Search: extraterritorial sanctions

In reading Kal’s description of territoriality’s ebb and flow, I was particularly interested in the evolution in judicial thinking with regard to constitutional scope or domain. His description of the path from In re Ross, which stated emphatically that the Constitution does not follow the flag, to Reid and Boumediene, which give some extra-territorial force to the Bill of Rights and other constitutional guarantees, is excellent. The evolution has obviously been gradual, even glacial. Within this narrative, there are some fascinating examples of courts dramatically pushing constitutional boundaries outward, including...

...investigations into international crimes in Ukraine” (p. 10), Trial international notes more generally the “increasing use of the principles of universal and extraterritorial jurisdiction to curb impunity for international crimes” (see here). But, how can a State prosecute efficiently persons accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity or other serious international crimes in cases when the relevant conduct took place in the territory of one State, (some of) the victims and witnesses have found refuge in the territory of another, and the author is present in the territory of yet...

...allow them to provide further guidance in such cases. Kiobel was something of an outlier—a class action against a foreign parent corporation (Royal Dutch Shell) based entirely on its foreign subsidiary’s activities in a foreign country (Nigeria), in which the foreign parent’s home countries (the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) objected that their own courts were more appropriate forums for the plaintiffs’ claims. The Supreme Court held that the principles underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality limit the causes of action that may be brought under the ATS, but it did...

...crime of torture. FF argued therefore that prosecution of Prince Nasser for torture committed in Bahrain would be possible in UK courts pursuant to the extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction under Section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. In January 2013 FF was granted judicial review permission. As mentioned above, the matter was due to be heard in the High Court of England and Wales on 7 October 2014, roughly one year and 10 months after permission for judicial review was granted. However shortly before, the DPP appears to have accepted...

...of the UN and those of the troop contributing states (TCC). Siobhan states that according to a number of courts, human rights violations of a UN Peacekeeping force may be attributable to the TCC, and possibly to both the UN and the contributing state. In discussing this issue, she focuses primarily on the exercise of (extraterritorial) jurisdiction, rather than on attribution issues. The attribution question is however highly interesting. Siobhan refers inter alia to the Nuhanovic and Mustafic cases. In these cases, the Dutch Supreme Court held that in the...

...ATS claims arising in the territory of foreign states would require rejecting thirty years of ATS litigation, including the holding of Filártiga v. Peña-Irala. As Justice Kagan explained, it would also require abandoning the reasoning of the Court’s 2004 decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain. Justice Scalia pointed out that applying the presumption against extraterritoriality would bar claims arising on the high seas as well as those arising in the territory of a foreign state, despite Sosa’s indication that the ATS was intended to apply to piracy, an international crime that...

...— it’s unclear from the fact sheet — its new understanding of the use of lethal force applies only to the current conflict. Second, although I don’t imagine that the US much cares, the jus ad bellum-like targeting standards announced in the fact sheet do not necessarily satisfy the limitations on lethal force imposed by international human rights law. As I have pointed out ad nauseum on the blog (see here for an example), whether an extraterritorial use of force is legitimate under the jus ad bellum says nothing about...

...cases will be determined in the future according to the detailed statutory scheme Congress has enacted. Other cases may arise with allegations of serious violations of international law principles protecting persons, cases covered neither by the TVPA nor by the reasoning and holding of today’s case; and in those disputes the proper implementation of the presumption against extraterritorial application may require some further elaboration and explanation. UPDATE: In the annals of amusing moments in OJ history, looks like Julian and I had much the same thought at the same moment....

...limiting itself to authorizing private citizen (as opposed to “national”) exploitation, and subjecting that exploitation to “international obligations of the United States.” The Act also goes on to “disclaim” extraterritorial sovereignty (shouldn’t that be “extraterrestrial” by the way?) It is the sense of Congress that by the enactment of this Act, the United States does not thereby assert sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or the ownership of, any celestial body. I think the law’s backers are correct that it does not violate US treaty obligations. All...

...Roger Alford discussed how extraterritorial application of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act could jumpstart anti-corruption prosecution in other OECD countries, and Julian Ku posted about Germany v Greece in the Euro 2012. Peter Spiro asked whether the pending Supreme Court ruling on Arizona’s SB1070 will make any difference and whether Julian Assange will live out his days in the Ecuadorian Embassy in London. Peter also pointed to the plight of persons of South Sudanese descent residing in Sudan who have become stateless after South Sudan’s secession. As always, Kevin...

...greater fidelity to traditional understandings of international law. (Harold Koh, the former Legal Advisor to the U.S. Department of State, made similar pleas around transparency during his May 7 speech at Oxford.) These are all critical points that Congress and others should be hearing, but I would like to shift the focus—away from U.S. responsibilities and on to the responsibilities of the States that consent to the use lethal force on their territories. This is part of the “drone” discussion (or, to be more accurate, the “extraterritorial use of lethal...

...the United Nations in a question of enforcing UN Security Council sanctions is the same as that between the United States and Egypt in the case of the extraterritorial application of anti-trust law. But to think that the two scenarios are governed equally by politics alone, is to miss something important. Post-national governance, to use the fashionable term, involves more than mere “multiplicity.” It depends on constitutional connective tissue between the various legal systems that are at play with one another. The plural theory of constitutionalism that I, for one,...