Search: self-defense

to both justify and regulate the use of force? One way of looking at Adil’s “first strike” proposal is as a solution to the problem of so-called “self-defense targeting” or “naked”/“robust” self-defense: it preserves the distinction between the jus belli branches by ensuring, in Daniel Bethlehem’s formulation, that “any use of force in self-defense [is] subject to applicable jus in bello principles governing the conduct of military operations.” Adil’s framework would, at least presumably, complicate the current White House’s efforts to distinguish between “the use of force in armed conflict...

...in a meaningful sense, the depiction of the jus ad bellum and jus in bellow are nonetheless instructive. The complete non-acknowledgment of jus ad bellum restraints on the use of force underscores the constantly expanding interpretations of self-defense, bringing states closer to anticipatory self-defense without consideration of necessity or imminence and helping to undergird Forever Wars. In contrast, the jus in bello conduct of U.S. forces is entirely compliant with international humanitarian law (IHL). The portrayal of U.S. forces as entirely compliant with IHL is critical to the film’s logic, and perhaps...

...were very much written with an eye to the near-to-middle future, in which the US will be increasingly unable to maintain the fiction that it is involved in a single armed conflict “with al-Qaida, the Taliban, and associated forces.” Differently put, the US seems to be anticipating a time in which it will no longer be able to argue that the US may use lethal force outside of areas of active hostilities on the ground of either self-defense or IHL, but will be able to invoke only self-defense. I think...

...minority view globally. Other possibilities would include: (1) collective self-defense at the request of Turkey, (2) a type of collective self-defense with the consent of the legitimate representative of the Syrian people (the "rebers"), (3) a NATO authorization, (4) a League of Arab States authorization, (5) possibly a United for Peace authorization from the GA (?), (6) a foolish attack on a U.S. naval vessel by Assad et al., (7) a policy-serving interpretation of UN art. 2(4). See my essay in the Pa. J. Int'l L. that you provided a...

...legitimate act of self-defense under Art. 51. On the contrary, the provision concerning self-defense — Rule 13 — is located in the section of the Manual that exclusively addresses the jus ad bellum. The Manual’s commentary to Rule 13 also continually emphasizes that what is at stake in an act of self-defence is whether the attacked state’s sovereignty has been violated. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the section of the Manual that discusses “attacks generally” specifically states (p. 105) that “[t]he law of armed conflict applies to the targeting of...

Ian Henderson Prof Ku, Thank you for the post. I am interested to know whether you think acting in self-defense has any bearing on the legality of using the particular class of weapon? Put another way, is a claim of self-defense relevant to the type of weapon used or only goes to the authority to use force in the first place? thank you Julian Ku Hi, I don't think the "self-defense" limitation on laser cannons is required by any legal rule I am aware of, except of course that the...

...a motivation for complete withdrawal. And a complete withdrawal will allow the space for genuine self-government. Even if one accepts that the functional approach struggles from the perspective of self-determination, this does not answer how this issue should be balanced against other considerations, such as the protection of civilians. I would therefore be very interested to hear the views of my fellow participants in this symposium on how much significance they think should be placed in the self-determination angle when assessing the merits of the functional approach; and, of course,...

...as that they intervene to counter terrorism, address a threat to their national security (sometimes with the claim of self-defense) or to the region, counter a prior illegal intervention in the inviting State, assist the inviting State in the exercise of its collective self-defense, rescue nationals or foreigners, maintain law and order, bring stability, protect vital infrastructure, prevent a humanitarian crisis or genocide, protect the democratically elected government, or ensure a secure environment for the elections, or that they are not taking a side in the internal conflict. The controversy...

the use of military force under customary international law, govern the relations between ISIS and States?     In the affirmative, the use of unilateral force against ISIS must be justified as self-defense. Such construction would be consistent with Article 51 interpreted as allowing a State to react militarily to an armed attack – including terrorist attacks – attributable to a subject of international law other than States. From this perspective, the military action against ISIS must keep a defensive character and comply inter alia with the principle of proportionality in the...

...obligation to respect the right to self-determination is erga omnes (para 155), meaning that all States have a legal interest in the protection of the right. Turning to the right to self-determination as it pertains to Palestinians, UN General Assembly Resolutions have consistently recognised the right of Palestinians to self-determination, have condemned Israel’s continued occupation of Arab territories, and have expressed a determination to end Israeli occupation and fulfil the vision of a two-state solution. Indeed, as recently as 17 December 2024, the UN General Assembly reaffirmed the right of...

hands of groups who are actively trying to do the United States or U.S. allies in the region harm – an inclination the current Syrian regime has mostly not shown in this conflict. In this sense, the purpose seems better understood as a modified and stunningly broad theory of anticipatory self-defense. But it stretches anticipatory self-defense to absurd proportions to suggest that State A can use force against State B because there’s a chance State B’s weapons might someday be acquired by Actor C, which might then use weapons formerly...

...national interests. Why invoke an inherently selfish rationale such as self-defence as a pretext for aggression when you could invoke humanitarian intervention instead? Who is opposed to helping innocent civilians? And if we take your land and oil and other resources along the way, well, we have to pay for our selflessness somehow, don’t we? Legalising UHI, in short, will not lead to more humanitarian uses of force. It will lead to more aggression. And that is because international law is not the problem in Syria and elsewhere. States are....