National Security Law

A couple of people have suggested to me that I should be celebrating Obama's adoption of the "near certainty" standard, because it is more protective of civilians than the principle of proportionality. I will not celebrate the standard, for two very simple reasons. First, I don't believe for a moment that Obama will actually enforce it, no matter how pure...

There is a classic jury instruction that reads, "[a] witness who is willfully false in one material part of his or her testimony is to be distrusted in others. You may reject the whole testimony of a witness who willfully has testified falsely as to a material point, unless, from all the evidence, you believe the probability of truth favors his...

In my previous post, I expressed my skepticism that the OTP will open a formal investigation into the situation -- loosely defined -- involving Israel's attack on the MV Mavi Marmara. In this post, I want to raise two issues concerning Comoros' referral that I find particularly troubling. First, why is Comoros being represented by Turkish lawyers, the Elmadag Law Firm...

Baher Azmy, the legal director of the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), has flagged a very interesting ATS case that is due to be re-argued in light of the Supreme Court's recent -- and much discussed here at Opinio Juris -- decision in Kiobel. Here is CCR's description of the case, Al Shimari v. CACI: Al Shimari  v. CACI was originally...

Rep. Mac Thornberry (R-Texas), member of the US House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, plans to introduce a bill that would increase Congressional oversight over kill-capture operations conducted outside of Afghanistan by the US military.  Bobby Chesney discusses the proposed legislation over at Lawfare, and gives a section by section commentary.  Whether this is an important step or not depends on one's starting point, of course; I agree with Bobby that it is a big deal and a welcome step - though if one's view is that all these operations are unlawful, or that  they require judicial oversight, or something else, then you won't be much moved. Seen within the framework of US law and oversight of overseas use of force operations, however, this is an important step.  A couple of observations; see Bobby's post for a detailed discussion.  First, this legislation is with respect to operations conducted by the US military; it does not cover CIA activities.  Second, it covers US military operations with respect to the lines of oversight running back to the Armed Services committees; it does not alter existing oversight processes of Congressional intelligence committees governing covert action as defined in US Code Title 50, but extends and increases oversight over military operations.  These limitations run to several different things. Counterintuitive as many might find it, the CIA is subject to far greater oversight, and at a far higher level of government, in its conduct of Title 50 covert activities than the US military is in its conduct of armed operations under Title 10.  There are good reasons why the military is not subject to direct oversight in essentially tactical decision-making in its traditional military activities once a decision has been made to commit to the use of force.  These decisions have long been understood to be within the discretion and responsibility of commanders who have the expertise to carry them out.  Oversight through the Armed Services committees is robust, including its closed sessions, but is not considered the same as that which Title 50 requires for covert activities.  However, the expansion of the US military into clandestine activities - which might or might not meet the legal definition of "covert" under Title 50 and so trigger those oversight functions - has raised new questions as to whether Armed Services committees oversight, traditionally conceived for conventional conflicts, keeps Congress sufficiently informed and permits sufficiently timely oversight in the case of activities carried by JSOC.

This according to the Commission of Inquiry on Syria, which has considerable investigative ability. Reuters: (Reuters) - U.N. human rights investigators have gathered testimony from casualties of Syria's civil war and medical staff indicating that rebel forces have used the nerve agent sarin, one of the lead investigators said on Sunday. The United Nations independent commission of inquiry on Syria has not yet seen...

Peter beat me to the punch in commenting on Samuel Moyn's interesting take on the ATS and Kiobel in Foreign Affairs, but I'm going to add a somewhat different point from Peter's about what the body of ATS law has meant over the past few decades. I didn't intervene in the earlier discussion about Kiobel because that discussion seemed to me properly focused mostly on the internal legal aspects of the decision - everything from jurisdiction to state courts, and much else besides.  I want to raise something external to Kiobel and the ATS as "law" - the distinction between international law and what (in various postings here and there) I've referred to as the "law of the hegemon." One way of looking at the ATS, including the body of cases built up over the years, is that it is "international law."  Of course that's not literally true; it is a domestic statute that refers to international law as the basis of some form of liability; violations of treaties or the law of nations.  But in a broader sense - the sense in which its supporters have long seen it - the ATS offers a domestic law vehicle by which to work out, interpret, express and, perhaps most important, make effective the requirements of international law. This is surely the sense that, for example, Judge Jack Weinstein had when he opened the ATS hearing in the Agent Orange case ten years ago - this court sits, he said, in some fashion as an international court.  Sitting in the courtroom, it was entirely plain that he both took seriously and took real pleasure in seeing this District Court as sitting in judgment on the same types of crimes as raised at Nuremberg. There are several practical problems for this broader view, of course - how to figure out the relationship between the domestic law piece of the statute and the international law piece, for one. Another, however, is that if this is supposed to be the working out in some broad sense of "international law" in American courts and using the tools available to American law, how does one keep the link between international law and its sources, processes, standards of interpretation, etc., as they exist in the international arena - and the application of this in an American law setting that has its own sources of authority, standards of interpretation, etc.  It's fine to say that the ATS is the working out of international law in US courts, but international law is made in the international framework and evolves according to things that are different from and quite alien to the American legal system.  A telling example of the problem is found simply in the status of US court cases interpreting the ATS and, in the process, interpreting features of international law in ways that bear little relationship to how the international community might do it, now or in the future.  Yet in an American domestic law system, those distinctively US cases have greater authority than the international authorities. One can say that this is precisely the problem of the American court system in dealing with human rights cases; it ought to recognize the international law sources and authorities as such, rather than privileging its own processes.  But this is hard, given that plaintiffs want simultaneously to reach to the special features of the US litigation system to achieve their aims; those special features of the US litigation system include many things, such as civil liability, corporate liability, etc., that don't obviously exist in the international system.  It isn't likely that one can pick and choose in the most favorable way - whether one is the plaintiff or the defendant - and if you go with the American system, you take its doctrine of sources, methods of interpretation, and much else besides, even as it applies to international law questions.  But those don't match up very well with how the "international" actors in international law see those fundamental questions.  The questions are not substantive or procedural in the usual sense - they are, rather, the fundamental doctrines of authority, precedent, methods of interpretation. A better way of seeing the law of the ATS, it has long seemed to me, is to treat it not as a particular state's working out of international law in its courts, but rather a quite different category.  It seems to me best understood as the hegemonic power working out the law of the hegemon in ways that are intended to be somewhat parallel to "international law" on these issues.  There is a shared impulse rooted in morality, but what the hegemon does is within the terms of its own legal system.  It depends in large part upon the extent to which the hegemonic power is willing to allow the capital of its power to be exercised roughly to these ends - and the extent to which other important actors are willing to go along as a sort of rough way of getting international law actually enforced.

I want to take a moment to spruik (if you don't know the word, look it up!) Jeffrey Kahn's new book, Mrs. Shipley's Ghost: The Right to Travel and Terrorist Watchlists, which has just been published by the University of Michigan Press. Here is the publisher's description: Today, when a single person can turn an airplane into a guided missile, no...

In the wake of Obama's memorable statement, a number of bloggers have questioned whether the Boston bombings deserve to be labeled "terrorism." Most of those bloggers -- such as the excellent Ali Abuminah here -- emphasize that many US definitions of terrorism require the violent act in question to be politically or ideologically motivated, which is still an open question with regard...