Search: extraterritorial sanctions

...of a U.S. person. “Blocking” means that the property is frozen so that the owner cannot exercise any power or control over it despite still retaining title. In order to impose such sanctions, the President simply needs to determine, based on “credible evidence,” that a foreign person either is “responsible” for a “gross violation[]” of internationally recognized human rights or acted as an agent for that person. The same “credible evidence” standard applies to sanctions for corruption, or “materially assisting” corruption. Taken together, it is hard to read this law...

...after the ICJ decision, Greece continued to veto “Macedonia’s” admittance without facing any consequences. On the issue of potential sanctions against Turkey from the EU, though some may find it wrong for the EU nations who are in NATO to enact sanctions against their NATO ally Turkey, this would not be the first time this has occurred. In August 2018, the US brought sanctions against Turkey over a detained American. Additionally, the US has threatened sanctions against Turkey for the separate issue of Turkey potentially doing a defense deal with...

...there was nothing in this sanctions regime that prevented the Swiss authorities from providing effective judicial review mechanisms on the domestic level. As a result, it concluded that Switzerland had violated Article 13(1) ECHR by not providing Mr. Nada with access to judicial review on the domestic level, by means of which he could have verified those measures implementing the Resolution 1267 (1999) sanctions regime. This implies nothing less than that a sanctions regime such as the one resulting from Resolution 1267 (1999) necessarily and implicitly allows states the discretion...

...repercussions from such a step. But abandonment will nonetheless raise at least one interesting legal question. If the United States ends the Iran deal, can it thereby trigger the re-imposition of Security Council sanctions against Iran? First, a bit of background (discussed more here). Prior to the JCPOA, the Security Council had imposed various sanctions against Iran – sanctions which all countries were legally obligated to enact. The core bargain in the Iran deal involved the lifting of sanctions, including these Security Council sanctions, in exchange for Iran’s commitments not...

...with the objectives set by the Security Council without resorting to the use of force. Sanctions thus offer the Security Council an important instrument to enforce its decisions. The universal character of the United Nations makes it an especially appropriate body to establish and monitor such measures. The Council has resorted to mandatory sanctions as an enforcement tool when peace has been threatened and diplomatic efforts have failed (see below). The range of sanctions has included comprehensive economic and trade sanctions and/or more targeted measures such as arms embargoes, travel...

...so-called “sanctions” and restrictive measures targeting, directly or indirectly, Iran (and Iranian companies/nationals). The JCPOA was concluded on 14 July 2015 by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the US, the High Representative of the European Union (the E3/EU+3) and Iran with two purposes: to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program, on the one hand, and to produce “the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear program”, on the other hand. On...

open to the U.S. But rather than assert this unquestioned right, the President has chosen the alternative route of authorizing asset and visa sanctions on ICC lawyers. Finally, the sanctions are contrary to U.S. national interests. They will not succeed in blocking ICC investigations, which are undertaken by lawyers duty bound to carry out their responsibilities as prosecutors. Worse, the ineffectual sanctions mock our bipartisan commitment to human rights and the rule of law, alienate our allies, and encourage repressive regimes. Bloody and lawless rulers can now be expected, not...

...to bypass EU sanctions. However, no sanctions have been issued against Russia itself for its involvement in Transnistria. A possible reason for this is that there have already been a myriad of sanctions against Russia for its actions in Crimea, a situation where Russia had no right to be in that region and has been more aggressive, yet the West’s sanctions against Russia in response to the Crimea situation have not put an end to the dispute in Crimea. Sanctions are no more likely to end the Transnistria conflict. Moreover,...

...ATS cases are extraterritorial in ways that piracy cases would not have been. Nevertheless, and here I depart from the position of the respondents in Kiobel, I do not think the strong presumption against extraterritoriality—which was applied, for example, to the securities fraud statute in Morrison—is a perfect fit here. When the ATS was enacted, it was conceivable that the United States would have been responsible for providing opportunities for redress for certain extraterritorial conduct by U.S. citizens, as illustrated by the Sierra Leone incident noted above. Moreover, when the...

[Nina Sun is the Deputy Director and Global Health and Human Rights & Assistant Clinical Professor at the Dornsife School of Public Health, Drexel University  and Livio Zilli is a Senior Legal Adviser & UN Representative at the International Commission of Jurists.] This piece is split into two parts – the first focuses on criminalization of COVID-19 exposure and transmission, and the second on criminal sanctions for the enforcement of public health measures. On 11 March, the World Health Organization (WHO) officially recognized COVID-19 as a pandemic. COVID-19 is a...

...legacy of the sanctions against Bensouda and Mochochoko. They explore the intricacies of national, regional and global power while at the same time reflecting on the future of the ICC and the international criminal justice field more broadly. The posts engage with various themes including:  the discriminatory nature of the sanctions and what this means for ‘less-powerful’ states and their nationals; the USA’s relationship with the ICC; the potential effect on the ICC’s investigations in Afghanistan and Palestine; and the international criminal justice narratives and metaphors brought to the fore...

...lifted prior sanctions imposed by the Security Council on Iran in the course of blessing the Iran deal (formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA). These prior sanctions had been an important piece of the pressure brought to bear against Iran, in addition to separate sanctions imposed unilaterally by the United States and allies. But in lifting the Security Council sanctions, Resolution 2231 contained a “snapback” provision. This provision provides that if “a JCPOA participant State” notifies the Security Council of “an issue that the JCPOA...