Search: Syria Insta-Symposium

As readers of the blog no doubt know, Syria is is one of seven states that have not ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). (The others are Angola, Egypt, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea, and South Sudan.) To consider Syria’s use of chemical weapons as a rationale for attacking the country, the USG obviously needs to assume that the use of such weapons is prohibited by customary international law. I have no doubt that they are; after all, the CWC has been ratified by 96% of the world’s states, and nearly...

Syria exhibit an increasing tendency amongst states to abandon gravity-based appeals. Instead, we are offered narrow exceptions in justification of UHI. These increasingly preference specific incidents, like the use of chemical weapons, above general assessments of the seriousness of the humanitarian crisis. The United Kingdom was the first of the three states that recently intervened in Syria to provide legal reasoning. The UK appears to have maintained its gravity-based justification of UHI. Its defense of the Syrian attack began in conformity with its 2013 rationale which based legality on: (i)...

used to threaten it, is a key part of the Bush Doctrine. It is fascinating, and telling, that there is no concern in President Obama’s comments, or in the article, about the tenuous international legal basis for such an action against Syria. Certainly, there would be no UNSC authorization in this case. And yet I doubt there will be much grousing about legality in the NYT or Washington Post if there was an intervention in Syria. Which suggests that there might be an emerging bipartisan consensus here in the US...

As regular readers may recall, I am skeptical that the use of chemical weapons, by itself, can justify the use of military force under current international law absent authorization from the U.N. Security Council. Of course, I wouldn’t oppose the use of military force by the U.S. to stop the use of chemical weapons in Syria, I just doubt its legality under international law. More importantly, so does President Obama. Although reports are out suggesting the U.S. is preparing to launch cruise missiles into Syria, President Obama also told CNN...

...Convention with those who did not sign it. And just when you think the argument’s over and they can’t make any more mistakes, Paul Clement offers up this: Now, the government says you can’t do that because that’s going to mess up what’s going on in Syria. With all due respect, I assume that the issue in Syria is whether or not the nation state of Syria is doing something that would violate the convention if, contrary to fact, they were a signatory to this convention.” (emphasis added) Well, as...

[Spencer Zifcak is Allan Myers Professor of Law and Director of the Institute of Legal Studies at the Australian Catholic University.] This post is part of the MJIL 13(1) Symposium. Other posts in this series can be found in the related posts below. My article on this subject attempts to encapsulate the standing of coercive (Pillar 3) intervention within the framework of the Responsibility to Protect (‘R2P’) following the application of the doctrine in Libya and paralysis with respect to it in Syria. In 2011, the international community was confronted...

...for Palestine, whose primary object was the reconstitution of the Jewish national home in that territory. The Lausanne Treaty did not include provisions on Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia as these articles had become moot in the interim. France had been selected as Mandatory for Syria and Lebanon, and Great Britain the Mandatory for Mesopotamia, with the Mandates coming into force in September 1923. The draft Mandate for Palestine was submitted for League of Nation’s approval in December 1920, approved in July 1922, and came into force in September 1923. The...

Obligations End? Prior to the U.S.’ decision to withdraw its forces from Syria, commentators, including the UN Human Rights Council’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, had observed that under Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, States had a “duty to ensure respect for IHL” by the non-State actors with whom they were collaborating. At least one commentator noted as much in the context of U.S. collaboration with Kurdish forces in the fight against ISIS specifically. As a result of this relationship, the U.S. was...

Syria” (“ISIS”), the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (“ISIL”), “Da’esh,” and “Daesh”) has committed genocide against the Yezidis (also sometimes spelled “Yazidis”). The Islamic State’s atrocity crimes against the Yezidis are summarized in the Belgian Parliament’s resolution and well-documented in numerous reports by: UN agencies (including the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic and the UN Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant), NGOs (including Human Rights Watch here, here, here, here, here, here, here,...

I will be participating in a roundtable about Syria and international justice next Monday night at the LSE. It’s free and open to the public, so I hope at least a few OJ readers will come. You can also send questions to the following hashtag: #LSESyriaICC. We will try to answer at least a few of them! Here are the event details: Syria and International Justice LSE Centre for International Studies Dialogue 30 June 2014 6.30-8pm at LSE Thai Theatre New Academic Building With a draft Security Council resolution to...

allowed domestic courts in a number of countries hosting Syrian refugees to prosecute crimes committed in Syria. These efforts led to, for instance, the conviction of two former Syrian intelligence officials in the first ever trial on Syrian state torture, the al-Khatib trial, in Koblenz, Germany. This created a strong momentum for international criminal justice efforts. While highlighting the horror of the Syrian prison system or gulag, it has also triggered vivid debates within Syria’s civil society about the meaning and limits of prosecuting and trying a handful of midlevel...

...held in detention facilities in Iraq and Syria. The lack of a coherent and appropriate policy, one reflective with respect to the gender dimensions of the response to returning fighters, is especially pressing when it comes women and children. Four per cent of all recorded returnees from Iraq and Syria are women and these women constitute only five per cent of women who travelled to the conflict zones, meaning the majority are not returning. In Northeast Syria alone, the Autonomous Administration is holding 790 foreign ISIL fighters, 584 women and...