Search: Affective Justice: Book Symposium: A Response

...Law’s Main Challenges” in D Armstrong (ed), Routledge Handbook of International Law (Routledge 2009) at 404. Schachter’s “invisible college” of international lawyers seems to have largely disappeared and has been replaced by a patchwork quilt of specialized international lawyers. Diverse interpretive communities have come to play an increasingly important role in treaty interpretation. This development raises concerns about the unity of international law, not just in relation to its interpretive methods, but also in relation the system as a whole. The challenge going forward is how to achieve a reasonable...

[Julian Arato is an Associate-in-Law at Columbia Law School.] Interpretation in International Law is something of an iconoclastic volume, from its critical ethos to its provocative structure around the metaphor of the game. The object of its revisionism, above all, is an apparently stagnant formalism that seems too prevalent in the theory and practice of interpretation in international law today. Symbolic of this antiquated formalism – for the editors and for many of the contributors – are the rules of interpretation embedded in the Vienna Convention on the...

a ‘courtroom’ should look like and intentionally refuse to transition towards liberal market capitalism. (See Marcos Zunino, Justice Framed). In sum, then, for me one broader takeaway of Jalloh’s book is methodological in nature. Where should ‘we’ look? With whom should ‘we’ engage? Who is the ‘we’? Does the world really need yet another ‘qualitative methods’ doctoral dissertation that interviews Hague lawyers at the ICC, ICTY, and ICTR? That defoliates some other arcane detail of the ICC’s Rome Statute? Perhaps the time has come to foster a more complete and...

well considered decision. Although India is increasingly an exporter of capital, in the near term, India is likely attract more investor disputes against it. In addition, as Buser notes in his book, most of the signatories to the BITs did not consider these treaties as ‘hard’ legal instruments capable of enforcement and consequent monetary damages. Once they realised the perils of being parties to the investment treaties, their response was predictable to an extent. It is sound way to analyse the rising powers in four typologies – loyalists; reformers; revolutionaries;...

[Michael W. Lewis is a Professor of Law at Ohio Northern University where he teaches International Law and the Law of War.] I want to thank Gabor for continuing a discussion started over on Lawfare a couple of weeks ago and to thank Opinio Juris for allowing me an opportunity to respond. As I had the last word on Lawfare I believe Gabor will be given the final word here. Gabor is correct that drones themselves are “stupid” in that they do not make any targeting decisions...

...obligation. (The President’s memorandum may do so, but I don’t understand Roger to be asking about that). You have to interpret treaties, like contracts, fairly and consistently with the background assumptions of the parties, and neither the Optional Protocol nor the UN Charter indicates that states were contemplating domestic-court enforcement when they signed on. Contrast, for example, the New York Convention on international commercial arbitration, which clearly contemplates domestic judicial enforcement of international arbitral awards. Second, on Justice Ginsburg’s “middle way,” I don’t read her dissent quite the way Roger...

As a general matter, we agree with Professor Weber’s comments, especially in relation to development and climate change. While we have not in this article focused on developmental aspects of the global financial architecture, in fact, we both view this as the fundamental goal.[1] Development however is not a simple objective and no single set of solutions to the development challenge has emerged. In the global economic architecture today, developmental issues are addressed through the Millennium Development Goals (‘MDGs’), a huge range of multilateral, domestic and non-governmental...

...justice, into IHL itself), ignoring the comparative justness of the parties’ causes becomes even less normatively attractive. Indeed, as Prof. Heller surmised, I am generally sympathetic to his position. I agree that it is difficult to accept the complete divorce of the jus in bello from the jus ad bellum as a moral matter; this is especially true concerning the equal status of combatants, i.e., that no soldier commits a crime when he fights other soldiers, even if he fights an unjust war. Unless we believe that individuals bear no...

[Tom Ginsburg is a Professor at the University of Chicago Law School] Thanks for this opportunity to respond to the Article by Professors Abebe and Masur. My learned colleagues are certainly correct that, notwithstanding its status as a unitary and authoritarian state, China is an internally complicated place, with substantial de facto control at the provincial level. Besides the East-West cleavages that Professors Abebe and Masur focus on, there are other internal tensions among different levels of government, different governmental agencies at each level, and different ideological groups...

[Rolf H Weber is a Professor for Civil, Commercial and European Law at the University of Zurich Law School and a visiting Professor at the University of Hong Kong] The contribution of Professor Douglas W Arner and Professor Ross P Buckley is an important piece to the lively debate about the (new) architecture of the global financial system. The exposé is very thoughtful and enlightening, giving a historical outline of the attempts of regulators to prevent financial crises, with special focus on architectural aspects to be derived...

...“state” (because I had the privilege of looking through some of the books from his personal collection and some notes that he wrote in some of the books – which were housed in the Judge Advocate General’s School in Charlottesville). It is enough to know that Oppenheim was wrong. Perhaps “readers” here can disclose other examples of treaties involving non”state” actors Christiana quotes the Martens clause (see Martens above) from the 1899 Hague Convention, which was mirrored in the 1907 Hague Convention No. IV (all around the time of Oppenheim’s...

[Marko Milanovic is a Lecturer in Law at the University of Nottingham School of Law.] In their timely article Brilmayer and Tesfalidet address an important issue of general international law – when should states bear obligations to either put an end to or not contribute to violations of international law by other states, even when the obligation in question is not owed to them specifically. They challenge the orthodox view that by and large it is not any one state’s business whether third states comply with their obligations...