...

...exactly what Haile Selassie or others sought to achieve in engaging with the UNWCC through Ethiopia’s Swedish legal adviser, Erik Leijonhufvud (Donaldson 2022) (recent oral history interviews might assume too much concern with prosecutions in the larger scheme of postwar diplomacy (e.g. Imru Zelleke 2012, 16–17)). Debates in London Ethiopian efforts to submit cases to the UNWCC gave rise to a preliminary question: was the Italo-Ethiopian conflict even within the UNWCC’s jurisdiction? Though China had been keen to ensure Manchuria could be considered, the UNWCC’s assumed focus had been 1939...

...the same, and states continued celebrating when they were the top receivers of FDI in their regions. This was indisputably a good signal for private and public actors.  This ‘quantitative’ model has not been a success, however. In the last three decades, the contribution of FDI to sustainable development remains debatable. For one, positive spillover effects depend on several factors, while these capital flows can also have negative implications, such as crowding out domestic firms (Colen et al 2012). The relationship between FDI and inequality can also be problematic (Piketty...

...to provide: when exactly can reduction of punishment constitute impunity and when can it not. Hence, for the Court, peace negotiations to end conflict would indeed constitute a “clearly identifiable objective compatible with the American Convention” that warrants a softening of proportionality. This conclusion has been gaining traction in the Court’s jurisprudence, particularly thanks to the Colombian experience with the FARC. For example, in the 2012 El Mozote v. El Salvador case, not very long after the initiation of negotiations with the FARC, five judges appended a Concurring Opinion, very...

...well known to most OJ readers. I think the issue of corporate liability should be governed by international law and that the strict standards for recognizing an actionable norm under the Court’s prior decision in Sosa precludes recognizing an ATS cause of action against corporations. I joined a great amicus brief saying basically that in the original Kiobel case back in 2012. I have also recognized, however, that this is pretty formalistic argument that is unusually unattractive to most observers. Still, the international norms haven’t really changed since 2012. Plaintiffs...

...atrocity investigations in Western Europe and North America, including the 1988 Lockerbie plane bombing, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, the 2005 London train bombings, the shooting down of MH17 in 2014 and the 2015 Paris attacks. The situation was much worse when Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda took office in 2012. A lack of resources at that time forced the OTP to take a ‘stop-go’ approach to preliminary examinations because there were not enough staff to work on them simultaneously. Resources for investigations were so low that a rotational model had to...