Search: Complementarity SAIF GADDAFI

...short hand for the ICC’s Afghanistan and Palestine situations. On 2 September, 2020, then Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, exercised this power to designate Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda and Phakiso Mochochoko, head of the ICC’s Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Co-operation Division (JCCD), making them ineligible for entry clearance into the United States. The designation also froze any assets they may have had in the country and barred them from holding any assets in the US currency. The Trump administration equally threatened similar sanctions on anyone who had any contact or collaboration with...

...the Court has been or is being committed”; (2) admissibility is not an issue; and (3) there are no “substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.” There is no question that the OTP’s request for authorization satisfies requirements 1 and 3, and it cannot seriously be argued that complementarity — the first aspect of the admissibility requirement — counsels against opening the Afghanistan investigation. As the request itself notes, none of the relevant parties (the Afghan government, the US government, and the armed...

...He placed the blame squarely on three individuals: Sam Shoamanesh, the chef de cabinet to the ICC Prosecutor, Phakiso Mochochoko, the head of jurisdiction, complementarity and cooperation division and the Prosecutor herself, Fatou Bensouda. The USA’s contention with the ICC also stemmed from the Prosecutor’s intention to investigate international crimes allegedly committed in the State of Palestine, which potentially implicates citizens of Israel, a long-time ally of the USA. Two months later, then-President of the USA Donald Trump issued Executive Order 13928, which sought to block the properties of certain...

...primary obligation to investigate and prosecute its nationals who commit crimes under international law in Afghanistan, the ICC may not have cause to investigate US citizens. Finally, the ICC must develop a backbone in dealing with powerful countries like the US and UK. The OTP stretched the doctrine of complementarity to its very limits, when it decided that the domestic processes in the UK which led to zero prosecutions, were sufficient to avert an investigation by the court. Similarly, the Court’s decision to “deprioritise” the investigation of the US activities...

...they didn’t do a very good job. As the Sudan Tribune notes, the report contains nary a critical word about the ICC or the arrest warrant. And although the report does offer Bashir a “way out” — creating a domestic accountability mechanism that would satisfy the principle of complementarity — its laundry list of needed legal reforms means that, as I have noted before, the likelihood of the Sudanese government creating such a mechanism is precisely zero. By the report’s own logic, therefore, Bashir should face prosecution by the ICC....

...for victims in judicial assistance proceedings (Part VI). The Convention is therefore ambitious in its efforts to bolster the ICC complementarity regime and close the loopholes which have enabled perpetrators of international crimes to evade justice in the past. While the ICC Statute’s silence on the obligations of states to enact implementing legislation led to much debate in academic circles, there is no such ambiguity in the Ljubljana-The Hague Convention. In terms of cooperation, which forms the most substantial component of the Treaty and was the impetus behind it, the...

...democratic rights. In this light, it is worth looking at the rise of international adjudication in the post-Cold-War world along with the increasing attention to the problem of weak and failed states. The decisions of international adjudicators in the international criminal law and human rights law areas often respond directly to political and legal institutional failures or gaps at the level of the state. The authority of international adjudicators thus may be seen as relative to that of other institutions. This is explicitly contemplated by the conception of “complementarity” that...

Last year, as I was reading an early draft of the agenda for the ICC’s Review Conference in 2010, I asked myself what I would change about the Rome Statute if I was King of the Assembly of States Parties. My answer was that I would amend Article 17, the complementarity provision, to make a case admissible if a national proceeding did not provide the defendant with due process — an issue I had written about before. (You can find the essay here, if you’re interested.) I then wondered what...

...not meant for hearing cases of genocide. But somewhere in the process of retrofitting it for mass atrocity, gacaca appears to have lost its core restorative justice defining qualities. In my upcoming article “Complementarity and Alternative Justice” (to be published in the Oregon Law Review), I explore this dilemma in greater depth. I still believe that there is hope for successfully using traditional alternative justice mechanisms to deal with gross human rights violations. For that, a better calibrated hybridization will be necessary. Posterity may not ultimately view gacaca as the...

...meaning of ‘public authority’. Not surprisingly those who are directly involved in the prosecution are included – judges, prosecutors, police, and investigators. However, public authorities are not limited to those who have a direct connection with the criminal case. For example, a member of the ICC Office of the Prosecutor’s Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation Division was considered a public authority. In national jurisdictions public authorities include people who are legislators and those employed by the government. In international jurisdictions the term can extend to employees of the relevant international court,...

...activity during war. (In the case of the UK trial, they are doing so in accordance with the complementarity provisions of the ICC statute.) By additionally compensating victims for criminal killings and for those in which no criminal charges are brought, we convey a sense of responsibility and remorse in terms that are culturally understood. But better to “refresh” training so that fewer mistakes are made in the first place. In the case of detainees, as I argued earlier this week, having clearly defined parameters of treatment — set down...

...Similarly, Professor Bennoune has noted that “the persecution approach fails to adequately implicate the institutionalized and ideological nature of the abuses in question or reflect on the responsibilities of other international actors to respond appropriately.” This argument also fails to recognize the complementarity between gender apartheid and gender persecution. Indeed, the crimes of apartheid and persecution already co-exist in the Rome Statute and, more broadly, in international law. The Taliban’s institutionalized regime of systematic gender-based oppression is similar to the South African apartheid regime, where racial discrimination and the doctrine...