Search: Symposium on the Functional Approach to the Law of Occupation

...held only under US authority, they may be entitled to Habeas review. Once the Iraqi government takes an interest, however, it supercedes US jurisdiction. HowardGilbert If you accept that Eisentrager arises from principles of international and national law and not the letter or any particular treaty or statue, then this argument runs smack into the problem that everyone has been closing their eyes and trying to ignore. The enemy has an alternate theory of law that he regards as superior to our law. In his theory, all the members of...

supremacy. Regarding the infringement of a state’s territorial sovereignty, no consensus could be found among the Experts as to whether or not a “cyber operation that results in neither physical damage nor the loss of functionality amounts to a violation of sovereignty” (Rule 4, note 14). Among the proponent of a violation of territory in spite of any physical damage or loss of functionality, Experts noted that “altering or deleting data stored in cyber infrastructure without causing physical or functional consequences” could potentially amount to a violation of sovereignty. Nonetheless,...

feature conflicts involving state law, such as competing claims for authority between two or more states (should the IP law of states A or B should govern the registration of internet domain names); between domestic and international institutions (such as the ICJ and US Supreme Court decisions in the Avena/Medellin line of cases); and between public and private actors (such as when religious and state law diverge on family law matters). Perhaps as a result, GLP devotes very limited attention to analysis of “conflicts” between and among different functional international...

...not demonstrate our willingness to apply the law equally, if it is seen as being applied selectively, we will be creating the conditions for its collapse”. That could not be clearer than now. The ICC has previously tried and convicted individuals under Article 70. In the Kilolo case, Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo and four others were found guilty in 2016 in relation to the false testimonies of defence witnesses. Charges were confirmed in the case of Kenyan lawyer Paul Gicheru in 2021 for the alleged bribery of a number of witnesses...

[Dr Anastasios Gourgourinis is Lecturer in Public International Law at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens Faculty of Law, and Research Fellow at the Academy of Athens] I am very grateful to Anne van Aaken for her challenging and insightful comments on my chapter “Reviewing the administration of domestic regulation in WTO and investment law: the international minimum standard as ‘one standard to rule them all’?”, as well as for providing me the opportunity to further expand and explain my argument. She essentially poses two questions: whether the simultaneous...

JordanPaust Response... BUT the WPR (sec. 2) only addresses the President's c-i-c power, not the President's authority and duty faithfully to execute the Laws, including international law -- including a U.N. S.C. authorization to use force, nor does it address the President's power as the Executive (executing Laws, including international law). Moreover, Section 8(b), (d)(1)-(2) assures that there was no intent to limit presidential competence to execute relevant treaties of the U.S. (e.g., a U.N. S.C. authorization). See generally 26 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 15, 19, 21-24 (1996)....

of the organization are the key concept that can turn an independent state into an organ. Indeed, the core of the controversy concerns the nature of the arrest warrant as a rule of an international organization. If the arrest warrant is international law, the ICC is a functional entity of which member states are independent sovereign entities. They remain responsible for the action taken while implementing ICC law. Conversely, if the arrest warrant is internal law, the ICC is a supra-national, constitutional, entity under which member states appear as organs....

unilaterally introduced forces into the Persian Gulf consistent with the Resolution, but neither would have passed constitutional muster). On the other hand, it can’t constrain Presidents to terminate military operations without affirmative congressional action, as the 60-day clock would require. From a functional perspective, the default termination provision leaves important military decisionmaking intolerably hostage to the probabilities of congressional inaction (Kosovo as exhibit A). That’s getting lost in the debate over the meaning of “hostilities”. Even if the Libya operation does qualify as such for purposes of the law, it...

[Zoran Oklopcic is an Associate Professor of International Law at Carleton University in Canada. He focuses on self-determination, popular sovereignty in theory of constitutional law and on the theories of secession and territorial rights] I am grateful to Professor Brad Roth for engaging with my article, “Beyond Empty, Conservative, and Ethereal: Pluralist Self-Determination and a Peripheral Political Imaginary”. In his response, Roth embraces my understanding of his account of self-determination as “emptied” of normative content, and, in fact, insists on rejecting projects that would seek to give it a more...

...assigned to the IDF’s Southern Command (the headquarters responsible for prosecuting the war in Gaza) appears to be close-held information but Mimran claims that a maximum of 50 lawyers on a rotating watch is a “close” estimate of current force composition.  If we assume that in the war’s first week 1.) some of these lawyers were not already mobilized; 2.) some were otherwise occupied with non-targeting duties; and 3.) the remainder were split between, say, 12-hour shifts, this leaves a (generous) estimate of perhaps 10 lawyers on-station doing targeting determinations...

...domestic counterparts. Because international prosecution is both highly discretionary and politically charged, the legitimacy of international criminal justice depends, in large part, on the ability of tribunals to strike an appropriate balance between independence and accountability. This chapter explores the tension between the two. Section I addresses the Prosecutor’s structural independence — her independence from external political actors and other organs of the tribunal. Section II examines the Prosecutor’s functional independence – her practical ability to exercise her discretion free from undue limitation. As always, comments and criticisms most welcome!...

Hannah Buxbaum has just posted on SSRN an interesting article on “Transnational Regulatory Litigation.” You can download the document here. In particular she includes an illuminating section on global class actions. Here is the abstract: Recent years have seen much debate about the role of national courts in addressing global harms. That debate has focused on the application by domestic courts of international law – for instance, in civil actions brought in U.S. courts to enforce human rights law. This article identifies a parallel development in the area of economic...