Search: drones

...regardless of the munition used.  On this note, the author argues that large drone swarms will be inherently indiscriminate and disproportionate. Once the swarms scale in the thousands, its operator’s cognitive capacity would simply fail to meaningfully control the sheer number of drones. This loss of control makes the drones intrinsically unpredictable, causing failures to be infinitely possible and, in some instances, even inevitable. The author proposes that any WMD would also satisfy the contextual elements for crimes against humanity which can be committed both, during peacetime or armed conflict,...

...personel. I see no reason why they'd engage in such activity since it certainly isn't necessary (plenty of people within the military are trained to do these types of missions, and many have the secretest of top secret clearances). Private contractors, too, are trained to fly these drones but they don't function in a combat capacity either (they serve alternately as instructors, or get the things into the air, and then the drones are taken over by defense personel stationed elsewhere). Ian Henderson Noting that in any event, if the...

specific geographical area that would eliminate occasional flare-ups from the scope. These issues will be returned to in greater detail in later sections. Our focus is on the particular challenges raised to the geographical scope of armed conflict by the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, commonly referred to as drones. Much has been written about drones from a variety of perspectives,4 and we do not intend to repeat all the debates. Instead, the aim of this work is to asses not the drones themselves, but rather to examine one of...

...the target than conventional military operations would require — this is, after all, what makes it intelligence-driven targeted killing. In that particular aspect, covert action (again speaking loosely) ought to have standards that are higher than simply those that are and legally should be applied to that other use of drones – not targeted killing, but instead the targeting of a mass of combatants id’d as fighters crossing the Afghan border to fight Americans. (Drones have a role in both conventional warfare and special operations targeted killing, but the latter...

...position to advocate for acknowledgement of the constraints that international human rights law places on a government’s use of lethal force, including outside its own territory. As Koh writes, the problem isn’t the use of drones technology, which can be used in rights-compliant ways. Drones may make it easier to kill certain individuals, but the problem arises when the US uses any sort of lethal force to target individuals that the US does not have clear legal authority to kill. Contrary to Koh’s argument, however, the law need not, and...

...operations people on down hanging out there exposed. The drone warfare campaign embraced most thoroughly as a strategic matter – correctly, in my view – by the senior administration officials starting with the President is not the “hot battlefield” use of drones, in which they are essentially a substitute air support weapon for a manned system. It is, instead, the use of drones in a role unique to them, as a targeted killing mechanism for use in places far off of active battlefields. There are some questions raised about military...

...human teams. It is not solely a technology, the technology of drones, but instead equally or more dependent on an extraordinary intelligence effort at the ground level in order to identify targets. Drones, in their surveillance role, can be useful, but nothing substitutes for the ground level intelligence network. In that sense, the fear that critics sometimes have (that drones are a kind of weird mixture of globally ubiquitous surveillance-and-attack system that can strike anywhere around the world and at the same time a kind of flock of Predator ronin,...

It’s not true that everything I do is about drone warfare, but it has taken a lot of my time lately and, of course, a lot of stuff is happening, both on the operational side as well as legal side. So here’s a little round-up of links, more or less at random. First, the New York Times has a front page article today, looking at the impact of drones on terrorist and militant activities in Waziristan. It is an interesting piece, not least because it acknowledges not just the effectiveness...

...value of a drone on the battlefield as anything more than a novelty. Once the war on terror started, and the value of drones became apparent to everyone. The Air Force jumped into the game and tried to muscle out the CIA. Unfortunately, almost immediately the Air Force drone program was caught in the inevitable Pentagon procurement death spiral where large numbers of a good enough system (predators/reapers) are sacrificed for fewer of a perfect-but as yet undeveloped system, see F-35. In the war on terror the drone's best asset...

...as the way to regulate their use. That will likely work out fine in civil aviation and the use of drones. I’m sure states will eventually incorporate drones in ordinary civil aviation into protocols for air traffic control and transborder use, and might well show up in some form of aviation treaty or international rules. But it seems to me highly unlikely and indeed counterproductive to pursue treaty mechanisms for their use in armed conflict in its legal sense, or in uses of force that are outside of technical states...

...putting Czechia or other allies in awkward positions with their proposed transfer of offensive weapons. Furthermore, Turkey’s drones have allegedly been used to commit war crimes in theaters it has been deployed in; both Nagorno-Karabakh and Ethiopia conflict. Despite their legality being questioned by President Biden and the UN, the use of the drones are currently prima facie legal and it would be unreasonable to argue that Turkey breached the knowledge requirement of Article 6 ATT. Nevertheless, the risk assessment of Article 7 ATT should have forced Turkey to ensure...

...of drones in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency as distinct activities. The article explains: The CIA carries out two different types of drone strikes in the tribal areas of Pakistan—those against so-called high-value targets, including Mr. Rahman, and “signature” strikes targeting Taliban foot-soldiers who criss-cross the border with Afghanistan to fight U.S. forces there. High-value targets are added to a classified list that the CIA maintains and updates. The agency often doesn’t know the names of the signature targets, but it tracks their movements and activities for hours or days before striking...