Search: Complementarity SAIF GADDAFI

...investigate individual suspects and seek indictments against them as long as they fall under the subject matter jurisdiction defined by the Rome Statute. The ICC’s process is characterized by deferential complementarity. Its primary duty is to ensure that national court systems are given sufficient opportunity to “investigate and prosecute individuals suspected of committing atrocity crimes referred to the Court” (p. 75). The ICC takes initiative only after national courts are unwilling or unable to carry out proper investigations or prosecutions. After all, “the long-term objective is to strengthen the capabilities...

...an excellent discussion of the inter-jurisdictional ne bis in idem rules in Article 20 (2) and (3) of the Rome Statute of the ICC. Dr. Iryna Marchuk, University of Copenhagen, and Dr. Aloka Wanigasuriya, University of Southern Denmark, investigate a topical issue of interaction between ne bis in idem and the principle of complementarity in the context of domestic prosecution of war crimes committed in Ukraine. Dr. Daniel R. Ruhweza of Makerere University in Uganda provides an insightful overview of challenges arising in connection with the application of ne bis...

...regarding the repercussions of the ad hoc declarations in particular and ratification as a whole. For example, concerns over the new declaration being in breach of Article 5 of the Minsk II agreement which provides pardon and amnesty to those involved in the conflict in the Donbass region. However, under international law such amnesty has consistently been interpreted as excluding international crimes and gross human rights violations. Therefore, if Ukrainian courts are unable or unwilling to investigate and prosecute such crimes, the ICC’s complementarity principle can be activated, as it...

...the atrocities are committed on the territory of ICC member states, the hybrid approach can be viewed as a form of “complementarity” that avoids taking the situation to The Hague but does not rely on exclusively national trials.   It can be a better alternative than a single global court in The Hague that is expensive, distant and easy for local leaders to demonize, and national courts where it can be very hard to properly try powerful actors, particularly if these courts were dysfunctional before the violence and were further disabled...

...deployment described in Res. 1546 and the letters from the US and Iraqi representatives accompanying that resolution (including the statement in the US letter that the MNF operate in a framework “in which the contributing states have responsibility for exercising jurisdiction over their personnel”) meet the requirement of Art. 16 and preclude ICC jurisdiction. Finally, Art. 17 of the ICC statute requires “complementarity.” That means if a local or national investigation or prosecution of the conduct at issue is taking place, the Court is prohibited from exercising its jurisdiction. The...

...meaning of ‘public authority’. Not surprisingly those who are directly involved in the prosecution are included – judges, prosecutors, police, and investigators. However, public authorities are not limited to those who have a direct connection with the criminal case. For example, a member of the ICC Office of the Prosecutor’s Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation Division was considered a public authority. In national jurisdictions public authorities include people who are legislators and those employed by the government. In international jurisdictions the term can extend to employees of the relevant international court,...

...a repudiation of multilateral engagement and a repudiation of the rule of law. Specifically, Secretary Pompeo’s statements were not accompanied by any commitment to investigate and/or prosecute the crimes alleged to have been committed by U.S. nationals (members of the U.S. armed forced and members of the CIA) in Afghanistan—even though some of the crimes have been well-documented by the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Notably, the U.S.-ICC showdown could be avoided if the United States prosecuted these cases itself. Under the ICC’s complementarity regime, any state that...

...short hand for the ICC’s Afghanistan and Palestine situations. On 2 September, 2020, then Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, exercised this power to designate Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda and Phakiso Mochochoko, head of the ICC’s Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Co-operation Division (JCCD), making them ineligible for entry clearance into the United States. The designation also froze any assets they may have had in the country and barred them from holding any assets in the US currency. The Trump administration equally threatened similar sanctions on anyone who had any contact or collaboration with...

...and civil proceedings seems unjustified, since (as the Chamber acknowledges at para. 207) “[t]here is no doubt that individuals may in certain circumstances also be personally liable for wrongful acts which engage the State’s responsibility.” Unless a Grand Chamber revisits the Jones opinion, it appears likely that, conceptually incoherent as it might be, the law of foreign official immunity will develop for the time being along two tracks: the non-recognition of immunity ratione materiae for international crimes that is a logical corollary of the Rome Statute’s complementarity regime and that...

[Satang Nabaneh is a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Centre for Human Rights, Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria, and the Founder and Executive Director of Law Hub Gambia. She currently pursues research interests including international human rights law and monitoring mechanisms, democratization in Africa, and Gambian constitutional law.] On September 2, 2020, the Trump administration announced that the United States had designated the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, and the head of the Office of the Prosecutor’s Jurisdiction, Complementarity, and Cooperation Division (JCCD), Phakiso Mochochoko, for sanctions. These...

...we are not facing a possible gap in the Rome Statute? It can be further asked which category the 3 April decision falls in, i.e. on which basis did the Prosecutor actually decide not to open the investigation? Article 53(1) ICC Statute outlines three elements for the Prosecutor to consider in order to decide whether to open the investigation: a) the information available, which must provide a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed; b) the complementarity principle, i.e. that the...

...the UN Office of Legal Affairs recently added the following audio lectures to the AVL’s podcast: Professor Concepción Escobar Hernández on “El Tribunal Internacional del Derecho del Mar” (in Spanish) and Professor Sarah Nouwen on “Complementarity” (in English). The Audiovisual Library of International Law is available as a podcast on SoundCloud and can also be accessed through the preinstalled applications in Apple or Google devices, or through the podcast application of your preference by searching “Audiovisual Library of International Law”. If you would like to post an announcement on Opinio...