In association with the International Commission of Jurists

Search: jens iverson

01 Aug

...wrote about combatant status re: members of the regular armed forces of the Taliban and immunity in the Yale J. Int'l Law many years ago. I know that some members of the U.S. military have come to recognize that it is dangerous for U.S. military personnel to have any other criterion for combatant status than membership (which is the criterion under CIL -- see the Yale J. article and Telford Taylor's writing addressed therein) Jens David Ohlin Jordan, if the standard is membership alone, then Quirin and his co-defendants should...
01.08.14 | |

02 Jun

...and abetted international crimes committed by units of the Serbian State Security Service, the Trial Chamber concluded that although Stanišić and Simatović had provided assistance to the units in question, the prosecution had failed to prove that their assistance was specifically directed towards those units’ crimes. Various scholars criticized the “specific direction” requirement following Perišić’s acquittal, most notably — and very intelligently — James Stewart on this blog (see here and here). Jens Ohlin has also just written an excellent post on the requirement in response to the acquittals of...
02.06.13 | |

03 Feb

carl meyer Touché, as usual. Jens Iverson I understand the objection, but for what it's worth - it's not his language, it's the language of the ASPA. See 22 U.S.C. § 7424(c)(2). http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/uscode/22/81/II/7424 (b) Restriction Members of the Armed Forces of the United States may not participate in any peacekeeping operation under chapter VI of the charter of the United Nations or peace enforcement operation under chapter VII of the charter of the United Nations, the creation of which is authorized by the United Nations Security Council on or after...
03.02.14 | |

12 Jun

...the defense is unavailable in cases involving the killing of civilians. The common law rule has also been adopted at the ICTY (Erdemovic). So the viability of this third strategy (necessity) requires adopting the civil law approach to necessity (no carve-out for murder and loss-of-life cases). John C. Dehn Jens, was the reference to Dudley & Stephens coupled with the use "no carve-out" intentional? James G. Stewart I wanted to add something brief in response to Dov Jacobs’ and Jens Ohlin’s thoughtful comments. In response to Dov, I agree that...
12.06.13 | |

06 Sep

authorization to engage in covert action is not, by itself, sufficient to exempt a government official from the demands of a general criminal law prohibition. Put another way, there is nothing in the language of Title 50 which suggests that the covert action authorization is meant to exempt the president from other legal constraints. What do you think? jens David Ohlin ... So basically I am agreeing with the board outlines of your argument but reaching the conclusion through a slightly different route Kevin Jon Heller Jens, I'm not sure...
06.09.14 | |

23 Nov

My friend Jens Ohlin — Associate Professor of Law at Cornell and one of the very best substantive international criminal law scholars writing today — has started a solo blog, LieberCode. Like his scholarship, the posts are top notch; recent entries address Libya and positive complementarity; the Florence Hartmann saga; targeted killing and citizenship; and the presumption of regularity regarding intelligence reports in Latif. I hope Jens can continue his productivity; running a solo blog can be a thankless endeavor. Check the LieberCode out here. Go now. I’m waiting…...
23.11.11 | |

08 Feb

Kevin Jon Heller Thanks for this, Jens. I should add that I avoided the dreaded dolus eventualis issue in my comments to the previous post because we don't have to resolve it to demonstrate that John Dehn incorrectly insists that intent=dolus directus and nothing more. As the text of Article 30 and Lubanga indicate, at a minimum intent as it's used in the Rome Statute with regard to consequence and circumstance elements extends beyond dolus directus to include dolus indirectus. It's also worth reiterating that the ICRC Commentary to AP...
08.02.12 | |

15 Nov

...of culpability would be needed. I am very grateful to Professor Ilias Bantekas, Professor Jens Ohlin and Professor James Stewart for their insightful comments and reactions. [1] Darryl Robinson, ‘How Command Responsibility Got So Complicated: A Culpability Contradition, Its Obfuscation and a Simple Solution’ (2012) 13 Melbourne Journal of International Law 1, 25. [2] Ibid 25–9. [3] Ibid 14 n 48, 18 n 67–8, 48 n 225. [4] This position is developed in ibid above n 1, 12–15, 41–5 (drawing inter alia on the work of Gardner, Kadish, Dressler, Ashworth,...
15.11.12 | |

18 Sep

...money to terrorist organizations is also a crime. Duress would work in Portugal as you described for the USA. However, in my opinion, duress should only work to reduce the sentence, but the act should still be a crime. Jordan Jens David: are you addressing defenses under federal criminal law applicable in a federal district court? Under international law, which is also "part of" the law of the U.S., necessity might relate to defense of others, but both defense of others and duress involve an imminent death or serious bodily...
18.09.14 | |

10 Oct

...of war. Quirin recognized, however, that a federal statute incorporated all of the laws of war as offenses against the laws of the United States "by reference." T John C. Dehn Jens, This is a thoughtful argument but I tend to disagree with you. I think the problem yet to be resolved, and that you do not clearly address, is how to understand what constitute "offenses against the law of nations" or "international offenses" or "war crimes" for purposes of U.S. military commissions when at their inception and at the...
10.10.14 | |

17 Jan

The following is a guest-post by Gabor Rona, the International Legal Director of Human Rights First. It is a response to a post at LieberCode by Jens Ohlin, a Professor at Cornell Law School, that argues international human rights law (IHRL) does not apply in armed conflict, because it is displaced by international humanitarian law (IHL). Prof. Ohlin’s conclusion that IHRL doesn’t (and shouldn’t) apply in armed conflict cannot survive a more than superficial look at the lay of the legal and practical landscape. Essentially, his horse left the barn...
17.01.12 | |

16 Feb

rests. At stake is nothing less than the moral and legal distinction between terrorists who deliberately kill civilians and lawful combatants who foresee collateral damage. I am completely in agreement with Jens concerning recklessness/dolus eventualis. The more difficult issue, which the essay touches on, is whether knowledge/dolus indirectus qualifies as intent in the targeting context. I believe it does, for all the reasons I’ve previously discussed on Opinio Juris. (See here and here, for example.) Jens is more agnostic, at least for now. As Larry Solum would say, read Ohlin!...
16.02.13 | |