Search: Affective Justice: Book Symposium: A Response

My friend Dapo Akande takes me to task today at EJIL: Talk! for my position on drone strikes directed at combatants attending a funeral or helping the wounded. I will address his curious reluctance to address the text of the Rome Statute in Part II of my response; in this post, I want to address his arguments concerning IHL. Here are the key paragraphs: First of all, Article 51(2) which prohibits attacks on the civilian population and individual civilians does not simply prohibits attacks but rather makes it illegal to...

...prong. This is why it has been long considered by both the Bush and Obama administrations to be covert action, not TMA. If the covert-action statute is capable of conferring the benefits of the public-authority justification, then, it does so here. I think this response elides the difference between two different situations: (1) where the military wants to use force covertly against al-Qaeda; and (2) where the CIA wants to use force covertly against al-Qaeda. As Bobby’s article brilliantly explains, the TMA language was included in Title 50 because neither...

...unableness of the Pakistani government to address that threat? For what it’s worth, the AfPak terminology seems to be on the rise again. In the case of the targeted killings outside Afghanistan, it must be heartbreaking for Mr Koh to see proper legal justifications give way to political expediency. Chris Rogers So Koh's response is essentially to cut and paste his ASIL speech? There are important legal questions that continue to be unanswered, which Koh's response has done nothing to clarify. Oddly, he says nothing about the legal grounds for...

who hold the greatest responsibility for setting policies of state violence and repression –a trend already underway in international, hybrid and national tribunals. However, these criminal law mechanisms at least do not force societies to confront the all or nothing option of trials v. total forgetting for the sake of political expediency. Instead, a flexible criminal justice process emerges that upholds the primacy of accountability, important for building the rule of law and meeting the justice demands of victims-survivors. On this last point, I believe that Slye and I concur....

Mihai Martoiu Ticu "Calls on all States to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks and stresses that those responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable;" I wonder what the resolution means by bringing to justice? Is it justice of the John Wayne type or a real court with real judges? Liz There has to be a means to bring suspects to that "real court" with "real judges". They don't...

...so while anticipating and preparing for armed resistance from the host/target state. And host/target states which have not granted permission for others to use force on their territory will assert a right to defend their sovereignty by treating such uses of force as aggression, and by responding with force if they so choose. The host/target state’s response, though theoretically unlawful, is very likely to occur and is something that any state relying upon the “unable or unwilling” standard will both anticipate and factor in to its decision to use force....

Professor Lederman asks in a comment to Professor Kent’s post if we could clarify our disagreement on the President’s power to respond to attacks. Briefly, here is how I understand it. I think both of us agree: (1) That Congress has the ultimate control over the U.S. response to an attack, in that it can limit the response by statute, or simply refuse to approve funding for certain kinds of responses; and (2) That in the absence of statutory approval the President can “repel sudden attacks” (as Madison said at...

[Col. (Ret.) Pnina Sharvit Baruch is a Former Head of the International Law Department of the IDF Military Advocate General’s Office] This is the fourth response in our Symposium on the Functional Approach to the Law of Occupation. Earlier posts can be found in the Related Links at the end of this post. I am grateful for the opportunity to respond in brief to some of the points made in the excellent contributions of fellow bloggers. At the outset, as a former practitioner, I admit that I prefer functional approaches...

...tradition. Students in Asia experience, it seems to me, various forms of dissonance between the local and international, between the promise of international justice and the historic experience of international injustice, between law and politics (It is an interesting approach to present the TWAIL approach as the standard approach. My friend and colleague Susan Marks has told me how she presents both the classic and TWAIL versions of international law and that students find the TWAIL account more persuasive. This of course is very gratifying, but I am glad that...

results reflecting the fundamental principles underlying international humanitarian law. The author concludes by highlighting and comparing the main areas of concern arising with regard to state-sponsored targeted killing under each normative paradigm and by placing the results of the analysis in the greater context of the rule of law. The book is obviously very timely, given the debate (see, for example, here and here) about the legality of the recent U.S. airstrike in Somalia. I hope to organize a mini-symposium on the book in the near future. Until then, buy...

...really in doubt. Even during armed conflict, we have to see that individuals retain the right against prolonged arbitrary detention as a fundamental human right. This isn't written into the laws of armed conflict, but it is clearly accepted as a fundamental norm applicable during peace and armed conflict by the United States (for instance, this is clearly stated even in the DoD's Operational Law Handbook). The question is, what form of due process is necessary to guarantee this right? I believe that in counter-terrorist or counter-insurgent conflict, especially of...

...on a ... country,” not “on” a NSA. Gray wrote that “the response of the world in 1998 with respect to the U.S. use of force in self-defense against al Qaeda that “the response of the world was generally muted,” whereas others wrote that most states had “acquiesced” and generally accepted “Article 51's application. See id. At 247-49 n.29, and Mary Ellen at 97 AJIL 446, 450 (2003) (“use of force in Afghanistan in 2001 was lawful self-defense.... September 11 attacks were part of a series of terrorist actions” that...