Search: battlefield robots

...the “specific direction” standard bulldozes over. In broaching the question of necessity, courts would discriminate between: (a) providing Syrian rebel groups with weapons (knowing that they will lead to some international crimes) in order to prevent bloodletting of civilians on a massive scale; and (b) furnishing the same weapons (knowing that they will lead to some international crimes) in order to trial cutting edge military technologies in a battlefield setting. Clearly, the rationale for the assistance matters enormously in ascribing moral and criminal responsibility, but the new “specific direction” standard...

...treatment. And they secure the right to appeal to Article III judges – all the way to the United States Supreme Court. In addition, like our federal civilian courts, reformed commissions allow for the protection of sensitive sources and methods of intelligence gathering, and for the safety and security of participants. A key difference is that, in military commissions, evidentiary rules reflect the realities of the battlefield and of conducting investigations in a war zone. For example, statements may be admissible even in the absence of Miranda warnings, because we...

...in relatively short order). See, e.g., Slip. Op. at 51, 52-53. This is at the heart of the mess that Roberts and Kennedy stumble into as they talk past one another in their discussion of direct vs. collateral review. Where the pre-habeas process is battlefield interrogation by U.S. soldiers, as the Solicitor General came close to suggesting in Hamdi, habeas courts will be searching and skeptical. Where the pre-habeas process offers a legitimate chance for innocent detainees to prove that innocence to an independent decisionmaker, the procedures and standards applied...

...princess would. But what do I know? I once thought that a really great TV comedy in the 1990s would be an American military surgeon assigned (in order to get much needed expertise, this being the pre Iraq 1990s) to a roving team of those plucky, happy go lucky, hard partying Swiss doctors out dealing with landmine and other battlefield injuries across the world: sounded pretty funny to me but, if one needed confirmation that it was not, it sounded pretty funny to my friends at the ICRC, too. Jody,...

...are attacked (including with lethal force) should not amount to gratuitous injury or suffering. I contend that the right to use armed force is limited to the objective of rendering individuals hors de combat (taken out of battle) or, in the collective sense, to defeating enemy forces. Parties have a right to kill enemy combatants during hostilities, but that right is constrained when killing is manifestly unnecessary to removing an individual from the battlefield. In some circumstances, it will thus be unlawful to use lethal force when a fighter could...

...of whether the second strike was necessary. Law and Justice, But Existing Tropes What is presented to the audience are, on the face of it, brief questions. What is the acceptable use of force and potential collateral damage when war happens at a distance from the battlefield? Both films can be classed not only as war films, but also as law and justice films which ask the audience what they would do as they watch events unfold through a screen in the same way the characters do.  Yet while the...

...the Allies faced after WW II. The unlikelihood of a Ukrainian victory foregrounds the key practical problem a Special Tribunal would face: obtaining suspects and evidence. Nearly all of the suspects and evidence would be in Russia, because unlike other international crimes the crime of aggression focuses on decisions that are taken and plans that are made behind closed doors, not actions on the battlefield. Russia would obviously refuse to cooperate with a Special Tribunal after the conflict ends, and the one avenue that would exist for enforcing its cooperation,...

...e.g. Vietnam and the 1991 Gulf War). All of these models have had issues, but some far far fewer than others. I got curious a few years back so finally did some digging and wrote up this little survey. Here, for example, is 1991 in sum. Between January 22, 1991, when the first prisoner was captured, and May 2, 1991, when the United States transferred the final prisoner from its custody, U.S. detention facilities processed nearly 70,000 detainees, including through the use of battlefield hearings on prisoner status pursuant to...

...the congressional authorization for a military response to September 11 remains good law. But the execution without trial and/or the denial of habeas corpus is much murkier. As it stands now, I don’t believe the President can execute (as oppose to kill on the battlefield) Bin Laden without sending him through the military commission system (which could take a while). Nor does the President control whether or not Bin Laden gets habeas corpus. The Court’s Boumediene decision makes that question tricky, but certainly there is good reason to believe that...

...of weapons and soldiers through Rwandan territory”, and recruited Rwandan youths, demobilised ex-combatants and Congolese refugees as M23 fighters. It also offers evidence of “direct Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) interventions into Congolese territory to reinforce M23” and “support to several other armed groups”. “RDF operational units are periodically reinforcing the M23 on the battlefield against the Congolese army,” it said. Many M23 members formerly served in another Rwandan-backed militia, the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), which was responsible along with other militias for widespread atrocities over...

...U.S. citizens; the question was whether this congressional grant of detention power extended not only to a battlefield in Afghanistan (as in Hamdi), but also to the United States. Last year, Feinstein successfully introduced an amendment to the FY2012 NDAA that carefully preserved the status quo by specifying that the act did not alter existing law or authorities relating to the detention of individuals arrested in the United States, regardless of citizenship. But Feinstein’s amendment to this year’s NDAA weakens the effect of that language. While the new amendment would...

...a non-uniformed soldier using tactics in violation of the customary laws of war against U.S. military personnel. At least in this context, this doesn’t seem like some crazy idea cooked up by the U.S government. One can imagine its practical usage – especially on the battlefield. The individual in question here is alleged to be a Al Qaeda operative in Iraq. But U.S. courts’ skepticism of the enemy combatant concept is probably why the U.S. is transferring him to Iraq. Leaving him in U.S. custody means that he could bring...