Search: Affective Justice: Book Symposium: A Response

The following is a guest-post by Gabor Rona, the International Legal Director of Human Rights First. It is a response to a post at LieberCode by Jens Ohlin, a Professor at Cornell Law School, that argues international human rights law (IHRL) does not apply in armed conflict, because it is displaced by international humanitarian law (IHL). Prof. Ohlin’s conclusion that IHRL doesn’t (and shouldn’t) apply in armed conflict cannot survive a more than superficial look at the lay of the legal and practical landscape. Essentially, his horse left the barn...

...sparking concerns in Israel about the possibility of an imminent attack. This situation further coincided with the killing of Fuad Shukr, a senior Hezbollah commander (also supported by Iran), in an Israeli airstrike on a suburb of Beirut, the Lebanese capital. Time has since passed without any major response to those initial threats by the international community leaving Israel and the broader Middle East in a state of on-going hostility and tension. While the nature and severity of Iran’s overall response remains unclear, Iran has issued a prime facie threat...

...support characterizing this as a military operation conducted under the laws of armed conflict and not a law enforcement operation. This is not necessarily wrong, but it is at least misleading. Although how a state chooses to respond to a threat from a non-state actor is relevant to whether hostilities rise to the level of armed conflict, the form of the response — military or law-enforcement — does not determine whether an armed conflict exists. It is simply one factor, the importance of which is debatable. States do not get...

...that the 2005 definition of a PHEIC in Article 1(1) IHR as an ‘extraordinary event’ in one state which is determined to ‘(i) constitute a public health risk to other States through the international spread of disease’ and ‘(ii) to potentially require a coordinated international response’ has long been plagued by vagueness – are exacerbated by the amendments. No clear ‘severe’ or ‘life-threatening’ disease benchmarks have been included through the amendments in Article 1 IHR or the decision instrument in Annex 2 to be applied in accordance with the principles...

...India and Thailand. A uniting factor in this region is the non-ratification of the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, resulting in ad-hoc policies that govern refugee status and protection. Countries in the region have adopted different responses towards the Rohingya refugee crisis. The States’ varied response has also resulted in a lack of uniformity in the strategy adopted by country specific UN agencies working on this issue; while Bangladesh co-leads the Joint Response  Plan, which coordinates aid by multiple agencies including UNHCR, IOM and UNFPA, Thailand does not...

response essay” to David Golove’s fascinating essay on “The Supreme Court, the War on Terror, and the American Just War Constitutional Tradition.” Like Mike Ramsey (Response Essay in Part V.E.) I find much to admire but also some things to question and debate in Professor Golove’s thought-provoking contribution to this volume. Professor Golove argues that the war-on-terror decisions in Hamdi, Rasul, Hamdan and Boumediene were striking departures from more recent precedent and principles, but were fundamentally consistent with three deeper themes from earlier periods of American constitutional history, what Professor...

[Dr. Anne T. Gallagher is the Head of Operations at Equity International, Technical Director of Asia Regional Trafficking in Persons Project, and the former UN Adviser on Trafficking] My response to James Hathaway, written with the benefit of close involvement in the development of the new legal framework, as well as in its implementation at the national level in over forty countries, provides an alternative and a sharply differing perspective on the global battle to combat trafficking. In considering each of Hathaway’s major concerns in turn, and discrediting the assumptions...

[This post is part of the Second Harvard International Law Journal/Opinio Juris Symposium.] In 2007, I authored two papers — one for a military audience and another for a legal one — arguing that debates over the law’s response to the growing range of cyberthreats would likely track ongoing debates over law’s response to terrorism. In that context, we’ve seen 4 options emerge: First, those who say terrorism is a crime, and only a crime, with any legal response limited to law enforcement mechanisms. Second, those who insist terrorism is...

At International Criminal Law Bureau, Kirsty Sutherland calls attention to a surprise moment during the Taylor verdict that has received, to the best of my knowledge, absolutely no attention from the media: In an unexpected turn of events, as Justice Lussick (Presiding), Justice Doherty and Justice Sebutinde rose to leave the courtroom after delivering the verdict, Justice Sow addressed the Court: “The only moment where a Judge can express his opinion is during the deliberations or in the courtroom, and, pursuant to the Rules, when there are no serious deliberations,...

...the conduct alleged to have occurred in the United States was not relevant. The facts alleged in Cardona certainly seem sufficient to recognize a cause of action under the criteria set forth in Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion. Four Justices joined that opinion, and it takes only four votes to grant cert. If those Justices think the facts in Cardona are sufficiently egregious to persuade Justice Kennedy that an ATS cause of action against U.S. corporations should exist in at least some circumstances, they could well vote to hear the case....

...assessing individual criminal responsibility at the Court and raise questions about the implications thereof for international criminal justice. Collective crimes, individual responsibility International criminal justice is concerned with the ‘most serious’ crimes and with the ‘most responsible’ individuals that stand behind those crimes. The Nuremberg tribunal was established to try the ‘major war criminals’ of the European Axis. Similarly, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)’s completion strategy envisioned that ‘the most senior leaders suspected of being most responsible’ for the crimes in the Former Yugoslavia would be...

...in a peace settlement that will ultimately save lives requires ceding painful concessions to that villain’s power, especially when the concession is justice. And, yet, we know that true peace is never really achieved without justice.  It is possible that meaningful justice is not found in the actual legal judgements of tribunals, anyway, but the many social processes and political institutions that courts create a space for in the aftermaths of atrocities. And, for that matter, any sense of justice that victims and survivors gain from tribunals usually does not have much to do...