Wells Bennett calls my attention to this statement by Marc Ambinder in a recent article in The Week entitled "Five Truths About the Drone War": The CIA does not "fly" drones. It "owns" drones, but the Air Force flies them. The Air Force coordinates (and deconflicts) their use through the CIA's Office of Military Affairs, which is run by an Air Force...
I'm grateful to Ken, Wells Bennett, and Marcy Wheeler for speculating that my April 2010 blog post on 18 USC 1119, the foreign-murder statute, is the post referred to in today's New York Times article on the behind-the-scenes machinations that culminated in the CIA using a drone to kill Anwar al-Awlaki. I imagine they are correct; the post fits the timeline...
As everyone likely knows by now, Rand Paul has ended his remarkable talking filibuster because Attorney General Holder officially responded "no" to the question "Does the President have the authority to use a weaponized drone to kill an American not engaged in combat on American soil?" Is it just me, or does Holder's answer actually raise more questions than it answers? (1)...
Dan Blumenthal of AEI has a thoughtful piece in Foreign Policy on different tactics the U.S. could take to "win a cyberwar" with China. I think it is more about how the U.S. should "fight" the cyberwar with China and other governments that are going to use cyber-attacks against US companies and government entities. Still, what caught my eye are...
Libya has filed yet another brief concerning the admissibility of the case against Saif Gaddafi. The new brief is more than 50 pages long, so it's going to take some time to digest. But we really don't have to go beyond pages 22-24, because Libya's admissions in those paragraphs doom -- or at least should doom, if the Pre-Trial Chamber...
My previous posts (see here for the most recent) have explained why Judge Kozinski's opinion in the Sea Shepherd case wrongly considers a political end to be a private end. In this post I want to highlight what is ironic -- though not technically incorrect -- about Judge Kozinski's conclusion that Sea Shepherd committed an act of piracy on "the...
Eugene Kontorovich has responded at Volokh Conspiracy to my previous post about politically-motivated acts of violence on the high seas. I invite interested readers to examine for themselves the various documents Eugene and I discuss; in this final post I simply want to correct a fundamental error on Eugene's part concerning the Harvard Draft Convention on Piracy -- an error...
That may seem like a ridiculous question. After all, Libya is doing everything in its power to prosecute Saif domestically -- and he is facing a variety of charges that carry the death penalty. But consider the text of Art. 17(2), the "unwillingness" prong of the the admissibility test: In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall...
As I have explained before, Libya's admissibility challenge must fail if it cannot ensure that the militia in Zintan who have Saif custody will transfer him to the government to stand trial, because Art. 17(3) of the Rome Statute deems a state "unable" to prosecute if, "due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the...
Breaking news: China has rejected arbitration under Annex VII of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea with the Philippines, dealing a heavy blow to the future of dispute settlement under UNCLOS (h/t China Law Prof Blog). According to this China Daily report, "Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines Ma Keqing had an appointment with officials from the Philippines' Foreign...
The Australian political world is all abuzz at the prospect of Assange running for the Senate in the upcoming federal election, which will be held on September 14. It's not completely clear whom he'll run against, but he will register as a voter in my home state of Victoria and intends to start a new political party, surprisingly entitled the...
My friend Jens Ohlin (Cornell) has just posted a very important article on SSRN entitled "Targeting and the Concept of Intent." Here is the abstract: International law generally prohibits military forces from intentionally targeting civilians; this is the principle of distinction. In contrast, unintended collateral damage is permissible unless the anticipated civilian deaths outweigh the expected military advantage of the strike;...
