Search: crossing lines

...to draw lines separating acceptable from unacceptable behavior, permitted conduct from required conduct, etc. I’ve drafted a new chapter that, in the context of cyber war, examines both the ways we draw law from borders and borders from law in cyberspace. I critique the status quo on both theoretical and functional grounds, concluding that we should seek to start a new process not just for constructing governance regimes, but normative ones as well. Consistent with the book’s central focus on cyber war, I proffer a case-study for such an approach...

...line – something along the lines of, this was fun (or not fun) while it lasted, but now it’s over. Bainbridge’s conversion is a riff on this, and here’s another site that recently pulled the plug in a forthright way. In the meantime, the number of abandoned blogs shows at least that the medium is still a fluid and unstable one. UPDATE: Interesting thoughts from Orin Kerr and Doug Berman, as well as this post on the growth of the Law Professors Blog Network, in addition to the comments below....

...same time – not only UBL [Usama Bin Laden]” (as discussed on p. 334-335 of The 9/11 Commission Report and in Bob Woodward’s Plan of Attack). In addition, the documents confirm the contents of CBS News’ Sept. 4, 2002 report “Plans For Iraq Attack Began on 9/11,” which quoted Rumsfeld’s notes as stating: “Go massive . . . Sweep it all up. Things related and not.” These lines were not mentioned in the 9/11 Commission Report or Woodward’s Plan of Attack, and to my knowledge, have not been independently confirmed...

...countries which are leased long-term from host nations or held de facto for the long-term by the U.S. military. I think it would be dangerous and unwise for the Supreme Court to decide that potentially all aliens in the world outside the U.S. and its territories have individual constitutional rights. Clear and sensible lines need to be drawn to determine what is or is not a territory of the United States in which aliens have constitutional protections. I am working on an article that argues that these lines should be...

...documenting Israel’s violations as manifested in testimonies from people on the ground as well as publications circulated by UN agencies, international organisations, and media outlets. Instead, the Chief Justice stressed how the government ‘improved’ the crossings’ infrastructure (paras 59, 66), ‘increased’ the hours the crossings operated (para 60), established a new crossing to ‘ease’ the transfer of aid to northern Gaza (para 63), and ‘opened’ additional crossings in other locations (para 64). All of these are cast as signs of Israel’s goodwill instead of measures that had been put in...

...most people figure it would take them, from start to finish, building the centrifuges, encasing them in a plant, doing the cold test, running the hot test, running the cascades … it’s going to take about three years…. … I don’t think there’s that much disagreement anymore over those general time lines, but there is an earlier time line in which I believe, from a political perspective, the Iranians feel, in a relatively robust moment, they are witnessing a United States that is very much tied down in Iraq. And...

...include non-state actors is appropriate. Sunday’s operation was another example of state practice undertaken with the belief that the boundaries of the battlefield are not determined by geopolitical lines but rather by the location of participants in an armed conflict, whether the participants are states or non-state actors. This continues to be the standard for determining where the law of armed conflict is properly applied. The second and third sentences of this statement are correct, but they in no way follow from the first sentence. IHL applies to the operation...

...ATS cases are limited by federal courts? Along the lines of that conjecture, I recently published an article with the Georgetown Law Journal regarding the next wave of transnational human rights litigation in state and federal courts under state and foreign law. The upshot of that article was that if federal courts begin to close their doors as a matter of substantive and procedural federal law to ATS claims, then what will happen if those human rights cases seek out other law (state/foreign) and other courts (state/foreign)? This idea was...

...more efficient technologies. The facility would also adopt flexible modalities to leverage private investment, through concessional finance, loan guarantees, risk insurance, advance payment guarantees, and payment of intellectual property fees. Further, it would give rich and poor countries balanced representation in decision-making and in monitoring and reviewing both project performance and financial flows. It is unlikely that Copenhagen will be the venue for movement along these lines. But a constructive dialogue on governance questions will not begin unless we recognise how current narratives define and distract discussions on climate finance....

...allows. So the litigating lines, such as they are, are drawn. And the question remains, what detention power does IHL contemplate? More specifically, what detention power does the IHL of non-international armed conflict contemplate – for if there is any armed conflict within the meaning of international law between the United States and Al Qaeda, it is perforce a non-international one. As I wrote here last week, I believe the IHL of NIAC is effectively silent on the question of detention authority, leaving the question of detention authority to applicable...

...The leading comprehensive work on the subject describes how several conquests were met with international acceptance. The international community recognized these conquered lands as part of the conqueror, and did not treat them as occupied territory. Korman’s examples: India’s conquest of Goa, Daman, and Diu in 1961 and Indonesia’s conquest of East Timor in 1975. However, I’ve come up with further examples where conquest by force was accepted, or broadly accepted, by the international community: • Israel, 1949. The armistice lines at the end of Israel’s War of Independence were...

...letter is substantive and faithful to the true state of investment arbitration, while the AFJ letter reads more like a piece of political advocacy than a memorandum by scholars offering legal analysis. Of course, these battle lines are not new. The Multilateral Agreement on Investment was scuttled in the late 1990s because of similar concerns. In the meantime, over 3,000 bilateral and multilateral investment agreements have now been signed, with the United States a signatory to over 50 such agreements. NAFTA and CAFTA-DR are among the most prominent examples of...