Search: Complementarity SAIF GADDAFI

...is no reason to believe that a crime within the Court’s jurisdiction has been committed in the situation (a very low standard) or that the situation does not satisfy the admissibility requirements of Article 17, which deals with complementarity and gravity. That’s Article 53(3)(b). I think it is very unlikely that Moreno-Ocampo will decline to investigate the Libyan situation. But it’s interesting to note that he can — and that, if he based a declination on complementarity or gravity grounds, there is nothing the Pre-Trial Chamber could do about it....

...has shown in the essay linked to above, complementarity is a two-step process, not a one-step process as many scholars assume. The first step asks whether the state is “active” with regard to a case that the OTP wants to pursue — whether, in other words, the state is currently pursuing an investigation or prosecution of the same suspect for the same conduct. If it isn’t active, the case is admissible regardless of whether the state is willing and able to investigate or prosecute. If it is active — and...

...opening an investigation: if taken seriously, it will simply overwhelm the OTP’s resources. There may not be even one admissible case in the Comoros situation (because there is only one case), but how likely is it that larger situations, which are the norm, will not contain even one case sufficiently grave to prosecute? Just think about the situations currently at Phase 2 or Phase 3 of the preliminary-examination process: Burundi, Gabon, Iraq, Palestine, Ukraine, Colombia, Guinea, and Nigeria. There may well be complementarity issues in some of those situations that...

...this largely as the cross-referencing of cases between the two regional courts. However, one might ask for a greater examination of the use of similar doctrines and practices across not only these courts but also others, as she begins to discuss when addressing subsidiarity, deference, and the ICC principle of complementarity. Here, an examination of the work of the African Court of Human and People’s Rights might have provided an additional comparative perspective, particularly given that court’s broader application of states’ obligations beyond the African Convention. The necessity of the...

...two prosecutorial staffers by name who might be subject to visa restrictions and other punitive measures—the Prosecutor’s Chef de Cabinet and the head of the Jurisdiction, Complementarity, and Cooperation Division (JCCD) (even though neither would likely be involved in any actual investigation were one to materialize)—and threatened to also sanction the family members of ICC personnel. Experienced U.S. diplomats, including several who served under Republican and Democratic Administrations as U.S. Ambassadors-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, along with former Nuremberg Prosecutor Ben Ferencz, immediately decried this startling and counter-productive move, pronouncing...

...in fact have common interests and pursue them collaboratively (self-referrals for instance, or the complementarity principle). Cirimwani proposes a “proceduralising” of the “unwilling or unable” as a way out of the complementarity principle conundrum. As it is the case for all procedures, I agree that a clearer guideline on the assessment of the “unwilling and unable” could be useful. K. K. Sithebe argues that “there are gaps […] in texts that are critical of the ICC and/or international criminal justice” – I assume my book fits this mold – in...

...adhere to treaties, rather than delegation of equivalent jurisdictional titles by the state.” Any other understanding could make way for notable accountability gaps by implying that a state that is unable to exercise jurisdiction over certain parts of its territory would no longer be able to investigate or prosecute perpetrators, or reach out to international jurisdiction. Similarly, this would also render the Rome Statute’s provision on complementarity obsolete. In its response to the amici observations, the OTP argues that any limitation to Palestine’s enforcement jurisdiction arising from Oslo “does not...

...would have needed to issue a new Art. 18 notification. Israel would then have had 30 days to inform the OTP that it was pursuing its own investigations of Netanyahu and Gallant. If it did, the OTP would have been required to suspend its investigation until it was able to convince the PTC that Israel’s efforts were not sufficient to satisfy complementarity. That process would have delayed issuance of the warrants by months. The PTC, however, unanimously rejected Israel’s challenge. It began by rejecting the claim that the 2021 Art....

...question about truth commissions, because you can’t say a priori which ones are a reasonable response to the situation, and which ones are a cover-up. It’s going to require extreme care by the prosecutor. There may be some problem there with the capacity to subvert those processes if they are reasonable, and we’ll just have to hope that the institutions within the court take a sensible view about it. But complementarity extends to covering internal processes which don’t necessarily involve prosecutions of individuals, so there’s no reason why the principle...

...universal jurisdiction and positive complementarity, states are encouraged to domestically investigate and prosecute crimes that have international character, or that would otherwise attract the jurisdiction of international courts. In this respect, states are increasingly passing legislation to permit the prosecution of international crimes in domestic settings, including by setting up specialized tribunals or court divisions with the existing judicial structure of a state. A recent notable example is the Special Criminal Court in the Central African Republic, set up to prosecute crimes in the aftermath of its recent civil war....

...concerns that the peace negotiations will falter and the Taliban will regain control of Afghanistan. Such a turn of events will almost certainly see resistance at the domestic level to any form of accountability for past crimes committed by the Taliban. Current and future generations of Afghans, particularly Afghan women, are instead likely to suffer widespread and systematic human rights violations. Investigation into alleged war crimes Central to the ICC system of international criminal justice is the complementarity principle. Article 17(1)(a) of the ICC Statute stipulates that a case is...

...Until 2025, it is up to the discretion of Member States, with the political-cultural barriers such discretion entails, to determine whether to extend whistleblower protection beyond the confines prescribed by the Directive. A note on complementarity In its Proposal, the Commission explained that the Directive’s whistleblowing rules “will run parallel to existing protection in the field of other EU legislation: (i) on equal treatment, which provide for protection against victimisation as a reaction to a complaint or to proceedings aimed at enforcing compliance with this principle and (ii) on protection...