Search: UNCLOS

...and compliant with UNCLOS. Under UNCLOS, states may only claim maritime rights such as an EEZ from land features like a nation’s coastline or its islands. Second, and more importantly, the spokesperson further stated that “No country including China has claimed sovereignty over the entire South China Sea.” By making such a statement, this phrase suggests that the “nine-dashed line” doesn’t represent a claim to maritime rights (such as historic rights), much less a claim to sovereignty over the water space enclose by the line. More likely, the line indicates...

or its outcome. UPDATE: That was fast. The SFRC voted 17 to 4 to favorably recommend the Senate give its advice and consent to accede to UNCLOS. Next up — the full Senate. I’m assuming that in addition to debates over accession itself, we might also see some debate over what understandings and declarations to append to the Senate resolution of advice and consent (the Senate will probably not come up with any reservations since UNCLOS Art. 309 prohibits reservations or exceptions not expressly permitted by other articles of UNCLOS)....

...a sovereign territory of the coastal State, the EEZ does not entail sovereignty but it grants the coastal State sovereign rights over natural resources (see UNCLOS, Part V). During the UNCLOS negotiations, there was a group of twenty-three States arguing that the territorial sea could extend up to 200nm. Allegedly, they were aware that their proposal would not receive universal acceptation, and thus they decided to support the proposal of the creation of the EEZ, which ended up being successful.  Before the issue was settled by UNCLOS, there were intense...

...not military aircraft or submarines) have the right to “innocent passage” through a country’s 12 nautical mile territorial waters. The U.S. Navy has been conducting “freedom of navigation” operations for decades to enforce these views of international law, and it even has a “Freedom of Navigation” website making public where it has been operating. The point of these operations it to publicly challenge a country which is making (in the U.S. view) unjustified legal rights under UNCLOS. China has a longstanding disagreement with this U.S. interpretation of UNCLOS. So they...

...fishing, however, several States, including Australia, China, Ireland, Spain and the UK, objected that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions except in disputes involving the international seabed. Writing separately, Judge Lucky characterized the States’ jurisdictional objections as “cogent, clear and articulate, as well as considerably persuasive,” but he ultimately rejected them (Separate Opinion of Lucky, J.). In doing so, Judge Lucky opined that UNCLOS “is akin to (comparable with) a national constitution” and that, just as the “living constitution” doctrine advocates argue, UNCLOS “must ‘grow’ in accordance with...

a signatory but not a party to the treaty, cannot directly invoke UNCLOS procedures and rules to challenge Russia (although we can be sure Canada will). On the other hand, the U.S. already recognizes the relevant provisions of UNCLOS related to the continental shelf as customary international law. So the U.S. would follow the same rules. All it would miss out on is the UNCLOS dispute resolution procedures. But that may actually work to the U.S.’s long term benefit, forcing other states to bargain with the U.S. rather than litigate....

...which while not embedded in the wording of the provision itself, still constitute part of its essence. The Rome Statute provision was drafted along the lines of article 91 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The latter, echoing a strong jurisprudence and treaty tradition stipulates and favours the notion that there must be a genuine link between the flag state and the vessel. This genuine link requirement is critical. While in some instances judicial bodies may have appeared reluctant to assert it, the reason was...

2. The UNCLOS is not the only international law regime which should be respected in the SCS, actually the international law also include custom international law which exists long before the adoption of the UNCLOS. In 1940s and the following decades, the Nine Dash Line was there and Chinese governments made the same claims according to the international law at that time without resort to the EEZs or the so-called land features. The sovereignty to the land territories and waters in the nine Dash Line is not based on the...

...of American sovereignty, and we oppose any form of U.N. Global Tax. Unlike Josh Keating, I don’t read this platform as “black helicopter” stuff. I think there are reasonable policy arguments against all of the above treaties, especially UNCLOS. I do agree, though, that this might herald an important policy shift. A majority of the GOP has previously supported US ratification of UNCLOS, but it looks like UNCLOS opposition is now going to be in the GOP mainstream. And that means that US ratification of UNCLOS looks even more unlikely....

...are not unreasonable, even if they are not always completely persuasive. That said, they can still be pretty easily rebutted. Here is an account of Utah Senator Mike Lee’s speech recently outlining his (and most conservatives’) objections to ratifying the treaty. According to the article, Sen. Lee has three main objections. 1) UNCLOS creates a “tax” on U.S. development of deep seabeds, by requiring contributions to the International Seabed Authority. 2) UNCLOS has, as key parties, many regimes hostile to the U.S., and state sponsors of terrorism. They would be...

...which renders the prohibition of the use of force inapplicable to this case. The Blasts Took Place in an EEZ – Does That Matter? As mentioned, the blasts occurred in Denmark’s and Sweden’s EEZs. Under Article 56 of the UNCLOS the sovereign rights of the coastal State are quite restricted in an EEZ, which also includes control over foreign military activities. Despite coastal States’ concerns, the current legal framework, in general, does not explicitly prohibit military operations in an EEZ (p. 221). In particular, during the Third United Nations Conference...

...by far the strongest argument that treaty proponents have in their favor. As we learned last week during the exchange between Steve Groves and John Noyes, there is a real difference of opinion on whether the UNCLOS provisions regulating the development of undersea resources are necessary or desirable. As a refresher, here is Steve’s argument on this point: if the U.S. accedes to UNCLOS, it will be required by Article 82 to transfer royalties generated from hydrocarbon production of the U.S. ECS to the International Seabed Authority for redistribution to...