Search: Affective Justice: Book Symposium: A Response

[Ilias Bantekas is Professor of Law at Brunel University in London.] This post is part of the MJIL 13(1) Symposium. Other posts in this series can be found in the related posts below. Causality is central in the operation of criminal attribution in all legal systems. It makes sense of course that liability for particular conduct exists where it is proven that it caused the harmful outcome which constitutes the actus reus of an offence. Causation is the fundamental link between conduct and outcome and is as a result the...

[Janelle Diller is Paul Martin Sr. Professor of International Affairs and Law at the University of Windsor Faculty of Law (Canada), on leave from the International Labour Organization (ILO). Her views do not necessarily reflect the ILO’s positions.This is the fourth post in the Defining the Rule of Law Symposium, based on this article (free access for six months). The first is here, the second, here, the third here and the fourth here.]] By insisting on clarity in approaching the “rule of law” at the international level. Robert McCorquodale significantly...

might, I cannot follow Professor Robinson down this path. To be sure, there are few scholars whose work I revere more than Kutz and Sepinwall, both of whom bring exceptional degrees of sophistication to a whole raft of issues of great salience to modern international criminal justice. And yet, to my mind, both offer models of individual responsibility that are not available in international criminal justice as presently constituted, precisely because they are not minded to tailor their theories of responsibility to the specific identity of international crimes as they...

[Darryl Robinson is an Assistant Professor at Queen’s University, Faculty of Law] This post is part of the MJIL 13(1) symposium. Other posts in this series can be found in the related posts below. I am very grateful for James Stewart’s comments on “How Command Responsibility Got So Complicated”. Professor Stewart and I are engaged in similar projects (criminal law theory and international criminal law (‘ICL’)) and immersed in similar literature, so our discussions are always very helpful to me, even though we at times reach different conclusions. Professor Stewart...

[Jean d’Aspremont is Associate Professor of International Law, Amsterdam Centre for International Law (ACIL), University of Amsterdam and Editor-in-chief of the Leiden Journal of International Law] This post is part of the Leiden Journal of International Law Vol 25-3 symposium. Other posts in this series can be found in the related posts below. Debate has always been a central medium of thought-making and, hence, knowledge-production in social sciences. This is why, albeit aware of the pitfalls of such platforms (see my EJIL:Talk! post), I initiated, with the help of Dov...

[Colleen M. Flood is the Canada Research Chair in Health Law and Policy at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law; Y.Y. Brandon Chen is a doctoral candidate at the University of Toronto.] This post is part of the Virginia Journal of International Law Symposium, Volume 52, Issues 1 and 2. Other posts in this series can be found in the related posts below. In this thought-provoking article, Cohen proposes a six-prong framework to assess whether medical tourism diminishes health care access in destination countries. This kind of theoretical contribution...

...crucial as a moral matter because it promotes minimum world order. Further, the decisionmaking authority that states allocate to judges is not unbounded. It is limited to deciding legal disputes according to laws. It would thus be unethical for a judge to decide a dispute without regard to laws, or worse, based on his personal preferences. But strict legalism, as Professor Howse points out and as I explain in my book, does not exclude moral reasoning about the content of the applicable laws and the practical consequences of applying them...

...do not make fine grained predictions. . . . Our goal is, rather, to give a simple but plausible account for the various features of international law . . . in terms of something other than a state’s propensity to comply with international law. In other words, rationalist theories and my theory try to explain how the international legal system functions or fails. The reader will have to decide for him or herself whether the highly-contextual accounts of international incidents in my book provide useful explanations of decisions and outcomes....

global health emergency has enabled inappropriate and violative public health responses across nations. As the world’s struggle against the coronavirus stretches on, we must begin to consider how global health law and human rights law can be harmonized – not only to protect human dignity in the face future global health crises, but also to strengthen effective public health responses with justice. The necessarily multi-sectoral response to COVID-19 reveals the distinctive nature of interpreting human rights limitations in a global health emergency that (1) is an international (compared to a...

Finally, I would like to use this opportunity to briefly reflect on a broader normative matter. I am unable to determine with certainty whether Professor Trahan believes that, as a matter of lex lata, a rule has emerged to prohibit vetoes by the Permanent Members of the Security Council in situations of mass atrocities. In her response to my post she stated: “I do not believe my arguments are de lege ferenda.” However, in her response to Professor Kevin Jon Heller, she wrote: “the international system needs to evolve in...

...from the flexible interpretability of the self-defense doctrine and the customary uncertainty surrounding the precise boundary between lawful self-defense and unlawful reprisals. As has been acknowledged, “on several occasions, force was used in response to past events, rather than current or imminent armed actions, sometimes with considerable delay” (p. vii). The timing and purpose of a forcible response are closely interconnected, aiming to ensure “that the right to use force in self-defence is protective in nature”, rather than punitive (p. 255). Still, it has been argued that “[s]ome level of...

...motivate the decision not to take on a case; and so on. Granted, discretionary review has some disadvantages, too. It reduces access to justice and leaves the parties (mostly victims of human rights abuses) at the mercy of the discretion of the court. However, if we can trust the wisdom of these judges on the merits of the case, why can’t we trust them also on weighing the costs and benefits, writ large, of hearing the case? It is exactly the conundrums of transitional justices detailed in Teitel’s article that...