Search: crossing lines

...under Art. 42 of the Charter. When that fails, it is not that large of a leap to imagine states claiming a collective but unilateral right to threaten or use force against climate rogue states. Even just establishing the putative validity of such acition will be considered important as a means of shaping rogue state behavior. Force would be seldom if ever used, just as it has been rarely used against nuclear rogue states—and if used, it would be surgical strikes along the lines of the Israeli Osirak action in...

...state that could lay claim to using internal Palestinian district lines as the basis of its borders.” Again, Judge Sebutinde simply embraces this line of argument (paras. 62, 72), and all four link this to the principle of uti possidetis juris (see Part Two). The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel (adopted 14 May 1948; hereinafter Declaration of Independence), referencing the termination of the mandate over Eretz Israel (encompassing Mandatory Palestine), does indeed appear to lay claim over the whole territory, invoking natural and historic right and...

Doesn’t sound like it, if you read between the lines of this AP account. Until Friday, everyone was assuming that congressional pre-clearance was not constitutionally required or otherwise warranted. Obama’s national security team was in agreement that while consulting with Congress was critical, there was no need for formal approval, officials said. Seeking a vote in Congress to authorize a strike wasn’t even an option on the table. You have to guess there were memos to that effect bouncing around State and Justice. Obama turned around on a dime after...

...told, in effect, that they are not “gay enough” to be able to prove that they would suffer sufficient psychological harm. To be clear, I do not worry that Hathaway and Pobjoy or the judges on the House of Lords would stray in this direction. But credibility assessment at the front lines of refugee status determination is already a messy business, with adjudicators often tempted to probe the intimate lives of asylum-seekers more than they should.[7] I fear any interpretation of the refugee definition that might increase the risks of...

...documenting Israel’s violations as manifested in testimonies from people on the ground as well as publications circulated by UN agencies, international organisations, and media outlets. Instead, the Chief Justice stressed how the government ‘improved’ the crossings’ infrastructure (paras 59, 66), ‘increased’ the hours the crossings operated (para 60), established a new crossing to ‘ease’ the transfer of aid to northern Gaza (para 63), and ‘opened’ additional crossings in other locations (para 64). All of these are cast as signs of Israel’s goodwill instead of measures that had been put in...

...include non-state actors is appropriate. Sunday’s operation was another example of state practice undertaken with the belief that the boundaries of the battlefield are not determined by geopolitical lines but rather by the location of participants in an armed conflict, whether the participants are states or non-state actors. This continues to be the standard for determining where the law of armed conflict is properly applied. The second and third sentences of this statement are correct, but they in no way follow from the first sentence. IHL applies to the operation...

...most people figure it would take them, from start to finish, building the centrifuges, encasing them in a plant, doing the cold test, running the hot test, running the cascades … it’s going to take about three years…. … I don’t think there’s that much disagreement anymore over those general time lines, but there is an earlier time line in which I believe, from a political perspective, the Iranians feel, in a relatively robust moment, they are witnessing a United States that is very much tied down in Iraq. And...

...ATS cases are limited by federal courts? Along the lines of that conjecture, I recently published an article with the Georgetown Law Journal regarding the next wave of transnational human rights litigation in state and federal courts under state and foreign law. The upshot of that article was that if federal courts begin to close their doors as a matter of substantive and procedural federal law to ATS claims, then what will happen if those human rights cases seek out other law (state/foreign) and other courts (state/foreign)? This idea was...

...more efficient technologies. The facility would also adopt flexible modalities to leverage private investment, through concessional finance, loan guarantees, risk insurance, advance payment guarantees, and payment of intellectual property fees. Further, it would give rich and poor countries balanced representation in decision-making and in monitoring and reviewing both project performance and financial flows. It is unlikely that Copenhagen will be the venue for movement along these lines. But a constructive dialogue on governance questions will not begin unless we recognise how current narratives define and distract discussions on climate finance....

...allows. So the litigating lines, such as they are, are drawn. And the question remains, what detention power does IHL contemplate? More specifically, what detention power does the IHL of non-international armed conflict contemplate – for if there is any armed conflict within the meaning of international law between the United States and Al Qaeda, it is perforce a non-international one. As I wrote here last week, I believe the IHL of NIAC is effectively silent on the question of detention authority, leaving the question of detention authority to applicable...

...The leading comprehensive work on the subject describes how several conquests were met with international acceptance. The international community recognized these conquered lands as part of the conqueror, and did not treat them as occupied territory. Korman’s examples: India’s conquest of Goa, Daman, and Diu in 1961 and Indonesia’s conquest of East Timor in 1975. However, I’ve come up with further examples where conquest by force was accepted, or broadly accepted, by the international community: • Israel, 1949. The armistice lines at the end of Israel’s War of Independence were...

...letter is substantive and faithful to the true state of investment arbitration, while the AFJ letter reads more like a piece of political advocacy than a memorandum by scholars offering legal analysis. Of course, these battle lines are not new. The Multilateral Agreement on Investment was scuttled in the late 1990s because of similar concerns. In the meantime, over 3,000 bilateral and multilateral investment agreements have now been signed, with the United States a signatory to over 50 such agreements. NAFTA and CAFTA-DR are among the most prominent examples of...