17 Jan Trial Chamber Conditionally Excuses Ruto from Continuous Presence
The decision was given orally, and no written decision is available yet. But here is what The Standard‘s online platform is reporting:
The International Criminal Court has conditionally excused Deputy President William Ruto from continuos presence at trial but with some conditions.
The judges outlined nine conditions during the Wednesday ruling. ICC Presiding Judge Eboe-Osuji in the oral ruling said: “The Chamber hereby conditionally excuses Mr Ruto from continuous presence at trial on the following conditions: As indicated in the new rule 134, a waiver must be filed. That’s one condition. The further conditions are these: in the case, two, when victims present their views and concerns in person, three, the entirety of the delivery of the judgement in the case, four, the entirety of the sentencing hearing, if applicable, five, the entirety of the sentencing, if applicable, six, the entirety of the victim impact hearings, if applicable, seven, the entirety of the reparation hearings, if applicable, seven, the first five days of hearing starting after a judicial recess as set out in regulation 19 B I S of the regulations of the Court, and nine, any other attendance directed by the Chamber either/or other request of a party or participant as decided by the Chamber. The Chamber considers that the attendance of Mr Ruto pursuant to the requirement indicated in condition number eight, being attendance and first five days of hearing starting after a judicial recess, will require him to be present for today’s hearing and the next — sorry — starting tomorrow and the next five days. However, in view of the need for Mr Ruto to deputise for the president of the Republic of Kenya during his absence from the country from the 16 of January 2014, Mr Ruto is excused from presence at trial on the 16th and the 17th of January 2014. Mr Ruto shall, however, be present for the remainder of the period indicated under condition number eight”.
Kenya shouldn’t get too excited about the Trial Chamber’s ruling. Remember: the Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber’s previous decision concerning Ruto’s presence and articulated a very different, and much narrower, interpretation of Art. 63(1) of the Rome Statute. The OTP was never going to win at the trial level; the Appeals Chamber is much more likely to take seriously the differences between Rule 134quater and the multi-part test it previously articulated and to consider whether the Rule is ultra vires.
We shall see.
NOTE: For more on the ruling, please see Alexander’s comment to my previous post. He raises the spectre — skeptically, to be sure — of the Trial Chamber refusing to grant leave to appeal. I agree that’s unlikely, but even the possibility foregrounds the irrationality of permitting a Trial Chamber to decide whether a party can appeal the Trial Chamber’s own adverse decision. Trial Chambers have routinely abused that power, particularly in the context of the legal recharacterization of facts under Regulation 55. I discuss a number of such instances in this essay.
I did not want to conjure such spectre purposefully, but I must admit that my post, stroked against the grain, could be read so.
I think it is likely that leave to appeal will be granted, but I agree with Kevin that there are numerous decisions which should be appealable _ex lege_ rather than _de concesso_. I have not checked whether in general (not victims-specific) procedural decisions such as this, the Legal Representative of Victims can also appeal, resp. request leave to appeal, but I would suppose so.
The transcript of the pertinent status conference is now accessible online:
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1711590.pdf