From Google Spain to Gen Alpha: The Right to Be Forgotten and the Digital Protection of Children under International Law

[Mohammad Mehdi Seyed Nasseri is a researcher at the Center for Ethics and Law Studies, and lecturer at the Shahid Beheshti University (Tehran). He holds a PhD in Public International Law from Islamic Azad University, UAE Branch (Dubai)]

In July 2025, reports emerged across Europe about increasing requests by parents to delete images of their children from search engines. While the technology remains inconsistent, the legal question remains even more unsettled: do children have an internationally protected right to be forgotten? Children are particularly vulnerable in the digital world. Content published during childhood, whether by parents or by the children themselves, can significantly impact their future in education, employment, and psychological well-being. In a world where children’s digital footprints are recorded online before they even recognize their own image in a mirror, a fundamental question arises for legal scholars, governments, and the international community: Does a child have the right to forget their digital past? The term “child” in this writing, relying on the majority of human rights instruments, refers to any individual who has not yet reached the age of eighteen. As explicitly stated in Article 1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child: “For the purposes of the present Convention, a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.”

This notion, known as the “Right to be Forgotten,” represents a novel response to an age-old question in international human rights law: the right to enjoy a future unburdened by a past unjustly and involuntarily etched onto virtual walls. The right to be forgotten is an emerging and strategic concept in the realm of digital rights, allowing individuals to request the deletion of their personal data from online platforms. It was first formally recognized in the landmark ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) against Google and was subsequently codified in Article 17 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). (see, among others, here, p.105)

What renders this concept particularly critical in the broader landscape of children’s rights is the emergence of a new form of digital exploitation that exposes children—knowingly or unknowingly—to permanent registration, social judgment, and psychological harm stemming from the persistence of online content. The philosophical foundation of the right to be forgotten lies in the protection of human dignity—a principle enshrined in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 1 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).

The CRC emphasizes the child’s right to privacy (Article 16), freedom of expression (Article 13), and healthy psychological and personal development (Article 29). Safeguarding digital identity, ensuring control over personal data, and enabling the removal of inappropriate past content from online spaces are all aligned with these rights. A key issue in the violation of children’s rights in the digital sphere is the absence of informed consent. Often, children’s data is recorded and shared by parents, schools, digital platforms, or even governments without the child’s understanding of the long-term consequences. This practice contravenes the principles of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, both of which emphasize the right to privacy and data protection. Recent psychological studies, including UNICEF’s 2025 report titled Childhood in a Digital World, reveal that the exposure of children’s images, videos, or embarrassing content online can severely damage their self-esteem, mental health, and social development. During adolescence—a period of heightened psychological sensitivity—the inability to delete such content can lead to depression, anxiety, aggression, or social isolation. In many legal systems, parents retain the authority to publish content about their children in digital spaces. However, in some cases, this authority results in a direct violation of the child’s right to informational self-determination. According to contemporary comparative legal scholarship, particularly the German doctrine of informational self-determination, every individual—including children—has the right to monitor and control data concerning themselves. Although this right is firmly established in German law, it does not currently constitute a distinct, universally recognized right under international human rights law (IHRL). Nonetheless, the doctrine offers important analytical insight for assessing the implications of parental exploitation of children on social media, particularly in the emerging phenomenon of child influencers. Scholars have suggested that, while not codified at the international level, such principles resonate with broader notions of privacy and the protection of children’s autonomy under international human rights frameworks.

The rapid evolution of information technology has challenged the foundational concepts of international human rights law in the twenty-first century. One such challenge is the conflict between the “Right to free Access to Information” and the “Right of Individuals to Control their Personal Data.” Within this context, the landmark 2014 ruling of the CJEU in the case against Google represents a turning point in the development of the doctrine of the “Right to be Forgotten.” Until then, this right had largely been discussed in fragmented debates on personal data, cyber ethics, and media law. However, this ruling granted it a judicial, binding, and foundational character.

In this case, Mario Costeja González, a Spanish national, filed a complaint with the Spanish Data Protection Agency against Google Spain and Google Inc., arguing that search results linking his name to a Spanish newspaper article about the forced sale of his property due to tax debts were outdated and irrelevant, and their continued online presence harmed his reputation and privacy. Two key questions were referred by the Spanish national court to the CJEU:

1. Does a search engine like Google qualify as a “Data Controller” under EU data protection regulations?

2. Can an individual request the removal of search results about themselves even if the original source (e.g., the newspaper) remains lawful and publicly accessible?

The Court held that, due to its collection, storage, organization, and presentation of users’ personal data in response to search queries, Google acts as a “Data Controller.” This determination marked a fundamental step in recognizing the legal responsibility of platforms and search engines regarding personal data. Consequently, Google was deemed subject to the obligations outlined in EU Directive 95/46. The Court ruled that individuals may request the removal of search results if the information is “inadequate,” “Irrelevant,” or “Excessive.” This analysis laid the foundation for the concept of the “Right to be Forgotten,” which was institutionalized in Article 17 of the GDPR (2016). The Court emphasized that the right to erasure is conditional upon the public interest in maintaining access to the information not outweighing the individual’s interest in its removal. This allows for a balancing approach between the principle of information transparency and the protection of personal dignity. The Google Spain judgment not only formally recognized the right to be forgotten for the first time in judicial doctrine but also paved the way for its emergence as a human right in the digital era. It served as the departure point for the drafting of Article 17 of the GDPR—explicitly entitled “Right to Erasure”—which affirms the possibility of requesting the deletion of personal data. This ruling was a watershed moment in the evolution of platform accountability. In contrast to the U.S. approach, where Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act generally exempts platforms from liability for user-generated content, the CJEU emphasized that search engines bear direct responsibility for the information they index. This marked a fundamental shift in European internet governance.

Although the ruling did not directly address the broader system of children’s rights, its general principles on control over personal data have extended protections for children, adolescents, and other vulnerable groups. In contexts such as digital exploitation, child influencers, and the persistence of harmful online content, the principles of the Google Spain ruling have become foundational in many analyses of children’s rights. One major post-ruling challenge has been its practical implementation. Google responded by launching a link removal request mechanism. However, in some countries, oversight mechanisms for reviewing, assessing, and responding to these requests remain unclear. Moreover, removing links from regional search domains (e.g., google.fr or google.de) is insufficient, as access can still be gained through other domains (e.g., google.com). In the United States, the right to be forgotten is viewed with skepticism. The ideological foundations of classical liberalism and the high value placed on freedom of expression have led U.S. courts to regard restrictions on public information as potentially conflicting with the First Amendment. While this perspective upholds transparency, it often fails to address evolving psychological, cultural, and technological realities—particularly regarding children’s data. The CJEU’s ruling against Google must be seen as the genesis of a new doctrine in the international law of digital human rights: the doctrine of the right to be forgotten, which seeks to strike a balance between human dignity, access to information, and technological capacity. While technical, legal, and cultural challenges remain, the ruling decisively demonstrated that human dignity is worth defending—even in the digital age. Whether it is the dignity of a grown man or the digital trace of a child who has not yet had the chance to fully live, but whose data will remain forever in cyberspace, the principle is the same.

Conclusion

The right to be forgotten is a contemporary manifestation of human dignity in the digital age—a right born in response to the widespread tracking, surveillance, and involuntary permanence of private information. Although institutionalized in the European Union, it continues to face philosophical, legal, and technical challenges in other jurisdictions. Among those most in need of protective mechanisms are children of Generations Z and Alpha—the first true digital citizens. National legal systems and international bodies must identify these challenges with precision and develop mechanisms for protecting the right to be forgotten, particularly for children. Otherwise, digital life will transform from an opportunity into a persistent threat to privacy and individual futures. The right to be forgotten is not merely a technological tool for deleting data—it is a symbol of a child’s right to liberation from a past written without their awareness. In a world where technology has shattered the boundaries of time and memory, refusing to remain silent in the face of the unwanted permanence of digital memories is, ultimately, a defense of the human dignity of future generations.

Today, international children’s rights law stands before a fundamental test: balancing technological innovation with the preservation of human rights foundations. In this arena, the right to be forgotten is not only an individual right—it is a social, ethical, and legal necessity for the survival of the very concept of humanity in the digital age. It should be emphasized that technology, more than being inherently technological, possesses an ethical, cultural, and human nature, and that humanity, hypnotized by the age of technology, has distanced itself from the luminous essence that constitutes its very existence. Of course, technology in itself is not destructive; rather, it is the manner of its use that is crucial. The neglect of ethical considerations in the current engagement with technology has led to the creation of platforms and services based on artificial intelligence technologies that operate beyond human will and control. If this trend continues, in the not-too-distant future, we will witness the emergence of a new order in human society that will have profound effects on how society and law are approached.