Search: Complementarity SAIF GADDAFI

...or escape or Die in his way to Tripoli) ] - this statement of ICC is not a surprise, it's 1 more evidence and 1 more confirmation that ICC will do everything to Help in the ASSASSINATION of Saif al Islam. Watch the Program and you will realise that I'm not exaggerating nothing. PS.: the only Saif Crime was to Survived to NATO Bombs. Even if Saif had Used himself Chimical weapons to Kill this rebels should be target with Crimes Against Humanity, but RECIEVE THE NOBEL PRIZE OF PIECE!...

is addressed by other provisions of the Statute, and they address it better than Article 17 could. I would like to contribute four points to this discussion. First, Article 17 does not exhaust the principle of complementarity. Article 17 is an important but technical admissibility rule, which renders cases inadmissible before the ICC if they are genuinely addressed by states. Article 17 is certainly a centerpiece of complementarity, and it is understandable that it is often the focus of complementarity discussion. However, insofar as ‘complementarity’ refers to the broader interplay...

nevertheless insist that states should prosecute international crimes as international crimes whenever possible, because such prosecutions better serve the goals of the Rome Statute. I challenge both theses in the essay and defend an alternative theory of complementarity that focuses exclusively on sentence. In particular, I argue that any national prosecution of an ordinary crime should satisfy the principle of complementarity as long as it results in a sentence equal to, or longer than, the sentence the perpetrator would receive from the ICC. As always, comments and criticisms most welcome!...

...of the ICC practice in relation to the complementarity assessment are evident. Therefore, judicial review is required in view of the dramatic impact of the adopted complementarity assessment, on the present situation and beyond it, as the overly restrictive approach adopted by the Prosecutor in this situation may have grave consequences for other preliminary examinations and investigations. In light of the above, a new determination on the issue will only reinforce the Court and enhance confidence in the ICC Prosecutor’s independence, as the request notes referring also to the strong...

Gaddafi being the main object of this paragraph. This clear from Resolution 2238: “Recalling its decision in resolution 1970 (2011) to refer the situation in Libya to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), noting the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber dated 10 December 2014, and also noting the request of the Prosecutor to the Pre-Trial Chamber dated 30 July 2015 that Libya immediately surrender Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi to the Court”. Indeed, compliance with the request to surrender Gaddafi is what the SC is confirming. Interestingly on the same...

Dapo Akande has a typically excellent discussion of the surrender issue today at EJIL: Talk!, in which he agrees with Jens Ohlin and disagrees with me. In his view, Libya is entitled to challenge the admissibility of the case against Saif without having to first surrender him to the ICC. I find much of Dapo’s argument convincing, but I am skeptical of the way in which he distinguishes Article 89(2), which he admits is critical to the issue. Here is what he says (emphasis mine): One of the strongest arguments...

...Instead of states getting “the first bite at the apple,” the Court essentially dictates the charges domestic authorities must bring in order to prevent an ICC prosecution. Judge Usacka noted as much in her Gaddafi admissibility dissent. John Bolton also (very happily) picked up on the issue, contrasting the “untested ‘complementarity’ theory” and its claim of deference to national authorities with Libya’s admissibility challenge, asking whether countries are “sovereign only if the ICC allows it.” As for the test being fundamentally inconsistent with the ICC being a court of last...

identify what Taylor supposedly did wrong — all we get are vague generalities about deficient “protocols” and “conventions” and “procedures.” That’s a pretty significant omission, particularly given Libya’s consistent refusal to provide Saif with any kind of legal representation and its previous refusal to let the OPCD talk to Saif about the conditions of his confinement in private. (And recall that, in the few moments during the OPCD’s previous visit where the Libyan government official left the room, Saif quickly implied that he had been mistreated by his captors.) I...

...particularly useful in guiding our understanding of how internet shutdowns could be tried as part of crimes against humanity: “Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar GADDAFI, Saif Al-Islam GADDAFI and Abdullah AL- SENUSSI.” By way of reminder, a crime—such as murder or persecution—may qualify as a crime against humanity if it was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against the civilian population, in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such an attack. On 27...

...Council (UNSC) referred the situation in Libya since 15 February 2011 to the Court. Four months later, the Chamber issued arrest warrants against Muammar Gaddafi, Libya’s Head of State,  Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, de facto Prime Minister, and Abdullah Al-Senussi, head of the Military Intelligence, for crimes committed during the 2011 revolution. In 2013, the Chamber issued an additional arrest warrant for Al-Tuhamy Khaled, Lieutenant General of the Libyan army and head of the Internal Security Agency (ISA) under the Gaddafi regime, also for crimes committed during the 2011 revolution. In...

glorifying Gaddafi, his regime, his ideas or his sons”. Rather precariously, the law claims that Libya is still in a state of war and allows for the imposition of a life sentence on anyone who “harms the state” in glorifying the Gaddafi regime. While, to my knowledge, Western states have remained entirely silent on the subject, LFJL and Amnesty International have harshly condemned the legislation, suggesting that they harken back to the brutal and draconian laws that restricted the freedoms of Libyans under Gaddafi. Mark provides invaluable analysis of the...

...either al-Senussi or Gaddafi have ever had access to a lawyer, despite Libya’s constant assertions to the ICC that the government is doing everything in its power to arrange representation for them. Can’t let a little thing like Libyan law get in the way of a good show trial. And, of course, the nice thing about a show trial is that there really isn’t any need for the defendants to prepare a defence. It’s also difficult to avoid noting the irony of Sour’s suggestion that Gaddafi could be tried via...