Search: extraterritorial sanctions

...Portugal and 32 other Council of Europe states. In respect of the latter, their claim was necessarily extraterritorial. While their standing was denied for the reasons outlined above, their bid to expand the Court’s extraterritorial jurisdiction was also rejected.  Under the Convention, the term jurisdiction defines the area in which a State must protect, promote and respect human rights (art. 1). This is usually confined to national borders. The ECtHR has accepted extraterritorial application of the Convention if States hold “effective control over a foreign territory”, or State agents have...

...respect of its entire territory.” In fact, this provision and the presumption of the territorial application of treaties appeared to be so commonsensical that some states proposed deleting it from the ILC’s draft articles on the Law of Treaties. Therefore, in order for a treaty to generate extraterritorial obligations it must be shown that either the treaty includes explicit language to that effect or that the treaty’s object and purpose, context, and travaux préparatoires warrant interpreting the treaty as generating extraterritorial obligations. Moreover, since the conclusion of the Genocide Convention,...

particularly strong form of legal imperialism. In some ways then, extraterritoriality in the human rights field seems at its least interesting when discussing the extraterritorial application of treaties. But the topic is a window to a much more touchy topic tied to attempts to promote a new legal orthodoxy that fundamentally refashions international law. My last observation relates to a claim that Marko makes about the reason that issues of extraterritoriality have come to the fore now – a topic that Kal raises in his post too. Marko implies that...

...Israel – as requested by the governments of Spain and Ireland – with a view to possibly suspending it in whole or in part. The ICJ’s findings authoritatively prove that successive Israeli governments have seriously breached their human rights obligations, which constitute an “essential element” of the agreement. Third, EU governments should suspend arms transfers to Israel given the real risk that the weapons will be used to commit serious abuses, and in compliance with their common position on arms transfers.  Fourth, the EU should adopt targeted sanctions against Israeli officials...

On December 17 the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2083, which further details the listing / delisting criteria for the 1287 Al Qaida Sanctions regime. This Resolution also extends the Ombudsperson’s mandate for another 30 months, guaranteeing some stability for those who seek delisting. Simultaneously, the Council adopted Resolution 2082, applying the same measures to the Taliban sanctions regime. Last week I blogged about the wider dynamics leading up to this resolution here, noting proposals by the Like Minded Group to strengthen the Ombudsperson’s powers and improve the listing...

Syria has agreed to comply with the demands of Security Council resolution 1636 and will cooperate with the Hariri investigation by allowing five Syrian government officials to be interviewed in UN offices in Vienna. This ends, for now, the Syrian stalemate with the Council, and avoids a follow on resolution that would likely have slapped sanctions against Syria. The progress of the Mehlis team investigating the Hariri murder and the Security Council’s robust response is significant, fairly rebutting Julian’s view that UN investigations tend to produce “muddy, often useless conclusions.”...

...and rationale to amend the EU Enforcement Regulation The EU Enforcement Regulation allows the EU to adopt trade sanctions (eg. increased custom duties, quotas on imports or exports of goods, or other measures in the public procurement sector) on the losing party after the EU has secured ‘a win’ in a trade dispute at the WTO. Under Article 3 (Scope), the trade sanctions would be imposed when the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (‘DSB’) adopts the relevant WTO Panel or AB report (if appealed) and authorises the EU to suspend the...

...was part of a process of escalating measures directed at those responsible for atrocities, including targeted sanctions imposed by the EU and Canada in June, and sanctions imposed by the United States during August that focused on two military units, depriving their commanders of access to foreign financial assets. At the end of October Australia, an important regional power, also imposed targeted sanctions on five senior officers from Myanmar’s military. Finally, in late 2019, following a meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, it was announced that The Gambia would...

...interventions in the COVID-19 response than the threat of criminal sanctions. Clear, transparent and consistent public health communications can help persuade people to comply with public health measures. Provision of support services, fulfillment of basic needs (e.g., food, water), as well as financial, social and psychosocial support, can also strengthen compliance. Moreover, should sanctions to address the consequences of non-compliance be needed, States may impose administrative or civil fines, provided that they are implemented in a manner that is consistent with human rights. Red Flags for Future Use of Criminal...

...region.” Based on these and other pertinent data, it is predicted that North Korea may well present credible threats to the mainland United States soon, with land-based, nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), among others, under their belt.  Efforts of the U.S. Government for DPRK Denuclearization  Since the Singapore Summit, the United States was not merely talking the talk of denuclearization, but walking the walk of denuclearization in the form of commercial and economic sanctions in support of COVID efforts. These sanctions are in addition to a series of sanctions resolutions...

...accordingly. The US, the UK, Germany, Japan, France, Australia and Switzerland have imposed sanctions or taken measures against Hamas or individuals associated with it following October 7th, and France has called for EU sanctions on people linked to Hamas and Hezbollah. However, the majority of states have yet to take similar steps. Such measures are also relevant with respect the states that facilitate Hamas and finance its operations, such as Qatar, which hosts Hamas’ leaders, allowing them to evade accountability, and Iran, which funds and arms Hamas. By continuing to...

...sanctions strategy toward proliferation has met with criticism both for doing too little and for going too far. Many would prefer harsher sanctions on Iran in particular. Others worry that freezing assets and blacklisting individuals and entities in this way denies those designated their rights to due process. These sanctions actually strike the correct balance. And attempting to make them multilateral also makes sense—the United States cannot go it alone when confronting the threat of proliferation. The U.S. taking a stand that it will not allow its financial system to...