Search: Affective Justice: Book Symposium: A Response

...international law scholars are discussing in these days and how all of this is evidence that a Tallinn Manual 3.0 is needed, but will not give any definitive answer to the issues that still involve international (cyber) law. The politicians The Hill published an interesting article that summarizes some first responses by US politicians to this act. It is striking as their positions do no align with past actions conducted by the US Government in cyberspace and do not reflect international law. Sen. Dick Durbin’s statement that “[t]his is virtually...

...obligation. (The President’s memorandum may do so, but I don’t understand Roger to be asking about that). You have to interpret treaties, like contracts, fairly and consistently with the background assumptions of the parties, and neither the Optional Protocol nor the UN Charter indicates that states were contemplating domestic-court enforcement when they signed on. Contrast, for example, the New York Convention on international commercial arbitration, which clearly contemplates domestic judicial enforcement of international arbitral awards. Second, on Justice Ginsburg’s “middle way,” I don’t read her dissent quite the way Roger...

...mere minutes to evacuate especially when they have no sense where safety might be. I think this would hold true irrespective of the parties involved. Moreover, the report points equally to violations of the other side, but seemingly with regard to these there is never any controversy. Palestinian authorities don't provide credible accountability, the strikes against civilians are pervasive, the whole findings section starts with these. P.S. The link to Israeli authors book is pointing to your own computer, Kevin, and thus is not working. Akiva Kevin, A few points....

...and transform it into an issue of human welfare and dignity. Finally, I agree with Peter that the questions of how norms should be harmonized and what process will be most successful in achieving this goal are crucial. The answer to these questions will depend on the context, and this points to a need for further empirical research into how norms of access and exclusivity have been translated into domestic law. My thanks again to Peter, Opinio Juris, and YJIL for this online symposium. I welcome further comments at molly.beutz@nyls.edu....

As an initial matter, thanks to Professor Craik for his kind and well-thought out comments to our article. I should note that Neil has done some wonderful work on transnational environmental governance and the use of environmental impact assessments. Just as one example, his paper on deliberation and legitimacy in transnational environmental governance is excellent and well worth the read. But on to the task at hand… To a large extent, Neil agrees with our analysis on the loosening restrictions on extraterritoriality. Yet Neil is somewhat unconvinced...

[Michael W. Lewis is a Professor of Law at Ohio Northern University where he teaches International Law and the Law of War.] I want to thank Gabor for continuing a discussion started over on Lawfare a couple of weeks ago and to thank Opinio Juris for allowing me an opportunity to respond. As I had the last word on Lawfare I believe Gabor will be given the final word here. Gabor is correct that drones themselves are “stupid” in that they do not make any targeting decisions...

...of non-international armed conflict, it seems plausible that Al Warafi could refute his detention under international humanitarian law. Although the Court had correctly ruled that Article 24 did not apply, it did so on misguided grounds. In Al Warafi’s case, Article 24 was inapplicable because the conflict was not of a nature to trigger its application, nor was the petitioner a proper subject of this provision. Although Justice Brown identifies common Article 3 at the appropriate framework for considering the legality of Al Warafi’s detention in his concurring opinion for...

[Chiara Giorgetti is an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown Law Center and a member of the International Arbitration Group at the Washington, D.C. office of White & Case.] I am very pleased to join this discussion on Professor Lea Brilmayer and Isaias Yemane Tesfalidet’s upcoming article on third State obligations and the enforcement of international law. In their article, Brilmayer and Tesfalidet argue that States have a positive obligation not to contribute to another State’s violation of a victim’s legal rights, and propose that liability is triggered only when...

I am very pleased to be able to comment on Ingrid Wuerth’s recent article, Foreign Official Immunity Determinations in U.S. Courts: The Case Against the State Department. As readers of this blog are aware, the Supreme Court held in Samantar v. Yousuf that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) generally does not apply to suits against individual foreign officials, and that the immunity of such officials is to be determined instead as a matter of common law. The Executive Branch is now claiming (as it claimed before Samantar)...

...strictly speaking, be a loss of a state’s reputation for compliance with international law, but it might nevertheless be a costly loss of reputation for cooperation. This certainly seems to be what has happened to the United States with respect to both the ICC and the Kyoto Protocol. So as you suggest, Roger, there is a close connection between accepting an international legal obligation and complying with it. My book does discuss how joining a treaty can help a country to gain reputation, and how the presence of a treaty...

[Opinio Juris Note: Thanks to everyone, especially David Moore, for participating in the online workshop this week. Here is David’s last post and the last contribution to what has been a very interesting and useful workshop.] Marty is, of course, right that the issue before the Court in Sosa was not whether all CIL qualifies as federal common law or whether the creation of CIL-based common law requires positive authorization. The issue was whether the ATS supports common law claims based on CIL. That does not mean, however,...

...“the potential cases being considered for investigation by the Office” — not on the general availability or effectiveness of the domestic criminal-justice system in question. It is thus irrelevant that “[t]he United States has one of the most developed and effective military justice systems in the world, which has the demonstrated ability and willingness to hold its own accountable for violations of the law, including any violations in the context of detention operations.” The only question is whether the US is investigating the same cases as the OTP. Second, and...